Session 10-10 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

Good afternoon, distinguished delegates. The tenth and final meeting of the tenth substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of ICTs is now called to order. We’ll continue our discussion on the topic of regular institutional dialogue, and we will resume with the speakers list. As I indicated, we have about 25 speakers. We’ll start with Lao PDR, to be followed by Singapore. You have the floor, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good afternoon, colleagues. The Lao PDR supports the creation of a robust, inclusive, and transparent future mechanism that will address the growing risks and vulnerabilities in the ICT ecosystem. In this regard, we emphasize that any negotiation on all aspects of the future permanent mechanism should take place within the framework of the OEWG. My delegation underlines the importance of the decision-making process within the future mechanism that is guided by the principle of consensus. We believe that such an approach will ensure that the outcome reflects the diverse realities and needs of all countries, regardless of their size, capacity, and level of technological advancement. We are flexible regarding the arrangement of specific topic discussions and plenary meetings, and we would like to emphasize that any process should not create an additional burden for small states and allow for a well-balanced approach to the discussion. At the same time, we wish to underscore the critical importance of capacity building in narrowing the digital gap. For us, it is crucial to prioritize the implementation of agreed elements that directly foster an environment where all states, particularly small developing countries, can contribute to the ICT security process effectively. Lastly, we call for the establishment of a permanent mechanism that is adaptable, flexible, and responsive to the evolving nature of the ICT challenge. The scope of this mechanism should be comprehensive, enhancing the implementation of agreed components, while also leaving room to address all dimensions of global ICT security, including opening for discussion and elaborating on legally binding arrangements. We recognize the importance of a clear, enforceable instrument that provides a solid framework for international cooperation on addressing ICT security challenges and ensuring the peaceful use of the technology. Thank you.

Thank you very much, PDR, for your contribution. Singapore, to be followed by Vietnam.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. From our perspective, the five proposed thematic groups in the Chair’s latest discussion paper on the Future Permanent Mechanism reflect key cybersecurity issues of interest to small and developing states, including Singapore. It would be useful for these collective conversations to take place at the UN. It is important also that these meetings are held in a format which allows small states with limited resources to participate. We welcome the proposal for each dedicated thematic group to be scheduled sequentially and to meet within the same week. This will reduce the travel required from capital representatives attending the meetings in New York. Chair, we also welcome the recommendation for the thematic group meetings to be conducted in a hybrid format. This will allow other colleagues from capital to participate where relevant and necessary. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Singapore, for your contribution. Vietnam, to be followed by Poland.

Mr. Chair, Vietnam recognizes the critical roles of the Future Mechanisms in promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment. Regarding the structure of the Future Mechanisms, we fully support the Chair’s proposal to organize dedicated thematic groups. We also share the Chair’s approach to discuss international law together with rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behaviors in cyberspace. In our understanding, international law mostly serves as guidelines and framework for state actions in cyber and kinetic worlds, and may come into being by different ways, either in codification of universally adhered norms or development of newly agreed norms. It is really encouraging for this delegation to witness new realities of rule-based cyberspace, where more than 40 individual countries and two biggest regional groups of more than 18 member states have brought forward their understanding of international cyber law. This means the next step of codification is inevitable or even imminent. Further, this delegation believes that the Future Mechanism needs adjustment to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and delivery of the discussion. This may include shortening the duration and frequency of meetings in New York, considering alternative meeting locations outside New York, and also allowing other countries to host intersessionals, or promoting substantive and meaningful engagement of the tech industries. In addition, we recommend enhancing OEWG’s governance structures by appointing Vice Chairs or Rapporteurs to support the Chairs in managing the discussion and fostering consensus. Mr. Chair, regarding multistakeholder participation, we now acknowledge that the indispensable roles of businesses, tech industries, and academia in cybersecurity discussion, in particular private sector engagement, including businesses and technology cooperation with ICT expertise, is essential for risk and threat analysis, implementing norms, CBMs, and providing technical expertise for capacity building. However, we need to emphasize the need for a clearer selection criteria to ensure that entities participating in the Future Dialogue’s mechanisms need to possess the relevant expertise and may contribute in a meaningful way, as well as do not possess national security issues for any UN Member States. Accordingly, the admission of such entities should be based on non-objection principles. We also support the continuous meaningful participation of women in the Future Permanent Mechanism. In this regard, we are pleased to co-sponsor the Working Papers on Genders and the Future Permanent Mechanism, which is co-drafted with Australia, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, and the UK to promote the empowerment of women in cyberspace. I thank you for your attention.

Thank you very much, Vietnam, for your statement. Poland, to be followed by China.

Poland aligns itself with the statement made by the European Union and would like to make some remarks on our national capacity. Mr. Chair, you asked us yesterday to look once more at our statements, to revise our statements, to think about consensus, and it was, I mean, they were very wise words, and I would like to thank you for that. And I recognize that our position is already exactly reflecting what you expect from us. As you explained yesterday, it is good to evolve. We should not be afraid of that, of evolving. And I think that what we propose with our partners, this way forward is towards an evolution of our works in order to be more effective and adapted to the evolution we observe in cyber issues. We fully support an action-oriented approach and thematic groups which will focus on what we identify as our main challenges for the future: resilience, cooperation, and stability. And when I was thinking about what you told us yesterday, actually, I had this image that we need to see the forest behind the trees. And the five pillars we have right now are like the trees; we are looking at them. But maybe the time has come to look at the forest and to look deeper, not only on the surface, but look deeper at what resilience means, how we could be resilient, how we should be resilient, what actually cooperation means. Because when we all participate in all kinds of exercises, you know, cyber exercises and the cooperation, confidence-building measures, they are always behind that. Our cooperation between neighbors, between nations, this goes deeper, this means going deeper. And stability is exactly the same. So those are the real problems that are underneath. And I think that the time has come to not only look at the trees but also at the forest. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Pauline, for your very thoughtful contribution, and I appreciate very much your remarks, which I address, I believe, to everyone, not just to me. Thank you for that. China to be followed by Latvia.

Thank you, Chair. Yesterday, towards the end of the meeting, you suggested that we go back home and rewrite our statements. So, following your suggestion, I did exactly so. However, my progress has been slow so far. I haven’t finished my statement yet. So, without reading my statement, I will try to share China’s views and positions here. Through the discussions today, you said that we can be open-minded. But, to be honest, after coming back to the meeting room with a two-year gap, I believe that the discussions so far have been quite open-minded, quite open, so that many new views and new perspectives were demonstrated, and I find it hard to understand many of them. The topic we’re discussing is the future permanent mechanism. There’s one thing that I wish to put forward. We are not reinventing the wheel. We’re not setting up a new mechanism. We’re not doing so so that you can have blue-sky thinking. Our work is based on something that’s already there. The foundation of the work of the OEWG, it’s a matter of the essence and nature of the OEWG, and this is a question that we need to think about. For everyone to better understand this matter, we can perhaps raise two examples in the field of disarmament. In the context of disarmament, there are two kinds of deliberative or reviewing mechanisms. One good example is the NPT review mechanism. Another example is the POA on small arms and light weapons. These two mechanisms are different from each other, and the difference is not just about their names. The key of their distinction is that the review mechanism of NPT is based on the NPT, the treaty itself. Through this treaty, the international community has established a normative framework. Without the Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear nonproliferation will not become an international consensus. So all the follow-up mechanisms are established based on strengthening this normative framework. When it comes to the POA of small arms and light weapons, it’s a completely different business. The reason why we have the mechanism for small arms and light weapons is because we want to deal with the issue of trafficking and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons. When it comes to this issue, there is strong consensus in the international community. That is, there is no need for a new normative framework to be established. We only need to take concrete measures to realize this goal. That’s all we need to do. Therefore, the follow-up mechanism on small arms and light weapons is called a Program of Action. If we refer to these two mechanisms and if we look at our OEWG, which one is more similar to us? We believe that we’re more closer to the NPT review mechanism instead of the one for small arms and light weapons over the last two decades. Through the efforts of all member states, our biggest achievement in the ICT field is that we’ve started and established a normative framework from scratch. And this framework I’m referring to is the framework for responsible state behavior. Therefore, in this process, we must adhere to this framework and evolve this framework, adapting to the development. This is the task of our OEWG. In our discussions, we talked about new issues and emerging issues, such as AI’s impact on cybersecurity, for example, quantum computing, and its potential consequences and impact. These all demonstrate that in our field, establishing a new normative framework in response to new developments is the core of our work here. We are all talking about the five pillars. However, what are these pillars supposed to do? They’re not the pillars of the OEWG. Instead, they’re the pillars of the framework. So following these five pillars, if we organize our meetings based on these five pillars, that means we’re adhering to the framework. The adjustment of this framework is not a procedural matter. Instead, it’s a substantive matter. Therefore, over the last five years, we’ve discussed these five pillars, but the progress has been slow. That doesn’t mean that we can change these pillars or this framework arbitrarily. I wish to caution everyone that we’ve only been discussing for five years. However, the establishment of this framework that I’m referring to has taken over 20 years for all member states. And maybe we’re not satisfied about the progress of the discussions. Is it because of the agenda or is it because of the difficult geopolitical situation at the moment so that it is difficult for member states to achieve a political consensus? If the latter is the essence of the problem here, how – no matter how you adjust this framework, it won’t change the situation much. Instead, any change to the pillars will undermine the hot one framework. Let’s imagine if we follow some member states’ suggestions if – when we talk about the issue of resilience. After a few years, everybody would forget that the framework that we agreed upon should have been the foundation of our discussions. So when considering how to establish the Permanent Future Mechanism, we must have a clear understanding. We must adhere to the framework. It’s not a procedural matter. We must maintain and safeguard the hot one results. Over the last two decades, China would caution against changing the structure of our discussions. Second, on the establishment of the Permanent Future Mechanism, China has submitted its proposal. We wish to thank the delegation of the Russian Federation for their co-sponsorship, and I’m very happy to hear the support from some delegations for this proposal through our discussions. The table is on – the slide is on screen right now. To save time, I will not go into details. The core to China’s proposal is that we must adhere to the five pillars. Second, based on that, based on the first point, we – when we discuss the five pillars, we can go deeper on the five pillars when having our discussions. Here I wish to remind everyone that according to the third APR, you have clearly mentioned that the matter of establishing thematic groups could be carried over to the permanent mechanism for it to make decisions. This is a consensus that we have reached. So when it comes to the success or not of our July session, the discussion or decision on thematic groups is not a necessity for the July session to succeed. I just wish to remind you of the fact. Although China does not support discussions based on thematic topics, but it doesn’t mean that China has its priorities when it comes to topics such as the topic of data security, such as the topic of supply chain security. We also support the proposal of the Russian Federation on negotiating a legally binding instrument, for example, traceability mechanism. This Monday, we have all seen the intensive debate between the U.S. delegate and myself. Before that, we’ve discussed the possibility of having simulations or scenario-based discussions. The Monday discussion can serve as a good example, a best example. It demonstrates why traceability is so important. I hope that other countries, especially developing countries and small-sized and medium-sized countries, I hope you will not view this debate on Monday as a matter only between China and the U.S. Let’s imagine if you were in the position of China, and one day you’re faced with a major country saying that it has been attacked by you, it has undergone cyber attacks from your country, and that the cyber attacks have surpassed the threshold of military or armed attacks. Thus, it invokes its right to self-defense. Under such circumstances, is the application of the UN Charter in the cyberspace more important, or is the application of the IHL in the cyberspace more important? Do we first need to establish a just traceability mechanism first, or do we adhere to the international principle that a country should be held accountable for its criminal activities or unlawful activities? So when it comes to traceability, it is a very important topic. I’ve shared some of China’s priorities when it comes to the themes in today’s discussion. For China’s proposal of a step-by-step approach, some member states, some delegations have shown their support. The topics that I shared can serve as a menu for a step-by-step approach. If some delegations believe that we can work on some of the topics in the future, I’m ready to have more in-depth exchange with them. Fourth, on NGO participation and the participation mechanism, China believes that the existing mechanism in terms of promoting multistakeholder participation in our discussion is effective. There is no need to change the current mechanism. Due to various reasons, not every NGO will be granted the opportunity to participate automatically, but as the chair shared, over 100 NGOs have participated in our discussions. So we believe that the status quo is satisfying, is good enough. We are an intergovernmental mechanism. When it comes to the matter of participation, over the last five years, government representatives were not able to get visas from the host country, therefore denied the opportunity to participate in our discussions. However, this issue was not given due attention. I feel that when it comes to promoting NGOs’ participation in our discussions, many delegations are very interested. I hope that they would share some of that interest into ensuring the officials of member states can participate in the discussions of OEWG, because the United Nations, after all, is an intergovernmental organization. That’s all. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, China, for your contribution. Is that piece of slide similar to the paper that China had circulated? Thank you. Thank you, China, for your contribution. The slide is on the portal of the OEWG, for everyone’s information. China, to be followed by Latvia. Yes, Latvia, to be followed by India.

Thank you, Chair. I’d like to align with the statement of the European Union and would like to make a few remarks in international capacity. Mr. Chair, when it comes to thematic working groups, my delegation supports the working paper on action-oriented thematic groups prepared by France and presented in the December session. Yesterday’s published additional working paper further clarifies the essence of the proposal, and I thank the French delegation for this contribution. Considering resources, both human and financial, of small delegations, thematic groups should be organized in a hybrid format, especially as thematic groups would deal with cross-cutting issues. Experts from different institutions, for instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, National Cyber Security Center or CSIRT, and different departments, legal or those responsible for developmental or policy issues, would ideally be involved in discussions. A hybrid format would allow inclusive participation. When these thematic groups should take place, if the plan is to meet in New York, I would say that when hotel prices in New York are reasonable, like this week—in December, prices were four or five times higher. As I mentioned yesterday, the question of capacity building, both identification of needs and sharing of best practices, should be an integral part of all thematic groups. A UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR, if established, could become a vehicle for the delivery of capacity building and training. When it comes to multistakeholder participation modalities, Mr. Chair, the Latin delegation co-sponsored the Canadian and Chilean paper on practical modalities of enabling meaningful stakeholder participation. Non-governmental stakeholders are vital partners and should be involved in the discussions on cyber issues at the UN level. As they are first responders to cyber incidents and attacks, they have unique knowledge and expertise on cyber threats, for example. At the same time, we fully adhere to the principle, a voice, but not a vote. And finally, Mr. Chair, I have a question for you. Have you thought about the name for your and our common baby? I’m not sure that the name permanent mechanism is in the calendar of celebrated names. Would you choose PUA? In any case, this delegation believes in the Chair’s natural human intelligence and rich diplomatic experience to steer this process to a consensual outcome in July. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Latvia. I think we need to ensure the safe delivery of the baby before we contemplate naming ceremonies or baptism. So I’m still deep in prayer. Do join me if you believe in higher beings who have a bearing on the affairs of men and women. So let’s go on with the speaker’s list. Thank you very much, Latvia, for your contribution. India, to be followed by Sierra Leone.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Regular institutional dialogue on ICT security remains a key topic, particularly as we approach the final phase of the work of the OEWG. It is our fervent hope that any successor process will allow for Member States to engage constructively with colleagues, leveraging our collective cybersecurity experiences in an inclusive format. We must work to prevent fragmentations, exacerbating trust deficits, which could potentially unravel the hard-won consensus on the cumulative normative framework. As we work to realize a single-track, inclusive, and State-led permanent mechanism, we thank the Chair for preparing a discussion paper that we can both work with and work on. Mr. Chair, allow me to submit four brief comments on the said paper. Number one, stakeholders accredited on a non-objection basis are proposed to be valid for a duration of a five-year cycle of the permanent mechanism. We propose having in place a provision to review the status post-accreditation should the need to do so arise for any Member State. Also, reputable stakeholders with credible track records should be considered. Number two, on the point of dedicated thematic groups, we request reconsideration on whether there is a need for maintaining three separate groups on building resilience of the ICT ecosystem, on increasing stability in the ICT sphere, and enhancing cooperation through CBMs. While their subject matter differs, this does not necessarily warrant three separate groups and may be merged, considering especially the cross-cutting nature of CBMs. This could provide more space and time for discussing matters of greater critical importance. Number three, considering the fast-paced developments of digital technology and rapidly evolving challenges, we welcome the convening of additional ad hoc thematic groups when required by the Chair to engage in focused discussions on specific issues. However, we propose that such a convening should be done only after securing consensus from all Member States. And number four, we recognize that due regard needs to be given, among other things, to the resource constraints faced by several countries. In this regard, we support a dedicated thematic group on capacity building for discussing this and similar issues. Mr. Chair, we have been examining various statements from Member States outlining their conception of a mechanism to succeed the current OEWG. We note that the convergences by far outnumber the points of divergence. There are enough common elements of such a mechanism on which consensus exists, and that provides the OEWG a stable platform on which to conceptualize, and now we must proceed to build a mechanism that would find broad agreement among countries. We would like to reiterate that any such future permanent mechanism should be State-led and inclusive. It must be transparent and consensus-driven, with a clear decision-making role for governments and one that provides equal opportunity for participation to all Member States. Mr. Chair, India remains committed to supporting the Chair’s efforts as well as engaging constructively with Member States in taking the discussions on the regular institutional dialogue forward. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, India. Sierra Leone to be followed by Germany.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, since this is the first time we’ve taken the floor, we just want to commend you for the remarkable work you’ve done in chairing this group. You’ve used humour, you’ve used admonishment, and now we hear you’ve been praying. So we join you in praying that this is, in July, we’ll all be very happy and be grateful to God for answering our prayers. Mr. Chair, I’d like to align our statement with that of the African Union, as well as make the following brief remarks. Mr. Chair, the rapid evolution of ICTs brings significant challenges, particularly for developing countries like Sierra Leone, which face the challenge of limited resources, capacity gaps, and also heightened vulnerabilities. Sierra Leone supports the development of the Future Permanent Mechanism under the United Nations and emphasizes that the process must remain a state-led initiative, providing a dedicated and accountable platform for governments to engage in meaningful dialogue and collaboration on ICT security in the context of international security. Mr. Chair, the Sierra Leone Government’s vision on cyber security is to create a secure, stable, credible, and trustworthy environment for the use of ICTs, while empowering our citizens to use the internet safely for the nation’s socio-economic development. To achieve this vision, our national cyber security strategy identifies critical strategic goals and objectives that align with the 2024 APR, which itself outlines the thematic development of the OEWG framework that is currently under discussion. Namely, create an institutional, legal, and regulatory framework for effective governance, protect critical digital infrastructure through response readiness, promote public education, awareness, online child protection rights, and the privacy of citizens, develop cyber capabilities to support national security objectives, strengthen national, regional, and international cooperation. We believe that these development benchmarks enhance the scope of our cyber security strategy and align with the establishment of a future Permanent Mechanism, a necessary step to address some of the challenges affecting the protection, strengthening, and effective adoption of global cyber security norms, especially in countries with underdeveloped cyber security infrastructure. It is essential for the FPM to be open to all Member States, ensuring that the perspectives of developing countries are fully represented. Sierra Leone recognizes that some delegations face significant challenges in attending thematic group meetings and other deliberations due to financial constraints. To address this, we support the allocation of funding and capacity building resources to enable the effective participation of such States in global issues affecting threats to international security through the use of cyber activities. Such support would enhance diversity, foster meaningful engagement, and ensure that no State is left behind in the global dialogue. We further underscore the importance of integrating regional perspectives and engaging multistakeholder groups. The African Union has proven to be an essential partner in recognizing and addressing ICT security challenges in a context-specific manner. Similarly, the inclusion of stakeholders such as the private sector, academia, and technical experts will enrich the mechanism by bringing diverse expertise and innovative solutions. Mr. Chair, for Sierra Leone and other developing States that are disproportionately vulnerable to ICT-related threats, the FPM offers an opportunity to bridge these gaps by fostering capacity building, information sharing, and enhanced cooperation tailored to the agenda of developing State institutions. Finally, Mr. Chair, we emphasize the need for a clear and robust mandate for the FPM with priorities that include advancing adherence to agreed norms, fostering confidence-building measures, and promoting capacity building initiatives and, of course, adherence to international laws. Finally, Sierra Leone reiterates its strong commitment to this process and stands ready to work collaboratively with the African Union and all stakeholders, including others in this room, to build an inclusive, secure, and sustainable ICT environment for everyone. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Sierra Leone, for your contribution. Thank you also for the gift of a new acronym. You’ve given us FBM. First time I’m hearing that, so we now have the OEWG and the POA and the FBM. RID, of course. I hope that doesn’t mean we are getting rid of what we need to do, but we have a lot of work cut out ahead of us. Germany, to be followed by Finland.

Thank you, Chair. I would first like to align with the statement of the European Union and make the following remarks in our national capacity. Throughout the week, we have heard different views from delegations on how to organize the future mechanism. Germany supports the Program of Action proposal made by France with its cross-cutting, policy-oriented, dedicated thematic working groups. For us, the exact number of groups is not decisive, but as, for example, Mexico, Morocco, and Tonga highlighted, we also believe that we should keep the workload manageable so all delegations and all countries can meaningfully participate. One common element Germany recognizes is that many states, actually including Germany itself, want to preserve the framework and keep the pillars of the framework at the core of the future mechanism in a balanced way. In our view, that is exactly what the POA offers. For Germany, cross-cutting does not mean everything, everywhere, all at once, but to apply each pillar to concrete challenges we all face. A cross-cutting approach for the working groups would advance the cyber-key at a global level by addressing a policy challenge from different angles, would go deeper on each pillar in a balanced way, and then would feed it back into the plenary, which is structured the same way as today’s OEWG. So from our point of view, we would reinforce and consolidate the framework. In addition, as indicated by you, Chair, yesterday, we also do not see the pillar and cross-cutting approach as binary options. They are both part of our mandate and would be mutually reinforcing, and both would be an integral part of the POA. We have been listening carefully to the points many delegations raised during this week and heard that two topics were repeatedly stressed, namely how this would address international law and capacity building. From our point of view, international law should not be artificially separated from practical discussions on cybersecurity policy challenges, as it is the basis of all state conduct, both offline and online. In our understanding, international law, of course, is relevant to several thematic areas. For example, in a dedicated thematic group on enhancing cooperation in the management of ICT-related incidents, international law, including the law of state responsibility, is essential when considering how to effectively respond to a malicious cyber activity. A dedicated thematic group on preventing conflict and increasing stability would also need to consider the international legal framework that governs conduct of states in times of interstate tensions, including the use of peaceful settlements and disputes mechanisms under the UN Charter. On capacity building, Germany believes that cross-cutting policy-issue-focused working groups would identify needs for capacity building when discussing how to manage ICT incidents or resilience of critical infrastructures. Therefore, the cross-cutting groups and the future portal proposed by India could be natural places to address these identified needs. Another option could be to upgrade the status of the roundtable to an annual or biannual meeting where the identified needs from the working groups are discussed in greater detail and with the participation of practitioners from government and specialized stakeholders all in one place. We are looking forward to hearing other states’ views on this as well as on the proposal for a fund. Here, we were closely following the discussion yesterday with regard to the need for a clear scope and the need to avoid duplications. For us, it’s key that Germany and the other states we do capacity building for all get the most out of each euro we spend. Lastly, I would like to share our views on stakeholder modalities. There seems to be a common understanding the future mechanism will be a state-led process. At the same time, we must also recognize that cyberspace does not exist without stakeholders and as states, we need to hear from them. The status quo of stakeholder modalities does not adequately reflect the relevance of stakeholders. Germany believes that we need to involve stakeholders in a structured way across all the different meeting formats of the future mechanism, including in the dedicated kinetic working groups. Secondly, many states have expressed their frustration about the de facto veto power against stakeholders during the December session. Germany therefore supports the working paper by Canada and Chile that makes constructive proposals while moving beyond the status quo. Chair, a meltdown is not only about running, but a shared struggle and collective achievement. We are entering the painful final stretch, which we know is rather about the mindset, not only about who has the strongest legs. No state can muscle their way to a consensus, and Germany stands ready to put our mind to the question, how can we get both a good result and everyone across the finish line? We thank you, your team, and the Secretariat for your work and dedication and look forward to engaging in our joint effort. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Germany, for your contribution. Finland to be followed by Vanuatu.

Thank you, Chair. Finland aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and wishes to make three additional remarks in its national capacity. Firstly, we need a future permanent mechanism that’s inclusive, open, and transparent and contributes to the engagement of all relevant actors. The engagement of stakeholders is essential for states to implement their commitments under the framework, and the stakeholders themselves have a responsibility to use ICTs in a manner that does not endanger international peace and security. Finland fully supports the non-paper on the practical modalities to enable meaningful stakeholder participation in the future permanent mechanism published by Canada and Chile. There’s broad cross-regional support for improving the existing modalities. Secondly, we need to recognize the significant progress that has been made in our discussions about international law, including international humanitarian law, during the OEWG. As has been affirmed by the previous OEWG and endorsed by the General Assembly, international law, including the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace. Therefore, the modalities of the future POA should reflect this. It’s essential to enable in-depth discussions to continue and to ensure broad participation of states and other stakeholders in the conversations on how international law applies in cyberspace. Finland would wish for such dedicated discussions to continue in the framework of the future mechanism by including a standing point on international law in each of the three thematic working groups proposed in the POA. Thirdly, in order to build on the progress made by the OEWG regarding gender and to further advance existing UN commitments on gender equality, it’s imperative that the future POA continues promoting gender equality and building gender-responsive approaches to cybersecurity. Progress has been made in women’s meaningful participation during the OEWG’s mandate, but there’s a substantial amount of work ahead in order to make a lasting impact. We fully support the non-paper by the UK, Australia, Chile, Colombia, and Fiji on gender on the future permanent mechanism. As the last remark, Finland wants to emphasize that the final report should include enough detail on the future permanent mechanism. As we are now entering the final stretch of the OEWG, it’s important that we commit to working together to ensure the continuation of the good work already done. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Finland. Vanuatu, to be followed by Argentina.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. One of these is fully aligned with the Pacific Islands Forum Statement delivered by Tonga, and we wish to add the following in our national capacity. Chair, my delegation welcomes your discussion paper on regular institutional dialogue and appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the elements outlined within it. It is crucial that we establish a future mechanism that is inclusive, action-oriented, and responsive to the evolving cybersecurity landscape. The future mechanism must be structured in a way that enables full participation by all states, particularly small island developing states, and ensures that their cybersecurity needs are adequately reflected. On thematic groups, we have been of the position that, given the importance of capacity building to keeping cyberspace safe for not only our citizens, but those around the world, it should enjoy dedicated focus and stand on its own as a thematic group under the new mechanism. We’d like to recall the third APR, which states that, and I quote, capacity building efforts need to be accelerated and constitutes one of the key functions of the future permanent mechanism in order to bridge the digital divides and ensure that all states can safely and securely seize the benefits of digital technologies. End of quote. Chair, having listened to the positions in the room and in the spirit of compromise, we are happy to support the proposal put forward by France. However, to ensure that the mechanism is fit for purpose, we insist that in the design of the future mechanism, it is stipulated that capacity building should be a standing agenda item under every thematic group. Furthermore, my delegation supports hybrid meeting modalities to facilitate broad participation, recognizing the logistical and financial constraints faced by smaller states. At the same time, we are concerned about time zone implications and would regret a situation whereby, forevermore, most of us in the Pacific time zones are allocated to midnight meetings. Chair, my delegation also acknowledges the valuable contributions that non-governmental stakeholders, including civil society, academia, and the private sector can make to international cybersecurity discussions. We see merit in the Canada-Chile proposal on stakeholder inclusion, particularly its voice, not a vote approach, which allows for expert contributions without undermining the intergovernmental nature of the process. A structured and transparent accreditation system that prevents arbitrary exclusions while ensuring that discussions remain state-led would be a welcome improvement. Finally, we stress that a permanent mechanism must be sustainably funded. Many developing states struggle to meaningfully engage in international cybersecurity discussions due to resource constraints. The future mechanism must include financial provisions such as dedicated funds or sponsorship programs to ensure that all states, not just the wealthiest, can participate fully. Without sustainable funding, inclusivity risks becoming an aspiration rather than a reality. Chair, my delegation looks forward to further discussions on this issue and remains committed to shaping a future mechanism that is inclusive, effective, and responsive to the needs of all states. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Vanuatu. Argentina, followed by Switzerland.

Thank you very much, Chairman. First and foremost, we would like to express our gratitude to you for your commendable efforts to seek points of convergence that will enable this working group to reach a consensus agreement within less than five months on the various aspects of the future permanent mechanism. We believe that your proposal of January 27th is a solid and balanced foundation upon which we can move towards the construction of a consensus-based document. In the interest of time, with the aim of contributing meaningfully to this debate, my statement will focus on the following three points. One, dedicated thematic groups. This is the first one. Like others, we are concerned that the establishment of five groups may place an excessive burden on medium-sized or small delegations. We believe that it would be more appropriate to limit the number of thematic groups to a maximum of three. Regarding the topics, we understand the concern of several delegations to avoid a repetition of the same structure of this open-ended working group. We are convinced that we can reach a middle ground solution that allows us to transition towards an action-focused format while continuing to address issues of particular relevance for countries that are still in the early stages of cyber-resilience. As proposed in the working document jointly developed with 15 Latin American and Caribbean states that were circulated on January 6th and opened for co-sponsorship, we believe that it’s essential to make sure that one of these three groups be dedicated to capacity building. On this, and in line with the distinguished delegation of El Salvador, we remain flexible regarding the naming of this group. Chairman, the working document that we drafted alongside another 14 other Latin American countries highlights the broad range of critical issues that must be addressed in the area of capacity building. My delegation believes that this thematic group could also look at the reports of the Secretariat on capacity building projects to be implemented through the UN Voluntary Contributions Fund and to analyze measures to enhance the efficiency and agility of this fund. We recognize that the Voluntary Contributions Fund, like any tool, can be perfected with time. In this regard, we believe that a dedicated thematic group on capacity building would serve as the right forum to monitor and to promote the gradual enhancement of its operation, and this in close collaboration with the Secretariat. While we do see value in the biannual capacity building roundtable, we see that it’s an important platform. We believe that, given its format and objectives, it cannot serve as an adequate substitute for a dedicated thematic group on this issue. In practice, a thematic group will enable us to constantly follow up progress and identify challenges and strategies where necessary, and these are advantages that it’s very difficult to provide with a roundtable. If our goal really is to ensure dynamic and comprehensive feedback and cross-fertilization between the various substantive themes of the future mechanism relating to capacity building to the roundtable, this would end up isolating this issue from the rest of the substantive discussions. Now, on the working modalities of the mechanism, number two now, we believe that the structure of the mechanism should be simple. It also needs to incorporate tools for its progressive refinement in response to emerging needs. A straightforward structure will provide all delegations with a clear and comprehensive understanding of how the mechanism will function from its early years of implementation. We appreciate that your proposal adheres to this principle of simplicity, Chairman. In our view, we could start by establishing three thematic groups with concrete agendas, mainly technical in nature, with a clear mandate to formulate action-focused recommendations for consideration by the plenary. The plenary would be responsible for approving these recommendations and preparing a document for submission to the first committee. Likewise, during the plenary, applications would be announced and the chairs and coordinators or facilitators of the thematic groups would then be elected, while ensuring equitable geographical distribution. If over the course of the first four years states determined that additional groups or structures are required, the plenary could duly develop proposals for consideration at the review conference. Regarding the hybrid modalities now, we believe that this proposal requires more detailed analysis, since it could present significant challenges, in particular for developing countries that have a significant time difference compared to New York that are in faraway time zones. As the distinguished delegations of Thailand and Vanuatu have noted, these difficulties could hinder the effective participation of many delegations. At a first glance, we do not think it’s obvious that a hybrid format would necessarily promote greater inclusivity. We believe that a more efficient allocation of resources, particularly through contributions to the UN Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, would offer up a more effective solution to achieve better inclusivity. Furthermore, in-person participation in New York provides undeniable advantages for delegates, allowing them to engage in informal meetings and consultations that take place outside this room. Some middle ground could be to consider a purely virtual format for specific issues only, and certain technical presentations also that are not linked to decision making. This would allow for a significant reduction in conference service costs, while also identifying a time slot that is convenient for all regions. Now, our third point, participation of multiple stakeholders. My delegation strongly supports the meaningful participation by stakeholders in the Future Mechanism. In particular, we recognize that the private sector, as an operator of critical infrastructures and a provider of cloud-based services, can offer substantial contributions to all issues to be addressed in this forum. We appreciate and take note of the revised version of the document presented by Canada and Chile on this topic, and we agree with the Chair’s document that the participation of stakeholders must be strictly consultative, aimed at providing technical, specialized, and non-politicized inputs that are directly relevant to the specific issues under consideration in each meeting. A possible compromise solution to ensure their constructive participation could involve combining elements of formal and informal meetings within the thematic groups. In the Chair’s proposal, it is suggested that the thematic groups meet at least twice a year. Perhaps the first annual session of each group could adopt an informal format, fostering open and flexible discussions that facilitate the active participation of all stakeholders. The second annual session, on the other hand, could incorporate both informal and formal segments to ensure that the recommendations, work plans, or roadmaps developed during the informal sessions benefit from the necessary official status for submission and consideration to the plenary without objections. This could be a middle ground solution, if you like, that accommodates the concerns raised by various delegations at this debate. Finally, Chair, in the interest of inclusivity, my delegation joins the multiple voices in this room advocating for multilingualism to be upheld, ensuring that documents remain available and that formal and informal discussions are able to take place in all official UN languages is an essential condition for fostering equitable and meaningful participation by all delegations. Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you very much, Argentina, for your contribution. Switzerland, to be followed by Australia.

Thank you, Chair. First, we would like to thank you for the discussion paper. It’s a very valuable basis for our discussions. It will come as no surprise that for Switzerland, the topic of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights, will also be a priority for the Future Permanent Mechanism. The Future Mechanism must enable us to continue discussions on international law and to find a common understanding of its application. This will not always be an easy task. Allow me to give you an example in the area of IHL. In 2003, the ICRC started researching and consulting on the interpretation of IHL with regard to direct participation in hostilities. This term is of great importance, especially for cyberspace, where we see an increasing blurring of the lines between state and non-state actors. Various delegations have pointed this out in the discussions on threats on Monday. In 2003, the ICRC invited experts to a meeting in Geneva to discuss questions like, who is considered a civilian for the purpose of conducting hostilities? What conduct amounts to direct participation in hostilities? Or, what are the precise conditions under which civilians directly participating in hostilities lose their protection against direct attack? I was part of that process, and I still remember how some of us thought that we would need one afternoon for this discussion. Well, in the end, it took us five substantive meetings over a period of five years. Of course, not all issues of international law are as complex and time-consuming. From our point of view, this example shows that discussions about how existing international law is applied in cyberspace need capacities, time, and space. It is necessary to have these discussions to determine whether there are any gaps in the application of existing international law at all before we can discuss how to address potential gaps. It would be the wrong approach to start discussing possible new binding norms before we have had these discussions and reached common understandings. That would be putting the cart before the horse. We would be misallocating valuable resources and time, and we would risk creating contradictory binding rules, which would not lead to more clarity, but to more confusion. Since AI is trendy, I also asked an AI application how we in the Open-Ended Working Group, or the FPM, can make progress on IHL. The application mentioned several key steps: affirmation of applicability of IHL in cyberspace, developing common understandings, enhancing capacities, addressing specific threats, promoting CBMs, and encouraging inclusive dialogue, which we are doing here. By focusing on these areas, we will be able to make significant progress according to the AI. Mr. Chair, the future mechanism for which the Program of Action is the blueprint will allow us to focus on these areas and provide us with the space and mandate to have discussions on international law. The discussions would take place in the plenary and the cross-cutting thematic working groups. And if it would become apparent during these discussions that specific questions of international law require more in-depth discussions and time, an ad hoc group or standing committee could be created, for example, by the plenary. This ad hoc group or committee would discuss specific questions, for example, with the support of legal experts and based on scenarios, and then report back to the plenary or a dedicated thematic working group on the results of the discussions. Such discussions could also take place in a hybrid format and outside of New York. Mr. Chair, we would like to thank the Chinese delegation for their presentation and respond to one point. The Chinese delegate asked whether, in a specific example and situation, it is more important to apply the UN Charter or the principles of IHL. Our answer is clear. Both are equally important and do not exclude each other. They address two different aspects of international law, and we are happy to discuss them further in this group or in the future mechanism. Let me now briefly turn to modalities. Mr. Chair, once again, the participation of several stakeholders has been rejected for this meeting. No single state should have the right to veto the participation of stakeholders to the detriment of other states, even without giving reasons. We accept that states may exercise their sovereign right to refuse the accreditation of one or more actors. However, this should be reasonably justified, with the final decision on participation being left to all states. For this reason, Switzerland, together with many other states, is co-sponsor of the non-papers submitted by Canada and Chile on practical modalities to allow for meaningful stakeholder participation in the future UN mechanism on cybersecurity. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Switzerland, for your contribution. Australia to be followed by Fiji.

Thank you, Chair. Australia aligns with the statement of the Kingdom of Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Island Forum and makes the following remarks in a national capacity. We’ve been discussing future regular institutional dialogue for a very long time, and I can empathize with many of us in the room when it might begin to feel a little bit like Groundhog Day. From here, I have nevertheless found it worthwhile to hear so many countries express their views and their positions, because it’s only when we hear states’ positions that we can understand the interests that form the basis of those positions and identify and extract common interests that are shared by most, if not all, countries. For example, some of the common interests that we have heard on dedicated thematic groups include things like the best use of resources, avoiding excessively burdensome meetings, making sure we have inclusivity of all states and geographic diversity, a dedicated place to have deeper exchanges, basing all of this work upon our existing framework and its implementation, making sure that reporting to plenary is structured around the pillars of our agreed framework, and making sure that those reporting procedures are clear. This is a list upon which we can build, and I am sure that your team’s diligent note-taking has produced a much more comprehensive list of common interests, but I’d like to go into a little bit of detail about a few others. Going deeper on the application of international law to state conduct in cyberspace is a shared interest of everyone in this room, and going back to our agreed aims and objectives, we’ve set out already that we want to design this permanent mechanism in a way that allows discussions to be practical and action-oriented. In Australia’s view, the way to make the international law discussion practical is not to sequester apart the lawyers into their own siloed group but to integrate legal considerations across all our work and all the thematic groups. This can weave our pillars together with cross-cutting discussions and demonstrate how to use international law in a context. It is one tool in a state’s cybersecurity toolkit. It can help states to understand how international law applies to practical challenges and response options or redress available under the law of state responsibility if a state does not comply with its obligations. A cross-cutting structure can assist states to move beyond statements of position and identify the linkages between international law and the other pillars of the framework relevant to specific issues of interest. Other cross-cutting issues, mainstreaming gender across our work and the dedicated thematic groups is another cross-cutting issue that should not be relegated to one single group but that is essential for the effective and sustainable implementation of all the pillars of our framework. And the working paper that was drafted by Chile, Colombia, Fiji, the UK, and Australia and co-sponsored by 31 additional states provides a roadmap for just that. Similarly, it’s been referred to in several Pacific Island Forum statements this week that fostering cybersecurity in the face of climate change is a cross-cutting issue that can affect stability, requires cooperation, and is at the heart of digital resilience for the Pacific region and could be considered across all the dedicated thematic groups. That capacity building is indispensable to all our facets of work to promote peace and stability in cyberspace is also a shared interest. We all want to go deeper on capacity building and work towards practical and effective capacity building outcomes in our future mechanism. The question Australia has from that then is capacity building for what? And the answer that we hear most is that we need capacity building for everything or, as Germany said, everything everywhere all at once. And to turn everything into something that is manageable, that is meaningful, we find most compelling the option of making this a cross-cutting issue to ensure that capacity building is streamlined as a prominent feature across all our dedicated discussions, all of our groups, no matter what the issue being discussed, and then collect the outcomes of these discussions in each thematic group to bring to the plenary discussions. The dedicated thematic groups can dive deeper into issues that are raised during substantive plenary sessions, and the French paper provides an example of what these groups might look like were we to establish three thematic groups based on resilience, cooperation, and stability, which can be restructured should states see value in our first review conference, as we were reminded today. Australia is supportive of this model, and I thank France for providing a clear example because it helps us extract not just states’ positions in response to this example but also identify the shared interests there because we’ve identified a shared interest when it comes to what happens with the results of these thematic groups. Feedback into the plenaries, which is structured the same way as our OEWG is now, with an agenda that follows the pillars of our framework that is identifying emerging threats, how to address them through international law, norms of responsible state behavior, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. We all have a shared interest in protecting and nurturing our agreed framework of responsible state behavior, and I hope that we would all defend it should it come under threat. Finally, we have a shared interest in giving stakeholders a voice. I acknowledge that there are many different perspectives and positions about what this should look like in practice. As RSIS said during our stakeholder session yesterday, stakeholders have been actively working to advance the framework of responsible state behavior throughout this process. They’ve produced visible outcomes in all discussion areas, and safeguarding a holistic stakeholder participation in our new mechanism can prevent the work of the process that we are trying, spending so much time building, from falling into a diplomatic silo or, worse, obsolescence. Australia doesn’t believe that the status quo of the OEWG will support meaningful stakeholder engagement because the status quo is excluding essential voices from our discussion. The informal workaround for some of us here, which has been to add some vetoed stakeholders to our national delegations, is not a practice that we should be promoting or permanently cementing. That’s why Australia has co-sponsored the paper drafted by Chile and Canada because we consider this sets out a better way to ensure that the decisions that are made by states by consensus in our future mechanism are informed by the best evidence and the most up-to-date reporting. To close, new ideas and change can be scary, but we have a good track record in this group of working through that change and that change management. We’ve set up a capacity building roundtable, we’ve set up a point of contacts directory, we’ve agreed CBMs, and we’re working on a new norms implementation checklist. The diversity of viewpoints that we’ve had through all of that hasn’t meant that we can’t be creative and hasn’t meant that we haven’t found solutions. I think we need to find a balance between our fear of change that comes from a different perspective in the way that we’re looking at these new thematic groups with the comfort of familiarity as all our plenaries follow our existing structure and the pillars of our framework. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Australia, for your contribution. Fiji, to be followed by Ghana.

Thank you, Chair. Bulawanaka Chair and dear colleagues and friends, Fiji aligns firstly with the statement delivered this morning by the Kingdom of Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Island Forum members and delivers the following remarks in our national capacity. Chair, Fiji refers to Annex C of our third annual progress report and thanks you for your discussion paper in Annex C of your 27th letter on the permanent mechanism to advance responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs, which Fiji has found valuable. Fiji supports the guiding principles outlined in paragraphs three to seven of Annex C of your letter. Chair, given the recommended next steps in our third annual progress report, which is to continue discussions on the most effective format of stakeholder modalities and dedicated thematic working groups, Fiji thanks the states that have put forward proposals on these two components, and we will continue to study these closely. We’d like to share a number of preliminary observations, and we look forward to further discussions on these matters. With regards to the thematic working groups, Fiji welcomes the France proposal, which is gaining support by a large number of delegations, and we’re closely studying it. Chair, we’re flexible in the number of thematic groups as long as it does not overburden smaller delegations and is streamlined, and this has also been mentioned by a number of delegations, and for virtual meetings to account for diverse time zones. In addition to international law being a cross-cutting pillar, we would like to propose three additional key components as we see should be applied across all thematic groups and to be given top priority. Firstly, Fiji recognizes that in order for our permanent mechanism to work, it needs to be action-oriented, and so capacity building is crucial, and it needs to be prioritized across the thematic groups to enable all states to be in a position to develop and operationalize the commitments that we’re making as a group. Secondly, noting the great progress that we have made regarding gender mainstreaming in our work, we look forward to ensuring that this is strengthened in our future work, and we’d like to refer to the cross-regional group paper on gender, which Fiji is a part of, and we look forward to language in our cross-regional paper being reflected in the zero draft of our final report. And thirdly, Chair, over the course of our work, we have not only heard about the compounded crises faced by states and the inherent vulnerabilities of small island developing states, but the intersection between climate change and how it amplifies existing and potential threats for states and the criticality for climate-resilient critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, and this has also been raised by the distinguished colleague from Australia, and we look forward to further discussions in this regard. Chair, Fiji proposes for discussions in the permanent mechanism to also include designation of critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure and not just on the protection of critical infrastructure, as not all states have undergone designation and noting the possibility of new designations given new and emerging technologies and sectors. Fiji notes that this is already captured in our third annual progress report, and we look forward to further discussions as we embed resilience in our national and regional developments. With regard to stakeholder participation, Fiji notes with appreciation the Chair’s discussion paper and the paper by Chile and Canada supported by a number of states. Fiji strongly supports the meaningful and inclusive participation of multistakeholders, which will not only enrich our discussions but will enable member states, particularly from developing states, to have access to such research and technical expertise and tailored briefings and discussions. In conclusion, Chair, Fiji remains committed to forging consensus on reaching our collective goal, and on a personal note, Chair, we also wish all delegations safe travels back home.

Thank you very much, Fiji. Safe travels indeed, but not yet. Ghana, to be followed by Colombia.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the floor. Ghana aligns with the African Group’s statements on regular institutional dialogue. We wish to make the following remarks in our national capacity. We acknowledge your continued efforts, Chair, in shaping the framework for a structured institutional dialogue on ICT security. We recognize that this is no small undertaking, and we appreciate your commitment to promoting inclusivity and fostering meaningful discussions. Mr. Chair, we believe that a seamless transition from the OEWG to the Future Permanence Mechanism is crucial. Therefore, Ghana supports the proposal that the Future Mechanism fully inherits the mandate of the existing OEWG to ensure continuity and stability in our collective approach to cybersecurity challenges. On stakeholder modalities, Ghana continues to support the participation of relevant stakeholders in addressing cybersecurity-related issues. We firmly believe that stakeholder participation modalities should not become a subject of disputation, as this would unnecessarily detract from the substantive matters that we as Member States are required to discuss. For this reason, we support the application of the current modalities from the OEWG process, agreed upon after extensive discussions, to the Future Mechanism, and we also recognize the importance of continuing discussions on potential options to further enhance stakeholder participation in our future proceedings to ensure inclusivity and effectiveness. In that regard, we welcome the provision to invite stakeholders with relevant expertise to apply for accreditation, broadening participation, especially from non-governmental institutions in the Global South. We also support provisions that ensure the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders, particularly from developing countries, through sponsorship programs that promote inclusivity. And in this regard, we support Brazil’s proposal to include such provisions under the proposed Voluntary Fund. This approach would ensure diverse perspectives, enriching our discussions. We encourage the Judiciary’s use of the Non-Objection Mechanism to ensure that all voices are heard and valued in these important discussions. Mr. Chair, regarding the dedicated thematic groups, Ghana believes that the three thematic groups suggested by the African Group are both feasible and essential, especially for smaller delegations like ours, given the interconnected nature of the issues discussed under the current OEWG. We suggest that guiding questions, as currently utilized by the Chair, would help stimulate important discussions on other relevant and related topics under the dedicated thematic groups. To enhance the effectiveness of the framework, we propose clarifying the role of thematic groups, and in addition to the guiding questions, we recommend that each group have clearly defined mandates and deliverables to ensure the production of actionable recommendations. A review mechanism should also be implemented to assess the effectiveness of the work during the review conference. To keep pace with the rapid evolution of technology and the continuous emergence of new cybersecurity risks, we propose that the first review conference of the Permanent Mechanism take place after four years, as a trial period. During this, Member States could decide whether to extend the review cycle to five or six years, based on the results and evolving needs. Mr. Chair, Ghana further supports the proposal on the appointment of co-facilitators for each dedicated thematic group for a duration of two years. This would provide an opportunity for focused, in-depth, and continuous discussions on key thematic areas, ensuring that we build on concrete, actionable initiatives that address existing gaps. Moreover, Ghana appreciates that many proposals suggest scheduling meetings of the thematic groups sequentially, as that would help prevent smaller delegations from being overburdened by overlapping processes. To further enhance this, we propose a hybrid approach that would enable broader and more active participation from all States. We remain committed and flexible in supporting the development of a robust, inclusive, and action-oriented future Permanent Mechanism. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Ghana, for your contribution. Colombia to be followed by Ireland.

Thank you, Mr. President. We hope that technical experts and other stakeholders, in addition to participating in the review conferences and other events, will also be able to participate in an advisory role in the thematic groups to be defined. As was underscored in the working document co-sponsored by a group of delegations, including Colombia, bearing in mind the interconnected nature of cyberspace, and for multiple stakeholders to be part of this as operators, users, and owners, it’s important for them to be involved in the action-focused thematic groups. Furthermore, when it comes to practical modalities for participation, my delegation believes that the proposal put forward by Canada and Chile lays the foundations for a transparent, inclusive, and practical process. Now, as regards thematic groups, we reiterate our willingness to seek agreement and to move forward with understanding and pragmatic, comprehensive solutions with an action-focused process that is cross-cutting. As we’ve underscored, we believe that it would be beneficial to include the three permanent thematic groups dealing with existing and potential threats, the application of IHL to cyberspace, and the third group on capacity building. We underscore the fact that this proposal is in line with the one mentioned by several regional groups yesterday and today. We believe that these groups should have a permanent nature due to the fact that the topics they deal with evolve a lot. It’s true that threats continue to change and evolve, and security in cyberspace will continue to be an issue, and it’s necessary to work on common understandings. Also, the creation of this group will enable us to update the UN structure on current topics. So when it comes to capacity building, it’s essential for this to evolve in line with the different trends here. It’s also important to have different spaces and technical resources to ensure that the different experts from ministries, lawyers, and other relevant stakeholders can participate, especially from smaller delegations where the specialized resources can be limited and for whom it’s difficult to justify the participation in fora that are not under their strict competence. Now, when it comes to ensuring that the mechanism has sufficient flexibility to constantly tailor its actions to changes in ICTs, it would be good to have three fixed groups and one ad hoc group that would change topic every two years and would report back to states in the plenary meeting. This is contained in one of the working documents. Now, in complement to point eight of the working documents, in order to ensure transparency and discussion and coherence between discussions in the different groups in the plenary and the specific groups dealing with cross-cutting issues, it would be good to provide information like plans of action back to the plenary. In the plenary meeting, we would discuss and adopt these different plans that would include regional, national, and global action plans that could be of a biennial duration so that we can look at and assess the progress of different states and the plans adopted and implemented during each biennium. Chairman, finally, as this working group has very well underscored, one of the great achievements has been the broad participation of delegates in the different meetings and the prominence of the gender perspective in discussions. It’s important that the future mechanism continues this work to reduce the gender digital gap and to promote the full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership of women in the decision-making processes linked to the use of ICTs in the context of international security. In this regard, the gender document and the future mechanism presented by several delegations, including Colombia, contains options on how to integrate this issue. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Colombia. Ireland to be followed by Qatar.

Thank you, Chair. To begin, Ireland aligns with the statement delivered by the European Union, and I would like to proceed now with some additional remarks in my national capacity. Chair, firstly, I would like to thank you for the discussion paper on modalities for the Future Permanent Mechanism, or FPM. As we approach the end of the mandate of the OEWG, the establishment of a single-track permanent future mechanism, under the UN auspices, that is inclusive, action-oriented, and based on the UN normative framework, must be our priority. It is telling that states’ contributions this week have all, in one way or another, discussed that future permanent mechanism. As we make efforts to find a formulation of what that future permanent mechanism should look like, we would like to stress that a consensus outcome should reflect two elements. Firstly, the relative support of the proposals that have been tabled, and secondly, the realistic potential of those proposals to solve the very real problems that we all share. We cannot afford to discuss issues under rubrics that are out of date and no longer reflect the cross-cutting nature of our contemporary concerns. Let me, therefore, outline the proposals which Ireland has seen garner the most support and would have the greatest impact. Firstly, on stakeholder participation, and then on structure. On stakeholder participation, my delegation believes that stakeholders are particularly well-placed to enhance situational awareness, and also to input their learnings and insights into this process. Their input is particularly valuable on threats, where they can enhance our understanding, knowledge, and information of the cybersecurity challenges related to critical infrastructure, new and emerging technologies such as quantum and artificial intelligence. Therefore, inclusive participation is essential to the success in this regard. We support the Chair’s proposal for accreditation and review. However, the existing single-state veto of stakeholders is hampering this success. The exclusion of stakeholders, or their inclusion on the basis of a voice and not a vote, should be decided by majority consensus in the future permanent mechanism. On structure, particularly on the format of dedicated thematic groups, Ireland supports the cross-cutting structure as outlined in the Program of Action Support, that is, three dedicated thematic groups: resilience, cooperation, and stability. This proposal offers the right balance of issues and reduces burden on states. We believe the modalities proposed allow for both focused, results-driven discussions and succinctly facilitate discussions on cross-cutting issues. We support its state-driven approach while allowing for meaningful participation of stakeholder voices. Reflecting on the discussions this week, we feel it can appropriately absorb and effectively operationalize capacity-building initiatives proposed by this group. Modalities such as hybrid participation and dynamic scheduling for the dedicated thematic groups and capacity-building roundtables should also be considered. This core structure could be elaborated further by a number of capacity-building proposals to enhance its action-oriented manner. An internet portal which acts as a central access point and a knowledge hub, a global POC directory to ensure efficient communication in the event of cyber incidents, an efficient voluntary fund to support gender and regionally valid representation, and a global roundtable for dedicated exchanges on capacity-building. We have listened to colleagues from around this room this week and can relate to many of the desires and concerns. We believe the POA remains the most viable and pragmatic proposal for a future permanent mechanism that can work and evolve for all of us. As a final word, Chair, let me take advantage of my position towards the end of the day to echo something that you have alluded to previously. We have an opportunity to build together a new mechanism for states to address some of the most challenging security issues of our time. This is not something we get to do often, at least not if we do it right the first time. Ireland will continue to approach our shared challenge with honesty, best intention, and in the spirit of cooperation. And as this is the last session of the week, I would like to thank you and your team again, Chair, for convening us here in New York, the Secretariat, the interpreters, and UN staff for enabling our discussions. Go raibh maith agat. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Adnan, for your contribution. Qatar to be followed by Portugal.

Mr. Chair, my delegation would like to reaffirm its support for your effort to make the work of this Open-Ended Working Group a success, and we look forward to the continued discussion that is constructive and fruitful, and to reach a consensus that would meet the aspirations of all delegations during the current and the coming substantive sessions, in preparation for the transition from the OEWG to the Permanent Institutional Dialogue Mechanism in July. We align ourselves with the statement of the group. Mr. Chair, Qatar attaches great importance to issues of cybersecurity and contributing towards a secure and sustainable digital environment through our initiatives with member states and international organizations, to bridge the gap in many countries and areas pertaining to ICT technologies, the most recent of which was the third meeting of the Ministerial Committee of Cybersecurity of the GCC held in Doha in November. We have launched the Goal Strategy for Cybersecurity 2024-2028 during said meeting. Also, we have joined the BOD of OIC-CERT, which is a turning point in the development and interest in international cooperation in the digital and technological security area. At the national level, we have launched the National Framework for Responding to Cyber Incidents on the 18th of the current month, which is one of the strategic national initiatives for cybersecurity 2024-2030, contributing to achieving our 2030 national vision and to becoming one of the frontier countries towards the safe use of current and emerging technologies. As for the paper presented by the Chair on the draft elements pertaining to the mechanism for addressing the stakeholders and the dedicated substantive groups in the future mechanism, we think that this needs to be a comprehensive, flexible, and permanent future mechanism working under the UN and to include stakeholders to benefit from the experience and to take into consideration the geographical diversity, but decision-making needs to be only the purview of the member states. Here, we would like to commend the role of the stakeholders in the future mechanism. Their participation needs to be purely consultative and provide constructive assistance and provide the states with their relevant expertise and information. We support the proposal by Kuwait that was presented last session, which seeks to develop a platform for non-binding rules, principles, and norms for responsible states’ behavior in the use of ICTs that includes capacity building and enhancing confidence among states and implementing the rules that are adopted by the GGE. As for the dedicated thematic groups, we support reducing the number of those groups to avoid duplication in discussions in the future and to also take into consideration that some delegations do not have the manpower to work in a big number, and we need to make sure that everything stays within scope. We support the proposal that the dedicated meetings in the substantive sessions or on their margins so that there would be coordination and this would be in line with the resources of delegations and they all need to be action-oriented and to focus on the challenges facing the member states in the different areas that were proposed during the work of the OEWG, which also includes national strategies, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the threats of emerging technologies including the Internet of Things, cloud computing, and AI, and this would include the outcomes that would be part of the work of the dedicated working group through their sessions. Mr. Chair, in closing, we would like to thank you and thank all the delegations for the efforts made in the previous years. My delegation will continue to support your leadership and the OEWG to reach a consensus to achieve the desired goals. I thank you.

Thank you very much. Pakistan to be followed by Antigua and Barbuda.

Mr. Chairman, Portugal aligns with the EU statement and would like to add some very brief comments on the future of our regular institutional dialogue, which we have agreed should be focused on the implementation of the consensually agreed normative framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Our future dialogue on implementation of the normative framework is thus meant to contribute decisively to upgrade national cyber capabilities across divides, by mobilizing all interested parties, including tech industry companies, and to enable us to move on to a formal system of mutual accountability that will level up all member-state contributions to peace and security in the digital space, so that all of them can peacefully and securely benefit from the digital transition. Thanks to your chairmanship and to extensive engagements by cross-regional groups of member-states in response to your encouragement, the current Open-Ended Working Group has been able to add further layers of understanding on how some of the main elements of the normative framework apply in cyberspace, and I hope that it will continue to do so in its remaining time. The current Open-Ended Working Group has also been able to launch basic tools of communication, such as the Global POC Directory, and to make substantive progress towards harmonizing our language and to set up repositories of best practices in capacity building and incident management. Finally, the current Open-Ended Working Group has been able to show to all of us how we can smoothly move from the traditional pillar-based dialogue to a more action-oriented discussion, structured around priority policy areas and based on a cross-pillar model. In this respect, France’s proposal for a Program of Action, composed of cross-cutting working groups designed to address best legal and technical practices and capacity building in priority policy areas, which would submit recommendations to plenary sessions, has been widely well-received and has the potential to lead us to a consensual final report. Within each period of five years, the chair of the Program of Action should be able to task ad hoc expert groups to discuss and give advice on specific questions in need of further understanding. And the Member States in the review conferences of the Program of Action should of course remain free to, according to their evaluation of the results achieved, revisit the previous cross-cutting working group structure. It goes without saying that non-governmental interested parties to the future Program of Action must be selected in a more equitable and transparent way, so as to avoid that no applicant is consistently vetoed by one single Member State for three and a half consecutive years, as it outrageously happened to a Portuguese non-profit. In the future Program of Action, either the Member State provides for a thorough justification for its opposition to a particular applicant, or a decision should naturally be taken by vote. The transition between the current Open-Ended Working Group and the future permanent mechanism of regular institutional dialogue looks, therefore, promising in our view. And I would like, on behalf of my government, to once again extol, Mr. Chairman, your superior diplomatic talents and engagement. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Portugal, for your contribution. Antigua and Barbuda, to be followed by Peru.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Since this is our first time taking the floor, Antigua and Barbuda commends you and your team for your guidance in this process and assures you of our highest support and cooperation in moving this process to a successful outcome, thereby providing a smooth transition to the next stage. We welcome the opportunity for States to elaborate on the regular institutional dialogue of the future permanent mechanism, particularly the stakeholder modalities and the operation of the dedicated thematic working groups. In demonstrating our commitment to the success of the process, we are pleased to add our voices to the discussion. Antigua and Barbuda has always supported a single-track, action-oriented future permanent mechanism that can play a pivotal role in enhancing global cybersecurity and fostering a safe, secure, stable, and inclusive cyberspace. Chair, we have heard throughout this session of the continued existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security, such as ransomware, sophisticated AI-enabled phishing, attacks on critical infrastructures, and quantum technology that challenge us as States. As we explore possible cooperative measures to prevent and counter these threats, Antigua and Barbuda views the inclusion of this topic in the future permanent mechanism as pivotal. Thus, we see merit in the working paper submitted by Mauritius and are studying it further. We feel that the global POC, the Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal, should be part of the future mechanism. And Chair, we thank the secretariat for the paper presented. Many developing States, including small island developing States, face disproportionate risk due to geographic isolation, limited resources, imported cybersecurity challenges, and reliance on digital infrastructure for economic development and connectivity. The future permanent mechanism should ensure that all States benefit through capacity building, including technical assistance that builds resilience. We see capacity building as cross-cutting across all the pillars of the permanent mechanism, and we welcome the paper from the secretariat and the voluntary fund to support capacity building. We reiterate that in dealing with the issues of cybersecurity to international peace and security, we are as strong as the weakest States among us. Therefore, no State should be left behind in the future permanent mechanism. We continue to study the various proposals with regards to capacity building in the future mechanism. Chair, the inclusion of women in this OEWG process, especially through the Women in Cyber Fellowship, is a confidence and capacity building measure that has borne fruits demonstrated through the invaluable contributions in interventions made by the women in this process. Antigua and Barbuda thanks the sponsors of the WIC fellows and thinks that such an initiative should be part of the future mechanism. We take note of and will study further the paper on gender and the future mechanism put forward by Australia, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, the UK, and co-sponsors. Chair, the ability of the future mechanism to develop practical, relevant, and evidence-based solutions to the challenges to international peace and security in the use of ICTs in cyberspace will require leveraging the expertise and resources of multistakeholders. It is therefore critical that their participation should be structured to ensure meaningful consultation, dialogue, and cooperation while at the same time safeguarding the intergovernmental nature of the process. Furthermore, stakeholders from developing countries should be considered given their unique perspectives of the local or regional landscape. Chair, we thank Canada and Chile for their non-paper and we are reviewing it along with your discussion paper on stakeholder modalities. Chair, for our delegation, like our fellow delegates, failure is not an option in moving to a successful outcome, but we also concur with you that success in July is not guaranteed unless we as member states work for it. Be assured, Chair, that Antigua and Barbuda will do its part. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Antigua and Barbuda, for your contribution. Peru, to be followed by Djibouti, which is the last speaker I have. Muchas gracias, señor Presidente.

Thank you very much, Chairman. First of all, I’d like to congratulate you, sir, upon your excellent stewardship of this meeting. Thank you for all of the work that you’ve undertaken since you took up the chairmanship of this meeting, and for all of the achievements thus far. Secondly, on behalf of my delegation, I wish to express our full support to you, sir, for your work. From the statements that we’ve heard thus far, in particular the statement made by Nicaragua on behalf of a group of countries, it seems clear that there are two different positions on exactly how to approach the future permanent mechanism. Peru thus urges all member states present here to find a way of meeting in the middle, or finding some balance between these two positions. And this could be based on the proposal of the Chair. We fully support the Chair’s proposal. As Mexico said, the new permanent mechanism must not end up the same, or simply be a replica of the current Open-Ended Working Group. Rather, it should seek to evolve so that it can become more hands-on, or as we’re saying here, focused on action, and so that it can achieve the goals that we all aspire to. As regards the letter of the 27th of January that contains the Chair’s proposals on modalities for the participation of stakeholders, and for the thematic groups dedicated to thematic groups rather than the future permanent mechanism, in general, we agree with this proposal. On the participation of stakeholders, we agree on the question of objection to the participation of these stakeholders. So what we mean here is that these objections must be public and well-known to all of the membership in the interest of transparency. We also agree on the importance of having informal negotiations between the different stakeholders, the state that is objecting, the member states, the stakeholder, and the Chair, in order to reach a solution to any given objection. Likewise, we reaffirm the principle that the permanent mechanism is an intergovernmental process where negotiations and decision-making are the exclusive prerogatives of member states only. As regards the five thematic groups proposed, we believe that there could be more synergy between the ones suggested by the Chair. Perhaps we could reach a maximum of four, or perhaps three thematic groups in order to facilitate the work and not overburden delegations. For example, the resilience group, the resilience of ecosystems and critical ICT infrastructure could converge and merge with the prevention of conflicts and increase in stability groups. We believe that the dedicated group on capacity building is important. This is in line with the proposal made by a group of Latin American countries, laid out by Argentina, that seeks to strengthen the consideration of this issue. Because it’s essential, this issue, in order to bridge the gap for developing countries. We support the Latin American proposal that I just mentioned, and the different themes and sub-issues divided into domestic and international policy, response to and management of incidents, as well as proactive practices for cybersecurity. However, we believe that this could be a complementary proposal to the creation of capacity building and that could adopt a cross-cutting approach with other issues, as mentioned by other countries. Chair, to conclude, we hope that this 10th substantive meeting will be productive in order to achieve the final goal, which is the long-awaited permanent mechanism. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Thank you very much for your contribution. Djibouti, you’re the last speaker inscribed.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Chair, dear colleagues, since we are reaching the end of the penultimate session of our Working Group, allow me to once again express to you the sincere congratulations of my delegation on the progress made in this process of ICT security, which is thanks in large part to your efforts, your patience, and your perseverance, Mr. Chair. I would also like to thank your entire team. I would also like to reiterate my delegation’s thanks to the Secretariat and the interpreters. You can rely on the support of our delegation in making a success of this process. Regarding the future permanent mechanism, I would first of all like to congratulate us on the consensus in our Working Group on the establishment of a permanent mechanism within the United Nations on an issue that is so important, the establishment of a safe cyberspace. We hope that a future mechanism could conduct measurable, results-oriented actions. Based on the 10 years of efforts within the UN, the future mechanism on ICT security is going to be born after having been carried for 10 years by us, its parents. That’s 10 times longer than a mother carries a baby. We need to understand the efforts and the energy that have gone into this institutional dialogue, and I’m going to repeat what I said at the side meeting this afternoon. Let’s together make sure that our baby grows up in safety and security by avoiding everything that could stunt its growth. Regarding the different thematic groups of the future mechanism, it would be important to take into account those missions that have smaller delegations, such as ours, as well as the cost of expert participation. In that regard, we support the African position, which is grouping the themes of the future mechanism into three thematic groups. We are open to any proposal relating to those three groups. We recognize and express our sincere gratitude to the stakeholders for enriching our discussions and our shared understanding of cybersecurity, thanks to the research, efforts, and knowledge that they have shared with us throughout this process. We do take into account the disagreements over the modality of stakeholder participation, and my delegation recommends that we allow our mechanism to grow in the safest possible way so that we can conserve consensus and preserve the approach that we have tried and tested thus far. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Djibouti, for your contribution. Is there anyone else who wishes to speak or who wishes to come back and respond to any comments that have been made? Either you have exhausted the topic or you have exhausted yourselves. Okay, so I see no other speakers, and I’m not sure what I can say in terms of a summary. But I want to say that what has encouraged me about this discussion is that there is consensus that we need to strengthen the normative framework that we have painfully built over the last two and a half decades here at the UN. The framework of rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior. And that’s a good starting point for the discussion on regular institutional dialogue and the future permanent mechanism. Second, we have also in Annex C of the Third Annual Progress Report decided on quite a lot of the elements that are needed to make the transition to a future permanent mechanism. That also, I think, is a positive starting point. And we also have decided that it will be a single-track, open-ended process, the future permanent mechanism. And if we want it to be single-track, which is what we have all said we want, then it is important that we begin to merge all our ideas together. But at the same time, I think there is a certain reluctance to let go. Some of you are still talking about the future permanent mechanism as if it will be the OEWG. The future permanent mechanism is not the OEWG. Some of you are also reluctant to let go of the POA. The future permanent mechanism is not the POA. It is a combination of the different ideas and proposals, including the proposal for an OEWG, including the proposal for a Program of Action, that we have all put together. And we haven’t decided what we will call it, but it will be the future permanent mechanism. So this reluctance to let go is what is also causing some of the tension, because some of you would like the future permanent mechanism to be identical to the open-ended working group. Some of you would like the future permanent mechanism to look quite different from the OEWG, as we have functioned. But it is quite clear that the future permanent mechanism will be different. But even if we do things differently, we all agree that the future permanent mechanism must strengthen the normative framework. I think that too is a good starting point for all of us. And so this discussion about pillar versus cross-cutting I feel has been a little overemphasized as if it’s a binary choice. I think there is the possibility of looking at them as mutually reinforcing an iterative process. So the pillar-based discussions contributing to thematic discussions, but thematic discussions not with a view to undermine the pillars or to undermine the normative framework, but to strengthen the normative framework, to strengthen the work that we have done over the last 25 years, including in this working group. So I would urge all of you to keep these broader points in mind. There are some positive elements there, glimmers of hope, that we all agree that the future permanent mechanism and regular institutional dialogue is designed for all of us to come together and to strengthen the framework, build on our achievements. And at the same time, we also acknowledge that the framework is cumulative and evolving, so it has to evolve with the times. And that evolution as to how it evolves, again, has to be a collective endeavor. So if we look at the institutional architecture, I hope that we can keep an open mind, hope you can keep an open mind and not look at it as zero-sum or mutually exclusive, but how we can create a virtuous cycle of discussions that will build on each other, all with the common purpose of strengthening the framework, strengthening the implementation of the normative framework, creating opportunities for partnership and capacity building and confidence building, so the whole range of things. I think in terms of the architecture, we certainly need to look at the number of thematic groups. Quite a number of you said five is too many. It does make sense to have something that is streamlined, but in streamlining it, we have to do it in a way that makes it clear that we are not trying to depart from the pillars of the framework or the framework, but to reinforce the pillars and to implement the framework. So if we have that common understanding, some of the institutional discussion may reduce the levels of anxieties and concerns. So keep that in mind as well. I’ll also give some thought as to how we can, as we try and improve the modalities, how we can provide some of the assurance that may be needed. The assurance to all of you that the institutional architecture is not designed to go back on a parallel track, a two-track process. We have taken a step away from a two-track or multiple-track process and we have converged on a single-track mechanism as a result of the work that we have done. So I think if we stay focused on a single-track consensus-based process that is aimed at strengthening the normative framework, the cumulative and evolving normative framework, and if we have this understanding that whatever we do is not departing or diminishing the importance of the framework, but to strengthen it, then perhaps we can look at some of the options in terms of how we can go deeper into discussions. The other point was about hybrid versus in-person meetings. In December, there was a lot of sense, a lot of calls for hybrid option. At this session, I get the feeling that hybrid option also presents challenges and many of you have identified that. Again, the choice may not be a binary one. We will have to have in-person meetings, not just for the substantive sessions, but also for the thematic sessions. But we may want to keep the virtual option as an option for additional meetings or very detailed meetings. So again, the choice is not binary. Not everything needs to be hybrid, not everything needs to be in-person. So let’s be creative about it. And then finally, we also need to, as one of you put it, we need to create opportunities and spaces for discussions which may be needed. But creating a space for discussion does not mean that we are committing to go in a certain direction. So again, I think we need to reduce the level of anxiety. Some of you may have a concern that if we create a certain space for a certain discussion, then that particular discussion is going to rush ahead and produce an outcome that you don’t like. But the safeguard is that the future permanent mechanism will work and take decisions guided by the principle of consensus. So I think we need to trust each other. Of course, I know that trust is a very scarce commodity at the United Nations, especially these days. But having been in this process for some time, I think the institutional discussion should not be a proxy debate for some of the substantive discussions. We need to have a clear understanding that the institutional discussion is not intended to prejudice the position of anyone. Ultimately, the future permanent mechanism will have to make decisions on substance. And we need an institutional framework that will preserve the positions of every delegation in terms of substance. So that, too, is something that I’ll give some thought to as I work to revise the modalities that I put out earlier in my letter. Let me see what additional points I have. Now, on stakeholders’ discussion, I see that in some ways there’s a more transparent On stakeholders’ discussion, I see that in some ways there’s a more challenging area. So in the area of regular institutional dialogue, I see some glimmers of hope for us to arrive at a set of modalities that will not compromise each of your positions on substance, but give everyone the opportunity to continue your dialogue, your debate, and your differences, or your different points of view, and carry it into the future permanent mechanism. But do keep in mind that we are not going to have a perfect set of modalities in any case for regular institutional dialogue. So that’s why you have the review process. So if you don’t start with a set of modalities now, and you are tempted to postpone it, then you will spend five years on a new set of modalities. You will be spending the future permanent mechanism talking about what should be the shape of the table. And that would not be a productive discussion. So it’s really important that we start with a set of modalities so that we can make the smooth transition, so that we can preserve, strengthen, and continue implementing the normative framework, even as we continue our discussions and debates about how we build on the framework that we already have, and how we add additional layers, how we add new elements, including discussing the possibilities for new norms and new legally binding obligations. So everything will be on the table on the future permanent mechanism in any case. Whatever the institutional design, the issue is going to surface. So you are not going to prevent an issue from coming up in this context or that context by designing the structure a certain way. The issues will be there because the delegations are the same, the country positions will be the same. So in some ways, there are some glimmers of hope for this regular institutional dialogue. I think on stakeholders, it’s a bit more challenging because I don’t see a fundamental shift in positions. There have been some suggestions put forward, and I appreciate that very much. Some papers have been put forward, and I appreciate that very much. But it’s also an issue that has a wider ramification at the UN, because that’s an issue that gets debated in various processes. But the issue is this. In this working group, over the last four or five years, and then the previous open-ended working group for two years, we have evolved a certain way of working and a certain way of understanding. Can we use whatever reservoir of understanding we have built to make some improvements, to make things better, even if the solution is not perfect? So my sense is that the discussions on stakeholders is framed in a more stark and binary way, and the modalities I had put forward in my letter was an attempt to find a way in the middle. But I also have the sense that people from both sides of the aisle didn’t like it very much. So I think we need to be very creative there, and I don’t have too many ideas on that score. Ultimately, it will come back to all of you. So distinguished delegates, those are some thoughts that I wanted to share with you on these very important discussions we have had. About 65 delegations spoke on regular institutional dialogue, I think the largest number for any of the agenda items. But it is really important that we continue this discussion, but we don’t have much time. So for those of you who are searching for perfection, it is going to be difficult to find paradise on earth. We will all need to exercise some flexibility on both sides of the aisle, on all sides, if we want to reach an agreement in July to be adopted by consensus, which in turn is the foundation of the process. For making a smooth transition to a future permanent mechanism. So I think I will stop there, and then move on to the next agenda item, because I know that the hour is late, which is agenda item 6, Other Matters, and I would like to ask if any delegation wishes to take the floor under agenda item 6, Other Matters. Australia, please. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Chair. I’ll be very brief and beg your indulgence on this Friday afternoon because, as usual, the Australian Delegation and the Secretariat have been collecting statistics. There have been so many statements this week that have recognized the importance of gender mainstreaming across our work, so I don’t need to repeat the importance of the contribution of women to this process, but I will read out some numbers. Of the 305 substantive interventions this week, 169 of them were delivered by women. That equals 55%. Breaking that down, we had 55% of threats interventions delivered by women, 62% of norms interventions, 54% of international law interventions, 57% of interventions on CBMs, 56% of capacity building interventions, and just over the line, 51% of regular institutional dialogue interventions. Well done, everybody, thank you so much.

Thank you very much, Australia, for keeping account of this important issue. I’m, of course, gratified that we have so many representatives, women representatives, women leaders who are here from many parts of the world, and I think they really enrich our contributions. And I also count on them and all of you to bring our work forward in July. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor under other matters? I see none. So we have now completed our deliberations for this session. So please, if I may, just to add some final closing remarks. Again, I don’t have much to add. You’ve heard me throughout the week adding my comments, interjecting with views here and there. So I don’t want to belabor all the points that I’ve made, but I think this week has been a very significant crossing of the milestone because we have now essentially completed the penultimate step, which means that when we next see each other in July, it will be the final, final stretch to get things done. So there is no keeping for later, because later is around the corner. And I would urge everyone to go back and really reflect on the week. We did cross a significant milestone, but precisely because this has been an in-person meeting, there have been so many meaningful conversations. I’ve spoken to many of you individually and in groups. That has helped me obtain a better understanding of some of the issues. But I’m sure each one of you has also reached out and spoken to others. But also, more importantly, I know that all of you were listening to each other very intently. So I think we are leaving this evening with a better sense than we had arrived on Monday morning. So if the conclusion at the end of this session is that you go back and hold on to your positions, then perhaps you need to go back and review the entire week on UN Web TV. But I know that each one of you will be leaving with reflections, which is that there are areas of commonality. Some issues lend themselves to greater convergence. Other issues are very challenging. But we need to start to put together a set of outcomes that are ambitious, that live up to expectations, but that are also balanced. So keep that in mind. There has to be a balance. If we want to get to a consensus outcome, we need to have a set of balanced outcomes. And it must also be a set of ambitious outcomes. And you need to understand each other’s concerns, and you need to provide that assurance to each other so that you’re not trying to have everything your way. If you expect every issue to go your way, then I think the chances of getting to a consensus will not be easy. Second, I’ve been saying this from Monday. Success is not guaranteed, and failure is not an option. That is the motto for diplomats at the UN. And if you want an outcome, you have to work for it, and that means demonstrating flexibility. And a consensus outcome is not going to be imposed by the chair. I’ve met many of you over the week in separate meetings. Many of you came to me in some ways to indicate what your concerns are, in some ways hinting to me at your red lines. But in a sense, you’re not negotiating with me. I am not the person who can grant you your wishes and your preferred positions. I am not the person who’s standing in the way of you achieving your national positions and interests. You are supposed to be negotiating with each other. So I’m sure you did some of that this week. There’s a lot more that needs to be done, there’s a lot more that needs to be done. So I would encourage you to reach out to each other from different groups, different delegations, and talk to each other. I mean, one of the challenges in this process, candidly, I have to say, is that some of you are not talking to each other, even after almost five years. It’s a reality. Some of you can’t be seen with another person. It’s the reality. So you need to talk to each other. If you do all the talking, then I don’t need to do a lot of talking. And I don’t need to be the intermediary for some of these conversations. So that’s what I would encourage you to do. Outreach and talk to each other, especially those who have a different view. And sometimes those who might seemingly have a very different and difficult point of view, difficult from your point of view, may not be so difficult after you really understand what they want, and that might be a solution. So I would encourage all of you to spend this interesting time with each other. And if you have any questions, encourage all of you to spend this intersessional period talking to each other. The last thing I would say, and I was alluding to this as well, I think the risk of not having a consensus is high, higher than ever before in this process in the last few years. So the risk is certainly high. I mean, I do not want to sugarcoat the situation to all of you. You know exactly what’s happening. I don’t need to explain what is happening. But international cooperation has not become easy. And so those of you who are believers in the UN, in the work of the UN, I think you need to also work hard for that. I will do my best, very best, of course. And I’m always accessible to you, me and my team. But I think all of us who are believers in this organization, in the work that the UN does, not very well. The UN is not a perfect organization, but it’s the only universal organization that we have. So if you really believe in the value of multilateral outcomes and multilateral norms and rules and frameworks for international partnership and collaboration, then I think we need to work hard. Having said all of that, I do want to say that this is doable. I think there is a very, very, very narrow path that might take us to the finish line, but it is not very wide at all. But it requires demonstrations of flexibility from all of you. But I would not say that this is a walk in the park. It is not. It is not going to be a dash to the finish line. We are almost crawling at the end of the marathon. But it is doable. But that also depends on you. I can’t, as the chair, produce a miracle text and then pray that no one will object to it. So each one of you needs to also talk to each other and work hard to get to that finish line collectively. Finally, finally, in terms of next steps, it’s my intention to reflect on the modalities for regular institutional dialogue, thematic groups, and prepare a revised set of modalities. And hopefully, I can make this available around March. We are almost at the end of February now. And then it’s my hope to have a town hall meeting focused on the question of institutional questions relating to dedicated thematic groups. And then I will also reflect on modalities for stakeholder participation, which, as I said, is more challenging than any of the other issues. And I think we may want to have a separate town hall meeting as well. So the time between March and April, I will convene town hall meetings, at least two, if not more. It’s difficult for me to identify a specific date at this point. Let me go back and also consult my team. But it is important that we do some work intersessionally in March and in April. And it’s my intention to focus on the dedicated thematic groups and stakeholder modalities. And then it’s my intention to make available the zero draft in around May, in May. So March, April, May. And after the zero draft is circulated, which will be a compilation of everything, and then we’ll have to have another round of discussions over a virtual meeting. So we’ll need a town hall, virtual town hall meeting as well on the zero draft around May. We may need more than one. We’ll see how that goes. And then in July, we are here in person. So that roughly is my thinking. I can’t be precise about the dates now. But we need to use the intersessional period in a productive way, so that we are not coming back in July, having not discussed some of the outstanding issues. So in the meantime, if any of you have any brilliant ideas and indications of flexibility or dramatic changes in your position, hey, anything is possible. Let me know. And if you think that changes in your position will contribute to consensus or ideas that might contribute to consensus, that might help to find solutions, let me know. We need all the ideas we can get to get to the finish line. So I’m sorry to have kept you here much longer than I had anticipated, but it’s a quarter to six Friday, and I want to conclude by thanking all of you, thanking members of the Secretariat, thanking members of my team, thanking the interpreters, but most of all, thanking each one of you for your patience, for your constructive engagement. You bring a positive attitude that is very palpable. I’ve been at the UN in so many processes, but this is a real community, because ultimately, behind the nameplates are individuals who have invested their time, energy, passion, ideas to a process, and that’s what makes the United Nations great. It’s a community of people and leaders, and each one of you are leading not just your own delegations and within your own delegations, but you’re leading your country and your delegation at the global stage by helping to find solutions for common problems. I think the world needs more of that. At this precise point, so I wish you all a safe flight and a pleasant Friday evening to all of you, and see you in July. The meeting is adjourned. Thank you. Thank you.