Session 10-9 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

Good morning, distinguished delegates. The ninth meeting of the tenth substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs is now called to order. Distinguished delegates, we will now continue our discussions on the agenda item relating to Regular Institutional Dialogue. We began this discussion yesterday with 10 speakers, and I have on my list 50 other delegations who have registered to speak today. It’s, of course, my intention to give everyone the opportunity to give their views on this important topic. It’s important that we listen to each other because this is an issue on which we need new ideas to find the middle ground and to build consensus. So I welcome very much all the delegations that have already spoken and the delegations that have inscribed to speak. I invite all of them to put forward new ideas, demonstrate flexibility, all with a view to finding a middle ground approach to building consensus. I would also be happy to give delegations that have already spoken yesterday and who wish to come back with additional comments, reactions, suggestions, new ideas, new expressions of flexibility that might not have previously occurred to them. But having heard other delegations and having been inspired by the comments and ideas of other delegations, perhaps we might also be able to hear shifts in position and demonstrations of flexibility from all sides and from all delegations. That’s the intention this morning, and it’s my intention to take this meeting all the way to 6 p.m. We need to spend every minute we have today to talk to each other, understand each other, and to see what would be a viable path forward. So with those comments, I’ll start with the first speaker, which is Tonga speaking on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum, to be followed by Canada. Tonga, you have the floor, please.

Thank you, Jeff. I have the honor of speaking on behalf of the member states of the Pacific Islands Forum with our presence here in New York. Pacific Islands Forum members reaffirm the importance of continued discussions to support the creation of a permanent UN mechanism to advance regular institutional dialogue on responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The future mechanism should be inclusive, promote transparency, and exchange best practices with relevant and geographically diverse stakeholders in support of cyber capacity building, and be consensus-based and not be duplicative of existing initiatives across the UN system. To ensure that members of our Pacific family can effectively contribute to our future process, we emphasize the need for the future mechanism to be inclusive and enable participation by all states, regardless of size or resources. We would welcome further discussions on how best to achieve this through manageable modalities. With this, Chair, some practical considerations include leveraging technology to support virtual and hybrid attendance options, taking into account equitable geographical time zones for delegates and experts. Such meeting modalities are important to enhance efficiency and reduce the financial burden in relation to travel costs. Balance, however, must also be struck, and in our understanding, virtual informals are not a replacement for in-person attendance. It is important to remember that a 10 a.m. meeting in New York occurs in the early hours of the morning for many Pacific Island Forum capitals, ranging from 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. These time differences create barriers to meaningful participation, particularly for smaller delegations with limited resources. We also consider that keeping semantic groups limited in number will not overburden smaller delegations, while still allowing space and time for rich discussion on key topics of interest. Bringing relevant experts for inclusive dialogue is essential for the effectiveness of the practical, action-oriented work of the future mechanism. We draw particular importance to the discussions on how cyber capacity building can effectively be facilitated within a future permanent mechanism across all working groups. We want to ensure that capacity building discussions are not sidelined or siloed, but rather must form a core part of the discussion in all working groups. We recognize the role that cyber capacity building has had and will continue to play to strengthen our region’s resilience. However, there is more work to be done. Noting the varying levels of capacities and national contexts, there is an opportunity for the future mechanism to play a role in facilitating member states in identifying their needs, as well as in matching these with appropriate resources and technical assistance. Additionally, cyber capacity building is also necessary to enable states to participate in the future permanent mechanism in an inclusive manner and on equal footing, including through encouraging states to fund the participation of delegations from developing countries to attend meetings. Capacity building in this area is a critical enabler which strengthens cyber resilience and the ability of states to detect, defend against, or respond to malicious cyber activities. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Tonga. Canada, to be followed by Estonia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We are fortunate to be slightly ahead of schedule this week, thus allowing for a bit more time to discuss what must be our top priority for the remainder of this process, which is to agree on how we will continue to work together within a future mechanism. There remains much to discuss, but we are not starting from scratch. Rather, we must build upon the starting point of last year’s consensus APR and, as you note, the mandate of this OEWG. We appreciate, Mr. Chair, that your efforts and constructive engagement from delegations of all sizes have helped us get this far. Some of what we agreed is worth reiterating to ground ourselves as we move forward. We agreed there will be review conferences, plenary sessions, and thematic groups. The town hall two weeks ago and over the course of this week has confirmed that the plenaries will address each of the pillars of the current OEWG. Each element of the framework will be addressed in plenaries, as it is now and in a way that is well understood by all. The OEWG process has allowed for important state-led dialogue, and we would keep this process. But as Canada has indicated many times, we need more. Indeed, my Chinese colleagues spoke to the need for step-by-step progress, as did you, Mr. Chair. It is time for this body to take the next step. Action-oriented, cross-cutting thematic groups are that next step. We must future-proof a permanent mechanism. It needs to be allowed to grow beyond the OEWG conversations, as I’m quite sure none of us see us holding this same conversation 10 to 20 years from now. This is recognized in our consensus APR. We agreed that the future mechanism will include discussions of an integrated policy-oriented and cross-cutting nature and that plenary meetings will consider the work and recommendations of dedicated thematic groups. We agreed that this year’s OEWG should focus on the thematic groups and on stakeholder participation. We thank the French delegation for its dedicated efforts to hold countless bilateral and group meetings, to listen to diverse points of view, and consolidate them into a paper that sets out how thematic groups could function from a practical perspective. The paper makes sense and shows how integrated policy-oriented and cross-cutting can work, starting with expert briefings that set the stage on the needs and solutions to further implement our common framework, including on international law and on capacity building. This sequence, Mr. Chair, is different from the sequence of plenaries, and that matters. One must admit, after many years of discussing in pillars, they are at risk of becoming silos. As we have highlighted throughout the week, we need to go deeper. Very rarely do we talk about what to do about threats, as this would require that we also speak to the pillars of capacity building, confidence building, norms implementation, and the implementation of existing law. This conversation is not happening in the pillars. More focus is necessary to take the next step in making our discussion more action-oriented. We think that the OEWG is ready to move a bit further into practical issues, and this is another way that the thematic groups would be different from plenaries and complement the broader discussions that would continue to take place there. We recognize that this is a careful balance. We want to get more out of the process, and we want everyone to get more from it. We think it would be prudent to avoid being overly prescriptive in sub-themes or plans for the next two years. These two elements, having a more specific theme as a conversation starter and the sequence of briefings, needs, and solutions, will create the space to dive deeper into common priorities, and for the deep dive to be useful, it needs to allow for full participation of stakeholders, meaning they need to be in the room and have the time to speak on each topic in the dedicated thematic groups so that their contributions are on point and respond directly to the needs of our intergovernmental community. On stakeholder participation, again, we agreed by consensus last July to build on the OEWG experience. Building on something means improving it, not keeping it exactly the same. We note that the discussion paper of January 27th explored some ideas on how to build on the OEWG experience, yet as Canada stated during the town hall, the ideas in this discussion paper are unfortunately largely insufficient. As you know, Mr. Chair, Canada and Chile have been working hard to put ideas on paper. We’ve held over dozens of hours of virtual consultations, and like you, I am sure we cannot count anymore the number of bilateral discussions we have had with both states and stakeholders on this important issue. That work was all worth it because we managed to consolidate concrete, clear proposals in the paper that we recirculated today, this time with a list of co-sponsors. At its core, states that co-sponsor our practical modalities paper care about inclusivity and transparency in all and each meeting of the future mechanism. Your guiding questions, Mr. Chair, ask about how to accommodate genuine concerns to ensure that stakeholders’ contributions remain non-political. The fact is we have yet to hear states articulate the basis of their objections or vetoes. This makes it difficult to assess that, nor would I note have we heard any stakeholder make political statements in either plenaries or side events thus far. Our paper acknowledges that states may feel they have legitimate concerns with regard to certain stakeholders. We do not want to prevent them from objecting. We do not want to prevent them from making their case that their concerns are genuine or that they see a stakeholder behaving in a way that is inappropriate or raises particular concerns. However, this needs to be transparent. We want the occasion to hear them out, to hear their reasoning. This is a constructive approach for a healthy and necessary discussion. On the other hand, many of us may have a different point of view, and we really care about the inclusion of those objected stakeholders, and we should also have the chance to explain why we want to include them in our discussion. Holding this very conversation on exclusion and inclusion of specific stakeholders would allow us to address concerns transparently. By the end of such discussions, we are hopeful that we could agree together and decide by consensus. However, if we cannot find consensus, we should be able to use our existing and impartial tool to carry on. For procedural issues of stakeholder participation, that tool is majority vote. It relies on precedents such as those allowed by the adoption of the cybercrime convention, a convention we have heard lauded in this room this week. Another way to promote inclusion of diverse expert perspectives and transparency on how the framework is applied is to give more space for stakeholders for their contributions. We think the stakeholders should be able to speak every day of the meeting, likely for an hour, and to submit written documents for our consideration. Our paper also invites briefings and presentations by experts in a way that is similar to what we did during the intersessionals in May that was viewed as valuable by many participants. These ideas are supported by 25 states that co-sponsor the proposal, namely Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. We are, of course, open and willing to consider other creative ideas to achieve our objectives of more meaningful stakeholder participation. Mr. Chair, I would be remiss if I did not conclude today by noting the victory of Canada’s men’s national hockey team last night. Our team won because it had all the pieces it needed to put a win together in the right way. Our goal as Team OEWG must be to do the same. We need to ensure we have our plenary, our dedicated thematic groups, and our stakeholder modalities designed in such a way as they work together to create a workable future mechanism. We’ve heard some members of our team suggest that one piece of this mechanism, stakeholder modalities, might be left for later or not optimized for maximum success. We disagree. This would be equivalent to Canada’s coach leaving behind our defense or, God forbid, our goalie. This is not a winning strategy, and like Team Canada hockey, this piece of Team OEWG is committed to working for a shared OEWG win. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Canada. Congratulations on the hockey game win. I agree with you that we must all collectively work as a team, because winning this challenge that is before us, winning this challenge in July, will be a win for all of us. And I hope that that will motivate us in the time that we have left to work much harder to get to the finish line. Thank you very much for that, Canada. Estonia, to be followed by Senegal.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. Estonia aligns itself with the statement by the European Union and adds the following. We are at a crossroads as the Open-Ended Working Group enters its final phase, with key decisions ahead on how to advance international cooperation in cyberspace. The Program of Action offers a clear path forward, providing an action-oriented and sustainable framework to ensure concrete progress for international cooperation on cybersecurity. Regarding dedicated thematic groups, we view the recent French paper with a proposal for free action-oriented and cross-cutting thematic groups on resilience, cooperation, and stability as an effective way to structure our discussions. It indicates that all five pillars are fully integrated into the dedicated thematic groups. Therefore, discussions on international law should take place within the cross-cutting thematic groups, not in a separate thematic group together with non-binding norms, to maintain a strong link between legal considerations and real policy challenges. Addressing legal aspects separately risks creating a legal silo, which we should avoid. It is also important that legal principles shape the debate from the start. We support scenario-based discussions, and Estonia, along with many other countries, has benefited a lot from it. On stakeholder modalities, the paper put forward by the cross-regional group of Canada and Chile and co-sponsored by 25 states, including Estonia, provides a solid foundation. It is evident that governments alone do not have full expertise in the cyber field, and stakeholders provide essential knowledge on cyber discussions. Therefore, ensuring meaningful stakeholder inclusion in cyber discussions is of key importance. With this greater inclusion, we would like to emphasize that the question is not about shifting responsibilities from the governments, nor about giving the stakeholders decision power in the context of RID. The guiding principle here is to benefit from the voice without a vote. Additionally, we must address the issue of a single state having veto power, as this negatively impacts the effectiveness, transparency, and inclusivity of global cyber governance. Mr. Chair, we appreciate your leadership and the valuable contributions of all delegations. We remain committed to constructive dialogue and collaborative efforts to achieve a meaningful outcome. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Estonia. Senegal, to be followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, please.

Thank you very much, Chair. Senegal aligns itself with a statement by Nigeria on behalf of the African Group and would like to add the following in our national capacity. Chair, at the outset, my delegation aligns itself with what was shared by Madam Izumi Nakamitsu, USG for Disarmament Affairs, on the unique opportunity that we have to define together the outlines of a permanent mechanism to discuss questions of cyber security at a time where the impact of cyber activities on international peace and security needs no further proof. This is why Senegal would like to urge its peers to demonstrate a high level of compromise as we seek consensus at the end of the cycle, in particular on the modalities for this permanent mechanism, which is planned for as early as 2026, as well as on substantial questions where substantive discussions will be expected. Chair, Senegal takes due note of the working document of the Chair on the participation of stakeholders and thematic groups. My delegation believes that this is an excellent starting point for substantive discussions with a view to ensuring a smooth transition from the current OEWG towards a permanent mechanism. My delegation wants this opportunity of this general discussion to share its views on these two aspects. Firstly, Senegal welcomes the highly valuable contribution made by stakeholders in our work. They continue to enrich our deliberations, provide enlightenment, and share information too. However, in line with the African position, my delegation would advocate for keeping current modalities for their participation in the future mechanism. Indeed, the need to guarantee the exclusively intergovernmental nature of this process and also the need to prevent any skewing of the objectives of the involvement of these partners show that we should be prudent regarding introducing new procedures for their participation. Secondly, while we do recognize the equal relevance and importance of the five pillars, my country would like to underscore the need to ensure adaptations could be made to allow for substantive and inclusive discussions on each and every one of these pillars. To this end, it would be more a question of accommodating these pillars based on the nature of these pillars and on the mandates. That’s the idea behind the African proposal for three thematic groups. The first on purely technical aspects. This includes the definition of threats, countermeasures in response to cyber attacks, and confidence-building measures. The second would cover all legal issues, covering both the application of international law and the questions of norms for responsible behavior. The last would focus exclusively on capacity building and international cooperation, which, while this is of course cross-cutting across all pillars, requires particular attention within the future mechanism to bridge development gaps and foster better harmonization of practices in this field. Thirdly, on the question of suspending modalities of organization and functioning, my country welcomes the proposals made by the Chair, which again are an excellent starting point. However, bearing in mind the time frames that stand between us and the end of our mandate, it would be wise for some questions to be postponed for the future mechanism, particularly the first conference on organizing, the first organization conference on all substantive discussions. Fourthly and finally, Chair, my delegation agrees with you on the need to conclude the mandate of our group on a good note, particularly through a consensus-based adoption and one that enjoys an adoption of the final report that enjoys full support and also transition to the future permanent mechanism. Senegal would call on all states to show greater political will as well as determination to propose compromise as a key framework for negotiation to make real progress on unresolved issues regarding the mechanism. To conclude, Chair, Senegal believes that we are able to implement intentions and are looking forward to working as part of the future mechanism.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation fully aligns itself with the statement made by Nicaragua on behalf of like-minded countries and wishes to offer the following comments in its national capacity. Mr. Chair, we appreciate your dedication and tireless efforts in building consensus and addressing the outstanding issues related to the future permanent mechanism. We have reviewed the proposal outlined in your letter and would like to highlight the following points. Regarding the modalities for stakeholders’ participation, our comments are as follows. First, it is essential to emphasize that the group has already agreed in its third APR on the fundamental and overarching principle that, and I quote, the future permanent mechanism is a state-led process where negotiations and decisions on ICT security remain the prerogative of states, end of quote. This agreement clearly pertains to both the negotiation and decision-making procedures. Second, regarding proposals to apply similar modalities of stakeholders’ participation as were adopted for the Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrimes or the so-called Golden Standard, as previously mentioned, we believe that this modality was only applicable within the context of the Ad Hoc Committee. As its name indicates, the Ad Hoc Committee was a temporary body with a specific mandate and limited working period. Furthermore, its work and the stakeholders involved were focused on legal issues, which differ in nature and sensitivity from the information security agenda. Third, when defining the modalities for stakeholder participation, it is crucial to take into account the unique nature and specific complexity of engaging with ICT security issues, which differ significantly from other international processes. The political sensitivity surrounding ICT security for states is unparalleled and cannot be compared to those of other issues. Efforts to involve non-governmental stakeholders in areas that are politically sensitive or contentious may risk exacerbating disagreements and creating division among governments. We agree with giving stakeholders a voice, but this voice should be informal, consultative, and limited to technical matters. Fourth, we firmly believe that the current modalities for the participation of other interested parties are both effective and sufficient. These modalities strike a dedicated balance in addressing the concerns of all member states. We would like to recall that this approach results from extensive and complex discussions among member states. Fifth, the accreditation of 100 stakeholders to date, as you, Mr. Chair, referred to in your opening remarks, stands as a testament to the success of the current modalities. Therefore, rather than altering the current modalities, we believe the focus should be on ensuring equitable geographical representation of stakeholders and supporting the active engagement of stakeholders from developing countries. Meanwhile, regarding the proposed arrangement by the Chair, we would like to emphasize the following points. The future mechanism must uphold the principle of non-objection. The Chair’s paper is based on assumptions that have resulted in legal deficiencies. We cannot agree with the concept of provisional participation for stakeholders who have faced objection during the accreditation process. This proposal undermines the intergovernmental nature of UN bodies and disrespects the prerogative and sovereign rights of member states. The Chair’s engagement in informal consultations regarding the objections expressed should not be perceived as an attempt to exert pressure on member states. Regarding the dissemination of information, we fully agree with you on the importance of upholding the principle of transparency. However, this must be done in a way that avoids giving the impression of attempting to single out or pressure specific states through naming and shaming. In our view, providing information only to the requesting countries would be adequate. Following informal consultation and achievement of actual agreements, the Chair could then inform member states of any emerging consensus, eliminating the need for further decisions to be presented at the plenary session. The Chair’s proposed document includes a paragraph on stakeholder participation, urging them to engage in a technical and objective manner and refrain from politicizing issues. However, it does not provide a mechanism to ensure the implementation of these principles by stakeholders. Oral statements by stakeholders should be restricted to dedicated stakeholder sessions during plenary sessions and review conferences, while allowing them to attend all other meetings. Turning to the proposal for establishing dedicated thematic groups, our comments are as follows. First, Iran supports the idea of preserving the pillar of the current OEWG while creating thematic groups. We also note the proposal for a limited number of thematic groups, which would enable smaller delegations to participate and contribute meaningfully to discussions on an equal footing. We remain flexible regarding the merging of current items. Member states, through consensus, may consider rotational arrangements for convening meetings on each subject during the biannual two-year cycle. Second, prioritizing the interest of a specific group of countries by emphasizing critical infrastructure would not be appropriate. We believe that the priorities of all countries should be considered in a balanced manner. Establishing a dedicated thematic group to address existing and emerging threats, in line with the OEWG’s pillar-based approach, will more effectively address concerns related to the protection of critical infrastructure. Third, the proposal for a dedicated thematic group on preventing conflicts overlaps with the discussion on CBMs and can therefore be addressed within the future thematic group on CBMs, which could be established under the permanent mechanism in alignment with the OEWG pillars-based approach. Fourth, regarding the sequencing of meetings, we agree with the Chair’s proposal to hold thematic group meetings within a consolidated time window alongside plenary sessions. This approach will allow smaller delegations to participate and contribute meaningfully to discussions on an equal footing while also reducing administrative and logistical burdens. Finally, we would like to emphasize the language in paragraph 9 of Annex C of the third APR regarding the functions of the future mechanism. It specifies that the mechanism will further explore the development of additional legally binding obligations. This issue should be given priority when defining the working structure of the mechanism, including through the establishment of a dedicated thematic group. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Islamic Republic of Iran, for your contribution. El Salvador, to be followed by South Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My country aligns itself with the statement on capacity building made by Argentina on behalf of a group of countries from Latin America and the Caribbean. In line with that statement, I wish to state that El Salvador revised its statement in light of that statement, and we won’t repeat our national position. Rather, we’ll make suggestions to narrow gaps and build common ground regarding modalities for participation for stakeholders and thematic groups within the future permanent mechanism in light of and with a view to the final report of July 2025. In terms of modalities for stakeholder participation, El Salvador is of the view that the Chair’s proposal reflects an inclusive approach, and we support the general direction thereof. However, in order to guarantee that the modalities work smoothly, we suggest a number of thoughts be considered. We are, one, cognizant of the fact that reaching consensus could be a challenge to the functioning of the mechanism and create an excessive burden for the future Chair. As such, we fully support the spirit of paragraph 17 of annex C of the third version, but we suggest viewing consensus as a guiding principle instead of an absolute sine qua non. With that in mind, we are of the view that it would be useful to explore how we might apply the non-objection mechanism in a fair and constructive way, guaranteeing that the future Chair has the support they require to manage objections in such a way as to facilitate timely decision-making, guaranteeing equity and transparency. Measures need to be implemented which avoid excessive consultations regarding the participation of stakeholders. We need to avoid such discussions unduly delaying the work of the mechanism. In that vein, we propose that we establish specific timeframes, and we are flexible on how long they should be, but we do believe that it is necessary to ensure a specific timeframe for consultations to avoid them dragging out indefinitely. The Mexican delegation made suggestions for time limits yesterday that would merit consideration. We need to adopt a balanced approach which preserves the integrity of the process and which at the same time allows the meaningful participation of all stakeholders. Moreover, we are of the view that the proposal to allow the provisional participation of stakeholders until a final decision is made on their accreditation is a worthy one. However, we’d like clarification around whether this status would apply throughout the whole session because the lack of predictability there could create resource loss and waste time, and that would deter participation. So we need clarity on that procedure if we are to properly build the trust we need. Regarding dedicated thematic groups, we’re worried about the establishment of five thematic groups in addition to intersessional meetings, substantive sessions, and preparatory work for the review conference. We’re worried about the idea that five thematic groups could be an unnecessary excessive burden, particularly for small delegations. We understand that these groups will not sit in parallel, but we already have a hectic calendar when it comes to matters of international security, and this could weigh us down. We need a more manageable structure where the thematic groups are concerned, and that could foster more effective participation without overly burdening our resources. There need to be clear distinctions between thematic groups and the plenary sessions and a clear reporting procedure, this in order to avoid duplication of mandates. And all of this has to include clear rules of procedure, particularly when we’re talking about groups that sit informally. In our view, we should ensure that we preserve the principle of multilingualism in future thematic groups in order to ensure that participation is truly inclusive, particularly that of developing countries. With that in mind, we would also suggest that one of the thematic groups proposed focuses on analyzing the evolving threat landscape. That would allow us to broach new trends in terms of attacks and looking at how ICTs intersect with other emerging technologies and other trends. There is a proposal for a thematic group on international law and ICTs. That’s particularly relevant for El Salvador. That should be retained in any future working documents. However, we are flexible regarding how the groups are appointed and what form they take, provided that substantive issues are adequately tackled. In connection to that last point, we agree with the need to drill down into thematic issues that are proposed in terms of how they shape the structure of groups, because this will give us information about whether priorities are or are not being tackled properly, whatever the general name of the group. Thank you.

Thank you very much. El Salvador. South Africa, to be followed by Cameroon.

Thank you, Chairperson. We thank you and your team for preparing the paper on regular institutional dialogue and the guiding questions. With regards to safeguards that could be put in place to accommodate genuine concerns regarding the participation of specific stakeholders, South Africa supports the proposal in your discussion paper to allow stakeholders to engage in a technical and objective manner. The process of developing common understandings and sharing information should be inclusive without allowing stakeholders decision-making powers over member states. Civil society, academia, and business have expertise and knowledge that would assist member states in developing their understanding of the fast-developing ICT security environment. It would therefore be prudent to engage them in an informal, consultative manner that is acceptable to all member states. We underscore that the permanent mechanism is a member state-led process that allows for engagement with relevant stakeholders. Formal member state meetings of thematic groups would include decisions by member states on which actions could be referred to plenary for adoption in the permanent mechanism. This would maintain the apparatus of the mechanism as an unbiased and apolitical forum. Chairperson, we have also studied your proposals on thematic groups, and we can support three permanent thematic groups. Additional matters could be discussed in ad hoc thematic groups agreed upon in plenary sessions. Our rationale is to limit the number of meetings that experts from developing countries are required to participate in and to ensure that all ICT-related meetings in various other forums outside the UN are equally attended to within current national capacities. Having considered the proposed thematic groups in the discussion paper, we can support the following three broad thematic groups: 1. A dedicated thematic group on building the resilience of ICT ecosystems and critical infrastructure. This group could also include discussion on threats and capacity building. 2. A dedicated thematic group on cooperation in the management of ICT incidents. This group could include discussion on operationalization of the POC directory, implementation of norms, and capacity building. 3. A dedicated thematic group on confidence-building measures to foster stability and reduce misunderstandings. This group could discuss implementation of the eight CBMs, international law, and capacity building. We are open to discussions by member states on a rotational mechanism to ease the burden on cybersecurity experts from developing countries. We believe that there is a creative solution to accommodate the various discussions on ICT security, including through the review cycles, without establishing several thematic structures that can call meetings simply because of a schedule that compels them to. I thank you.

Thank you very much, South Africa, for your contribution. Cameroon, to be followed by Italy.

Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, my delegation welcomes the continued discussions on the establishment of a regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations, ensuring the broad participation of states in addressing issues related to cybersecurity, responsible state behavior in space, and the application of international law to ICTs. In today’s interconnected world, cyber threats transcend national borders, affecting governments, economies, and societies globally. An inclusive, structured, and institutionalized dialogue under the UN framework is essential to fostering trust, cooperation, and collective resilience in cyberspace. My country is in favor of establishing regular institutional dialogue. The need for a permanent UN-led cybersecurity forum is paramount. My delegation supports the creation of a UN-led multilateral institutional mechanism dedicated to cyber diplomacy, cyber governance, and international cooperation on ICT security. This forum should serve as a platform for continuous dialogue, exchange of best practices, and policy coordination on cyber-related matters. Such an institutional framework would prevent cyber conflicts, promote responsible state behavior, and facilitate the peaceful use of cyberspace. Concerning the broad and equitable participation of states, my delegation thinks that for this dialogue to be truly effective, it must include all states, regardless of their level of technological development. Cameroon advocates for a fair and inclusive approach that ensures the active participation of developing countries, particularly those in Africa, so that their concerns and priorities are adequately addressed. The process must also be transparent and consensus-driven, ensuring that all states contribute to shaping the rules and norms that govern cyberspace. Bridging the digital divide and ensuring cyber resilience is very necessary. A key component of this dialogue must be addressing the global digital divide to ensure that all nations can benefit from a secure and reliable ICT infrastructure. Cameroon supports initiatives aimed at enhancing the resilience of critical digital infrastructure, improving cyber incident response, and fostering cooperation in shared intelligence sharing. Concerning promoting confidence-building measures and cyber norms, institutionalized dialogue should also serve as a mechanism for advancing confidence-building measures, such as voluntary transparency measures on national cybersecurity policies, regular exchanges between states on cyber threat assessment and risk mitigation strategies, and development of shared norms and best practices to prevent misinterpretation of cyber incidents. The harmonization with existing UN processes is also very paramount. Cameroon emphasizes the importance of harmonizing this new institutional dialogue with existing UN initiatives, including the UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICTs, the Group of Governmental Experts, GGE, on cybersecurity, and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs on cyber threats. The objective should be to create a structured and permanent platform that complements ongoing UN efforts rather than duplicating them. Mr. Chair, my delegation firmly believes that a regular institutional dialogue under the UN with a broad and equitable participation of all states will enhance global cybersecurity governance. Such a mechanism will strengthen international trust, reduce cyber risks, and contribute to a stable and secure cyberspace. We look forward to working with all member states to establish a structured, inclusive, and action-oriented framework for international cyber cooperation. Thank you, Mr. President.

Thank you very much, Cameron, for your contribution. Italy, to be followed by Japan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. Italy fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. As the conclusion of this OEWG is rapidly approaching, we are all called to join efforts and identify a new mechanism that allows us to enhance our long-lasting changes in cyber security. Over the past years, we have had significant opportunities to meet and share our thoughts on some of the most pressing issues affecting cyberspace. Thanks to the OEWG, some significant outcomes have been achieved, as clearly underlined by the Annual Progress Reports. Since the international framework is evolving in a dramatic way, we believe that a change of pace is needed, so as to effectively dive into the concrete challenges our countries are confronted with. This is why we fully support France’s proposal for a Program of Action that manages to consistently address the five pillars of the OEWG across cost-cutting dedicated thematic groups, namely building resilience in national cyber security ecosystems and critical infrastructures, fostering cooperation to manage ICT-related incidents, and promoting stability in cyberspace. Thanks to such a concrete and flexible mechanism, also characterized by a more balanced number of meetings, we will be able to streamline our processes and deliver actionable outcomes that would support a meaningful process in advancing responsible state behavior and strengthening global cyber security. Recognizing the importance of gender inclusion in cyber security policy, Italy welcomes the OEWG’s ongoing efforts to mainstream gender equality in the future mechanism and co-sponsored the working paper on gender and the future permanent mechanism drafted by Australia, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and Northern Ireland. Finally, Italy places great importance on inclusive dialogue and the meaningful involvement of all relevant stakeholders. Governments, businesses, academia, and civil society each bring unique perspectives essential for crafting effective and comprehensive outcomes. We support mechanisms like remote participation to ensure broad and equitable engagement. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Italy, for your contribution. Japan to be followed by the Republic of Moldova.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Japan strongly supports the value of a future mechanism that is action-oriented to implement existing international law and norms. It is crucial to continue such discussions at the UN OEWG to date, and Japan sincerely respects the Chair’s tireless efforts and contributions on this issue. With regard to the multistakeholder modalities in the future mechanism, I would like to reiterate the value of technical contributions from organizations with technical advantages, including the private sector, if they are allowed to participate in the future mechanism. To realize such benefits, we need an open and transparent process to facilitate such valuable multistakeholder participation. With regard to the dedicated thematic groups in the future mechanism, Japan respects the need to take into account the limited resources of member states, while there are critical values for the establishment of additional groups focused on action-oriented, scenario-based technical discussions. Therefore, Japan supports the proposal by France on the action-oriented thematic groups. Such scenario-based thematic groups will add great value to what we are doing now in a complementary way. Simulating responses to cybersecurity incidents and threats will include aspects such as the use of various policy tools, laws and regulations, capacity building, public-private partnerships, and international cooperation. Such groups can also discuss needs and solutions associated with these tools to improve cybersecurity. Meanwhile, the plenary sessions in the future mechanism should continue to have policy-oriented discussions on such topics as international law, norms, confidence-building measures, and capacity building, as we are doing this week. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Japan, for your contribution. Republic of Moldova, to be followed by Kenya.

Esteemed Chair, distinguished colleagues, on behalf of my delegation, I would like to share our view on this important matter, the future regular institutional dialogue on cyber security at the United Nations. We recognize the constructive efforts made thus far and look forward to further collaboration and consensus. We warmly welcome the work of Canada and Chile on the non-paper enabling stakeholders to add value to state-led discussions in the future UN mechanism for security in cyberspace. We strongly believe in the undeniable expertise of stakeholders, academia, the technical community, civil society, and the private sector, who bring essential knowledge on cyber threats because their impact and solutions are of great value. Their capacity for professional capacity building and the research they provide are also invaluable in addressing the technical realities of cyberspace. We urge that their contributions continue to be promoted and integrated into the future UN mechanism. We also appreciate our French colleagues’ proposal for the structure of the future mechanism, which emphasizes a balanced, dynamic, and evolving process. These efforts are critical to ensure that the stakeholder community continues to play an integral role in shaping cyber security governance. Moldova supports France’s proposal to reduce the burden on small delegations and developing states by limiting formal meetings to fewer days annually, as my distinguished colleague from South Africa also mentioned. This approach will ensure accessibility for all while maintaining meaningful dialogue. Furthermore, the five-year review cycle will allow for continuous improvement, addressing gaps, challenges, and best practices in the framework’s implementation. The future permanent mechanism should prioritize building resilience, enhancing cross-border cooperation, and ensuring stability in cyberspace. The thematic groups should focus on actionable recommendations to advance these goals, leveraging norms, confidence-building measures, and capacity-building initiatives. The thematic groups should be inclusive, with participation open to all UN member states and stakeholders through both in-person and remote formats. This will ensure broad engagement and meaningful contributions from all sectors. The thematic groups must facilitate needs-based cyber security capacity building, ensuring that resources and expertise are effectively shared to address state-specific challenges. This will help align efforts with the evolving needs of states. Finally, Chair, the Republic of Moldova is committed to work, thus bringing its own contribution to ensure the future regular institutional dialogue is effective, inclusive, and action-oriented, strengthening the global security and stability in cyberspace. That’s all for now. Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you very much, Republic of Moldova, for your contribution. I give the floor now to Kenya, to be followed by Albania.

Thank you, Chair. My delegation believes that the future permanent mechanism should, as the OEWG, be designed in line with the principles of equitable, inclusive, and effective participation of all states. Kenya, therefore, submits the following six points. First, the design of the future permanent mechanism must ensure comprehensive representation and active participation of all member states. It should also consider the existing digital divide between member states, which influences member states’ ability to implement the framework for responsible state behavior. Second, the future permanent mechanism should continue to discuss existing and potential threats and focus on capacity building aimed at enhancing member states’ ability to implement the framework of responsible state behavior. Third, the establishment of a mechanism for the exchange of information on best practices for implementing the framework for responsible state behavior can also be considered under the permanent mechanism, building on the proposals already discussed at the OEWG. Fourth, the future permanent mechanism should not be more burdensome on the delegates; therefore, the proposed meetings of the thematic groups should be no more than five. The plenary sessions should be held back-to-back with those of the dedicated thematic groups. This will ensure that even small delegations like ours are able to effectively participate. Fifth, the proposed thematic groups should build on the work already done under the OEWG. Whatever number of groups we adopt, our ultimate aim should be to build confidence, grow members’ capacity, enable states to implement the voluntary non-binding norms, and develop a common understanding of the applicability of international law. Sixth, the collaborative approach should be holistic, incorporating both public and private sectors, academia, and civil societies to strengthen cybersecurity initiatives. Therefore, the participation of stakeholders in the future permanent mechanism is most welcome. I affirm Kenya’s continued constructive engagement to contribute to enhanced global efforts, legal frameworks, and norms that will promote a free, peaceful, and stable cyber domain and, at the same time, cooperatively work to mitigate the existing and potential threats. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Kenya, for your contribution. Albania, to be followed by the Republic of Korea.

Mr. Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, since in the last year and particularly over the past weeks, extensive discussions and dedicated efforts have been undertaken by countries worldwide to collectively advocate towards a safer and more resilient cyberspace. Drawing from our experience of significant state-sponsored cyber attacks, Albania has been committed to sharing its experience on responding to and mitigating the effects of such attacks with numerous countries in our region and beyond, including this honored audience of the United Nations. By fostering a culture of cooperation and mutual support, we aim to enhance our collective ability to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber threats, thereby contributing to global cyber stability and security. We have carefully examined our state stance on the future mechanism of regular institutional dialogue, recognizing the importance of a collaborative approach in addressing cybersecurity challenges. Albania aligns with the position of the EU on establishing a regular institutional dialogue and in the capacity of the country-states. Albania welcomes the discussion on establishing a regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations, recognizing the importance of structures and inclusive engagement in addressing cybersecurity challenges. An ongoing and substantial dialogue would enhance cooperation, improve information sharing, and strengthen cyber capabilities and resilience. The Program of Action will integrate the reflection of the five pillars with cross-cutting and action-driven discussions. Albania believes that maintaining the status quo or putting forward divisive proposals will not advance progress in this area, which is essential to ensure a cyberspace for our citizens. In addition, we find the proposal of the POA as flexible enough to accommodate all of us as an example regarding the proposals for dedicated discussions on international law. Both plenary and specialized working group discussions will offer a platform for dialogue on how international law applies and gaps to be addressed. And these discussions can complement each other. In addition, we also believe that the proposal for a global portal and the POC directory can be linked to the permanent structure. With regards to the question of how we can ensure the discussion in the dedicated thematic groups delve deeper into the issues raised during the substantial plenary sessions, this can be achieved by guiding the discussions around some key topics while ensuring it builds upon the plenary discussions. We should focus on the challenges, implementation of all pillars of the UN framework and best practices, as well as building global capacities to tackle cyber threats. In this way, we can ensure our discussions explore thoroughly and lead to meaningful progress in addressing the issues right. To implement the UN framework for responsible state behavior in a coherent manner and identify potential gaps, including in international law, an increased shared understanding of the threats and challenges is needed. We also should bring all the pillars together to address threats effectively and identify the needs and solutions for capacity building in this context, as we can ensure a more unified response. In this case, conducting a scenario-based exercise can enhance our understanding of how the UN framework is applied and help identify the areas where additional efforts are required. Discussing international law will have a key role in the future substantive plenary discussions and will be relevant across several thematic groups as it provides the legal framework linked to and for advancing many of the issues addressed in these groups. For example, international law can be included in discussing challenges of the critical infrastructures within a resilient group, as well as being included when discussing capacity building, where the cross-cutting groups help to identify threat-related needs. Thus, this approach supports more than one discussion on those issues, demonstrating the nexus between the pillars. Albania supports transparent, inclusive, and action-oriented discussions by also including stakeholders. Regarding stakeholders’ participation, the status quo will not support meaningful stakeholder engagement. We need to ensure that contributions of stakeholders are not limited so that UN member states have unrestricted access to knowledge and capacity building. With the veto modality remaining, this is not possible. Albania supports the non-paper put forward by Canada and Chile on how to overcome the veto. We believe it provides a fair, inclusive, and transparent approach and constitutes a constructive effort towards compromise. Thus, we believe it should be further discussed during the session. We would also like to underline that the POA proposal is an inclusive proposal that lays a strong foundation within the UN to address the relevant issues as it aims to drive tangible progress, tackle the challenges we face in an action-driven manner, and empower the UN’s role. Albania would like to thank you, Chair, and the Secretariat, for all the intensive work. I underline that Albania remains dedicated to promoting an inclusive, transparent, and action-driven approach for strengthening collaboration and advancing dialogue on cybersecurity issues. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Albania, for your contribution. Republic of Korea, to be followed by Ecuador.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, we appreciate the Chair’s efforts in circulating the discussion paper on the regular consultative mechanism. We hope that this discussion will contribute to the establishment of a single-track, action-oriented, and permanent mechanism. We affirm our position that multistakeholder participation makes a cross-cutting contribution within the OEWG and emphasize the importance of ensuring inclusive and integrated engagement of the stakeholders. From this perspective, we believe there is no need to restrict multistakeholders from sharing their relevant expertise within the OEWG. We appreciate the Chair’s discussion paper also reflects efforts to enhance the participation of multistakeholders in the process. As national positions may vary regarding the participation of certain multistakeholders in the OEWG process, we believe it would be worthwhile to discuss effective ways to reconcile the differences, referring to the working paper that we co-sponsored with Canada and Chile. Meanwhile, we welcome the Chair’s discussion paper, which proposes operating thematic groups in a hybrid format to minimize the time and financial burden on States. We believe this approach would promote greater inclusivity and flexibility. In addition, given that the need for cross-cutting discussions has been consistently emphasized in the OEWG, it may be worth considering adjusting the current five separate groups into more streamlined and integrated groups. For example, during the ninth substantive session, France proposed structuring the thematic groups around three key areas – resilience, cooperation, and stability. We believe that if each group appropriately adjusts its program agenda based on State consensus, this approach could effectively enhance cross-cutting discussions within the OEWG. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Republic of Korea. Ecuador, to be followed by Indonesia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Once again, I reiterate Ecuador’s support for the document presented by Argentina on behalf of a group of countries on capacity building. Ecuador is also grateful for the Chair’s document on the Future Permanent Mechanism. My delegation supports the proposals presented on the participation of stakeholders and the creation of thematic groups. Particularly, Mr. Chairman, I would underscore the need to create and maintain a specific group on capacity building, because this is an issue which cuts across every issue discussed in this working group. As regards the participation of stakeholders in the Future Permanent Mechanism, my country recognizes the experience that these stakeholders have and that could produce great value for our discussions in this process. Consequently, we are open to continuing to discuss modalities for their participation. Mr. Chairman, there will be no perfect proposal that will satisfy everyone’s needs when it comes to the structure of the Future Permanent Mechanism. However, the Chair’s proposal is a good basis upon which to achieve the consensus we so desire. You have my delegation’s full support in finding ways forward that will allow us to successfully create the Future Permanent Mechanism. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Ecuador, for your contribution. Indonesia, to be followed by…

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Indonesia welcomes the consensus and shared views among Member States on the establishment of a single-track and state-led future permanent mechanism on cyber security. We encourage active participation from all Member States in shaping the structure of this mechanism to ensure it is effective, inclusive, and sustainable. Ensuring inclusivity is vital to the success of this strategy. Excuse me. We would like to continue the statement later.

Sure, Indonesia, no problem. Pakistan to be followed by Malaysia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We appreciate your efforts in guiding discussions on the Institutional Record Dialogue, and thank you for the formulation of the Chair’s discussion paper. We view these as important contributions in shaping the structure and focus of the future mechanism. As we continue to undertake a careful review of your proposal, we do recognize it as a basis for our further deliberations. Let me offer specific comments, starting with stakeholders’ participation. First, Pakistan has consistently supported the engagement of stakeholders such as the private sector, industry, academia, civil society, and NGOs in the work of the Permanent Mechanism. Their expertise and insights are invaluable in addressing the multifaceted challenges in cyberspace. Second, we support efforts to bring more transparency to the existing accreditation process to allow inclusive and equitable participation from a broad range of stakeholders. Third, stakeholder contributions should remain consultative in nature, providing technical and objective input without politicizing discussions. With respect to dedicated thematic groups, I would make three additional points. First, Pakistan supports holding focused discussions on various critical aspects of global cybersecurity in a single-track process. These include securing critical infrastructure, building norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, the application of international law in cyberspace, including advancing discussions on a legally binding instrument, capacity-building initiatives, and confidence-building measures. Such thematic groups should ensure that all dimensions of cybersecurity are addressed comprehensively and systematically. Secondly, we see some overlap between the first and third proposed thematic groups, which could be addressed. We prefer a dedicated thematic group on the application of international law, which remains a key area of work for future deliberations. Therefore, we urge revision in the third proposed thematic group. Finally, key principles should continue to underpin the future permanent mechanism with inclusive, open, and universal representation. State-led discussions, consensus-driven decision-making, multistakeholder participation, and global collaboration must be integral to the future mechanism. Chair, we look forward to working constructively to refine these proposals and ensure that the future mechanism reflects our shared commitments.

Thank you very much, Pakistan, for your contribution. I give the floor now to Malaysia, to be followed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We appreciate your initiative in preparing a paper that has provided a good basis for our discussions on regular institutional dialogue. Building on the hard-won deliverables of the present OEWG, Malaysia looks forward to a permanent mechanism which enables deeper consideration of contemporary challenges in the cyber domain and solutions thereto, underpinned by the cumulative and evolving framework of responsible State behaviour. Among the salient features of the current OEWG, which we hope to see retained in the future mechanism, is the active engagement of a broad range of States, reflecting diverse viewpoints and national and regional experiences. It is therefore essential that the structure of the mechanism facilitates the regular participation of developing countries which may face particular resource constraints in covering multiple work streams. My delegation recognizes that the delineation of the substantive areas of work for the dedicated thematic groups remains challenging, given the different views expressed to date. We are keeping an open mind to possible compromise solutions in this regard, recognizing also that the structure may be refined by States over time through periodic assessment at review conferences. Ensuring clarity in the scope of each of the thematic groups, avoiding overlap as far as possible, and optimizing the use of scarce resources are key. This would enable delegations to determine agencies and officials best suited to participating in the more detailed discourse under the thematic groups, which would report to the plenary for political-level deliberations and decision-making. We also welcome continued discussions on how best to accommodate the perspectives of non-governmental stakeholders whose input and expertise have made valuable contributions to our work in this OEWG. As you have recognized, Mr. Chair, there is but a narrow path forward and maximum flexibility will be required to ensure the establishment of the new permanent mechanism by consensus. Let us redouble our efforts to realize this common objective in the months ahead. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Malaysia, for your contribution and for indicating that you’re keeping an open mind. I think that’s very good. I hope that all of you are keeping an open mind. I think that will be helpful. The other point that you made, which I think is also worth for all of us to reflect on, is that because we have a built-in review process at the end of two biennial cycles, the fifth year is a review process. So, in a sense, while the mechanism is permanent, the dedicated thematic group structure can be reviewed, potentially. So, keep that in mind. The review process gives everyone, all of you, the chance to look at that. And then we have also agreed that there could be additional thematic groups that could be established, based on consensus, of course. So, if we establish a number of thematic groups, say starting with the first biennial cycle and second biennial cycle, you could establish additional ad hoc ones or even additional mechanisms. So, there’s actually some degree of modularity and flexibility built into the architecture. And that’s good, so that all of you can review the architecture, and you may decide after two years of discussing a certain issue that you have resolved the problem and you want to address another thematic area. So, keep that in mind. I think that flexibility of a structure that is flexible but not cast in stone is a good way of thinking about it. The permanent mechanism is permanent. Well, nothing is permanent in life, not even permanent representatives. But the mechanism and institution, of course, are designed to be permanent in terms of having a very long duration. But the dedicated thematic groups can be thought of as modular. So, keep that in mind. Hopefully, that will open up new vistas for flexibility and compromise for us. The other point that some of you have mentioned is that, yes, we need to distinguish between the substantive plenary sessions and the dedicated thematic groups. So, how do we make sure that the work is complementary, complements, but you are not repeating the same thing in the plenary and in the dedicated thematic groups? And therefore, the question arises, when do you want to have those dedicated thematic group meetings? Some of you have said that if the substantive plenary session is, say, held for one week, let’s say next year in July, for example, should we then have back-to-back dedicated thematic group meetings the following week, which means that delegations who are already funded, for example, can stay on and attend these meetings back-to-back? Because if you have it, say, in October, then you need to bring back delegates. But, of course, you can have it as a hybrid meeting. But some of you have also said that, you know, it’s not a substitute for in-person meetings. So, that is also an issue, the sequencing issue that we need to keep in mind. So, I’d like to get more reactions to some of the different points that have been raised and some of the points that I’ve highlighted. But thank you for all the statements so far. I give the floor now to the Netherlands. Are you ready to take the floor? To be followed by the United Kingdom. Thank you.

Thank you, Chair. Please allow our delegation to take the floor later because our Deputy Ambassador is very keen to join our discussions and deliver the statement. Thank you.

Sure, no problem, Kingdom of the Netherlands. United Kingdom, to be followed by Belarus.

Thank you, Chair. We would like to begin by thanking you for your paper, which we found to be a valuable tool to stimulate further debate. My delegation remains committed to working with you and other delegations here to land on a consensus outcome on regular institutional dialogue in July. As you said yesterday, the question before us is not whether to have thematic groups, but the scope and function of those groups. This week, the United Kingdom’s statements provided some illustrations demonstrating how the consensus UN framework on responsible state behavior in cyberspace could be applied to the three themes of cooperation, resilience, and stability. We said existing and potential threats informed and underpinned cooperation, resilience, and stability in cyberspace. We gave one possible example of how the consideration of norms might lead states to discuss the challenges and solutions of cybersecurity information sharing to respond to incidents. We gave examples of how the principles of international law can be considered under the themes of cooperation, resilience, and stability. We also outlined a vision for what we called a golden thread connecting discussions of capacity building in dedicated thematic groups and plenary sessions with the global multistakeholder cybersecurity ecosystem in order to improve capacity building outcomes in practice. My delegation considers that the thematic groups of the future mechanism should provide a different type of discussion to the plenary session. This can be done whilst maintaining full respect for the consensus framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. We agree with the large number of states that have argued that the thematic groups should focus discussions on identifying challenges and developing solutions to those challenges. Capacity building is needed to deliver those solutions. In this context, we fully agree with the call by the Pacific Island Forum and others for capacity building to be a core consideration of each thematic group. A deeper focus on shared solutions will not be possible if we duplicate the familiar pillar-by-pillar discussions within the thematic groups themselves. At the same time, we do recognize and appreciate your reminder that the review conferences already contained in Annex C of the third APR will provide a flexible platform. Turning to stakeholders, it is well known that one state in particular has routinely vetoed a large number of capacity building and research organizations from participating at the OEWG. We must repeat our position that a single state veto on stakeholder participation is not appropriate for an international cyberspace governance process. As we have said before, it deprives states of the contributions of non-governmental entities, harms the effectiveness of state-led discussions, and prevents access to knowledge and capacity building. How can we expect to have a holistic discussion on cybersecurity without cybersecurity providers? Conversations on cyber threats from artificial intelligence without AI developers? Or the consequences of cyber incidents without incident response organizations? Therefore, continuing the modality of the current OEWG would be a serious concern for my delegation, given the permanent nature of the future mechanism. The solution is for the UN membership to decide collectively on whether stakeholders may participate. Following consultations with other delegations, the UK has decided to support the modality contained in the paper on practical modalities for stakeholder participation coordinated by Canada and Chile. This modality provides a balanced way forward based on the principle of a voice, not a vote. It maintains the ability of states to object to stakeholders, whilst incorporating a reasonable expectation that states should justify their objection and that UN members themselves should then decide collectively on the participation of stakeholders, drawing on the rules and procedure of the UN General Assembly. Such a modality is needed to ensure the foundations of the future mechanism can support a free, open, peaceful, and secure cyberspace. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, United Kingdom. Guatemala, to be followed by the Russian Federation. Sorry, I think I left out Belarus. Belarus, you have the floor, to be followed by Guatemala.

Thank you, Chair. We fully support your efforts and the work you’ve been undertaking at the Working Group. It is a key negotiation platform for international information security. As discussions in the OEWG have shown, all delegations have shown a general understanding of the crucial importance of creating a future permanent mechanism. However, a lot remains to be done to find common ground on specific structural and operational issues for the further work of this mechanism. In addition to the joint statement of the Group of Friends, which was delivered yesterday, and Belarus was one of the sponsors of it, allow us to set forth some thoughts that we had that we think are important in the context of the creation and the functioning of this mechanism. We see the current OEWG as the only legitimate platform to discuss all aspects of the work of the future mechanism. We believe that the cornerstone of decision-making as part of the future mechanism should be consensus. Bearing in mind the views of all states is critically important in the process of decision-making, both on substantive issues and procedural ones. The same principle should be complied with when identifying the parameters for creating the thematic groups of the mechanism. We believe that it’s necessary to create a limited number of working groups with this body corresponding to the thematic clusters, as identified in the third annual report of the OEWG, which was adopted by GA Resolution 79-237. Other more general questions should be considered as part of these thematic groups. In the context of discussions of the details of these thematic groups, in our view, it’s important to strike a balance between the efforts, on the one hand, to ensure the broadest possible scope of its activity and, on the other, preserve its unique specialized nature. We support your view, Chair, that the proposal to modify the number of themes of these groups could be considered as part of the permanent mechanism itself, in line with its mandate and, of course, bearing in mind the principle of taking into account the views of all member states. And finally, no less important is the question of the conditions for participation of stakeholders in the work of the future mechanism. Here, our priority is the principle of national sovereignty of states. The work of the mechanism is a state-driven and state-led process. I recognize the importance of the contribution made by NGOs, business, academia. We do believe that any decisions about NGO participation in the sessions should be underpinned by the no-objection principle on the part of member states. Participation of these kinds of organizations in the work of the mechanism should not interfere in areas that are the exclusive competence and prerogative of states. It is, of course, a primarily intergovernmental process that we have here, which should be in line with its status and mandate, which was bestowed upon it by states. Chair, allow me to reiterate that Belarus is ready to engage in constructive discussions and is open to cooperation with all states without exception. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Belarus, for your contribution. Guatemala, to be followed by the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we have previously stated, for my delegation, it is fundamental to establish a future mechanism which is permanent in nature and which guarantees a smooth transition. It is also important to avoid the duplication of effort in that process. We trust that the creation of this mechanism will make it possible to, in a feasible and effective way, join up norms and rules for responsible state behavior in cyberspace and ensure synergies across them. However, we are one session away from concluding the mandate of this OEWG, and we still face significant uncertainty. Regarding the concerns expressed in connection with modalities and particularly those in connection with thematic groups, Guatemala believes that the proliferation of such thematic groups could hinder the participation of all members. As such, we believe that the effort to merge a few groups whose work could be complementary so that we can focus our work would be a better alternative. In this same vein, we would opt to have a specific group on capacity building, bearing in mind that for some countries this issue is a priority and encompasses a series of needs which underpin this whole problem as a whole. These concerns prompted our delegation to put forward a document that covers these concerns, but we are concerned that there is no cross-cutting approach to concerns that we have expressed. Mexico quite rightly said it’s important to guarantee the participation and inclusion of delegations with limited capacity building capabilities. The hybrid modality is a good opportunity to achieve that goal. We should also guarantee multilingualism, inclusive participation, transparent and active participation. Regarding the importance of inter-sectoral cooperation, Guatemala firmly believes that it is necessary to increase cooperation and dialogue between stakeholders such as governments, private sector stakeholders, academia, and civil society in order to guarantee the collaborative development of initiatives. For this reason, we should agree upon transparent, effective methods to ensure that this participation is not affected without proper grounding. We favorably view the working document presented by Chile and Canada. Chairman, my country will continue to be committed to this process, and we hope that together with your efforts, we will lay the crucial foundations for the building of a safe and resilient cyberspace through the future mechanism. It’s vital that we continue to work together in a flexible way to find solutions without building more barriers. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Guatemala, for your contribution. Russian Federation, to be followed by New Zealand.

Chair, we align ourselves with the concept paper of the Group of Like-Minded States on the parameters of the successor body to the OEWG, made by the Distinguished Representative of the Republic of Nicaragua. We expect that its provisions will be taken into consideration by the Chair when he updates his discussion paper on this topic. The Russian Federation also aligns itself with the statement made, proposal by the Chinese delegation regarding the permanent negotiation mechanism. In a national capacity, we would like to thank you, Chair, and your team for your tireless efforts to fulfill the mandate of the OEWG and to achieve, find consensus on the future mechanism. The Russian Federation has considered the discussion paper on the modalities of NGO participation and the thematic groups. Unfortunately, in the current version, we cannot support this document. To serve as a starting point of discussion, it should be significantly improved. We are concerned, first of all, about the proposed principles for the participation of non-state actors. In our view, this would undermine the no-objection procedure that is tried and tested at the OEWG and, consequently, it would limit the so-called veto power of member states. We strongly oppose the idea of starting consultations on the NGO accreditation requests that have been objected to, not to mention some limited participation in the blocked organizations. We call for the adherence to the modalities of the OEWG’s mandate, which were adopted after difficult negotiations, and represent a delicate balance of interests for all parties. The principle of consensus must remain at its core. It is crucial to prevent automatically accrediting NGOs at the successor body, which is to inherit the sensitive international information security agenda from the OEWG. This mainly happens through ECOSOC. We assume that all NGOs should undergo the accreditation procedure on equal footing, without any privileges or exceptions. The Russian Federation has no objection to the disclosure of the reasons for the refusal of NGO applications. However, the idea of making such information public without the consent of the state objecting to the applications is counterproductive, and this will result in even greater politicization. We propose that such information could be disclosed only on a voluntary basis. We believe the idea of borrowing the models from other UN platforms is not a reasonable one, including the possibility of giving NGOs the floor at the plenary meetings at the discretion of the Chair. We draw the attention of those who advocate for following the example of the Ad Hoc Committee. To one thing, its mandate and the mandate of the future mechanism on ICT security are not comparable. The Ad Hoc Committee deals with anti-fraud issues, while the agenda of the OEWG and the successor body covers aspects of international and national security, which are the exclusive prerogative of states. Additionally, the Ad Hoc Committee modalities cannot be portrayed as some kind of gold standard, as NGOs did not make any meaningful contributions to the negotiations on this. As for the thematic discussions, the OEWG has shown how effective it can be in fulfilling its mandate. Member states have managed to reach an agreement on establishing the first universal confidence-building measure in the field of international information security, the Points of Contact Directory. There are, and we hope there will be even more future practical results in other areas of the group’s work. That said, we propose building the work of the thematic groups of the future mechanism strictly in accordance with the five pillars of the mandate. We don’t see any point in reinventing the wheel when a smooth and reliable mechanism is already there. In concrete terms, we oppose the idea of combining voluntary rules and international law within one thematic group. The discussions on legally binding norms and voluntary rules of behavior require completely different expertise and therefore should be conducted within the relevant specialized discussion platforms. We do not see any logic in establishing a separate group on preventing conflicts. This issue is a cross-cutting one. It could be totally discussed along with international law, norms, and confidence-building measures. We also cannot support a separate group on such a narrow topic as critical information infrastructure. It is not clear what the results of this discussion would look like, particularly since the criteria for designating this infrastructure is different in different countries. This topic could be considered within the groups on confidence-building measures and capacity building. Furthermore, Russia opposes the expansion of the Chair’s powers by providing the right to convene ad hoc groups. Such important decisions should be made strictly by consensus by member states. We would also like to respond to the statement made by some delegations who are trying to distract attention from our general consensus decisions to their own initiatives that are not inclusive. We would recall here we’re talking about creating a future permanent mechanism that will inherit the mandate from this group of OEWG as set forth in its third annual report. Attempts to change these understandings are unacceptable. In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that the Russian Federation stands ready for constructive work. We are committed to finding a balanced and fair compromise. Thank you for your attention.

Thank you, Russian Federation, for your contribution. New Zealand, to be followed by Denmark.

Thank you, Chair. Listening throughout this week and indeed over many past sessions, there are two themes that stand out in terms of the vision states have for a future mechanism. Many states have expressed a desire for a future mechanism that would be action-oriented, that would include the establishment of dynamic thematic groups. Others have expressed a preference for maintaining a structure that closely resembles the current pillar approach we use in the OEWG to organize our work. In our view, these two positions are not mutually exclusive, as you well noted yesterday afternoon, Chair. We find that encouraging. In fact, we would suggest they are not only compatible, but rather they complement each other. There is perhaps more common ground than we all realize. If carefully crafted, we can ensure the future mechanism provides for both, and in a way that will build on and enhance the fruitful discussions we’ve had within the OEWG. In that regard, we have considered and are supportive of France’s proposal for three thematic groups on resilience, cooperation, and stability. Three groups that were also included in your proposal, Chair. In our view, this proposal continues and builds on the traditional pillared approach. The central plenary discussions would remain organized around those traditional pillars, and the introduction of the thematic working groups would enhance our consideration of the pillars by situating them within practical context, where, for example, we can have deeper scenario-based discussions than we would have in a plenary meeting. France provided some very useful examples of how this would work in practice, and how the groups would link to the plenary, which we appreciate very much. We appreciate your proposal, Chair, for two additional groups on norms and international law and capacity building. In our view, however, five working groups alongside the plenary meetings would risk creating a burdensome workload, particularly on smaller states, as Tonga noted on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum. Further, we think we can have more effective consideration of those issues if we weave them into the other three groups on resilience, cooperation, and stability. There is detail to be worked through, including how many meetings should we have and how long should they run, but if we can start from this principle that these visions are complementary, then we believe there is capacity to make progress. As we consider modalities and timing, I would endorse Tonga’s remarks on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum regarding resource limitations for many smaller states. We support initiatives to reduce logistical burdens, for example, having the working groups run back-to-back with the plenary. We also support Tonga’s remarks that if hybrid or virtual meetings are considered for aspects of the future mechanism, there is a need to consider different time zones. We do love discussing cyber security in our region, but not necessarily at 2 a.m. every single time an international meeting is held, Chair. On stakeholder participation, we would firstly underscore the value that relevant stakeholders would bring to a future mechanism. This point has been made many times during the week, including by yourself, Chair. The future mechanism will be state-led. There’s really no debate on this central point. I don’t think anybody is making that point. But we also must find a way to ensure we have stakeholder participation and perspectives integrated into our process. We thank you, Chair, for your detailed proposal on stakeholder modalities. We do believe, however, that the proposal does not overcome a central weakness of the current process in that a veto would effectively remain, though we do appreciate your efforts, Chair, to look at ways to manage objections. Further, for stakeholder participation to be truly meaningful in a future process, we need to ensure stakeholders are also able to participate in the thematic working groups. That’s where we will be getting into a lot more specific detail, and that’s where stakeholder expertise would be very valuable. In terms of your guiding questions, Chair, we think we can take inspiration from the recent ad hoc committee negotiations toward a cybercrime convention, not necessarily to clone those modalities, but it certainly can provide us useful guidance as we try to find a balance. Some states have sought to differentiate the AHC process from our future mechanism based on the subject matter and issues of sensitivity around security. But there is a central point of commonality in both processes, and that is we can enrich our discussions as states with the technical, real-world expertise and experience of stakeholders who are often at the cutting edge of the technologies we are considering. I was involved in the AHC negotiations, and I can indeed confirm stakeholders made useful and, in fact, vital contributions. We thank Chile and Canada for their work on developing a proposal for stakeholder participation, which we have co-sponsored alongside a number of other states. In our view, this proposal overcomes the challenges identified in the current process while maintaining the central role of states in the process. We would encourage all participants to study the proposal and engage constructively with it as we collectively consider how best to use the expertise stakeholders can bring to a future mechanism. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, New Zealand, for your contribution. Denmark, to be followed by Brazil.

Thank you, Chair. And first, let me thank you for your tireless efforts in guiding this process. To say it shortly, you are doing a great job. Now, Denmark fully aligns with the EU statement made yesterday. At the same time, Denmark fully supports your call for a constructive approach as we work towards achieving meaningful results by our July deadline. And we remain open to dialogue and compromise. Finding common ground is essential for success. And I do believe, actually, that we have heard a lot of common ground this morning. Clearly, certain principles must guide our efforts. Any future UN permanent mechanism should be action-oriented, inclusive, and firmly rooted in consensus. Frankly, it is difficult to see why anyone would oppose the establishment of a stable and cooperative permanent mechanism under the UN as proposed in the Program of Action, particularly at a time when global cybersecurity challenges are growing ever more urgent and complex. In our view, the establishment of a small number of dedicated working groups offers a practical means of fostering focused, in-depth discussions while remaining aligned with the broader UN framework. As you have said, Chair, these groups should complement, not replace, plenary sessions and provide a space for developing concrete, solution-driven outcomes. Of course, different models can be considered when setting up these groups. Hardly surprising, we are supportive of the model outlined in the joint French paper, which we have joined. But we remain open to dialogue on how to best structure these groups, with a view to achieving meaningful and inclusive outcomes. And, I think importantly, taking into consideration the very real issue of Member States’ resources. As highlighted by you, Mr. Chair, we should also all remember that we are not setting things in stone. We do have the option to adapt along the way, and there will be a review process. Regarding participation, Denmark strongly believes that meaningful contributions from relevant stakeholders are essential to the legitimacy and success of this process. Those who operate, secure, and are directly affected by cyberspace must have the opportunity to contribute. While States should retain leadership over decision-making, stakeholder engagement must be open, transparent, and inclusive to reflect the truly global nature of the threats we face. We therefore also believe that we must move beyond the current veto-based approach. As you rightly emphasized, Mr. Chair, we need to recognize the seriousness of the moment. Failing to advance this process would not merely represent a diplomatic shortcoming. It would amount to a serious setback for global cybersecurity. As threats continue to escalate in both scale and complexity, inaction or deadlock will leave us more exposed and less prepared for the challenges ahead. We therefore urge all delegations to engage with a spirit of compromise, cooperation, and shared responsibility. We for certain are ready to listen, adapt, and contribute. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Denmark, for your contribution. Brazil, to be followed by Slovakia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Brazil aligns itself with the statement delivered by Argentina on behalf of a number of Latin American countries and would like to make additional remarks in its national capacity. My delegation reiterates its appreciation to you and your team for your efforts to help advance our deliberations on regular institutional dialogue. We made relevant progress from the second to the third APR in outlining the elements of the mechanism, which shows our capacity for reaching important agreements within this group. We thank you for presenting your discussion paper and guiding questions, as well as delegations that submitted specific proposals, which set the stage to advance our negotiations on a single permanent mechanism to be established by consensus in July. My delegation made some considerations on elements for the future mechanism in the town hall on February 6th and in its other statements this week, which we will avoid repeating for the sake of brevity, but remain part of our position. We agree that a regular institutional dialogue mechanism must be action-oriented and integrate all key aspects of a secure ICT environment, such as confidence building and capacity building, and also allow for in-depth discussions on areas where common understandings still elude us. This is why we support the combination of a yearly one-week plenary with thematic groups. The groups should be structured in a way that allows smaller delegations to have meaningful participation. In this regard, we would propose a number of three such groups with no simultaneous meetings. We recognize, of course, that there are more than three issues in ICT security that require and would benefit from in-depth discussions. This is, however, the reality of nearly all topics on the UN agenda. To reconcile this with a large number of important topics that merit more in-depth discussions, we reiterate our proposal to, in line with the practice in other UN bodies, have rotating agendas mandated by the plenary or review conference, which could match the biannual cycles proposed. To ensure that the debates in those groups are dynamic and interactive while also producing tangible results, we believe that they should be mostly informal, with some formal sessions to allow for the adoption of agreed outcomes on the topics under discussion, which should be elevated to the plenary. Much has been said about the importance of discussing many issues in a cross-cutting manner in different groups instead of a dedicated group. In our view, those options will not be necessarily mutually exclusive, and some issues such as international law or capacity building might require both. While international law underpins all our discussions at the United Nations and will be relevant in any working group discussion, our debates throughout the OEWG process have shown the need for deeper discussions between our legal experts to advance our quest for common understandings in this area. Capacity building, likewise, must be cross-cutting to all issues debated in the future mechanism but must also be the subject of targeted discussion with the adoption of tangible outcomes so as to address its effectiveness and ensure that resources are adequately allocated and that initiatives remain demand-driven, politically neutral, and duly incorporate our capacity building principles. The effectiveness of our future mechanism will be directly related to its inclusivity. Judicious use of remote meeting options as a complement to in-person meetings is one tool to make that happen. Nevertheless, given the challenges presented to delegations in distant time zones from New York and the importance of in-person contact to build the necessary trusting relationships in this area, it will also be key to promote in-person participation of delegates from developing countries. This is why funding to facilitate participation must be a permanent fixture of a future mechanism, and we support its inclusion in the report on the voluntary fund prepared by the Secretariat. The contributions of a wide range of views from other stakeholders will be positive to our debates given their expertise and the role of many of them in helping states implement elements of the UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior. We thank Canada and Chile for their working paper as well as the Chair’s proposal and believe both contain elements that could help us reach a solution that builds upon the current modalities while preserving the intergovernmental nature of the process. We must take into account that inclusivity in this case entails a balance in that participation in terms of both geographic and sectoral representation. Funding options to facilitate the participation of stakeholders with fewer financial resources, especially from the developing world, will be necessary. Mr. Chair, we have heard many different and detailed proposals on the specifics of the future mechanism this week. While we of course have a lot of work ahead of us to find a balanced compromise among them, we nevertheless see room for optimism as it means there is broad consensus on the main structure and key elements of our mechanism. We remain ready to engage in further negotiations between now and our next session to ensure the adoption of a consensus outcome in July. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Brazil, for your contribution. Slovakia, to be followed by Egypt.

Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, we are approaching the final phase of the Open-Ended Working Group. It is therefore not surprising that the question of the future continuation of the discussions on ICT security has become much more important. Slovakia identifies with the statement of the European Union and specifically the esteemed delegate of France. For many years, this group and GGEs have discussed the theoretical application of norms, rules, and principles, as well as international law in cyberspace. During the discussion on the structure and content of the future permanent mechanism, we have a unique opportunity to translate these past discussions into practical results. The Chair has made every effort since 2021 within the OEWG to accommodate the diverse views of national delegations and various stakeholders, whose contributions and real-world data proved invaluable during the process of discussing the goal, content, and structure of the future mechanism. Therefore, Slovakia co-sponsored the Non-Paper on Stakeholder Modalities presented by Canada and Chile, together with other supporting countries. My delegation also appreciates the vision of thematic groups as included in the Chairman’s discussion paper. However, the list of groups still needs more negotiation to reach a reasonable consensus. Cross-cutting thematic groups, as proposed in the model introduced by France and other states, will offer a broad space for discussion on how international law and non-binding norms apply in cyberspace and how they can be applied to specific policy issues. We therefore fully support the idea of bringing together various vital topics, such as promoting resilience, protecting critical infrastructure, and international law, as we have witnessed how these areas intersect in practice. Please keep in mind that in cybersecurity, all topics are interconnected, and it is practically impossible to select a topic for a dedicated working group, since this topic is certainly one of the properties of another topic. For example, everything we do in cybersecurity takes place in an environment where it is influenced by international and national legislations and norms. And for everything, we need resources and capacities. Therefore, it is not entirely possible to single out legislation and capacity building to separate discussion groups. If one of the aims is not to burden smaller delegations with limited resources, which is why the Program of Action proposed a reduction in formal meetings and back-to-back meetings of the dedicated thematic groups, we consider it important to establish only a limited number of cross-cutting thematic groups, probably no more than three. Finally, given the ambition of this room to arrive at a useful and action-oriented future mechanism, the Program of Action, which emphasizes regular review conferences, plenary sessions, and institutional continuity in the form of thematic groups as described in several of the interventions above, is in line with our urgent need for a stable, responsive, and forward-looking framework. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Slovakia, for your contribution. Cuba now, to be followed by Czechia. Cuba, please, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We align ourselves with the statement made by the delegation of Nicaragua. It is vital that the future institutional mechanism for regular dialogue preserve its intergovernmental nature. This will guarantee the full participation of all states on an equal footing. Consensus should be maintained as the method for decision-making. That is the only way that we will ensure that the concerns of all countries are given due consideration. Regarding the structure and functioning of the future mechanism, we agree with the delegations that underscore the importance of avoiding duplication of efforts and that we avoid prioritizing some issues over others in an imbalanced way. The organization of meetings as proposed by China could serve as a good basis to guarantee that we avoid those things. At the same time, whilst ultimately consensus overall may emerge on the creation of specific thematic groups, we must be very careful in ensuring that we design those thematic groups with stringent adherence to the five pillars of the mechanism’s mandate. This will ensure that discussions do not overlap and will guarantee that each topic receives the attention it deserves in order to ultimately produce added value in terms of presenting things to plenary sessions and in order to avoid additional burdens for delegations. Any decision taken about the formation of new groups or merging certain topics should be taken by member states. We emphasize that we do not support the creation of a group on conflict prevention that could introduce into the future mechanism concepts that do not enjoy consensus. On the contrary, we should focus on how to guarantee the safe and exclusively peaceful use of ICTs in the peaceful resolution of any dispute which may arise. Whilst the pillars on capacity building and confidence-building measures could be merged into one thematic group, due attention must be paid to capacity building without that topic being watered down and spread across the various areas of work of any future mechanism. Bearing in mind paragraph 9 of annex C of the third annual progress report on the functions of the future institutional dialogue mechanism, that mechanism should consider establishing legally binding obligations in the sphere of international information security. That must be borne in mind as we establish the details of the structures of the mechanism, including its possible specific thematic groups. Regarding the participation of stakeholders, we insist that we should maintain the delicate balance achieved in this regard within the current OEWG. That was already the result of a compromise previously made. We oppose attempts to bypass the OEWG in order to impose changes in current modalities for participation. Doing that would undermine trust in the process and would set a very negative precedent for other issues which themselves may produce difficulties in the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue. We are in favour of preserving consensus in the design and establishment of the future mechanism, such as to guarantee the continuation of periodic institutional dialogue on the security of ICTs and their use.

Thank you, Cuba, for your contribution. Czechia will be followed by the Netherlands.

So thank you, Mr. Chair. Czechia, aligned with the statement of the European Union on regular institutional dialogue made yesterday, would like to offer the following remarks in its national capacity. First, we strongly support reaching a consensus on establishing a future permanent mechanism within the current Open-Ended Working Group. A successful outcome will provide a solid foundation for implementing the agreed framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace and contribute to upholding a peaceful, secure, stable, and accessible ICT environment. From our perspective, the future mechanism should reduce the burden on delegations compared to the current OEWG. In this regard, we have consistently supported the proposal for a Cyber Program of Action – POA. We welcome the proposal on the establishment of three thematic groups that would be cross-cutting and action-oriented. This approach will streamline our efforts, reduce the number of meetings, and ensure a more efficient use of resources. These groups should integrate all pillars of the current OEWG framework, allowing us to move beyond conceptual discussion and focus on concrete actions, such as strengthening resilience, improving cooperation in cyber incident management, and enhancing stability in cyberspace. Furthermore, Czechia supports efforts to make these thematic group meetings more accessible and inclusive, including the possibility of holding them outside New York or in a hybrid format, allowing broader participation from all regions. Cyber capacity building must be a core component of the future mechanism. In this regard, again, we strongly support the POA proposal, as it provides a structured, action-oriented, and inclusive approach. It ensures that cyber capacity building efforts are demand-driven, tailored to national needs, and effectively linked to other key areas, such as international law and confidence-building measures. We also support the inclusion of expert briefings as an integral part of each thematic group, as they provide valuable insights and technical expertise to enrich our discussions. Last year’s informal OEWG session in May demonstrated the benefits of such an approach, with experts from diverse regions contributing to the dialogue. To facilitate expert briefings from the private sector, academia, and the expert community, we must establish clear modalities for the participation of non-governmental stakeholders. Therefore, we – and I mentioned it already in our previous statement – we strongly support the Canada-Chile proposal, which offers a transparent and balanced framework for stakeholders’ engagement. At the same time, Czechia emphasizes that stakeholders’ participation must be diverse and inclusive, ensuring representation from all regions and perspectives. We appreciate the Chair’s discussion paper as an important step toward compromise. We remain concerned that it retains the existing veto mechanism, which continues to limit stakeholders’ participation. Czechia firmly believes that no veto rights should exist in this process. If consensus cannot be reached on the inclusion or exclusion of a specific stakeholder, the decision should be made through a vote to ensure transparency and fairness. In conclusion, Czechia remains committed to constructive dialogue, consensus building, and international cooperation to advance global cybersecurity. We look forward to working with all Member States to establish an effective, inclusive, and action-oriented future mechanism. I thank you.

Thank you. Thank you, Czechia, for your contribution. Netherlands, to be followed by Chile.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and sorry that I took the floor a little bit too early earlier on. The Kingdom of the Netherlands aligns itself with the European Union, and I would like to make the following remarks in my national capacity. Mr. Chair, as the OEWG concludes, the Netherlands stresses the need to continue our fruitful discussions in the future mechanism, drawing on lessons learned from this OEWG to establish an effective permanent framework. In this regard, we are a supporter of the Program of Action and welcome the three dedicated working groups that France has proposed and shared in their working papers. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is of the view that cross-cutting and policy-goal-oriented thematic working groups would allow for deeper, concrete, and action-oriented discussions. The three proposed working groups would enable us to tackle the contemporary cyber-challenges of today, while also being flexible enough to discuss the emerging threats of the future. However, we agree that having cross-cutting thematic groups or having a pillar structure is not mutually exclusive. We believe that replicating the OEWG pillars in the plenary and having cross-cutting thematic discussions actually complement each other very well. This would strike a good balance between nurturing what we have, while also giving room for innovation. Mr. Chair, specifically on capacity building, the Kingdom of the Netherlands agrees that it should be an essential element of the future mechanism. We believe integrating capacity building as a core element that cuts across the mandate will support implementation of the UN framework and actionable recommendations. We specifically propose a cyclical approach consisting of several steps, as we have presented last December. We also note a call for a dedicated space for capacity building, alongside the thematic group and plenary discussions. We believe that a high-level roundtable for cyber-capacity building could be an option to provide that stage. Here, states could exchange information on programs and initiatives, share experiences, and explore new sources of financing and training. This will enable the UN to effectively complement, support, and enhance the work of other existing cyber-security capacity building initiatives. Mr. Chair, on stakeholder modalities, we agreed to the current modalities of the OEWG, in the hope that more transparency, including a justification for an objection of a stakeholder, would lead to more judicious use. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Therefore, the future mechanism must have robust stakeholder modalities. This is crucial for their meaningful contribution to the discussion. In this regard, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has joined the group of co-sponsors of the paper of Canada and Chile, that outlines proposals on stakeholder modalities in a future discussion. We, as states, cannot counter the international cyber-challenges alone. These challenges are simply complex, so we need to work together and make use of each other’s expertise and insights. This is also why we believe it is essential that stakeholders can meaningfully engage, in both the thematic groups and the plenary, on issues within their area of expertise. Apart from an open exchange and discussions with stakeholders in the thematic groups, we propose allocating dedicated time for oral statements, under each agenda item in the plenary. This approach would allow relevant stakeholders to come in, on the subject of their expertise, and enable us to benefit from their specialized knowledge and enriching our discussions. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, in the final period of the OEWG, my delegation stands ready to work together with you and other delegations to ensure a smooth transition into the future mechanisms. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Kingdom of the Netherlands, for your contribution. Chile, to be followed by Israel.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize at the outset given that my delegation only planned to make a statement in this segment. This will be a longer statement because it will cover multiple areas. We think it’s the most productive way to proceed at this stage of our discussions. Chair, yesterday we closed meetings with the task of reassessing our work, thinking about pillars and the very roof of our future house. In this regard, my delegation can be flexible, including in terms of furnishings of our house, but we do think we need to build this house on solid foundations such as to allow us to keep pace with emerging threats, technological change, and other political matters. Chile reiterates its readiness to work constructively and together with others to build a permanent future mechanism which harmoniously integrates capacity building, the respect for international law, the inclusion of a gender perspective, and the effective participation of the multistakeholder community. With a structure rooted in principles focusing on people as well as the defense of human rights, neutrality, and transparency, we are convinced that that is the structure that will allow us to move towards a more safe, resilient, and equitable digital environment for all. These are principles which should govern our laying the foundations of our house. Regarding regular institutional dialogue, we hope that the future permanent mechanism will be a body in which we will be able to make concrete progress on issues that have been under discussion regarding the responsible behavior of states in cyberspace. An action-oriented mechanism, as my delegation has previously stated, should serve as a body which will allow us to make concrete progress with the effective implementation of recommendations that have arisen in recent years. At the same time, a permanent mechanism should be an effective body within which to hold constructive dialogue, dialogue which allows us to produce concrete measures to tackle threats in cyberspace. Cyberattacks and malicious activities in cyberspace are dynamic and ever-changing. As we noted during our session specifically devoted to emerging threats, given the high number of delegations that took the floor, these changes we have seen are evolving at a pace which affects our discussions and agreements. As such, we should ensure that our future mechanism is effective and issues recommendations which can really assist states in tackling threats. So, our multilateral future discussions cannot become discussions in and of themselves. They need to offer plausible concrete solutions. We attach particular importance to the establishment of thematic groups in the future mechanism because these should allow more detailed discussions. That is how we see their function. They should dwell on problems but also concrete solutions. Consequently, we need to have a number of clear definitions regarding the functioning, the role of our mechanism as well as its future cycles. As such, we are grateful for the proposals made by the Chair. We are flexible and we are ready to have more detailed discussions on the number of thematic groups. We do think that the structuring of them should allow the active participation of all stakeholders. As such, in our view, it would be possible to establish a smaller number of thematic groups. As other delegations have stated, we might look at the possibility of merging themes under discussion in these thematic groups. It is very important for us to ensure that capacity building gives rise to a specific focus discussion. So, we echo the working group recently presented by a group of Latin American countries. We have to have a thematic group to talk about this very important issue that is capacity building. But if it’s not the focus of a specific group, we need to know that it will be discussed in depth and in such a way that allows our work on it to evolve. In the previous session and the previous OEWG, we saw that capacity building was a strategic issue. So, the way it’s discussed and the way recommendations are implemented should ultimately strengthen the resilience of states and persons in the face of existing and future threats. It’s not possible to build a safe and efficient cyberspace if we cannot guarantee the safety of all of those that form part of ICTs, and we need to know that all our voices will be heard. As such, debating capacity building continues to be a priority of our international digital agenda. Allow me briefly to talk about the ideas that are contained in the Canada-Chile document, supported by 25 delegations. The document is on practical modalities for stakeholder participation. We firmly believe that significantly involving the multistakeholder community, including the academia, experts, civil society, and the private sector is vital to enrich our discussions and bolster our collective response to threats in cyberspace. The proposal, based on the principle of a voice, not a vote, guarantees that while final decisions might be intergovernmental, the contributions made by stakeholders, non-state stakeholders, provide critical information and a technical perspective that would otherwise be lacking in this debate. We believe that it’s only in that way that our dialogue will really be able to encompass the full breadth of issues that we need to tackle and ensure that we’re relevant in terms of coming up with real situations when the threats to cybersecurity arise. Moreover, we are establishing practical modalities for the accreditation and participation of civil society in our document. That will lend transparency and predictability to our work, and that will ensure that the mechanism remains inclusive and effective throughout its existence. This is particularly important in an environment in which the pace of technological change and cyber threats require agile and properly informed evidence-based results to give certainty to the stakeholder community. That is also important. That certainty means that they can properly schedule their contributions and contribute properly. In the segment devoted to them, we saw how they, too, create networks and mutually support each other. That means that they are a community that provides contributions not only in the room but outside of it. We saw that one person had to give three statements on three different issues, so you can see how they all work together. Ultimately, our proposal does not only complement the intergovernmental process, but it also paves the way for a broader dialogue, a richer dialogue that can produce the CBMs and bolster our collective ability to tackle cybersecurity challenges and threats. Moreover, we believe that the discussion on international law is so crucially important when it comes to the responsible behavior of states in cyberspace that it is, in our view, relevant and necessary to continue our discussions and allow them to evolve. We’re flexible in terms of the best way to achieve that goal. That could be in a specific thematic group or having a mandated other forum for dialogue within plenary, of course. My delegation does want to note that in terms of allowing our dialogue to mature, there needs to be common definitions that can be reflected in the outcomes of our group. These will stand as a basis for work for the future mechanism. Our goal here is to find common ground, and with that in mind, we joined a collective endeavor and backed a proposal presented by a number of delegations from different regions, and that was a declaration on this area of work. That document says that we should have continued discussion and build shared understanding because that reduces the risk of misunderstandings and ultimately prevents inappropriate behavior on the part of states. That document also recommends the need to build capacity so that national positions can be robust and best practices can be shared, and that will facilitate broader participation of all in international debate. We believe that’s appropriate as a way to continue dialogue and tackle the needs that arise in this area in the best possible way. My delegation does want to point out that we would have liked to see more specific developed language, particularly regarding the application of international humanitarian law in cyberspace, so we staunchly support the proposal of language made by Switzerland on this matter during this segment. In sum, we believe that championing these ideas means plumping for a safe cyberspace where adherence to international law and cooperation between states are fundamental pillars to address current and future challenges in the use of ICTs. Chair, at the beginning of this week we shared that in our view this group was one of the best kept secrets of the United Nations. We believe that to a large extent, or rather as the speaker says, this is due to the equal participation of women delegates. We wish to underscore the importance of incorporating gender perspectives as a cross-cutting focus in future discussions on the ICTs. The document drawn up by Australia, Colombia, Fiji, the United Kingdom, and also Chile that is currently supported by more than 30 delegations demonstrates that gender equality is not only a human rights imperative but also decisive in guaranteeing international peace and security. In addition to the document, the document elsewhere says that civil society working on gender equality and cybersecurity have an essential role to play. We’re grateful to the contributions made by women representatives in cybersecurity in the Middle East, writer pilots, and other groups that talked about this issue. This not only strengthens capacity building efforts but also helps to narrow the gender digital divide, ultimately defining the role of women adopting such an approach allows us to have mechanisms which not only address technical and security challenges but also which promote equality, inclusion, and the protection of the fundamental rights of all persons. This is a step in the right direction. In addition to all of the above, we value the chair’s proposals, those of France and China. We’d like to share a number of concrete proposals elsewhere in terms of creative ways to ensure the participation of stakeholders. We could look at the possibility of access to platforms which allow the real-time presentation of written contributions supplemented by periodic information sessions such as those already held by the chair prior to every session. That should be established as a practice and not something that can be used at the whim of a future chair. Rotating accreditation processes allowing new people to come in is also important. To safeguard and pay attention to a number of security concerns expressed by states, perhaps we could develop a practical guide to support the participation of stakeholders in terms of the contributions they make. Those contributions have to be safe and secure but we could guide them about how to improve their contributions to discussions on the future mechanism and its ultimate structure. We also value the proposal made by the chair about having a mechanism so that states can publicly present objections accompanied by detailed justifications. That could also be extended as something we discuss in the plenary and these objections could be discussed in plenary and evaluated. In terms of the thematic groups presented by the delegation of France, we believe that these could be a basis and allow us to have action-oriented work. However, we believe that we could also explore including additional thematic groups such as that on capacity building and legally binding aspects or humanitarian law as applied to the ICTs. This work should be focused without duplicating what’s done in plenary. We agree that all of this should be evaluated, its relevance should be evaluated and all this relevance should also be tackled during the various cycles of the OEWG to guarantee the success of these thematic groups. We believe that we must ensure that each group clearly define what their areas of focus and themes of work will be. That is something that should be tackled in the run-up to the July session and the outcome document to be adopted by plenary. The thematic groups should focus on technical discussions, in-depth discussions that are guided towards concrete results. Plenary sessions will evaluate the recommendations suggested by the thematic groups and this is all part of our overarching policy. Having feedback sessions where we present the results and recommendations of thematic groups is important so that they can be discussed and endorsed by the plenary. We need to foster the exchange of written documents by thematic groups before the plenary sessions and in a timely way. We have listened to the myriad points of view expressed by delegations, particularly the contributions from developing countries and we’ve borne in mind limited resources. Therefore, having three and no more than five simultaneous thematic groups could be the most appropriate way forward. We could also implement a rotating mechanism so that various groups can be active in various cycles, avoiding the overburdening of delegations. We always need to bear in mind whether we’re going to work in biennial or five-year periods. Regarding sequencing and programming, we think a biennial program is appropriate with thematic groups that would meet annually or twice a year maybe. We should have plenary sessions to incorporate their feedback. We should align our scheduling with that of thematic groups and align that with annual planning cycles for the permanent mechanism to ensure coherence and the timely integration of recommendations into our work. Now, on the nature of thematic groups, we should design them to encourage proper full participation and that scheduling will be important. We should have formal in-person meetings for these working groups to allow us to record what we’re doing and effectively transmit the results of our discussions to those who require them. However, that does not stop us from having the possibility of some types of hybrid meetings so that we can properly include delegations with limited capacity and so that we can have the contributions of experts from capital and specialists. Here, in these meetings, we should always bear in mind the importance of having multilingualism and respecting time differences. We need to explore additional initiatives to build capacity and how these might work and mutually enrich each other within the future mechanism. We have the plenary and high-level discussion groups, for example. All of these could coexist if they effectively reconcile their work. We do need to respond to needs that have been expressed here and any future needs that may arise. We need to bear in mind realities and priorities. We need to discuss how the future mechanism can be agile and ever-evolving in the face of cyber threats and how they evolve. That is vital. Finally, in terms of consensus, and this is in a vein to what was said by Mexico and El Salvador, consensus should be a means to achieve common understanding, broad common understanding, and not as an end in itself. The abuse of consensus can paralyze action and allow one state to impose their interest on the collective. In terms of procedure, when it is clear that consensus is not achievable, a quick resolution should be found to not hinder constructive dialogue on areas that are substantive. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Chile, for your contribution. Israel, please.

Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor. As we approach the conclusion of the current Open-Ended Working Group, Israel welcomes this opportunity to contribute to the discussions on the future mechanism that will succeed it. We recognize the importance of ensuring continuity, inclusivity, and effectiveness in global discussions on international cyber security. However, the design of this future mechanism must reflect lessons learned from past processes and safeguard core principles that ensure practical outcomes. Chair, we listened to your remarks yesterday very carefully. We found your suggestion to all of us to avoid the tendency to simply copy-paste everything that we have now in our current process to the new mechanism. We found that suggestion to be very useful, and we would like to encourage all Member States to refrain from it, as it will not contribute to our future work and will not be the best use of our time and resources. Mr. Chair, Israel is of the view that for the sake of inclusiveness and effectiveness of such a dialogue, the framework for such a dialogue on ICT security should be of a voluntary and non-legally binding nature. Any other type of framework carries the risk of alienating and driving away some of the relevant actors. In this context, we also believe that cyber security and cyber resilience are key elements of states’ national security. It is essential that any future framework will be consensus-based. Mr. Chair, in our view, the chosen institutional dialogue should be a single track and avoid duplications or further fragmentations, and it should optimize the use of resources and maintain a process which will be practical and action-oriented in nature. Like many other Member States, we also anticipate that we might encounter difficulties equally contributing and fully engaging with parallel and multiple processes. In the same way, we advocate minimizing the number of thematic working groups, allowing size, distance, or resource-challenged delegations to equally participate. We wish to thank France for a very thoughtful working paper presented to us on the future mechanism, structure, and modalities of the cross-cutting thematic working groups. In this regard, Israel also believes that there are several potential advantages in creating two or three dedicated thematic groups to deal with cross-cutting challenges or problems like ransomware, national or global resilience, security by design, and supply chain security, to name a few. Through these issues, we can continue to elaborate and use the five pillars and relevant issues pertaining to the framework we have created in previous work of the open-ended working groups and GGEs. Using a rotating agenda item in a yearly cycle of the new mechanism can be one of the ways to address the concerns of creating an excessive work burden as flagged by some Member States. We wish to join the U.S. as they have presented some grave concerns over the suggestions by some to conflate and merge our pillars of voluntary norms and international law into one working group, as these issues are very different in nature and might create ambiguity and confusion. The same goes for the suggestions to pick one or two of our pillars and make them the titles of the new thematic working groups, as that will be a contradiction to the whole idea of having cross-cutting working groups. Chair, any future mechanism should place stronger emphasis on regional cooperation and technical capacity building. Israel will continue to support initiatives that strengthen national and global cyber resilience, particularly in developing states, while ensuring that such programs remain free from political influence. The role of the private sector, academia, and civil society is indispensable in ensuring a secure and resilient cyberspace. The future mechanism must facilitate structured engagement with these actors, recognizing their role in cybersecurity policy, incident response, and innovation. We have noted the Canadian-Chilean working paper that brings a fresh look and offers revised modalities on the participation of relevant stakeholders in our future mechanism and wish to thank them for their initiatives and ideas. We will further study this paper and consider it. We are also open to considering suggestions made by a few Member States to adopt the multistakeholder modalities that guided the ad hoc cybercrime treaty negotiations, as they have proved to be very practical and useful, and we all know they brought a very successful result. In addition, Chair, we have persistently made clear that it is imperative in our view that all decisions on substantial matters and a new mechanism be taken based on the principle of consensus. This principle should apply both to the negotiation processes itself, leading to the creation of this mechanism, as well as to the decision-making process once the future mechanism is in place. Chair, in conclusion, Israel continues to support the creation of a state-led, single-track, practical, inclusive, and permanent UN mechanism, and we are ready to continue our constructive engagement, aiming to find the needed consensus on all matters vis-à-vis the modality, structure, scope, and function of this future mechanism. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Israel, for your contribution. I think we can take one more speaker before we adjourn for lunch. Thailand, please.

Mr. Chair, Thailand appreciates your efforts, including in the discussion paper on draft elements on stakeholder modalities and the dedicated thematic groups of the Future Permanent Mechanism. We support the participation of multistakeholders, including NGOs and academia, in the process of the Future Permanent Mechanism. As guided by you yesterday, Mr. Chair, and today as well, Thailand wishes to show our flexibility regarding the modalities proposed by you and wishes that States reach a consensus on this matter. We support the establishment of dedicated thematic groups to facilitate in-depth dialogue on various topics. We would like to share our views on this issue as follows. First, as a principle, Thailand is of the view that the establishment of these groups should be structured in a way that ensures equal participation by all States, including developing countries with limited resources. Therefore, we will support prioritizing topics that require urgent attention and merging interconnected issues where appropriate. While we remain flexible with the proposals put forward by certain Member States and by you, Mr. Chair, we support the establishment of the following thematic groups. First, a dedicated thematic group on international law. We are of the view that how international law applies in cyberspace remains a topic on which States need to develop a common understanding. Establishing a dedicated thematic group that incorporates scenario-based exercises on international law issues would provide a useful action-oriented platform to facilitate substantive exchanges on international law as well as capacity building. Second, a thematic group that will allow our technical experts to discuss existing and future threats for emerging technologies, in particular to critical infrastructure, and how such threats can be mitigated. While Thailand remains flexible with the name and the grouping of certain purpose groups, we also support the proposal by certain States to create a clear link between the threats we identify and discussing recommendations and proposals for responsible conduct of States as well as threat prevention, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. This leads to my second point, Mr. Chair. We would like to reiterate that capacity building efforts should be systematically integrated into discussions across all thematic groups and plenary sessions. We also reaffirm the importance of integrating gender equality into the new permanent mechanism, both as a core component of capacity building efforts and as a guiding principle. Thirdly, with regard to the format of the meetings, while we see merit in having hybrid meetings, we also see the need for in-person meetings, given the difference in time zones, which may not be practical for certain States. We also see merit in having in-person interaction among experts to promote better understanding and cooperation. Lastly, while it is important that Member States engage in the current discussion on the establishment of dedicated thematic groups under the new permanent mechanism, Thailand is of the view that the establishment of such groups should remain flexible. As rightly pointed out by you, Mr. Chair, we are mandated to establish thematic groups as necessary and that we should allow for future mechanisms to periodically assess the necessity to establish or make changes to these groups to evolving dynamics in the future, perhaps at the review conferences or, if the rules permit, even earlier. Mr. Chair, let me reiterate once again Thailand’s support for the establishment of the future permanent mechanism under the auspices of the UN that will allow for the continuation of dialogue among States on cybersecurity after the OEWG’s mandate ends this July. The new mechanism will serve as an important CBM in itself and will be crucial to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible, interoperable, and peaceful cyberspace. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Thailand, for your contribution. It’s exactly 1 p.m. We have about 25 speakers left. We’ve gone through the list halfway, so we’ll resume at 3 o’clock to continue with the rest of the speakers’ list. I wish you a pleasant lunch. The meeting is adjourned. Thank you.