Session 11-4 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

The fourth meeting of the 11th substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs is now called to order. Distinguished Delegates, we’ll continue our discussion under Agenda Item 5. As I indicated just before we broke for lunch, we will this afternoon begin with a discussion on Section G relating to Regular Institutional Dialogue and Annex 3 of REV1, which is related to Regular Institutional Dialogue and has additional draft modalities to be discussed. Now, please do not press the buttons yet to request the floor. We are going to erase the previous list and we will start afresh. So please hold on while we start afresh. And I wanted to say at this point, I wanted to at this point apologize for those who were not able to speak this afternoon on Sections A to F. I want to assure you that after we consider Regular Institutional Dialogue, we will find some time to give other delegations who wish to go back to Sections A to F and who have not yet spoken. So at this point, I’m only inviting comments on the section relating to Regular Institutional Dialogue. If your comments relate to Sections A to F, I kindly ask you to hold on. The discussions relating to Regular Institutional Dialogue are in some ways interconnected with the other sections, and therefore, I think it’s important that we start a discussion on RID and then come back to some of the other issues if needed. But the overarching point is that we do not have a lot of time, and even on Regular Institutional Dialogue, I’d like everyone to be as brief as possible, because we only have this three-hour session to get through this topic, and it is an important topic that we need to address. So I’d like to hear as many of you as possible, and please be very brief. So let me now invite you to press the button if you wish to speak on RID. Thank you very much. I think we have quite a number of delegations, maybe around 40 or more. So you do the math. We have three hours this afternoon, and I’d like you to speak within three minutes. All right. We’ll start with France, to be followed by Chile. French delegation, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chairman. My delegation would like to use a visual presentation to try to summarize from our perspective the challenges related to the historic opportunity to establish a permanent action-oriented mechanism related to cyber security at the UN. I’d like to thank you and the Secretariat for your flexibility here. Since our visual presentation is in English, I will now unfortunately move into English. Colleagues who are watching on the UN Web TV, please don’t get mad at me. We thought it was important to take a few steps back to look at what is at stake this week. We should indeed look at the situation from a higher standpoint, and from there, observe that there are more agreements than disagreements, more common goals than diverging interests. Our goal is to bridge the gaps, as we’ve always done with our work around the POA proposal. Next slide, please. The most important gap to fill is the digital divide, which results from the capacity building divide and capacity building gap. The previous processes have given a prominent place to this issue in the discussions, that’s true. But in the next process, we need to walk the talk and create the conditions for better capacity building. This is what a group of states from the LAC region has made clear in their paper on strengthening strategic dialogue on capacity building and its inclusion in the future permanent mechanism. Next slide, please. Therefore, we want to make a constructive proposal for the final report for better capacity building with three dimensions. The first dimension would be cyber capacity building discussions in the plenary. The second dimension would be discussions on concrete needs and solutions in the dedicated thematic groups. And finally, the third dimension would be a roundtable to be a dedicated space to capacity building. Next slide, please. The second gap to fill is the implementation gap. The previous processes have allowed negotiations to establish the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. But in order to face rising threats in cyberspace, we need here again to walk the talk. We need to start from the reality on the ground and from there understand how to best implement this framework through action-oriented recommendations. Next slide, please. Therefore, we suggest adding an agenda item for the future plenary. This item would allow the decision-making process in the plenary to benefit from the outcomes of action-oriented discussions in the dedicated thematic groups. More broadly, this will connect regional needs and best practices to the global conversation as the working paper from the Pacific Island Forum member states invited us to do. Next slide, please. And finally, we need to fill the inclusivity gap. The previous processes have seen a broad participation of cyber diplomats, which is a very good thing. But the next mechanism needs to give a voice to expertise by having cyber agencies, legal experts, and stakeholders around the table as well, being able to contribute when necessary. Let me be clear on one point, though. The decisions will remain the prerogative of states. Next slide, please. To accommodate experts’ inputs while depoliticizing these discussions, we propose three items as the agenda of each dedicated thematic group. They would start with briefings by experts and then discussion on needs and finally recommendations on solutions drawing from all the pillars of the framework to address cyber threats. Dear colleagues, international cooperation is not a zero-sum game. Discussing concrete challenges in cyberspace should not be seen as a national security risk. On the contrary, by sharing best practices, we can learn from each other and improve our collective resilience. This is the spirit of this proposal. Next slide, please. To try to bridge the consensus gap, France has uploaded a paper on the OEWG website proposing language for the three dedicated thematic groups. We hope this could be acceptable to all. This approach draws on all the pillars of the framework in a comprehensive and balanced way. The proposal online takes stock of agreed language as well as member state statements, especially the calls for a reasonable number of groups to avoid burdening delegations. Delegations may also observe that this approach is compatible with focusing on their various respective national priorities as raised by many delegations since Monday. Dear colleagues, my delegation is willing to keep this constructive dialogue going with a view to bridge the consensus gap by Friday. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, France, for that presentation. Thank you also for your statement in English. I see that as a sign of flexibility on the part of the French delegation. That is to be welcomed. I think, apart from all the gaps that we have, the consensus gap, we also have a time gap. And I think that’s what we are trying to address as well, to give everyone a chance to give us their contributions before we look at REV2. So I’ll go down the list of speakers. Chile, to be followed by South Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Allow me to start by thanking France for their presentation. We will review it in detail. Also, to say that we look forward to a very constructive dialogue on this agenda item as the outcomes of the regular institutional dialogue set us forward towards our future permanent mechanism. I will deliver this statement on behalf of Canada and Chile, also in English, as co-coordinators of the proposal on practical modalities for stakeholder participation and accreditation in the future permanent mechanism, one of the core elements of the REIT. Mr. Chair, we are encouraged to note that our proposal is now co-sponsored by 42 member states from across regions. In previous sessions, we also had many other states express views that align with the spirit and intent of this initiative. We recall that in 2024, a number of delegations conveyed a clear interest in strengthening stakeholder engagement. There was broad convergence on the need to develop a more transparent structure and practical modalities for their accreditation and to guide their participation in the future mechanism. We believe that this is not just a procedural matter but one of real operational relevance. In many instances, stakeholders are at the forefront of capacity-building efforts, especially when responding to evolving threats, such as ransomware. They often serve as trusted interlocutors between donors and recipients and are well-positioned to distill lessons learned and good practices that can enrich our shared understandings. Our intent in presenting this proposal is not to create division but to offer a practical, balanced, and implementable framework. We fully recognize that states may have legitimate concerns regarding certain stakeholder actors. That is why our proposal explicitly provides the opportunity for states to raise objections and present their reasoning to the broader group. At the same time, the proposal seeks to ensure that the decision-making process reflects our collective responsibility. In cases where there is no consensus to exclude a stakeholder, and the concern raised is not broadly shared, we believe that the majority vote is an appropriate mechanism. This approach is not only consistent with the establishment of the UN practice, including the rules and procedures of the General Assembly, but also with our commitment to transparency and accountability. We reaffirm our understanding that the future mechanism must be state-led. This means led by all states collectively and guided by dialogue and compromise from all sides. Within such a framework, stakeholders should have opportunities to contribute meaningfully on the issues that states identify as priorities. Their input is most effective when they are invited to speak in connection with each specific agenda item, ensuring their contributions are both relevant and timely. Finally, we wish to recall that informal meetings by UN practice and tradition are naturally more open to the participation of all stakeholders. They provide important opportunities for even more inclusive dialogue while preserving the intergovernmental nature of our process. Mr. Chair, we recognize that the issue of stakeholder modalities is of high priority to a significant number of delegations. We believe it’s also essential to our collective aim of ensuring a seamless, inclusive, and adequate transition towards the future mechanism. We remain committed to working constructively with all delegations to achieve a solution that reflects our shared values and strengths and strengthens this process going forward. I will deliver my intervention on the REIT in a national capacity later. Thank you so much, Chair.

Thank you. Thank you, Chile, for your statement. South Africa to be followed by Argentina.

Thank you, Chair. The South African delegation recognizes that Member States have varying views on the nature of the framework for the future mechanism. However, we must emphasize that failing to reach a consensus on this matter for inclusion in the final report would undermine the progress we have made in advancing our discussion with concrete actions. We fully support paragraph 63 of REV1. Regarding annex 3, additional elements for the future permanent mechanism, we agree with the proposal to establish three dedicated thematic groups based on the motivations presented in previous sessions. While we appreciate the Chair’s efforts to integrate the five pillars of the framework in DTG1, as currently drafted, the focus of DTG1 is not clear. Having heard proposals made during the Town Hall meetings, we are persuaded to have a dedicated thematic group on international law and norms, without assuming that the two are of the same legal status. Thus, we propose deletion of cooperative measures such as rules, norms, and principles in DTG1 to allow for discussions on these matters to be discussed in DTG2 on IL and norms. Consideration should also be given to place the discussion on confidence-building measures under DTG on capacity building instead of DTG1, if Member States would be agreeable to such a placement. South Africa looks forward to exchanging views on proposals by Member States in this regard. In line with paragraph 53 of REV1, we accept a standalone DTG3 on capacity building, notwithstanding the need to discuss capacity building as a cross-cutting issue in the other two dedicated thematic groups. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, South Africa, for your statement within the time limit. Argentina, to be followed by the European Union.

peace and security in the use of information and communication technologies. We believe that the establishment of these DTGs will enhance the effectiveness of the mechanism and contribute to the overall goals of the OEWG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Argentina, for your statement within the time.

Thank you, Chair. In the essence of time, I will just say that I speak on behalf of the same States as before, and I have, with the indulgence of those States I represent, shortened my text significantly, but the full text will be published online and shared with you, of course. First of all, Chair, we need to conclude this week with the report that establishes a future permanent mechanism with its plenary, its DTGs, the capacity-building roundtable, a review conference, and a portal that will help us and support us to further our work to advance security and stability in cyberspace. In line with our proposals for a UN Cyber Program of Action, we want the discussions to become more concrete and more action-oriented, tackling real-life cybersecurity challenges. Therefore, in addition to the Open-Ended Working Group-like plenary discussions, the DTGs are to discuss these challenges, drawing upon all the five pillars of the framework. Challenges in cyberspace rarely occur in isolation and are not solved by just one pillar of the framework. Each pillar represents a distinct but independent dimension to tackling cyber threats. Isolating one pillar from the rest risks creating a silo and producing narrow and incoherent solutions. We therefore cannot accept a DTG solely on international law as it goes against its very purpose. Let me make an example of a challenge that affects us all in a cross-cutting DTG. For instance, protecting our essential services against the use of malicious software, ransomware specifically. The cross-cutting DTG would allow us to dive into understanding this threat, into the norms both related to the protection of essential services as well as also to prevent those malicious acts. The implications for international security and stability and the role of international law in this context, such as the law of state responsibility. The CBMs we could use for international cooperation as well as, and moreover, the capacity-building needs and gaps that would need to be addressed in the context of this threat. Putting all of the pillars in place to address cybersecurity challenges will enable us to exchange on best practices and address needs and gaps, notably as regards implementation and capacity building. Stakeholders could be invited to share their experience and measures contributing to our knowledge. Building on these DTG discussions, the plenary can then discuss and decide upon recommendations, and we therefore suggest replacing the item of the regular institutional dialogue in our plenaries with the outcome of the DTGs. Chair, we need to build a mechanism of which the different elements work together smoothly without the risk of duplicating our discussions. Plenary discussions discuss the pillars and decide. The DTGs discuss the challenges and define actionable solutions, including on capacity building. And the capacity-building roundtable at expert level allows us to advance capacity-building opportunities and, where necessary, recommendations on how to improve cyber capacity building. It is the combination of the formats where the strength of the future permanent mechanism will lie and which will allow us to make the most progress. As for the participation of stakeholders, I can be very short as we have a clear stance and fully support the paper by Chile and Canada. Our support for stakeholder engagement is not a political point, but rather a pragmatic one. Why would we not tap into their expertise to help us advance security and stability in cyberspace? Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you very much, European Union, for your brevity and also for speaking on behalf of your group. Paraguay, followed by Thailand, please, and I encourage the same level of focus and brevity. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Chairman. Paraguay, I would like to reiterate that one of the fundamental pillars of the discussions of this group is capacity building, because this not only means institutional growth but also the development of capacities, which, when applied to ICTs, allows for the protection and prevention against cyber threats. It guarantees data security and allows us to be at the vanguard with regard to the constant evolution of this topic and to move forward quickly. Seeking an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and safe internet is important, and hence why it’s important to ensure that no one is left behind. Like other delegations, therefore, we believe it fundamental that the future mechanism should include a specialized working group looking at capacity building, because it would enable continued discussions on crucial topics so as to facilitate the consolidation of national efforts as they develop policies, exchange information, and improve cyber security policies and other areas. In this sense, we join the Working Group on Capacity Building and its incorporation in the Future Permanent Mechanism, and we encourage other countries to join this. Chair, Paraguay would like to express its thanks for the efforts made by the Chair, and we’d like to refer to the following ad hoc matters. Firstly, we’d like to highlight something that may have gone unnoticed by the majority of countries, that is, during these discussions, the participation of landlocked developing countries has been limited. Chairman, we’d like to take this opportunity also to thank other organizations, international organizations, and the academic world for their efforts, which have contributed to reducing the digital divide in our country. One example of this is the presidential decree that was adopted on cyber security that was crafted with the support of the OAS. Further, we’d like to express our sincere thanks to organizations and countries that have supported our national efforts to build our capacities, both diplomatic and technical. We have a policy supported by the OAS, Canada, and the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise and Unity on Cyberspace and Related Norms. We have the Cyber Diplomacy Winter School and the Summer School that were organized by the Estonian Government and other initiatives. Finally, we’d also like to note that we’ve received support to combat cyber threats, which have been particularly active against Paraguay this year. We highlight the invaluable support of the United States and Taiwan here following the latest attacks that we suffered, many of which were directly or indirectly related to our foreign policy. Thank you.

Thank you, Paraguay, for your statement. Thailand, to be followed by Australia.

Mr. Chair, as we are approaching the conclusion of the OEWG’s mandate, it is essential to make a seamless transition to the Future Permanent Mechanism. As encouraged by the Chair, I’ll be brief on my statement. First, we are, in general, supportive of the Chair’s proposal, as outlined in annex 3. Thailand can be supportive of the establishment of three dedicated thematic groups, as proposed by the Chair. A group on cross-cutting issues, which would provide space for discussion on resilience and effective responses. A group on capacity building, which is essential to ensure the mechanism’s practical and action-oriented character. And, lastly, a group on international law, which we particularly welcome. This group will enable focused and sustained discussion, including on related capacity building, aimed at bridging legal and technical gaps and promoting more inclusive participation by States on this specialized topic. These thematic areas reflect key priorities that merge in that continuous dialogue among States. Second, Thailand strongly supports the inclusion of a provision allowing for the establishment of additional ad hoc dedicated thematic groups, as necessary. This would enable the new Permanent Mechanism to remain responsive to emerging challenges and evolving priorities. Third, Thailand strongly supports the Chair’s proposal to convene all three dedicated thematic groups in the same week, as this would optimize resources used particularly for developing countries. However, we believe that the proposed requirements for the groups to meet at least one day per year may be insufficient, given the complexity of the issues. While we remain flexible on the modalities, we encourage extending this period to allow for deeper and more meaningful conversation, particularly on international law. Fourth, while Thailand maintains a preference for in-person meetings, given their value in trust-building engagement and addressing time-zone challenges, we can support a hybrid format with in-person participation strongly encouraged. Mr. Chair, Thailand supports the engagement of multistakeholders in the future Permanent Mechanism. Their involvement will enrich discussions and promote transparent cross-sector collaboration in addressing cybersecurity challenges. We remain flexible regarding the modalities proposed by you, Mr. Chair, and sincerely hope that consensus can be reached on this important matter. Mr. Chair, we hope that Member States can reach an agreement on these outstanding issues, enabling operationalization of the mechanism that fosters continued substantive and inclusive dialogue on ICT security. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Thailand, for being on time, but most importantly for saying that you are flexible on the modalities put forward. I’d like to hear those words more often—flexibility in all its languages, in the true spirit of multilingualism and multilateral cooperation. So I call on the next speaker, Australia, to be followed by Malaysia. Thank you.

Thank you, Chair. We align with the earlier Pacific Islands Forum statement and would like to make the additional remarks in our national capacity. On paragraph 63, Australia agrees with this approach for establishing the future action-oriented permanent mechanism and notes the importance of additional elements such as dedicated thematic groups and stakeholder modalities. Under annex 3, paragraph 7, we propose replacing a rotating agenda of issues with sharing lessons learned and best practices and identifying capacity-building needs. On paragraph 8, we support the updated French-led proposal for the action-oriented thematic groups based on resilience, cooperation, and stability. We continue to emphasize the importance of dedicated thematic groups which will facilitate discussions of an integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting nature, with a frameworks toolkit of international law, norms, confidence-building measures, and capacity-building that can be applied to real-world cyber-policy challenges. The French updated proposal explicitly draws on the five pillars of the framework in each dedicated thematic group. In addition, we have heard from many states that capacity-building is essential to building cyber-resilience. The updated proposal also strengthens the linkages between the resilience group and capacity-building, including by convening the Global Roundtable on ICT Security Capacity-Building. We support continued in-depth discussions on international law. However, a dedicated thematic group on international law is not the answer. We have a space in the plenary for broad discussions on international law. In addition, it is through discussing how international law applies to specific cyber-policy challenges in cross-cutting dedicated thematic groups that we will be able to move from abstract statements on international law to concrete and responsive discussions on what international law means in practice. Ensuring that international law is cross-cutting across the dedicated thematic groups is essential to building capacity and promoting further convergences on how international law applies in cyberspace and understanding how all the tools in our framework work together to promote international peace and security. On paragraph 11, we support the opportunity to review the number and scope of dedicated thematic groups at the review conference and therefore consider it redundant to also review them at the third substantive session and request this reference be removed. On paragraph 12 and the indicative timeline, while Australia supports the streamlining of in-person meetings from three weeks to two weeks, we do not think it makes sense for the DTGs to be held immediately after the plenary. After all, the DTGs are meant to report to the plenary and it wouldn’t make sense to do this 11 and a half months later. There is also no time to digest the discussions from the plenary and the DTGs if they’re immediately together. We think there is benefit in meeting twice a year given the rapidly evolving cyber security environment and in order to deliver capacity-building training in the margins. We would like to propose the plenary meets for one week in July and the DTGs meet for one week in December. This would strike the right balance between ensuring meetings are regular and the outcomes are useful with capacity and financial constraints also taken into consideration. We also request that any additional meetings be agreed by consensus given the constraints and challenges that not only smaller delegations have but all of us have and we don’t want the meeting schedule to become overly burdensome. On paragraph 14 on additional ad hoc dedicated thematic groups, we suggest deleting this paragraph. As we’ve heard, many smaller delegations have already expressed concern about too many DTGs given their limited capacities. The potential for additional ad hoc groups creates additional uncertainties and potential burdens, and there is already an opportunity to review DTGs at the review conference. On paragraph 15, we would like to emphasize that action-oriented draft recommendations should be agreed by consensus in line with the consensus principle. On paragraph 17 on stakeholder modalities, Australia emphasizes the importance of a multistakeholder approach which enriches our discussions by drawing on the expertise, research, and resources of academia, civil society, the private sector, and the technical community to improve our collective cyber security and resilience. We strongly support the Canada and Chile-led paper on practical modalities for stakeholders’ participation and accreditation to improve inclusiveness and transparency and would like to see these elements reflected in the next draft. In particular, a state opposing a stakeholder’s accreditation should be required to share its objection and rationale with the OEWG, and where there is no consensus on its accreditation status, it should be decided by a majority. Finally, Australia has meticulously recorded women’s participation in the OEWG formal meetings as a measure to reflect the level of gender equality in cyber security. Further to the cross-regional paper on mainstreaming gender equality and the future permanent mechanism, we request the Secretary to assume this role. Thank you.

Thank you, Australia, for your statement. Malaysia, to be followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation commends your continued efforts relating to the future permanent mechanism, including through the latest iteration of Annex 3. Malaysia notes that there remain divergent views on, inter alia, the dedicated thematic groups or DTGs. On the whole, we believe that Annex 3 sets out a helpful overall structure for detailed consideration of specific issue areas at the technical level, with periodic reporting to the plenary for decision-making at the political level. Whilst we believe there is scope for improvement in delineating the DTGs, we greatly appreciate the Chair’s efforts to provide a pathway towards consensus, guided by our overarching goal of a seamless transition from the OEWG to its successor mechanism. In principle, we recognize the value of cross-cutting discourse on ICT security, given the dynamic nature of the ICT environment, which necessitates a degree of agility and adaptability in responding to evolving threats and challenges. Over the past five years, we have seen this OEWG make tangible contributions in advancing the implementation of the framework of responsible state behavior, deepening collective understandings, and also providing a space for discussions on possible gaps and solutions thereto. At the same time, we appreciate the emphasis which delegations have placed on the value of further focused examination of particular aspects of the framework so as to support and reinforce discussions at the plenary level. In this respect, we remain open to bridging proposals, noting that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. We thank delegations which have made specific language proposals, which we are presently reviewing, together with suggestions relating to the important issue of non-governmental stakeholder participation. Mr. Chair, as many have highlighted, we must guard against the real risk of fragmentation both of our substantive work at the UN on ICT security and of the attendant practical modalities if we are unable to agree on key elements of the future mechanism this week. Rest assured that Malaysia will continue working intensively with all States in the spirit of constructive dialogue, conscious of what we collectively stand to gain from a single-track permanent UN mechanism on ICT security and what we stand to lose in its absence. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Malaysia. First statement, Islamic Republic of Iran, to be followed by Morocco.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On Annex 3, we have the following comments. During the previous informal consultations, we noted some uncertainty and differing interpretations regarding the consensus-based nature of decision-making within the future permanent mechanism. In this regard, we propose the inclusion of a new paragraph before paragraph 4 of Annex 3 to read as follows: The future permanent mechanism shall take all decisions by consensus. While we remain flexible regarding the number of dedicated thematic groups within the future permanent mechanism, we firmly believe that the pillars of the current OEWG should be reflected in these groups. Experience from other relevant mechanisms suggests that the concern raised by some states that structuring the thematic groups around the OEWG pillars might lead to repetitive statements in both plenary sessions and thematic discussions may be overstated. While the mandate of the thematic group 1 has been improved, it remains vague and overly complex, and therefore requires further strengthening and clarification in line with the pillars of the OEWG. Additionally, the phrase “maintaining peace and security” appears in the mandate; however, it falls within the responsibility of another body, and its use in the context of the thematic group is not acceptable. Mr. Chair, regarding the mandate of the first thematic group, we will provide specific language later in this session. The authority granted to the co-facilitators of the dedicated thematic groups in paragraph 15 to transmit action-oriented draft recommendations to the permanent mechanism is unacceptable. We strongly urge that the modalities outlined in the zero draft be retained. This includes the requirement that dedicated thematic groups agree by consensus to submit any action-oriented draft recommendations to the permanent mechanism and that such draft recommendations may be provisionally agreed upon through a silence procedure for transmission to the substantive plenary session for consideration by states. Regarding the modalities for the participation of stakeholders, we prefer to maintain the current modality, which has demonstrated its effectiveness. This is affirmed in paragraph 10 of the zero draft, which notes that the OEWG engages stakeholders in a systematic, sustained, and substantive manner. However, we emphasize that preserving the principle of non-objection in any stakeholder participation modalities remains our highest priority. We cannot accept any proposal that would weaken this fundamental principle. Given that technical experts from states will participate in the thematic groups and will engage in technical rather than political or diplomatic discussions, we believe that the expert briefings referenced in paragraph 7a, as well as the participation of other stakeholders outlined in paragraph 8, don’t offer additional value and could therefore be deleted. We support the proposal made by the Russian Federation during the town hall consultations to empower the chair and the secretariat of the future permanent mechanism to assess the relevance of ECOSOC-accredited NGOs that have applied to participate in the mechanism and to inform the state of the outcome of such assessment. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Iran, for your statement. Before I give the floor to Morocco, and I hope Morocco will accept this, I invite Nigeria, which is making a statement on behalf of the African Group. Thank you, Morocco. Nigeria, you have the floor, please.

Thank you, Chair. On the structure of the Future Permanent Mechanism, we wish to state that while the African group would like to reaffirm the relevance and equal importance of the fifth pillars of the framework, it welcomes the proposal to have three dedicated thematic groups on resilience, international law, and capacity building within the Future Permanent Mechanism. We believe that a focus on three dedicated thematic groups will assist with greater efficiency and, for obvious reasons, inclusiveness. The discussion of threats under the dedicated thematic group on resilience should provide a platform for formulating a continuously updated list of concurrent and emerging threats and seeking the best means and ways of preventing and responding to these threats from technical and operational perspectives. It is important that this thematic group also consider discussing cooperation in ICT incident management. We take note of the proposal on the revised first draft of the final report of Mr. Chair to have confidence-building measures discussed under the thematic group. Regarding the dedicated thematic group on the application of international law in cyberspace, we understand that this would enhance deep and meaningful discussion on the effectiveness of and the existing landscape of obligations and norms. This will also give an insight into whether we need to enact a means of both binding and non-binding measures to deal with the increasing and rapid development of threats, as well as address the gaps. The African group would like to reiterate that discussion on existing and future norms of responsible state behavior should be addressed in this thematic group. On the dedicated thematic group on capacity building, the group believes that this will provide a veritable platform for a more focused discussion on capacity building efforts and on the best option to strengthen developing countries and bridge the digital gap that impedes resilience and effective response. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that both capacity building and international law matters would naturally feature in a cross-cutting manner in the discussion of the other two thematic working groups. On the participation of stakeholders, the African group believes that input from various stakeholders, including civil society, academia, and the private sector, will add value to the discussion. As such, their engagement with the work of the Future Permanent Mechanism would not only enhance the discussion but provide additional impetus. That said, the African group reiterates the intergovernmental and state-led nature of the current process, as well as the prospective permanent mechanism, and thus cautions against introducing new ideas that might be counterproductive and have a detrimental impact on the proceedings of such an important mechanism. Accordingly, it is most advisable to continue applying the current modality that has been successfully working on the open-ended working group process while continuing discussions on possible options to enhance the participation of stakeholders in our proceedings, as well as on the sidelines of the formal convening and during the intersessional periods. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, the group welcomes the Chair’s ongoing proposal regarding the organizational arrangements for the future mechanism and takes note of those put forward by certain states. Finally, the group reiterates its readiness and commitment to continue consultation in order to finalize arrangements that will guarantee the effectiveness and inclusiveness of the future mechanism. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Nigeria, on behalf of the African Group, for your statement. Morocco, to be followed by the United States.

Monsieur le Président. Chairman, distinguished delegates, given this is the first time I’m taking the floor, I wish to convey to you my gratitude for your commitment, as well as the efforts that have been undertaken, which have allowed us over the past four years to maintain open, rich dialogue on a matter of tremendous importance. The Kingdom of Morocco is already looking towards the permanent mechanism which attributes significance to the continuation of dialogue among states to achieve tangible results, and we stand ready also to work to ensure a smooth transition towards the new cooperation framework. We believe that the section of the report that deals with institutional regular dialogue and Annex III offers a foundation to build a sustainable mechanism based on shared principles. For the Kingdom of Morocco, we prioritize the need for the mechanism to reflect two major objectives: to ensure collective security in the digital sphere and to ensure that this be accessible to all in an equitable way, in a manner that respects the sovereignty of all. Digital security needs to be viewed as a shared good, and on the basis of this conviction, we call for capacity building to be prioritized. There’s a need to build solutions that are tailored to meet the needs of each country and to build targeted information programs and to ensure equitable access to resources specifically through the specific support mechanism. Trust is key, and this hinges on a common, applicable, measurable language. We support such practices as checklists as well as the reporting models which allow states to make progress while contributing to the collective effort. Furthermore, responsible conduct is, of course, important, but there’s a need to continue discussions on the application of international law and cyberspace in a constructive spirit in order to ensure a legally clear and unified interpretation of the existing rules. Respect for the sovereignty of states in the digital sphere needs to be the core principle. For example, this issue is of paramount importance because cyberattacks and malicious attacks serve as a reminder of the crucial need to make progress towards a clear multilateral framework that is rooted in international law, that brings together responsible conduct and space security. It also hinges on better protection of critical infrastructure given the growing number of digital attacks with a broader scope. There’s a need to prioritize these issues. In terms of resilience, efforts need to be focused as a matter of priority on the sensitive systems which support our vital infrastructure. Morocco also wishes to stress the importance of regional cooperation, particularly in Africa, and we advocate having a future mechanism place value on regional mechanisms while at the same time establishing bridges among them. A follow-up mechanism based on exchange of knowledge is key to assess progress, and this assessment needs to be envisaged as a real tool for learning and not as a burden, and lastly, to support each country on the basis of its priorities and capacity. To conclude, Chairman, we welcome the fact that a number of these priorities for the forthcoming permanent mechanism are reflected in Annex III, and we think that there’s an important need to recall the following: States need to demonstrate flexibility vis-à-vis the functioning modalities and the composition of the proposed thematic group. This flexibility is all the more necessary given that the report incorporates mechanisms to assess, to adjust, or to review the group over the course of time based on needs and priorities as well as lessons drawn from their implementation. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Morocco. United States, to be followed by Colombia.

Thank you, Chair. A report that accurately reflects states’ positions on regular institutional dialogue is critical to the successful conclusion of this Working Group’s mandate. States have reached a significant degree of alignment on elements of the future permanent mechanism. Specifically, as noted in last year’s Annex C, the future permanent mechanism must be integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting in nature. The future mechanism should be action-oriented and challenge-focused, with cross-cutting discussions that will allow us to progress in our implementation of the framework, including capacity-building to that end. First, I will discuss the RID portion in the main body of the draft report. Generally, we support this section’s brevity, leaving the detail to Annex 3 at the end allows us to focus our discussion there. We do want to highlight that in paragraph 62 of the RID section, we are concerned that the language changed from states proposed to states agreed, that the future mechanism will facilitate the continued operationalization of all initiatives from the OEWG. Our preference would be to revert to the original language. If agreed is retained, those initiatives which are being agreed to by consensus must be named so that states have clarity. Chair, moving to Annex 3, we appreciate your ongoing efforts to help this group find consensus on the topic of RID. The 2024 APR, particularly Annex C, represents an important step in defining a clear path for the single-track, permanent, action-oriented mechanism with implementation of the consensus framework as its foundation and mandate. Given that, Annex 3 must remain concise and focused on the fundamental parameters of the future permanent mechanism without delving into specific details that can be sorted in a future organizational conference for that mechanism. States have already agreed by consensus that the future permanent mechanism would be integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting in nature. 2024 APR, Paragraph 5, and Annex C, Paragraph 9. We do not believe the dedicated thematic working groups as drafted in REV1 fulfill that mandate. We continue to strongly support the French proposal that is action-oriented and includes challenge-focused groups that will allow us to progress in our implementation of the framework. The proposal for dedicated thematic groups on selective pillars of the framework, such as international law and capacity building necessarily, duplicates the work of the plenary, where these topics already have dedicated discussion space. Such an approach could waste time and keeps our conversation on this critical topic stagnant. It also unhelpfully elevates certain pillars of the framework at the expense of others. In particular, some states have already affirmed this week that they will seek to exploit conversations in the international law DTG to advance new legally binding obligations contrary to the consensus spirit of the OEWG. We have exhibited extreme flexibility over the course of this OEWG in allowing for the future possibility of elaborating on additional binding obligations, but we cannot agree to a group that states openly affirm will be hijacked for such a purpose. The OEWG is not the appropriate body to be developing new law, nor is the time for that work ripe. The best use of the future mechanism in this respect is to continue to build states’ capacity to implement the consensus framework, including by formulating views on how existing legal obligations apply to states’ use of ICTs. Plenary and cross-cutting discussions, as well as the scenario-based workshops, like the successful event run by UNIDIR, further the development of common understanding, which is a prerequisite to identifying any gaps in the current legal framework. On stakeholders, we continue to hear calls from the vast majority of states that we need meaningful engagement with stakeholders in the future mechanism. The process outlined in this annex is not fit for purpose and almost certainly allows single states with radical positions to veto valuable stakeholders from providing their expertise to our discussions. American businesses have deep expertise on a range of topics that are extremely relevant to this group, but are consistently excluded by one or two states who want to rob all states of such expertise for petty political reasons. We are disappointed that minor edits to this topic in REV1 still create stakeholder modalities that would not facilitate the meaningful dialogue that so many states are calling for. Meaningful engagement with industry and other non-governmental experts is critical to the utility of the future mechanism. The process outlined in this annex is not fit for purpose and will continue to allow a single state to prevent any number of expert stakeholders from attending. Chair, the United States seeks to achieve consensus in negotiations on this final report. To accomplish that, the report must accurately reflect the discussions that have taken place in this OEWG, jettison mention of topics that do not enjoy consensus and details that are not essential to solidifying the next process, and focus on the OEWG’s core concern of laying the groundwork for the future permanent mechanism based on implementation of the framework. We will submit additional comments in writing. Thank you.

Thank you, United States, for your statement. Colombia, to be followed by Finland.

Thank you, Chairman. On the future permanent mechanism, we’re grateful for the efforts under your leadership to advance towards consensus in this area, and on national capacity, we’d like to make the following comments. On the thematic groups, we reiterate our willingness to seek agreement and advance in practical and pragmatic commitments to lay the foundations for a comprehensive, action-oriented, cross-cutting mechanism. In this sense, we support the creation of the three groups that are currently proposed, particularly the importance of the international law group and on capacity building. On the future structure for capacity building, we believe that the global roundtable would be complementary to the thematic group on capacity building, which would develop the updates on this matter, as well as the discussions in the plenary, which would see the adoption of reports and where progress would be assessed. Therefore, the global roundtable on ICT could be the scenario where we would have the exchange of experience and good practice on this matter. As we’ve previously highlighted, methodologically and in order to grant the mechanism the appropriate flexibility to make progress on ICTs, we support the creation of an ad hoc group, the thematic of which would be chosen by the states and set out in its working document. In light of the functioning of the thematic group, we have the following comments. Firstly, we’d like to thank you for taking into account Colombia’s proposal in paragraph 7. Secondly, as you are aware, for our delegation, it’s fundamental to ensure the inclusive participation of national experts in these working groups. That means that to ensure meaningful participation, the thematic session should have interpretation services. In addition, in order to facilitate dialogue and exchange of opinions between experts, it’s important for hybrid sessions to consider the most appropriate hybrid platform to facilitate this type of dialogue. Thirdly, I’d like to refer to paragraph 16 and the proposal for a calendar for the future mechanism. We agree with Australia here on the importance for states to have sufficient time to review the updates from the thematic groups. Therefore, we suggest that we grant two months between the holding of each session, and in addition, we should take into account the calendar of sessions of the First Committee. Finally, while we understand that the first session of the group should be organizational in nature, we believe that the next should be focused on the thematic groups and then subsequently the plenary session. The previous one should be focused on making recommendations, and then we would consider those within the plenary. On modalities, finally, my delegation believes that as proposed recently, the proposal put forward by Chile and Canada lays the foundation for a transparent and inclusive system. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Colombia, for your statement. Finland, to be followed by Ireland.

Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor. Finland aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and wishes to make some additional remarks in its national capacity. When it comes to the dedicated thematic groups, a multi-dimensional approach is needed, not the least for ensuring that the action-oriented measures proposed are in line with the full UN framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Finland believes that the DDGs should complement the pillar approach of the plenaries by offering the possibility to share challenges and best practices in order to recognize any gaps in implementation and capacity building. Finland supports the next proposal of the DDGs made by France. Moreover, we need to close the inclusivity gap. Finland recognizes the Chair’s efforts to make improvements on the modalities for stakeholder participation in the future permanent mechanism. However, the non-objection mechanism regarding stakeholder participation should be reconsidered. Open discussions on any objection are needed, but if unresolved, the majority should decide in accordance with the rules of procedure of the United Nations General Assembly. This has been suggested in the non-paper by Canada and Chile and co-sponsored by several states, including Finland. Dear Chair, please allow me to thank you and your team once again for your efforts throughout this process. Finland believes that at the end of this week, a consensus can be reached. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Finland, for the vote of confidence. I’ll now give the floor to Ireland, followed by Côte d’Ivoire.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Ireland would align itself with the intervention of the EU and also with the French presentation and proposal that was made, but we would like to make a few points in our national capacity as well. As we approach the end of this mandate of the OEWG, the establishment of a single-track permanent future mechanism under UN auspices that is inclusive, action-oriented, and based on the UN normative framework must be our priority. Securing cyberspace comes down to addressing real-life concrete challenges. That is why the discussions in the DTGs need to be cross-cutting. This has been the call of the overwhelming majority of delegations as we have grown to understand together that our considerations are necessarily interrelated. The DTGs are there to discuss actual challenges we face and leverage all of the different elements of the UN framework we have to address these. We recall with appreciation, Chair, that you have also been a champion of highlighting this essentially cross-cutting nature. We cannot afford to discuss issues in a way that no longer reflects the cross-cutting nature of contemporary concerns. Like others, we do not consider that a dedicated thematic group on international law is beneficial for the future mechanism and, as currently proposed, does not reflect the mandate we have been asked to fulfill in furthering understandings of how international law applies in cyberspace. As currently proposed, there is a risk that this group would duplicate efforts and divert resources and attention from more dynamic engagement on legal issues within the context of the work of the other thematic groups. We believe that stakeholders are particularly well-placed to enhance situational awareness and also to input their learnings and insights into this process. Their input is particularly valuable on threats, where they enhance our understanding, knowledge, and information of the cybersecurity challenges related to critical infrastructure and new and emerging technologies such as quantum and artificial intelligence. For this reason, Ireland has joined 42 countries in supporting the cross-regional paper prepared by Canada and Chile, which ambitiously reimagines how we can best utilize the expertise and insight of stakeholders in our future deliberations. And finally, just in regards to timing, as was mentioned, I think, by Australia and Colombia, we would query the proposal to have the DTGs take place after the plenary session. Logically, we consider they should be placed so as to prepare the plenary session’s work, and there are very good precedents for this across a number of other UN processes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Ireland. Côte d’Ivoire to be followed by Egypt.

Mr. President, Chairman, Côte d’Ivoire has been a long-standing supporter of the establishment of a permanent mechanism for regular institutional dialogue to take over from the current working group in order to guarantee the continuity and stability of our work towards digital security and safety. Indeed, we very quickly supported the idea of a Program of Action to promote responsible state behavior in the digital sphere. Today, we welcome the considerable headway that we have made that led to a shared adoption of this draft and the various elements of consensus that we’ve reached, particularly the need for a single mechanism and the need to smoothly, without delay, establish it. Its definitive establishment is the great challenge that we have in our current process, so it’s essential that we take the last decisive step, particularly to agree on the supplementary elements in annex 3 of the final report. In this regard, in paragraph 5, I would like to specify the pillars of the responsible behavior framework for plenary sessions, even if we are supposed to understand and know about these pillars, including these details wouldn’t necessarily be going too far. Further, my delegation supports the establishment of three thematic groups and the possibility of creating ad hoc supplementary groups. We welcome the principle of a coherent coordinated operation of the various components of the structure of the future mechanism in order to avoid any duplication. We think that this should involve clear delimitations between the scope of DTG 1, which should be focused on all of the pillars of the framework, and DTGs 2 and 3 related to two of these pillars. On the calendar for meetings, Côte d’Ivoire would welcome the holding of thematic group meetings either before or after the plenary sessions. However, we would allow the DTGs to report to these plenary sessions and have understanding the dates of these meetings upstream would be helpful. In order to ensure more inclusivity, Côte d’Ivoire has always been in favor of ensuring the most – the broadest possible participation of stakeholders and other concerned parties in the future permanent mechanism through a consultative mode and without necessarily their involvement in decision-making to preserve the intergovernmental nature of the mechanism. We therefore welcome the accreditation modalities that are set out in the supplementary elements. We encourage member states to carefully use the non-objection mechanism in order to harness this participation as best as possible. We are also in favor of diverse participation based on equitable geographic representation of stakeholders and other concerned parties, and in this regard, we support the establishment of a fellowship program. To conclude, Côte d’Ivoire calls on us to demonstrate in this last step flexibility and a spirit of compromise that we will need to ensure the establishment of the future permanent mechanism. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Côte d’Ivoire. Egypt to be followed by Fiji.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor, and I wish to align myself with the statement of the African Group. I would like to start my intervention with one observation, which is that over the past four years, I guess we have had separate discussions on international law, on norms, on threats, and yet we managed to agree on three consensual reports. If that proves anything, that proves that neither the structure nor the discussions are the problem. Rather, it’s the flexibility and the willingness to compromise. My second point is that we all agree that we convene here in order to bridge the digital divide and the gaps between the developed and developing countries. We have varying degrees of understanding of cyber threats and the actions to be taken. Accordingly, adopting a scenario-based discussion for our convening, while necessary, is not sufficient. We risk that we convert our discussions into a discussion between developed countries while alienating developing countries. That’s our main fear. That said, Chair, we support your current proposal of having three thematic groupings. The first one will be convened in a scenario-based approach, where we discuss the threats from all different aspects. And then the other two groupings, one on international law, which might be complemented by norms, and the other one on capacity building, will cater for the differences we have in priorities and needs, will provide a platform that combines both the interests and needs of developed and developing countries. I wish to say as well that we do not preempt the discussions in those two groups. No one said it would reach somewhere or that we have to reach a certain outcome. We just entertain a discussion, like we have been doing for the past four years. And at the end, and according to paragraph 15 of the report, all we’re going to produce are draft recommendations. They are draft. They are subject to a decision-taking procedure, which is by consensus. So I propose, Chair, instead of focusing on how to reformulate your structure, the three thematic groupings, that we focus rather on language and caveats that will better serve our interests and that will make us feel more comfortable with the current structure you propose. Thank you, Chair. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Egypt, for your contribution. Fiji, to be followed by Italy.

Thank you, Chair. Chair, Fiji fully aligns itself with the Pacific Islands Forum statement delivered this morning in relation to Section G on RID. Fiji now delivers in its national capacity. Chair, Fiji supports the proposal by a cross-regional group of states mentioned by Chile relating to the practical modalities for stakeholders’ participation and multistakeholder accreditation in the future mechanism. Further, Fiji thanks France for its visual presentation of its proposal on bridging the consensus gap. Fiji supports the text proposal for paragraph 8 from France and proposes a further minor but important amendment to include critical information infrastructure after critical information. Chair, we welcome the dedicated focus on capacity building, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the continuation of the global points of contact directory under the future permanent mechanism. Finally, Fiji supports other delegations that have called for capacity building to be a standing priority across the thematic groups to ensure small island developing states are able to fully engage and implement the framework for responsible state behavior in the use of ICT. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Fiji, for your statement. Italy, to be followed by the Russian Federation.

Thank you very much, Chair, for giving me the floor. Italy fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add a few considerations from the national perspective. As we are now at the conclusion of the OEWG, we believe that a significant change of pace is needed. The UN membership is called on to identify a new permanent mechanism that allows us to build on this experience and deepen our long-lasting exchanges on cyber security in a more action-oriented way. Indeed, it is evident to us that the rapidity by which the threat landscape is evolving and the challenges related to it, and challenges affecting every country, require a permanent single track and flexible mechanism that is grounded in the UN acquis. This ought to be an action-oriented platform that can support all of us in increasing resilience and ICT security, fostering cooperation to address ICT threats, and promoting peace, security, and stability in cyberspace. That is the structure of the DTGs as proposed by France, which we fully support. Also, regarding the DTGs review process, we believe that paragraph 11 of annex 3 could benefit from additional clarity. Last but not least, we are convinced that it is important to recognize the valuable contribution the multistakeholder community has provided to the discussions of this OEWG and to CCB projects worldwide. Governments alone cannot always deliver what is needed. Technical and informed voices are indispensable for successful and effective discussions and for CCB. That is why Italy supports the non-paper proposed by Canada and Chile. Therefore, we encourage all delegations to positively consider such proposals. We believe that it is the best possible way for the new mechanism to be really inclusive to the benefit of its action-oriented character. Vetoes are not a synonym for inclusiveness. Mr. Chair, we believe that the above-mentioned points should be reflected in the final report. The future permanent mechanism will define our common ability to concretely act towards a cyberspace that is open, free, secure, and interoperable. As always, we trust in your leadership to identify the appropriate balance in the report for an actionable way forward.

Thank you very much, Italy. Russian Federation, to be followed by Ukraine.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues, we proceed from the understanding that defining the modalities of the future permanent mechanism for the OEWG is a key task. The current version of Annex 3 for the draft report provides us a good basis for discussion. However, a number of the key elements of the Annex need further improvement. First and foremost, there is a need to adjust the terminology in accordance with the mandate of the OEWG as approved by General Assembly resolution 75/240. We should talk about security of and in the use of ICTs, a topic that is the subject of consideration by the OEWG and the future permanent mechanism, and not ICT security, which is one of the narrow aspects of this. Therefore, there’s a need to change the title of the future mechanism. What is of key significance is clarifying the functionality of the new body. Paragraph 5, instead of framework for responsible state behavior, we should mention all of the specific pillars of the mandate for the future permanent mechanism, including threats, norms, international law, confidence-building measures, as well as capacity-building. In order to avoid misinterpretation in paragraph 7, we also propose an adjustment from action-oriented measures to replace that language with result-oriented measures. We believe that the results are more important than actions for the future mechanism insofar as actions may not have any result at all. The establishment of thematic groups in paragraph 8 needs to be carried out strictly in accordance with the mandate of the future permanent mechanism, which was agreed upon during the eighth OEWG session. Distorting or going beyond its scope can undermine or even cancel out the results achieved within the OEWG and inherited by the successor body. We welcome the attempt by the chairman to align the groups with the pillars, so we have no objections to the international law and capacity-building groups. At the same time, there are serious questions about the first DTG. We think there’s a need to clean up, so to speak, the description of the latter, including terms which are unusual for the OEWG and not fully understood by all participants, such as the term resilience, as well as to delete footnotes to previous reports, which is not the case in other DTGs. We also believe that the discussion of the three pillars of the mandate within the same group may be challenging. When it comes to norms and confidence-building measures, we believe that these topics deserve separate groups. Responding to the concerns of those delegations who talk about the possible duplication of the work between the plenary meetings and the dedicated thematic groups, they, on the contrary, should complement one another. The groups will examine individual pillars of the mandate in a more detailed and expert manner in order to submit their findings to the plenary meetings. For example, if we’re talking about such a specific matter as a discussion of templates for the contact point registry, we cannot imagine how it is possible to organize a substantive discussion about this during a plenary session. This is precisely why we need to have the relevant thematic groups. We think it is excessive to hold expert briefings in thematic groups, paragraph 7a, as well as to involve experts and other stakeholders in the work of DTGs, paragraph 8. The DTGs are to provide a platform for dialogue specifically to government experts. The decision on the appointment of co-facilitators, paragraph 9, should remain with the states insofar as this has political significance. Following the same logic, we think it is risky to empower the co-facilitators to transmit recommendations to substantive plenary sessions without first reaching consensus within the groups. We think it is important to maintain the current modalities for NGO participation approved in April 2022 in the OEWG in the work of the future permanent mechanism. These are a delicate balance that includes both inclusivity and ensures the intergovernmental nature of the process. So paragraph 17L and 17I concerning the leading role of states and the consultative status of NGOs should be moved to the beginning of paragraph 17. We do not see added value in giving non-state actors the floor after states during plenary sessions and review conferences, subparagraph D. This would steal precious time allocated to intergovernmental dialogue. We continue to insist on the inclusion of the mechanism on consultations on blocked NGOs. These are subparagraphs 4F and G. Insofar as they undermine the non-objection procedure, moreover, we believe that granting the chair authority to make a final decision on the admission of certain organizations contrary to the position of a member state goes against the principle of consensus. We think it is justified to make a small clarification to subparagraph B concerning ECOSOC-accredited organizations. According to this provision of the participation in the work of the future permanent mechanism, relevant organizations are allowed—organizations relevant to the scope. So the question arises as to who determines their competence in the field of international information security because the range of structures having consultative status within ECOSOC is indeed wide. Therefore, we propose to empower the chair and the secretariat of the future permanent mechanism to assess the relevance of NGOs accredited to the ECOSOC who have applied for participation in the future mechanism to inform states on the results of this assessment. In addition, the invitation to states and NGOs to sponsor the participation of NGOs in the activities of the future permanent mechanism should be deleted, subparagraph J. The impartiality of the relevant aid recipients when participating in discussions is indeed questionable. Furthermore, in our view, there should be priority given to facilitating the participation in the future mechanism of governmental experts from developing countries. Thank you for your attention.

Thank you, Russian Federation. Ukraine, to be followed by Mexico.

Thank you, Chair. As we advance in the discussions, I would like to say that Ukraine fully aligns itself with the statements delivered by the European Union, and now our delegation would like to make some additional remarks in its national capacity. I will shortly touch upon the CBMs in relation to Section G. At the outset, we cannot…

Ukraine, sorry to interrupt you. We are dealing with regular institutional dialogue. Is that the section you’re addressing?

I would like to give an example of how the CBMs could be used in a different way. In relation to creating a separate thematic group on international law, we would like to underline that international law in the first place is a tool, just one of the tools for setting the rules and determining the rights and obligations, a tool for maintaining peace, security, and stability in the ICT environment. Any tool can be viewed as a piece of art in its frozen integrity, or it can be used for a purpose. In our view, studying international law and discussing it as a piece of art should be left to scholars and think tanks, who will then present their views and recommendations for the common benefit during the focus-oriented events in the course of the dedicated thematic groups within the future permanent mechanism. Also, states within the scope of the CBM3 are always welcome to publish their positions or doctrines on the application of international law in cyberspace or in the use of ICT. As the state-led future permanent mechanism, in our view, should concentrate on the subject-focused application of the existing provisions of international law. In similar logic, that capacity building should be goal-oriented in the first place, we consider the dedicated thematic group on capacity building in the use of ICT in the context of international security, that’s DTG3 in para 8 of annex 3, as the one whose work will be fully within the scope of the tasks of and the goals of increasing the resilience and ICT security of states and enhancing the concrete actions and cooperative measures to address ICT threats and to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment. Having said that, we support the relevant compromise wording for para 8 of annex 3 suggested in the updated proposal for action-oriented thematic groups presented and circulated by France. We remain committed to work constructively towards achieving a positive outcome of this session. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Ukraine, for your statement. Mexico, to be followed by Switzerland.

Thank you, Chairman. Regarding Annex 3 on elements for the permanent institutional mechanism, for Mexico, it’s important to include a specific item in the agenda dedicated to reviewing the reports of the thematic groups. This would ensure that the results of these discussions are effectively considered in the plenary meetings of the mechanism. Likewise, we support the calls mainly from delegations that have expressed the relevance of maintaining a thematic group dedicated to capacity building. While we recognize that this issue can and should be addressed in a cross-cutting manner in other groups across the other two groups, this does not replace the need for a specific space where experts can review this pillar comprehensively. We believe that this thematic group would allow us to advance in developing action-oriented recommendations, mapping specific needs and available resources, following up on the implementation of recommendations, ensuring coordination with the global roundtable, and looking at the way in which stakeholders are involved so as to ensure diversity and inclusion. Similarly, we believe that it’s relevant for the permanent mechanism to have a thematic group on international law. Given the fast pace at which technologies are evolving, states need to have a permanent space in which to review, when appropriate, their compatibility with the existing legal framework. On the decision-making process, there is a need for a specific space. The third progress report agreed, and I read in English: The future permanent mechanism will take all decisions based on the principle of consensus. The semantics here are clear. The principle of consensus does not equate to decisions by consensus understood as unanimity. For Mexico, consensus is an aspiration that should lead us to building general understandings constructively. We recall that this working group is subsidiary to the General Assembly, whose rules of procedure are clear and are not governed by 193 vetoes. On the hybrid modalities for the DTGs, we reiterate our concern about the possibility that they end up being a space where a small group of delegations is able to dominate the conversation due to possible limitations on interpretation and technical services that they might have. If in the end we decide to keep this format and bearing in mind that technical discussions are planned, it’s essential to guarantee at least simultaneous interpretation services, as has already been flagged by Colombia. Without this, it wouldn’t be an inclusive mechanism, as it would disadvantage delegations whose experts do not speak one of the six official UN languages. Finally, on the participation of stakeholders, we believe that our exchanges with these stakeholders, including intersessionally, should be integrated into the general discussions of the permanent mechanism, avoiding parallel or fragmented processes. Therefore, we join the voices that have already called for us to promote meaningful exchanges with stakeholders through modalities that are closer to the proposal presented by Canada and Chile. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mexico. Switzerland to be followed by China.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will keep this short because I hope we will have time later to make our statement on the Sections C to F, in particular on international law. Switzerland is of the view that the focus of the Future Permit Mechanism should be on the implementation of the existing framework in an action-oriented and cross-cutting manner, including by strengthening capacity. Therefore, Switzerland supports the proposal presented by France for a set of action-oriented thematic working groups. We welcome that in the proposed DTG, to promote maintaining peace, security, and stability in the ICT environment, we would have the possibility to discuss, with the participation of experts and legal advisors, how international law applies to cyberspace. But we also think that we should have a place in the Future Mechanism to delve even deeper into the topic of how existing international law applies in cyberspace. In that spirit, Switzerland welcomes your proposal, Mr. Chair, for a dedicated thematic working group on international law, but we object to the addition made in REV1, referring to paragraphs 8 to 11 of Annex C of the third APR. We object to any attempt to use such a group for any other purpose than discussing how existing international law applies. Having said that, we are flexible about the concrete format for such discussions. In that regard, Switzerland made a concrete proposal on a subgroup or committee during the sessions in December and February. On modalities, Switzerland is a co-sponsor of the working paper presented by Chile. Switzerland is of the firm view that we must overcome the very unsatisfactory situation in which one single state can object to the participation of one or several stakeholders to the detriment of all other participants.

Thank you very much, Switzerland, for your statement and for your brevity. China, to be followed by Cuba.

In the past, we had a framework, an important umbrella. That is, we need an open, secure, peaceful, accessible, and interoperable ICT environment. If we are going to discuss abstract concepts, China believes that peace, interoperability, and accessibility are more important components. Therefore, the current wording might give the framework a new umbrella, to a certain degree, that would weaken the framework. Therefore, China cannot support it. On the participation of NGOs, we have mentioned on many occasions that the current modality is adequate, and there is no need to change it. Member states, based on their national positions, decide which NGOs cannot participate in our meeting. That is the procedure that we will follow, and no other consultation or discussion is needed. This is a process for member states. This is also the right for member states. So far, any newly added procedure will weaken the rights of member states. In our discussions in the past, I have mentioned that some delegates of member states cannot participate in our meetings because of the acts of the host country. If the concerns of a member state or member states cannot be resolved, how can we push the participation of NGOs to an inappropriate, improper high level? I also have heard with regret the remarks by a member state which is not in line with GA Resolution 2758. Those remarks are inappropriate. If a member state can make inappropriate remarks, how can we ensure that NGOs can make proper statements? Therefore, on this question, the rights of member states brook no undermining at all. I have also noticed that in the opening remarks of USG, USG has even put the participation of NGOs before DTG. We express our appreciation in this regard because we also take this issue seriously. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, China, for your statement. Cuba, to be followed by Kenya.

Chairman, we support what was mentioned by the delegation of Nicaragua on behalf of our group of like-minded countries on the future institutional regular dialogue mechanism, including for participation of multiple interested parties. We would like to stress the following. Our work in this session on the design of a new mechanism should be on the basis of the elements agreed in the third annual progress report. It is a priority to achieve a consensus-based and fluid transition of the OEWG to the future mechanism, which would allow us to continue the regular institutional dialogue on security and the use of ICTs. The creation of dedicated thematic groups is essential to ensuring this transition. We should only proceed with this if we reach a common agreement on their design, which should be done carefully so as to ensure their strict adherence to the five pillars of the mechanism’s mandate. In this context, while we welcome the efforts to try to bring us closer to this aim, we do not support the current language on DTG1. At the same time, the reference to maintaining peace and security could be confused with the mandate of other UN bodies. We support the establishment of a specific group on norms. This cannot, however, take up the focus of discussion on certain matters over others. We also support having a dedicated thematic group on capacity building, which is a recurrent claim from many developing countries. This means that we should be addressing this matter in relation to other mandates under the mechanism. Having a specific group on this would contribute significantly to granting the paramount importance to this issue and would only have positive impacts, particularly for developing countries. But ultimately, this would have a collective benefit as well. Finally, we insist that it is essential to guarantee that future mechanism meetings, be they in thematic groups or the plenary, should not be held in parallel. We are not in favor of these meetings being virtual, as is mentioned in the table to Annex 3. This format would not enable the participation of all delegations on an equal footing. Our delegation will evaluate the proposals that are made on this topic with the firm determination to contribute to the best possible outcome. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Cuba. Kenya to be followed by the Republic of Korea.

I thank you, Chair, for this opportunity. Kenya welcomes the draft final report as a constructive step towards a more secure, stable cyberspace and therefore makes the following additions and supports the sentiments made by the African Group. Kenya endorses the establishment of a permanent inclusive mechanism to ensure sustained engagement and implementation under the auspices of the General Assembly. While the broad goals of the future permanent mechanism are well-intentioned and transparent, certain aspects need to be considered, and we give the following recommendations. Kenya recommends the introduction of a peer review mechanism complete with a dashboard to review progress under the future permanent mechanism. We also advocate for the implementation of a regional equitable leadership rotation for chairmanship and bureau roles for the future permanent mechanism, ensuring all geographical regions periodically lead. Equally, we encourage the establishment of regional resource hubs where smaller states can access pooled expertise as part of capacity building. Further, we recommend alliances of smaller nations to designate rapporteurs who will offer impartial insights on agenda formulation. The language on peace cooperation is central to the Program of Action. However, terms such as these, like sovereignty, responsible behavior, and capacity building, can carry diverse geopolitical interpretations. These differing interpretations, such as concerning state control versus open internet, may persist despite diplomatic phrasing. We therefore advocate for the development and regular update of a consensus-based glossary to clarify core terms and definitions. The provision of modern legislative language illustrating balanced interpretation is welcome. Lastly, slow institution processes may lag behind fast-moving threats such as ransomware and AI-generated threats. Kenya proposes continued discussion on cyber threats arising from emerging technologies with a view to moving beyond dialogue to action. Chair, I submit.

Thank you very much, Kenya, for your contribution. Republic of Korea, to be followed by Indonesia.

Thank you, Chair. I have three simple comments to make. First, regarding the proposed thematic groups, we recall that many delegations, including ours, have emphasized the need for cross-cutting discussions throughout the OEWG process. From this perspective, we welcome the updated French proposal, which would allow for more practical and integrated discussion. Second, on stakeholders, we would like to reaffirm our support for the inclusive and meaningful participation of multistakeholders in the OEWG process. In our view, there is no clear reason to unnecessarily limit the multistakeholders from sharing their expertise. At the same time, we recognize that views differ among member states on the level of their participation. In this regard, we align ourselves with the approach proposed by Canada and Chile. Lastly, we welcome the language in the final report encouraging the hybrid format for thematic group meetings. I’ll stop here. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Korea, for your statement and also for your brevity. Indonesia, to be followed by Brazil.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Allow us to share Indonesia’s reflections on Section G of the Final Report. First, Indonesia supports Paragraph 62, which sets the foundation for the future permanent mechanism, in accordance with Annex C of the Third Annual Progress Report, along with additional elements outlined in Annex III of the Final Report. We hope that Paragraph 62 will be retained in the Final Report and garner broad consensus among Member States. Second, Indonesia sees merits in the establishment of the three Dedicated Automatic Groups within the FDM, as outlined in Paragraph 8. We are of the view that Dedicated Automatic Group 1 can be streamlined to resilience and ICT security of States, with a particular focus on cybersecurity threats, protection of critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, and other cross-cutting issues. It is important that discussions under the Threats Pillar be continued under this group, including those related to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Third, Indonesia welcomes the Chair’s proposal on the DTG2 that builds upon Paragraphs 8 to 11 of the Annex C of the Third APR. Indonesia is open to continuing discussions on voluntary non-binding norms under this group. At the same time, we underscore that discussions on the development of new norms and the possibility of a legally binding instrument must proceed concurrently. This will help ensure coherence, avoid duplication, and promote greater synergy. Indonesia remains flexible to exploring both new norms and potential legal frameworks in the area of cybersecurity. Fourth, while recognizing the cross-cutting nature of capacity building, Indonesia strongly believes it must indeed be its own DTG. The last subparagraph of Paragraph 8 on DTG3 must therefore be reflected in the Final Report. Its discussions will focus on CBMs, strengthening technical training and States’ capacities, and identifying needs, particularly from developing States, to strengthen capacity and responding to cyber threats, as well as narrow the digital divide. This DTG can also serve as a forum to strengthen existing initiatives, including the global POC directory and a newly established global ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal. Furthermore, broader cross-cutting issues such as strategies to bridge the digital divide must also be incorporated into the three dedicated thematic groups. Lastly, Indonesia supports Paragraph 17, particularly Paragraph 17A, that acknowledges the value of stakeholder participation in the future permanent mechanism, as their perspective can further enrich our deliberations and provide better insights on the current cyber landscape. Indonesia is of the view that related stakeholders, including the private sector, play a significant role in advancing cyber technologies. Nevertheless, we also affirm that their role must remain consultative with the aim of assisting and informing Member States, as reflected on Paragraph 17I of the Annex. We believe Member States must be the ones that set the direction, lead the decision-making, and oversee the implementation of the process. In closing, Mr. Chair, allow me to reiterate Indonesia’s commitment to engage constructively and support consensus towards a smooth and seamless transition to a single-track and state-led future permanent mechanism. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Indonesia. Brazil, to be followed by the Lao PDR.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation would like to rate its appreciation to you and your team for your work on REV1 to guide us in establishing a single permanent future mechanism. Brazil was one of the sponsors of a working paper submitted on capacity building in the future mechanism, in which we further detail our arguments for a dedicated group and how we see its relationship to the plenary. As previously stated, this does not negate the cross-cutting nature of the issue. However, we need a space within this mechanism to discuss, evaluate, and make recommendations on how to conduct capacity building initiatives. In this regard, we reiterate our support for the current dedicated thematic group structure as reflected in REV1, especially for the capacity building DTG. Still on the DTGs, we can also support South Africa’s proposal to integrate the discussion on norms under a separate agenda item to the DTG on international law, highlighting that this does not mean granting them equivalent legal status. In discharging their work, we believe the DTGs could also benefit from the expertise of UNIDIR on specific topics under discussion. In this regard, we would propose the following additional paragraph, possibly after nine. To foster diverse and substantive discussions, dedicated thematic groups may request UNIDIR to produce neutral and objective research reports or to organize other capacity building activities supported by voluntary contributions. These materials could be used to inform the discussions of subsequent dedicated thematic group sessions. Brazil also supports Australia’s proposal on spacing the meetings of the DTGs and the plenary. We value the Chair’s idea to reduce costs of in-person participation. But for meetings in New York, accommodation comprises a much higher portion as compared to airfare, and we do see the benefit of having more time for our deliberations to percolate between meetings. However, we would propose avoiding meetings in December, a time when accommodation costs are notoriously high in New York, and suggest perhaps early February. We also support Colombia’s proposal on having interpretation for the thematic group meetings, even if hybrid, and also support Mexico’s proposals on having a clear agenda item at the plenary on the report of the groups. In this regard, we reiterate our proposal that dedicated thematic groups have a short formal segment to make the formal decision to elevate those reports to the plenary. We can support your text on modalities, which strike a good balance between diverging positions on this issue. We particularly welcome paragraph 17J on facilitating participation of stakeholders from developing countries. At the same time, we thank Chile and Canada for their work on this issue and remain flexible to incorporate elements from their working paper. Mr. Chair, as a final point, my delegation has some concerns on how we will integrate the third APR’s Annex C to the current Annex III. We would like to see both documents consolidated in a single one at the next review of the draft report for greater clarity. We have been happy to see, since late 2003, discussions on a future permanent mechanism take place within this group in order to avoid fragmentation. We remain ready to engage in further negotiations throughout the week to ensure the adoption of a single consensus outcome on Friday. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Brazil, for your statement and suggestions. Lao PDR, to be followed by Kiribati.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Lao PDR supports the establishment of a robust, inclusive, and transparent future mechanism that will address the growing risk and vulnerability in the ICT ecosystem. Our delegation underlines the importance of a decision-making process within the future mechanism. This is guided by the principles of consensus. In the same vein, we would like to underscore the critical importance of capacity building in narrowing the digital gap. In this regard, we support the establishment of a dedicated thematic group on capacity building for many states. Capacity building is essential for meaningful participation in global ICT security governance. We recognize that the latest piece of technological development demands that the permanent mechanism mandate be sufficiently flexible to address emerging challenges. The mechanism should be equipped to address this evolving technological reality through appropriate processes and discussions. The permanent mechanism should anticipate and prepare for future developments. In these connections, we support retaining in the final report the process for regular review and development of new norms and potential legally binding instruments as the continued mandate for the future permanent mechanism. In conclusion, we believe that an inclusive, consensus-based permanent mechanism with strong capacity building foundations and equipped with adaptive capability will best serve our collective security interests in cyberspace. Such an approach will enable all states to contribute meaningfully to global ICT security governance while ensuring the mechanism remains relevant and effective as technology continues to evolve. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Lao PDR, for your contribution. Kiribati to be followed by Denmark.

Thank you, Chair, Excellencies, and Delegates. Kiribati welcomes the proposals under Section G of the report and expresses strong support for the establishment of a regular institutional dialogue on the security of and in the use of ICTs. We commend the Chair for leading the Working Group toward a structured, inclusive, and forward-looking conclusion, including the vision for a future permanent mechanism. Cybersecurity remains a multidimensional and evolving issue, intersecting with legal, technical, diplomatic, economic, and societal concerns. Kiribati believes that sustaining dialogue, particularly one that involves all stakeholders, including government, civil society, technical experts, and the private sector, is essential to reducing miscalculation, strengthening trust, and ensuring accountability. We align with the Pacific Islands Forum call for a fit-for-purpose mechanism that is accessible, inclusive, and practical, especially for small island developing states like ours. In this regard, we highlight the importance of hybrid modalities, regional representation, and sensitivity to time zones, which are critical to ensuring meaningful participation from the Pacific. Kiribati supports the establishment of the future mechanism in accordance with Annex C of the third APR and Annex III of the final report. We appreciate that this platform will provide continuity and action-oriented follow-up across all thematic areas and must remain grounded in consensus. We look forward to working in partnership with all delegations to ensure that this mechanism is not only established but also responsive, inclusive, and effective for all. I thank you for your kind attention.

Thank you very much for your contribution. Denmark, please.

Thank you, Chair. As we work together towards a consensus outcome by the end of this week, I wish to thank you and your team for all your efforts throughout the five years of the OEWG. Denmark fully aligns itself with the statements made by the EU during the past days, as well as the joint Nordic Statement on International Law presented by my colleague from Finland yesterday. I would like to briefly elaborate in a national capacity on the important topic of regional, institutional dialogue and stakeholder engagement. Along with the EU, we continue to support the consensus reflected in the Annex C of the 2024 Annual Progress Report that the Working Group should be cross-cutting and action-oriented. We share the view of the EU and others that we should be able to draw on all five pillars of the Framework for Responsible State Behavior in each of the dedicated thematic groups, and we support the French updated proposal for the content and focus of each of the groups. We need to ensure that we build a permanent mechanism that is firmly grounded in the UN acquis. As for the participation of stakeholders, we strongly support an inclusive approach to working with stakeholders and experts from industry, academia, and civil society. Denmark supports the letter from Canada and Chile on stakeholder modalities, which is now co-sponsored by 42 states, including the 27 EU member states. We also share the view, as highlighted by many other delegations, that cyber capacity building is crucial for our collective security and resilience. But if we all pause for a moment and think about how capacity building is actually implemented, these efforts are simply not possible without the insightful, experienced, and valuable input from stakeholders. Private companies are often first responders in the event of a cyber attack. Capacity building is delivered on the ground by industry experts, companies, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders, and we need to listen and learn from them. If we’re serious about prioritizing our joint cyber capacity building, we should not decouple our work from the stakeholders. We will gain more meaningful and effective discussions in return. Stakeholder contributions should be guided by the principle of a voice, not a vote, ensuring that while decision-making remains state-led, discussions benefit from the expertise and insights of relevant stakeholders, including those who’ve been affected by cyber incidents, academia, and those who implement and secure cyberspace in practice. By extension, we see a clear need to move beyond a situation where the veto of a single state limits our collective ability to benefit from the valuable contributions of a diverse set of stakeholders. Any objections should be subject to open discussions, and if they persist, decisions should ultimately be guided by the will of the majority. In closing, as other delegations have mentioned, let’s not lose sight of the progress we’ve made throughout the five years of the OEWG, and let’s ensure that the report reflects this progress as we embark on the next chapter of a permanent, inclusive, and action-oriented mechanism for the international cyber community. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Denmark, for your statement. Japan, to be followed by Canada.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll just make two points. First, Japan believes the future mechanism should center and function on conducting practical, concrete, and effective discussions or exercises in order to upgrade UN members, countries’ cyber security resilience in light of increasing and persistent cyber attacks against facilities and infrastructure which all our modern societies heavily depend on. We have engaged in many constructive discussions through the OEWG and GGE, and Japan believes that we can move on to the next stage based on these achievements in the UN framework. In this regard, the content of the DTGs should be cross-cutting and action-oriented, including a scenario-based approach as well as avoiding duplication. As such, the proposal by the French delegation about how we should frame the DTGs seems more pertinent to my eyes rather than what is now proposed in Annex III with the single-issue DTG on international law. The future mechanism should be based on the nature that five pillars of the framework are closely interrelated with each other when we need to find and offer practical solutions through pragmatic deliberations on how we prepare against threats and risks under normal circumstances and how we quickly respond to incidents in case of emergencies. My second point is about multistakeholders. In Japan’s view, we need to move on to the practical and effective stage, and this could only be done fully with appropriate participation of the private sector and experts. I believe this is quite obvious because cyber attacks are done through tools, facilities, and infrastructure developed by the private sector and market, and at the same time, in case of cyber attacks, it is often them who become the first victims. Many risks and damages which state actors have to manage in fact lie within the private sector. Japan therefore suggests enabling a variety of multistakeholders to participate in the discussions of the DTGs. In this regard, Japan aligns itself with the proposal made by Canada and Chile and a significant number of other countries which joined their paper on the modality of multistakeholder participation. Thank you.

Thank you, Japan. Canada, to be followed by Sweden.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. As you mentioned some time ago, the creation of a permanent mechanism at the UN is a unique opportunity and it is not without consequence. In my last statement, I spoke to our birchbark canoe. Mr. Chair, in any canoe, everyone must paddle. Some paddle fast to move forward and may need to slow down for others that are learning to paddle. Multiple compromises made over the last year by the supporters of the Program of Action demonstrate our commitment to do just that. Yet, if some in the canoe start paddling backwards, the canoe will only go in circles. I wish to stress that Canada will not accept renegotiation of the existing agreements on the shape of our future mechanism, and I will quote four, that the future mechanism will take as its foundation of its work the consensus agreements on the framework, that it will be action-oriented in nature, that it will be open, inclusive, transparent, sustainable, and flexible, and that it will be integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting in nature. We do not believe that we can delay decisions on how the future mechanism will operate, including the role of DTGs. Doing so would only result in delaying the start of the future process as we continue to negotiate, but with no pressure to reach consensus. Canada strongly supports the DTG proposal eloquently presented by France today, and we underline the compromise they put forward, once again, on how to approach our work in the mechanism. We also support the inclusion of an agenda item for the plenaries to engage on cross-cutting discussions on recommendations of the DTGs. We oppose the duplication of pillars or groups of pillars in the DTGs. This is not integrated, and it is not cross-cutting. It is important to remember the DTGs are subsidiary bodies to the plenary. The plenary is the dominant and decision-making body. In the spirit of compromise, we have agreed that the plenary meetings could continue to address, like we do today, each pillar in turn. Discussions on capacity building, international law, non-binding norms, and CBMs will therefore remain central to our discussions. Not having pillar DTGs does not decrease the importance of any pillar. Rather, the DTGs allow us to consider in an action-oriented cross-cutting measure how the pillars come together when the issues we are discussing are applied in practice. Not only do practical pillar discussions risk creating silos, as outlined by the EU, they risk creating duplication. We believe that cross-cutting groups can place a solid focus on assessing capacity building and how it meets identified gaps with the intent of prioritizing and recommending improvements to its delivery. We support those proposing holding DTGs ahead of the plenary and ideally separating these two meetings through the year, allowing time for states to take the outcomes of DTGs, consider them with sufficient time, and return to move our discussions forward in plenary. Mr. Chair, I will not speak extensively on stakeholders, given that a statement was already delivered on our behalf. However, in my national capacity, I note that the veto counters the right of states and robs hundreds of states from the expertise and capacity building potential of stakeholders’ input based solely on the consideration of one state. Our future mechanism cannot operate on the basis of one veto to rule them all. An open, inclusive, and transparent mechanism will allow for open debate on objections, but the majority should decide in the end. Finally, in keeping with the goals of UN80, any future mechanism must not duplicate existing structures and processes and must be developed in a manner that ensures it can operate within existing resources. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Canada, for your statement and once again for reminding us that we are all on the same boat. We all need to paddle forward and move faster. We have very little time left. That much I agree with you. Sweden, to be followed by Romania.

Thank you, Chair. As this is the first time Sweden takes the floor, please allow me to express Sweden’s gratitude towards the work done by you and your team. Sweden fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and the Nordic Statement on International Law delivered by Finland. Chair, respecting your request, we will limit the statement to the aspects connected to the RID and Annex 3, yet we have a few additional remarks on the previous chapters that we hope to get the opportunity to put forward. Chair, as you said in the opening of this meeting, the RID and the Annex relate to the report’s overall substance. Let me therefore make a point by starting in paragraph 32. Sweden welcomes the recognition of the vital role that public-private partnerships play in addressing the threats facing states and the importance of dialogue between different sectors. At the same time, we question how we, as states, will be able to efficiently develop such partnerships and dialogues if the modalities of the future permanent mechanism do not enable effective stakeholder participation. Sweden therefore invites the Chair to draw from the Canada-Chile-led paper. We believe that the paper in fact constitutes a bridging proposal, enabling states which have an objection to a certain stakeholder to clearly express and argue for its objection, yet in the end, the majority of states, in line with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, make the decision of adhering to the principle of a voice on the vote. Regarding the recommendation of the future permanent mechanism discussion, Sweden echoes multiple states’ requests to set a full stop after, quote, ICTs in recommendation 43. And on the structure of the thematic groups, Sweden fully supports the French proposal, which in its revised form has drawn upon the views of many states and which constitutes an honest bridging proposal. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Sweden. Romania, to be followed by Vietnam.

Thank you, Chair. As it is the first time I am taking the floor, let me start by expressing Romania’s appreciation for your tremendous work and that of your team in support of this process. Romania aligns to the position expressed by the EU and makes the following comments on the regular institutional dialogue in its national capacity. Given the time constraints, I will keep my intervention short and be providing in writing the extended position, including our views, on the A to F chapters of the report. As for the future mechanism, I would like to stress that for us it is very important to preserve the results of the last five years of intense and good work, and I am convinced that we can all agree on a final version of the report that will be acceptable for all parties. Establishing a permanent mechanism is essential in this respect. Let me underline the importance to have an action-oriented, cross-cutting approach. This is of essence in order to ensure a comprehensive and inclusive perspective, addressing different elements of the UN framework. In this regard, Romania considers that a specific DTG on international law is incompatible with this practical and cross-cutting view, and we propose the deletion of the references from Para 8 of Annex 3. We strongly support the constructive proposals put forward by France that provide a coherent structure and a clear delineation between different strands of work, putting an emphasis on capacity building in a transversal and cross-cutting manner. Last but not least, we share the position expressed by previous speakers about the importance of stakeholders. They are essential for a broader cybersecurity, and we don’t think we can spare their valuable inputs. Romania supports and has co-signed the paper that Canada and Chile presented on this topic. All this being said, we will continue to constructively participate in these negotiations. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Romania, for your statement. Vietnam, to be followed by Estonia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Regarding the future mechanism, we support paragraph 63 of the draft report, particularly the structure of the future permanent mechanism, as well as the modality on participation of stakeholders, as proposed by the Chair in annex 3. We believe modalities for the establishment of a future permanent mechanism should adhere to the following principles. First, the mechanism must operate on the basis of consensus, ensuring that all member states have an equal voice in shaping international cooperation on ICT security. Secondly, it must be state-led, with member states taking the primary role in the development, implementation, and oversight of the mechanism. Thirdly, it should encourage the participation of relevant stakeholders, including private sector entities, research institutes, and other non-state actors, whose expertise and practical experience can enrich the discussion. At the same time, the involvement of non-governmental stakeholders must ensure the integrity and focus of the future mechanisms and comply with the first two principles. And finally, the mechanism must uphold the central role of the United Nations. In this regard, we believe that the future mechanism needs adjustment to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and delivery of discussions. This may include shortening the duration and frequency of meetings, organizing regional or inter-regional meetings, considering alternative meeting locations outside of New York, and allowing other countries to host inter-sessional meetings. The establishment of the mechanisms needs to be aligned with ongoing UN reform efforts, including the proposed UN 80 frameworks, in order to promote a streamlined, resource-efficient system. Vietnam supports reducing fragmentation, focusing resources, and prioritizing mechanisms that demonstrate clear, concrete, and achievable outcomes with defined time frames. Vietnam reaffirms our commitment to participating actively in the OEWG process, as well as the future mechanism, and working constructively with all member states to find common ground in building an open, safe, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. I thank you for your attention.

Thank you very much, Vietnam, for your statement. Friends, I wanted to give you an update. We have about 20 speakers left on this agenda item. We have about 40 minutes left, and I wanted to also make some remarks as we wrap up this discussion. So if each one of you took two minutes, then I think it’s doable that we give everyone a chance. And part of being a community to discuss these important issues is also to share the limited resources we have. In this case, that is time. So I would urge each one of you to jump to the essentials and then look at the option of sending your statements to me and to also all members. We’ll put that on the website. I still do not intend to muzzle any of you because I really think it’s important to give everyone a chance to speak, not just on this issue, but on every issue. But time is limited. So with these caveats, let’s see how far we can go in the speakers list. And I’m counting on you for your help and support. So Estonia to be followed by Portugal.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Estonia aligns itself with the statement of the European Union, and that’s the following in its national capacity. We express our full support to the French compromise proposal on the dedicated thematic groups presented today. We believe that this proposal is transparent, clear, logical, forward-looking, and provides an action-oriented basis for the future cyber discussions. It states clearly that at plenary we continue discussing the pillars of responsible state behavior and the action-oriented dedicated thematic groups will complement it, as well as offer an opportunity for concrete discussions. While taking into account also our own experience in capacity building activities, we believe that capacity building is an essential pillar of the future permanent mechanism, and it is essential to engage with it in a cross-cutting and action-oriented manner. We welcome the Pacific Islands Forum proposal, which provides small developing countries’ perspectives on making capacity building a cross-cutting item of DTGs. Mr. Chair, international law remains one of the most important topics for us. We believe that it should not be addressed in isolation, but rather in a cross-cutting manner with the other topics. Therefore, we are not in favor of a separate DTG on this. On stakeholder modalities, we believe that the non-objective mechanism allowing a single state to block participation has to be reconsidered. It has negative consequences for the effectiveness, transparency, and inclusivity of our work. We would like to see the cross-regional paper on stakeholder modalities submitted by Canada and Chile as a basis to draft the final report. And finally, I do apologize for abusing the word cross-cutting, but it seems to be the word of the day and a key to our future work. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Estonia, and well done. Under two minutes as well. By the way, you don’t need to speak in full sentences, you can just say… Keywords. I mean, I love good grammar, but as they say, the days of good English have gone. Well, my English is not my mother tongue, but please, I mean, the point I’m making is if you’re agreeing with delegation X, just say we agree with X, we don’t agree with Y, we don’t like this, or you love that. I think we’re telegraphing and communicating with each other where we are and where we stand. I think that’s useful for all of us and certainly for me. So Portugal, followed by the United Kingdom, which I’m sure will speak with good grammar.

Mr. Chairman, this week, more than usually, Portugal relied on the EAS to convey the collective views and positions of EU member states. Therefore, I take the floor with the sole purpose of calling our attention to the fact that last year, according to Cybersecurity Ventures, the cost of cybercrime reached $9.5 trillion, more than half the combined nominal GDP of the EU member states. That is the staggering dimension of the price we pay for the insecurity we are confronted with in cyberspace, and the figure does not even include the damage caused by state-sponsored espionage intrusions, which is understandably difficult to quantify. The main task of the future permanent mechanism, which will come after this very successful Open-Ended Working Group, will therefore be undoubtedly the leveling up of the resilience of the systems and networks of the critical infrastructure in all UN member states, without exceptions, so that all of them can benefit from the general compliance of the normative framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which the UN General Assembly endorsed in 2015, and since then, we have patiently considered, with a view to render it universally implementable, including the eight confidence-building measures, the 11 voluntary norms, and the relevant international law, i.e., the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the principles of international human law. Judging from what we heard yesterday and today, and as the French delegate underlined this afternoon, there is among us a strong degree of agreement that without the universal implementation of the UN framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, we will not be able to tackle the growing challenge of digital insecurity. However, we are all also aware that if the most inflexible positions, those which have not yet managed to attract enough support from the membership, continue to be pushed regardless, a consensus mandate for the future permanent mechanism will not be possible. It is true that the mandates of the fifth Group of Governmental Experts and the previous and current Open-Ended Working Groups were all voted, and that is precisely why resolutions on the mandate of a future Program of Action to promote responsible state behavior in cyberspace after 2025 were submitted to the General Assembly in 2022 and 2023. However, in spite of overwhelming votes, the sponsors of those resolutions accepted to bring the discussions of the mandate of the future permanent mechanism to within this Open-Ended Working Group, expecting that it could be finessed consensually in the highly constructive climate which your superlative stewardship, Mr. Chairman, fostered among us. It would therefore be highly unfair if, after five years of steadfast work, we were unable to achieve a consensus progress report that includes a structure for the future mechanism allowing for the cross-cutting, action-oriented, and integrated discussions called for by the third annual progress report. We therefore trust that, in a spirit of generous responsibility, the membership will eventually enable you, Mr. Chairman, to submit a revised draft in accordance with the ambition of the vast majority of all of us. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Portugal, for your contribution and for your kind words. United Kingdom, to be followed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Thank you, Chair. I’m pleased to announce that we’ve reduced our statement, and I’ll submit a longer version in writing. In paragraph 7.a, we would like to add “including but not limited to,” so it reads, “briefings from relevant experts, including but not limited to those drawn from a pool of experts nominated by States.” We support a provision for States to recommend experts, but as the process for such nominations would still need to be developed, our amendment is essential to ensure the future Chair can act flexibly and with agility to invite relevant experts to brief States. We would like to delete the last sentence of paragraph 11 for the reasons outlined by a number of States. In paragraph 12, we support the proposal made by Australia regarding meeting timings. We should retain all of paragraphs 13 and 14 as currently drafted. It’s particularly important to my delegation that any decision to establish additional thematic groups will be made by consensus. Regarding paragraph 15, as a number of States have requested, we would like to add “agreed by consensus” after “action-oriented draft recommendations” and would support further amendments to bring this in line with France’s proposal for a sixth plenary item, which we think is a good one. In paragraph 17F, we should delete the words “on a voluntary basis.” We have a number of amendments to paragraph 17G, but in the interest of time, we’ll send these to you in writing. Overall, this paragraph does not sufficiently bridge the requests of the 42 States co-sponsoring the Canada-Chile inclusive modalities paper. The operationalization of paragraph 17I potentially conflicts with the consensus recommendation of annex C paragraph 11.B. We request that 17I points back to this paragraph or is modified for consistency with the third APR. Turning to paragraph 8 in relation to dedicated thematic working groups, any configuration of DTGs should be consistent with the consensus agreement in annex C of the third APR that we will have action-oriented and cross-cutting discussions in the future mechanism. If we are following a pillar-based approach in plenary, as paragraph 5 proposes, such discussions surely occur in the thematic groups. Unfortunately, this is only the case in one out of the three groups in REV1. In this context, my delegation emphasizes in particular that we do not believe a DTG on international law will achieve consensus this week. Listening to statements today, we do hear a continuing and broad consensus that capacity building should be at the heart of the future mechanism. REV2 of annex 3 could draw further on the proposals that have been made in this regard, and we welcome the bridging compromise by France. We also support the global roundtable’s scope and purpose being expanded in a separate paragraph in annex 3 and the suggestions for the roundtable put forward by Brazil and Vanuatu to ensure flexibility and the inclusion of experts. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you UK. Netherlands, to be followed by Ghana.

Thank you very much, Chair. The Kingdom of the Netherlands aligns itself with the statements of the European Union, and I would like to make the following complimentary remarks in a national capacity. Building on NXT of last year’s APR, we hope to channel the results achieved in the OEWG into the future permanent mechanism to be mandated by the final consensus report. We fully support the updated proposal by France on dedicated thematic working groups. Focusing on capacity building, we welcome the proposal of France to put capacity building central in the cross-cutting group on increasing the resilience and ICT security of states. We also took note of the statement shared by others and joined papers by groups of states, including the Latin American states, on the functions within the structure of the future mechanism on capacity building. Taking these views into account and complementary to the French proposal, we would like to propose a structure for the facilitation of capacity building within the new mechanism. It would consist of the following three steps, which we would like to see reflected in a separate paragraph after paragraph 8 in annex 3. First, dedicated thematic working groups could be aimed at sharing experiences, identifying specific needs, proposing actionable recommendations to the plenary, and providing information to convene the roundtable. Second, the global roundtable, which functions could be to, one, facilitate exchanging information on programs and opportunities, two, facilitate connecting needs of those requesting to resources of those providing assistance, three, and sharing capacity building best practices. Such a roundtable would bring together a range of cyber capacity building experts, also allowing to foster coordination among different states, regional organizations, and capacity building stakeholders, and provide ideas and practices that can be further reflected on in the plenary. And then third, the plenary could focus on the adoption of the recommendations from the working groups and the monitoring of previous recommendations. Based on this, states can also further reflect on existing and potential tools on capacity building and the need to strengthen initiatives in this regard. This would not preclude discussions on other capacity building topics in the plenary. We will also share some specific writing on these ideas with you, Chair. And then lastly, I’d like to share three very quick expressions of support. First, we support the proposal of Brazil to keep a flexible approach to the level of participation to the global roundtable and therefore to strike out high level. On stakeholder modalities, we join other states in supporting the paper from Canada and Chile and the proposals in this regard. And then lastly, on the sequencing of the meeting, we support the proposal made by Australia to have enough time between the meetings of the DTGs and the plenaries. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Netherlands. Ghana, to be followed by El Salvador.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Africa Group and would like to reiterate its desire to witness a seamless transition from the UN OEWG to the Future Permanent Mechanism. This is essential to ensure continuity in states’ discussions on such important issues. Mr. Chair, regarding the dedicated thematic group DTG1, my delegation appreciates your efforts to combine three focus areas into DTG1 and the significant allocation of three days within the illustrative framework, illustrative timeline for the work of the group. We understand the intent to comprehensively address the three substantive focus areas within this timeframe. However, to further enhance clarity and support the effective functioning of this thematic group, my delegation is of the view that explicitly and clearly outlining within the illustrative timeline how the allocated time will be distributed among the group’s distinctive work streams would be highly beneficial. This would help ensure that each focus area receives equitable consideration and fosters a balanced, structured approach to the group’s deliberations. Such specificity would greatly assist delegations in planning their engagements and contributing meaningfully to the process. Furthermore, my delegation wishes to underscore the importance of having a dedicated discussion on international law as a topic that requires comprehensive discussions. However, my delegation sees merit in South Africa’s proposal to merge international law and norms, as both have some similarities in that they govern states’ behavior. Furthermore, we have witnessed in the past how some norms have been codified into international law. As such, we can remain flexible on this proposal as long as both thematic areas are given sufficient time to have discussions in depth. Finally, my delegation welcomes a reference to hybrid formats for all dedicated thematic meetings in paragraph 13 of annex 3. This is especially important, noting that some countries may not have the resources to always participate in person. However, having an option to participate virtually provides the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the process. As mentioned by my colleagues from Thailand and other countries, Ghana supports the proposal for the need to have in-person participation strongly encouraged. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Ghana. El Salvador to be followed by Senegal.

Thank you, Chairman. On Annex 3, we’re grateful for the revised proposal. El Salvador advocated for the establishment of limited thematic groups, and we believe that the structure presented, including the topics proposed, responds to our national and regional needs. Particularly, we highlight the importance of the group dedicated to capacity building, because this is of the utmost relevance for the global use. And we would also like to focus briefly on the other thematic group, which is the capacity building group, which is a priority for my country and other countries in Central America. We do not see capacity building only as a space for discussing financing. We see it as a space to connect requests with providers, where we can look at technical assistance, exchange of knowledge, and discuss possible alternatives in light of the realities of limited financial resources that we face in our countries. This discussion can only happen in a space dedicated to that end. On the modalities for the participation of other stakeholders, we welcome the progress reflected in the hybrid participation option and the limited use of this option. We welcome that these modalities could be consistent in order to have a uniform level of participation for stakeholders throughout the process. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, El Salvador. Senegal, to be followed by Chile.

Mr. Chairman, given that this is the first time I’m taking the floor, I wish to applaud you and the Secretariat for the efforts. We align ourselves with the statement delivered by Nigeria on behalf of the African Group on threats and capacity building and the future mechanism. In our national capacity, we wish to deliver the following statement. On the norms, we wish to recall our steadfast position on the matter. The implementation of the current norms should include – could include the drafting of new norms. If there’s a consensus-based agreement about the necessity of this, we believe that additional norms may not be necessary. Turning to the implementation of international law, we note with satisfaction that there’s a reference to the framework for responsible conduct of the use of ICT and applicability of the core principles of international law in cyberspace. We also recognize the merits of presenting national positions and regional positions on the matter. Yesterday, the EU delegate quite rightly noted that individually, collectively, more than 100 states presented their national positions. In this regard, my delegation, in light of the substantive discussions of the future mechanism, proposes the following addition to paragraph 42 for the Secretary to present to the thematic group to report on the views already available in order to identify general trends and the perception of the matter by states on IHL. We applaud the reference to the resolution of the ICRC on the protection of civilians as well as the work which we represented here, the transnational group of friends on this matter, where our shared understanding has evolved about the way that this law is implemented. This needs to be reflected. We also support what has been proposed to incorporate paragraph 4 of the ICRC resolution, capacity building. We support the relevant non-exhaustive positions in the document. We also support the Vietnamese proposal on academic resilience and on UNIDIR. As a contribution, we wish to propose in 52C that we think it would be relevant to add to a technological divide in capacity building efforts. 453 proposes the addition of the need to organize regional preparatory meetings for the Round Table. Now 451B, in the same paragraph, also to add at least one – or the review conference. Now I briefly wish to turn to the future mechanism. We fully align ourselves with the position of the African Group, the group of 54 countries on the structure of the mechanism, specifically the three thematic groups vis-a-vis international law and the other on capacity building. We support the concerns of Egypt about the future mechanism with a dedicated space for discussions on the application of international law. The same applies to capacity building. Like Morocco, we think that modifications can be carried out if necessary throughout the future cycle and subsequent cycles. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Senegal, for your statement. Chile, to be followed by Zimbabwe.

Thank you, Chair. Chile is grateful for your proposal to present the additional elements for the operationalization of the Future Permanent Mechanism. We value the efforts to ensure a structured, consistent basis which will allow for a fluid transition of our work from the OEWG towards a sustainable, inclusive, and action-oriented mechanism. The predicted cycles with co-facilitators, particularly the relevance to the gender balance and geographic representation, are also to be welcomed. We’d like to express our support briefly for the proposal by Brazil on setting dates for meetings, particularly given the cost of accommodation. And along similar lines, my delegation has the same issues. We also support the proposal of Colombia to have the interpretation in the hybrid groups. In terms of decision-making, we agree with Mexico on the fact that decisions should be adopted on the basis of the principle of consensus, which is not the same as decisions by consensus. We would like to, in particular, express our firm support for the inclusion of a thematic group for capacity building, which is a faithful reflection of the permanent strategic nature of this within our interests. We also value the proposal of periodically convening a global roundtable on capacity building as a space to raise the profile of needs and to mobilize collective efforts. The functional articulation of both spaces should be revised on a timely basis. We also believe that the mandate of this group could be further strengthened by incorporating functions such as, for instance, clearly establishing the needs in capacity building, systematic assessment of results from capacity building initiatives so as to guarantee their sustainability and inclusion. Also, as was suggested by Mexico, we should have specific work agendas that are circulated ahead of time. We hope that these will be considered as a part of thematic group three so as to strengthen its structure and to work within the mechanism. Within the structure, this should not represent a duplication of the discussions in the plenary. Turning to the participation of other stakeholders, we welcome the reference to the participation of experts and other interested parties in each DTG. We also think that we welcome the reference to states exercising the power here. However, we believe that this should follow a procedure that should at least ensure full transparency, and we should also look at the final outcome decided by the member states efficiently. Chile reiterates its commitment to an inclusive, action-oriented multilateral forum. We believe that the success of the permanent mechanism will, to a large extent, depend on its ability to bridge gaps and ensure the voices of everyone in this area. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. Zimbabwe, to be followed by Uruguay.

Thank you, Chair. As this is the first time we’re taking the floor, Zimbabwe would like to commend you, Chair, for your continued commitment to an inclusive, transparent, and consensus-driven process. Over the past four years, under your able leadership, the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) has addressed complex and sensitive issues concerning the security of and in the use of ICTs. We are confident that this momentum will be sustained as we move towards the establishment and operationalization of a future permanent mechanism. Chair, we are particularly supportive of the inclusion of a dedicated thematic group on capacity building and the intention to convene a regular global roundtable on ICT security capacity building. This aligns with Zimbabwe’s national view that capacity building must be embedded in the permanent mechanism and treated as an enabler of both security and development objectives to bridge the digital divide. Furthermore, Chair, Zimbabwe welcomes the inclusion of a dedicated thematic group on the application of international law to the use of ICTs in the context of international security. We regard this as essential to fostering legal clarity, ensuring accountability, and preserving stability in cyberspace. In line with the common African position adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council, Zimbabwe reaffirms that existing international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, fully applies in cyberspace. We are further of the view that this thematic group could facilitate the long-term objective of elaborating a comprehensive legal instrument negotiated multilaterally and grounded in customary and treaty-based international law to codify the applicable rules and principles governing state conduct in cyberspace. Such an instrument would reinforce the rules-based international order and provide states, particularly developing countries, with the predictable legal framework to address complex cyber threats while safeguarding sovereignty and international peace and security. Chair, on stakeholder participation, Zimbabwe recognizes the valuable role that stakeholders, including the private sector, civil society, and academia, can play in shaping cybersecurity policy. However, we reaffirm the intergovernmental and state-led nature of both the current process and the envisaged permanent mechanism, and my delegation is mindful of the introduction of new elements that may prove counterproductive or risk undermining the integrity and effectiveness of this critical mechanism. In this regard, we support the modalities that have thus far guided the Open-Ended Working Group process to continue to be applied given their proven efficacy. To conclude, Chair, Zimbabwe recognizes the growing importance of moving from conceptual debates to operational structures, and we appreciate the clarity and specificity that the current paper also brings to the institutional design of the future mechanism. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Uruguay, please.

Thank you very much, Chairman. This is the first time that Uruguay is taking the floor, so briefly, our country would like to express its thanks for your work and the constructive spirit demonstrated throughout the negotiations, which is reflected in this robust document that we’re discussing. We advocate for the creation of a single permanent mechanism which has the trust of the members, which is a space for discussion on the application of international law and the use of ICTs, and which has a thematic group to look at capacity building, as is set out in annex 3 of the document. On section F, as we have said several times, technical capacities and specialized bodies’ knowledge of countries is valuable not only between countries but also within them. The appearance of the digital divide underscores the need to ensure technology transfer and to foster international cooperation. Therefore, we’re convinced that the creation of a DTG dedicated to capacity building, which is established in annex 3 and in line with the working groups put forward by the Latin American region, would allow us to go beyond the simple organization of training programs. This would allow us to have a comprehensive view to identify specific needs and ensure specific support. The full intervention has been sent and will be available for publication. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Uruguay, for your statement and brevity. Botswana, please.

Thank you, Chair. The Botswana delegation takes the floor for the first time in this session and would like to express our gratitude to you and your Secretariat for having led this process to its completion. With regards to Section 1, Chair, relating – Section 1 of REV1 relating to regular institutional dialogue, Botswana wishes to note that it fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by Nigeria on behalf of the African group. Botswana remains fully committed to an inclusive process for maintaining international peace and security in cyberspace and supports the establishment of a robust and permanent mechanism that builds upon the OEWG’s work over the past three cycles and its delivery on the expectations of all states, particularly those from the developing states. We therefore welcome the recognition of the importance of continuing regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the UN, under paragraphs 59 of REV1, and we believe it appropriately reflects the consistent call made by participants of this OEWG to remain inclusive, action-oriented, and consensus-driven. Botswana welcomes the inclusion within the Chair’s proposal in Annex 3, the proposed structured multistakeholder participation, including that of regional and sub-regional organizations, the private sector, academia, and civil society, as this will ensure a balanced regional representation and will be guided by the principles of consensus, transparency, and inclusivity. We do understand that the expertise provided by the stakeholders will be crucial for insight and provide informed guidance on the work of the future mechanism and will not necessarily translate to decision-making, which will be left to the states to retain, as Cote d’Ivoire has highlighted, the intergovernmental nature of the process. The report reflects the aspirational consensus on the need for continuity, and we believe at this point that Annex 3 should be sufficient in prescribing the operational modalities and institutional design of a future mechanism. As has already been indicated by other states, we are not particularly strict on this aspect and choose to be flexible in this regard, Chair. It is in this spirit that we agree with the Chair’s proposal, our client in Annex 3, for the plenary sessions that will be supplemented by the work of the three dedicated thematic working groups in the future mechanism. We particularly support the establishment of a thematic group on capacity building that will assist states in the organization of their national cybersecurity efforts in developing policy frameworks, protecting the CI and CIIs against cyber threats, and in the implementation of existing voluntary norms and to develop national positions on the applicability of international law in cyberspace. We wish to align ourselves with Brazil’s position, supported by the UK and the Netherlands, which call for the exercise of flexibility regarding participation in the global roundtable on ICT security capacity building, as opposed to high-level participation. This would ensure that deliberations take a more engaging approach. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Botswana. Nicaragua, please.

Chair, our thanks to you and your team for all of your efforts to reach a successful outcome in this exhaustive process. The future permanent mechanism should fully implement all of the decisions adopted by consensus within our group, particularly respecting the principles of the UN Charter. It will also be vital to establish the appropriate mechanism to implement capacity building programs for developing countries and to ensure interstate international cooperation to address the threats of the undue use of ICTs identified in the OEWG. The highest priority for this meeting is to achieve a fluid transition from the current OEWG to the future permanent mechanism through a concise report. In the meantime, the DTGs of the future permanent mechanism should be aligned with the five pillars of its mandate. We recognize the efforts of the Chair here. However, as has already been raised by other delegations, the scope and approach of thematic group one is not clear. We believe that we need greater discussion here. It has been shown that existing non-binding voluntary behavior norms, despite being a positive step for the effective regulation of the use of ICTs, are insufficient. Being guided by this and as well as by the spirit of striking a balance between norms and international law, we suggest the establishment of a specific thematic group on norms. We also support the establishment of a specific group on capacity building. Chair, in order to preserve the intergovernmental nature both of the UN and of this very process, we advocate for us to keep the current modalities for the participation of stakeholders in the future permanent mechanism. The issue of the participation of non-governmental stakeholders is not a procedural, rather a substantive issue. Guided by this reasoning, we are not in favor of the participation of non-governmental stakeholders in specific thematic groups, which should provide a forum for discussion solely between governmental experts. Finally, we support the terminology for this process to be aligned with the mandate of the OEWG. In this sense, ICT security should be replaced by security of and in the use of ICTs throughout the text. We also propose editing the title of Annex 3, replacing ICT security with security of and in the use of ICTs following the same thinking. Nicaragua stands ready to continue to support constructively throughout this process.

Thank you very much, Nicaragua. Germany, please.

Thank you, Chair. Germany aligns with the EU Statement, the presentation by the French delegation, and on stakeholder modalities, the paper led by Chile and Canada. I will not repeat specific points that have been submitted in writing, but rather would like to share Germany’s view on the key goals that we want to achieve with the Future Permanent Mechanism, and I will focus on the question of the DTGs. First, we want to protect, promote, and implement the normative framework of responsible state behavior that we have built over the years and strengthen it. We cannot accept putting in question the implementation of that framework. Second, we want to have a space for policy-oriented, cross-cutting discussions in the DTGs. This has already been agreed in the 2024 APR. These cross-cutting, issue-oriented discussions allow for concrete and meaningful exchanges on many issues that also have been highlighted by colleagues like – and these are just examples – ransomware threats to essential public services. Third, we all want to move forward in a single-track format. We believe that the renewed compromise proposal made by France on how to bridge the different views on working groups would be appropriate to address the objective of strengthening the existing framework, breaking up silos, and also addressing policy challenges holistically and also the concerns raised by other delegations, including on assessing needs for and improving delivery of capacity building. We welcome and continue studying the perspectives of the LAC region and the Pacific Island Forum region. In a very concrete way, we could flexibly discuss challenges we all share, for example, ransomware that was raised by many during the course of our discussions. The considerations or potentially the consensus recommendations flowing from the dedicated thematic working groups would then again inform the plenary discussions. We support the essence of the proposals made by Mexico and France to have a dedicated plenary agenda item for such discussions. Such recommendations will enable us to move our discussion forward in the sole decision-making body of the Future Permanent Mechanism and then strengthen the framework with its five pillars. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. Germany. It’s six o’clock exactly. First of all, I want to express my thanks to the interpreters who have kindly given us another 10 minutes, and I’m grateful for their support for our process here. Second, I want to say that we have about six speakers who wanted to speak on this item of RIT, but we will not be able to cover them today. Third, we have 30 outstanding speakers from the morning list, and I had said that we will find a way to give them a chance, but I have the sense that out of 30 speakers who had registered to speak in the morning, some might have already spoken already in this debate because it was not clear when they pressed the button whether they were wishing to address RID, so the number may well be less than 30. So this is how we’ll proceed. First, tomorrow we will meet at 10 a.m. sharp. We will hear the stakeholders as is indicated in the work program and as approved in the work program, and it is fair that we hear them and they have been a part of this process. The voices and views of the stakeholders are important, and in this process, I’ve always said that I’m committed to engaging them in a systematic, sustained, and substantive way, and so we will hear them tomorrow morning. But I would also like to seek the kind indulgence of the stakeholders in seeking their understanding and patience, so we will have to impose a time limit of three minutes for them tomorrow. We have about 20 stakeholders who are registered to speak, so if we allow for three-minute statements, we should be able to complete it in about an hour, and then after that, I will take up the remaining speakers from this morning. And I would also like each one of you to come to the secretariat to see where you are in the speakers list left off from yesterday morning and whether you wish to take yourself away from the speakers list. Of course, the idea is not to open it up to have another 50 speakers. If we open it up to have another 50 speakers, then we will not be able to give everyone a chance. This afternoon, some of you took the floor and said this is the first time you were speaking, and that’s very gratifying because it’s important that we hear the voices of those who have not spoken. But at the same time, it’s not for me to say that delegations should not speak more than once or twice. So responsible state behavior, we have a normative framework. So I leave it to you to exercise your judgment and for you to decide whether there are burning things that you need to say that haven’t already been said in one way or another by your partners or groups. So the speakers list from this morning is going to be left with the secretariat here in the podium, and if you wish to take yourself away, I would encourage you to do that, and if so, then we will have a shorter speakers list. So we will go through the speakers list tomorrow morning after the stakeholders have spoken, and then finally, for those who have not been able to speak today, we will combine the remainder of the six speakers today, and we have to do it tomorrow morning. We will have to have a cut-off of concluding the meeting at 1 p.m. tomorrow. After that, I will need to sit down and go through the discussions, my notes, and to prepare a REV2, and I will need time to do that. This is not to be generated through an AI program. We are not there yet, but it will require me and my team to go through all the interventions, proposals, paragraphs, 56 pages of it, and it will require me to make some judgments. My judgment as chair, as your friend, from the podium, I am a friend to all of you, but I also have a responsibility as chair. Now, in that capacity, let me say a few words about the discussion today. I found the tone very, very positive. I sense a palpable commitment to bring this to a closure. I sense that there is an enormous amount of commitment to conclude the work and reach consensus. So this discussion, in that sense, has been very encouraging for me, and I thank you for that. Second, a range of issues with regard to regular institutional dialogue. The whole question of NXC is there. It is the foundational framework for the future permanent mechanism, and we are looking at additional elements, and some of the discussions also relate back to NXC, which we have already agreed, and that’s a good thing. We have a very strong framework, and we are not revisiting or reopening NXC in any way. That much I want to make clear. But we need to build on that with some additional elements, and that’s what we are trying to do, and I think we need to find a way as to perhaps how we can connect NXC to the additional elements that we are doing. Second, of course, there are many different views, but I think there are some really converging elements. I mean, we all recognize the need for dedicated thematic groups to allow us to go deeper, to have focused discussions, and to look at the interconnections and to have a cross-cutting discussion, which is part of what we agreed to in NXC as the mandate of the future permanent mechanism, that we will have policy-oriented cross-cutting discussions. And everyone agrees that we are not trying to replicate the plenary and the dedicated thematic group. So the question is, how do we differentiate the discussions? How do we go deeper? What do we need to do? How do we organize our discussions? Now, the idea of dedicated thematic groups was a means to go deeper and to look at the discussions in a policy-oriented way, to look at the interconnections, the cross-cutting nature, and within the context of the five pillars. That’s the other point that I think we are all converging on. No one’s questioning the five pillars. And look at it, after five years, everyone’s defending the five pillars. Look how far we have come. That is one of the many, many acquis of this process. Everyone’s committed to defending the five pillars, and that’s a very convergent element. So the idea of the DTGs is not to displace or diminish the five pillars, but to actually complement it. And being committed to the five pillars does not mean that we can’t go deeper and look at the interconnections between the five pillars. We did agree on five pillars, but we did not agree to five silos. How do we connect the dots between the different pillars? I think that’s the challenge. I’ve got two more minutes, and I should be fair to the interpreters, but I do want to say that the proposals that I’ve put forward for the three dedicated thematic groups, very divergent views on dedicated thematic group one, divergent views, dedicated thematic group two, divergent views, dedicated thematic group three, more convergent views as far as the importance of capacity building goes. So how do we organize this? Let me give some thought to that. But it seems clear to me that we do need dedicated thematic groups. It is not an option to postpone the decision to the future permanent mechanism. I urge you to reflect on that. We cannot postpone it. If we do, the transition will not be smooth and seamless. You will spend the next two years debating dedicated thematic groups. So you might as well call it the global mechanism to discuss dedicated thematic groups. I’m being serious. I think that I’m making this as a friend of yours, that we do need to make a decision, but we need a decision that doesn’t lock us in. It must have sufficient flexibility. It must be general enough. It must respect the five pillars, but it must be able to organize our work. As our friend from Egypt said this morning, it’s not the structure or the architecture that is going to make this process work. It’s the political will. It’s the reservoir of trust that is going to make this process work. This OEWG has come thus far, not because of the structure or anything architectural that we have designed. It’s because of your commitment, the process, the people, and the political will has all helped. So I think those things are important. So don’t be fixated on the structure or the architecture. It’s about how we organize the discussions, and we need to have dedicated thematic groups. The number and scope is something that we need to reflect on. Finally, on stakeholders, I’ll just say very divergent views on one side and the other. And it seems very clear to me that if we are to attain consensus, we need to go towards the middle. And the REV1 elements that I have put forward in the REV1 draft was an attempt to chart out a middle path. And I have not heard any new solutions today. So we need to go back to the middle. So that’s all I would say. Let me reflect on REV2 and all the different elements. But most of all, my gratitude to all of you for your very constructive and positive tone this afternoon. The meeting is adjourned. See you tomorrow, 10 a.m. And one last thing. I would like everyone to be here at 10 a.m. to listen to the stakeholders, especially those who have defended and advocated for stakeholder participation. You should be here. I’m going to be taking attendance. And those… Because it’s not fair to the stakeholders that they come here at 10 o’clock and there’s no one in the room and they’re talking to me. No, they need to talk to you. And for those of you who also have different views on stakeholders, I’d like you to be here because I’ll be taking attendance. And I’m asking you as a friend, please come and listen to the stakeholders. The meeting is adjourned. Thank you.