Session 3-1 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, good morning to all of you. The first meeting of the third substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies 2021-2025, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 75/240 of 31st December 2020, is now called to order. Distinguished delegates, I extend a very warm welcome to all of you who are attending this meeting in person, as well as to those who might be following the discussions virtually through UN Web TV. I’d like to acknowledge the presence of Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, and I would like to give the floor now to her for some opening remarks. Ms. Nakamitsu, you have the floor, please.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, and dear colleagues, thank you for the opportunity to address the third substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of information and communication technologies. At the second substantive session in March, I spoke frankly about the extraordinary challenges facing the international community, including those of direct relevance to the work of this body. I stated plainly that the use of ICTs in support of active hostilities is unfolding before us. I noted that the present reality has been marked by serious ICT incidents. Four months later, I am afraid my assessment remains unchanged. We continue to witness a steady stream of ICT incidents resulting in destruction and disruption, including those impacting infrastructure providing services to the public. Several states have announced measures to buttress their so-called cyber defenses, having assessed an overall heightened risk of confrontation in this domain. We have heard grave concerns raised over an increased risk of direct military confrontation in response to malicious ICT activity. Thus, this body once again meets under very difficult circumstances. Nonetheless, I continue to believe that such moments can only be met with a redoubling of efforts to find common ground. Dialogue and constructive engagement are the only viable pathways forward. With this in mind, I am pleased that the second substantive session featured rich exchanges on all key topics under the group’s mandate. More than 300 statements were delivered, including 130 by women delegates. I welcome this progress towards gender parity and hope this trend continues. I commend the willingness of states to discuss substance, despite an ongoing divergence of views on some organizational matters. Many practical, action-oriented proposals were made, from the development of additional guidance on norms implementation to the establishment of a global repository of points of contact. Delegations noted the value of engagement with regional and sub-regional organizations to foster cooperative approaches on ICT security. And there was general agreement on the value of information exchange on good practices, the centrality of capacity building, and the need for regular institutional dialogue. With such a robust exchange, the working group is well-placed to consider its first annual progress report this week. The annual progress reports must be a vehicle for intermediate outcomes that respond to the urgent peace and security challenges related to state use of ICTs. I therefore wish to commend the chair on his early circulation of a zero draft several weeks ago, followed by a revised draft last week. I welcome the draft’s very focused, action-oriented approach. The draft importantly outlines recommended next steps for the working group, including framing future discussions during the fourth and fifth substantive sessions in 2023. I welcome the proposals related to strengthening the protection of critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, including through enhanced interactions with interested stakeholders on this topic. This is in line with calls by the Secretary-General for prioritization of measures that address the challenges of the current pandemic. I also welcome the measures that enhance the protection of critical infrastructure, including the health sector. In a similar vein, I would encourage focused discussions on specific topics related to the applicability of international law to the use of ICTs by states, inter alia state sovereignty, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the principles of proportionality, distinction, humanity, and necessity pursuant to international humanitarian law. I am also pleased to see the inclusion of gender-related language in the latest draft, including reference to raising awareness of gender dimensions of ICT security. My office stands ready to support the implementation of annual progress reports’ recommendations and looks forward to engaging with delegations to that end. Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, before concluding, I would like to make brief comments on the issue of stakeholder participation. Firstly, allow me to congratulate the chair and all delegations on the consensus agreement reached on modalities for participation of non-governmental entities ahead of this substantive session. I warmly welcome those accredited entities that are here today. I have repeatedly emphasized the importance of engaging stakeholders in an inclusive and sustained manner, given the current pandemic. I also want to highlight the unique nature of ICTs and the central role played by non-governmental entities in the management of many ICT resources. Diverse stakeholders have much to contribute to this process, including through direct support to the implementation of the normative framework. Through both the dedicated stakeholder sessions scheduled for later this week and the informal consultative meetings convened by the chair on the sidelines of the working group sessions, I trust the contributions of stakeholders will greatly enhance the work of delegations. Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, I can only reiterate my previous calls to this working group that it continues focused, concrete work on ensuring the peace and security of the ICT environment, which remains one of the most urgent priorities on the international agenda. Challenges to a peaceful and secure cyberspace cannot be expected to diminish. Let us meet these formidable challenges together. I wish you every success with your session this week, and I thank you very much for your attention. Back to you, Mr. Chair.

I thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her statement. Distinguished delegates, at this stage, I’d like to offer some remarks in my capacity as Chair of this Working Group. I’d like to once again welcome all of you to the third substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group. I’d like to make a few general points. First, this session, in my view, is particularly significant because it marks the closing of the first annual cycle of the OEWG process. You will recall that we held our organizational session in June 2021, the first substantive session in December 2021, and the second substantive session in March 2022. After more than 12 months of deliberations, I think we have a collective responsibility to show progress and deliver some results. This session is therefore a test. It is a test of our ability to work together and to build consensus. The reality is that we have not had an easy start to this process. We spent 10 long months working on an agreement on modalities for the participation of stakeholders. And we finally reached an agreement on modalities for stakeholder participation in April this year. The modalities we agreed have allowed for the accreditation of 71 stakeholders, some of whom are here today, and I welcome them to the meeting. The agreement we reached on modalities may not be perfect, but it has allowed for increased participation of stakeholders in our process. And it is my hope that with the modalities we have adopted, more and more stakeholders will be able to participate in the work of the Working Group. I take this opportunity to thank all the stakeholders who are participating in this session, and also all the stakeholders who may be following our important work virtually through UN Web TV. I want to tell the stakeholders that I attach the greatest importance to your contribution to the Open-Ended Working Group process. And I, as Chair, will continue to engage with stakeholders through informal meetings, as well as at dedicated stakeholder sessions, as agreed in our modalities. The agreement we reached on modalities for stakeholder participation was possible because of the flexibility shown by all delegations. And I want to put on record my appreciation to all delegations for their support and spirit of flexibility. I hope that this spirit of flexibility and constructiveness will continue as we begin our important work at this session. The second point that I wish to make is that the Open-Ended Working Group must deliver results if it is to be credible. As we begin our third substantive session, it is important that we work together to make the Open-Ended Working Group an action-oriented and results-focused process. I have said many times before that the Working Group cannot just be a talk show. Many countries, especially smaller countries and developing countries, are looking to the OEWG for results. In the last 12 months, we have all seen that many smaller delegations and developing countries are closely engaged in the Working Group process. The level of interest in the work of the OEWG is very high. Many developing countries and small delegations have very high expectations of this Working Group. In my view, this is a very encouraging sign because it indicates that members of the UN attach great importance to the issue of ICT security. It is also clear from our discussions in this Working Group over the last 12 months that UN members attach great importance to the implementation of the framework of norms, rules, and principles. This, too, is a very encouraging sign, and that is why it is important for this Working Group to deliver concrete results. If we are not able to show progress, the reality is that many delegations will lose interest in the Open-Ended Working Group process. This, in turn, will affect our credibility and also affect the credibility of the United Nations. It is therefore important that we continue to make progress on the essential work of implementation of norms and of delivering action and results. At the same time, it is equally important for our Working Group to continue developing and deepening common understandings on the issue of ICT security in accordance with our mandate. The development of common understanding has been a key part of the UN’s work in the area of ICT security. It is through this work that we have been able to consolidate an initial framework for responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs, which is what we now refer to collectively as the acquis. In our last two substantive sessions, we have had many useful discussions on each of the six pillars of the mandate. However, these discussions were a little too general, and I think it is necessary for us to move to more focused discussions on specific issues at our future substantive sessions of the OEWG. That is why we need the Annual Progress Report to provide a clear roadmap for our future work and identify specific issues for focused discussions. The third point that I want to make is that it is very important for the credibility and effectiveness of this Working Group that we adopt the Annual Progress Report at the end of the week. The Annual Progress Report is a means to capture the many concrete proposals that delegations have made at the first and second substantive sessions. The Annual Progress Report will provide a clear roadmap for our work in the future. For these reasons, it is my view that the adoption of an Annual Progress Report at the end of the week is not an option but a necessity. Let me put it differently. The adoption of an Annual Progress Report is not a nice-to-have. It is, in my view, an essential requirement for the OEWG to continue its work next year in a focused and substantive manner. If we are unable to adopt an Annual Progress Report at this session, then it is likely that we will be faced with a scenario next year where we will repeat the same general discussions. In my view, it is not an efficient use of time to repeat a general discussion on the same issues next year. And if we are unable to agree on an Annual Progress Report, the reality is that there will be no clear guidance for the Secretariat and for the Chair to begin work during the intersessional period. In the absence of an Annual Progress Report, the intersessional period will therefore be a wasted opportunity. That is why, Distinguished Delegates, I am convinced that we need a detailed and focused Annual Progress Report that provides a clear roadmap for our work next year. Finally, I want to emphasize to Delegations the urgency of reaching an agreement on the Annual Progress Report by the end of this week. We do not have the option of extending our work or conducting intersessional consultations beyond this week. To put it starkly, we do not have the option of kicking the can down the road. The reality is that August will be a very busy month at the UN in New York for many First Committee Delegates because of other important UN meetings that will take place. September is the beginning of High-Level Week and also the beginning of the 77th session of the General Assembly. In October and November, the UN will be busy with the work of the main committees, including the First Committee. In other words, if we do not reach an agreement on an Annual Progress Report this week, we will have no opportunity for another discussion at a later stage. And looking at the calendar, it is clear to me that if we do not adopt an Annual Progress Report by this week, there will simply be no other chance to do so. I would therefore like to urge all of you to work together and do your best to reach an agreement within this week. I also encourage all Delegations to reach out and talk to each other in order to build bridges, to build trust, and to build consensus. I am deeply aware that the world is facing many challenges and geopolitical tensions. And yet, it is important in my view that we talk about our differences in a spirit of mutual trust and mutual respect. Indeed, that is what the United Nations is about. It is a place to talk to each other in a spirit of mutual trust and mutual respect. As I have said many times before, the Open-Ended Working Group is itself a confidence-building measure. And it is in this Working Group that we have to build trust and build confidence, or, if necessary, rebuild trust and rebuild confidence. I therefore encourage all Delegations to use this week productively to reach out and talk to other Delegations. I would also like to urge all Delegations to work together in a flexible and constructive spirit towards the common objective of advancing international peace and security in the sphere of ICTs. Our efforts this week will also be important in setting the tone for the rest of our five-year process. If we are able to agree on a draft Annual Progress Report, this would give our process a much-needed momentum and energy to make further progress next year and in the years to come, hopefully paving the way for a comprehensive and meaningful final report at the end of our process in 2025. Distinguished Delegates, I look forward to working with all of you over the coming days. And this concludes my opening remarks as Chair of the Open-Ended Working Group. Distinguished Delegates, I would now like to move to Agenda Item 3. And I’d like to remind Delegates of the decisions taken by the Group at its Organizational Session held on 1 June 2021, which will guide the way this Open-Ended Working Group undertakes its work for all of its Sessions. The Working Group adopted its agenda contained in Document A-AC.292-2021-1. At the same Session, the Group also decided to conduct its work in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Main Committees of the General Assembly, while acting on a consensus basis in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 75-240. Now, I’d like to draw the attention of Members of the Open-Ended Working Group to the Provisional Program of Work of the Third Substantive Session as contained in Document A-AC.292-2022-2, which has been structured in accordance with the agenda of the Open-Ended Working Group. May I take it that the Working Group wishes to proceed in accordance with the Provisional Program of Work of the Third Substantive Session of the Working Group as contained in Document A-AC.292-2022-2? I hear no objection. It is so decided. I see a request for the floor from the Russian Federation. Russian Federation, you have the floor, please. Thank you.

Thank you, Chair. Distinguished Chair of the Open-Ended Working Group of the United Nations, Mr. Burhan Gafoor, dear Ms. Nakamitsu, dear colleagues. I welcome all participants to the third substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Information and Communications Technology Security for 2021 to 2025. Our work in this format is more important and needed than ever before, given the rising threats to information security. This is why we are compelled to take the floor. This is to once more point out the fact that the United States has not implemented its commitments as regards the central headquarters of the UN. The U.S. administration again has brazenly refused to issue visas to the representatives of Russia, namely Andrei Kutski, special representative. This high-placed diplomat is well known to you as a negotiator, a results-based negotiator, and the main individual working on information technology at the UN. The U.S. has refrained from issuing visas to a number of other members of our delegation, including from the relevant agencies. Russian NGOs are affected as well. They were thus cut off from the opportunity to participate in a specialized session for NGOs. As far as we know, this practice of non-issuance of visas by the U.S. is used against the members of other delegations. It’s clear that the tool of visas has been used shamelessly to undermine the international community’s efforts to ensure ICT security. The member states of the UN have ended up on unequal footing in the negotiations on this issue, and the delegations are only contingent upon the will of Washington in that regard. In this regard, we wish to voice our protest against the acts of the U.S. The repercussions of their short-sighted policy will be felt not only by Russia but by the entire United Nations, its leadership, the specific Open-Ended Working Group, and by you, distinguished Chair. We support the colossal efforts of the Chair to ensure a successful outcome to the negotiations. We regret that certain states have used the cheapest instrument in order to hinder this work from being done. We call upon the UN Secretariat to take specific actions to resolve this unacceptable situation. We trust that the leadership of the organization will pay due attention to it. Dear colleagues, we prepared for a long time for this event despite the impediments that were created by the American authorities. Part of our interagency delegation was still able to arrive at the UN. The delegation was left without its leader from Moscow at the 11th hour. We were therefore compelled to change our schedule to reflect the changed circumstances. Due to that, we have no alternative but to speak right now on a number of substantive issues with regard to the registry of contact points. A strategically urgent task is to establish direct ties between relevant agencies. Without this, it’s even difficult to talk about ensuring information security.

Sorry, Distinguished Delegate from the Russian Federation, it is not my intention at this point to enter into a discussion of substantive issues. I’d like to reserve comments on those items for a later stage. Thank you very much. So I take note of the earlier point that you have made on behalf of your delegation, and I would urge your delegation to reserve comments on substantive issues for Agenda Item 5. We are under organizational matters, and I have matters relating to modalities for stakeholder participation, so can I kindly seek your indulgence in not addressing substantive issues until Agenda Item 5. Thank you for your understanding. You have the floor, please.

I wish to point out the following, Chair. We were not the ones. We were compelled to adapt to these circumstances that were created by the authorities of the U.S. That’s the reason why we would like to issue a statement now, somewhat earlier. We’re compelled to do this. The reason for that is that our leader was not – the head of our delegation was not granted a visa.

Russian Federation, I understand the point that your delegation has made. We are under the agenda item on organization of work, so I’d like to kindly seek your understanding as Chair of this process. Please reserve your comments on substance when we go to agenda item five. You will have the opportunity, and I will give your delegation the opportunity, when we come to agenda item five. I have taken note of the points that you have made in your intervention so far, relating to the participation of your delegates and the ability of your delegates to be present at this meeting. I take note of that, so I hope that you will kindly reserve your comments on substance when we go to agenda item five. Thank you very much, Russian Federation. Do you have any other comments to make at this stage? Thank you.

Mr. Chair, then, may I ask you to give us the floor on the first item? You’re placing us in a very difficult position, but we’ll attempt to make do.

Thank you, Russian Federation, for your understanding. Yes, when we come to Agenda Item 5, your delegation will be the first on the speaker’s list. Thank you. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I’d like to remind delegations that we are not entering a general debate. We are still in Agenda Item 3. We have adopted the program of work, and I thank you and I thank all delegations for your kind support and participation. Under this Agenda Item, I have two more items that need formal adoption, and let me share that with you in advance so that delegations have an idea. We need to formally adopt the modalities that were adopted in April, the modalities that were adopted through a silence procedure. That needs to be adopted formally in the setting of this Open-Ended Working Group. Subsequent to that, we are also required to formally adopt the list of accredited stakeholders who had been approved for participation in this meeting. So these are two decisions that we need to address under organization of work. It is now my intention to go to these two items: adoption of the question of modalities for the participation of stakeholders. I see that there are still two requests for the floor from the Islamic Republic of Iran, Nicaragua, and Czech Republic. Three requests for the floor. I see a fourth request from Ukraine, so we’ll go through this speaker’s list. Once again, to remind that we are not going into substance, we are talking about the modalities for the stakeholder participation. These are the items that are before us under organization of work in Agenda Item 3. I give now the floor to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, first and foremost, welcome back to the Chair, and thank you for your tireless efforts to prepare this meeting. As far as the issue of visas is concerned, we share the same concern with our delegation, and we want to inform you and the OEWG on the issue of the visa. It is always very difficult to get a visa and to be on time to follow these important meetings like the OEWG in New York. From the beginning of the discussion of the OEWG, the humble suggestion of this delegation was that the meetings of the OEWG would be convened in other cities of the UN, like Geneva or Vienna. So far, since it has been adopted that all the meetings would be convened in New York, we have always had the difficulty of getting the visa on time. My first participation in the first meeting was delayed; I came later. The second time, the issuance of the visa was so late that I was not able to participate. And the third time is the first time that I am here on time. We appreciate all your efforts and the Secretariat’s efforts to facilitate the issuance of the visa. As far as the issue of the visa is concerned, we emphasize that the host country issue the visa on time to enable delegations like ours to follow the important meetings like the OEWG and to follow our interests. I will limit my comment to this, Mr. Chairman, as you wish, and we will discuss the substance later on upon the rules of procedure. Thank you so much.

Thank you, Islamic Republic of Iran. Your comments are noted. Nicaragua, please.

Thank you very much, Chair. It is a pleasure to be able to see you once again. We thank you for your efforts and your leadership in organizing this meeting. My delegation adds its voice to the concern at the denial of diplomatic visas, which is being experienced, and I simply wish to state our position to recall the responsibility of the host country in providing, in a timely fashion, the visas required to delegations with no discrimination in order to ensure the participation of all member states under equal conditions. We hope that the host country will comply with the headquarters agreement, something we have been stating at the host country committee meetings and with other delegations. We stand in solidarity with those affected by this injustice. Thank you, sir.

Thank you very much, Nicaragua. Your comments are noted. I have four more speakers who have asked for the floor, and I intend to close the speakers’ list now, before moving on to the adoption of the modalities for the participation of stakeholders. The four speakers are Chechnya, Ukraine, Cuba, and the Syrian Arab Republic. Chechnya, you have the floor, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I ask for the floor because I’d like to draw attention to a concern of the Czech Republic, which is shared by many other countries, among them all EU member states. We have agreed to ask to speak only once to save time. I’m therefore making my current intervention on their behalf as well. I would like to welcome the fact that 54 non-governmental entities that do not have consultative status can speak at the current Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) meeting. It’s encouraging that these entities come from many different parts of the world. This is a major improvement from the past when none of them could participate. I would also like to welcome, Mr. Chair, your informal multistakeholder consultation last week and look forward to the time allocated to stakeholders this session. I highly appreciate, Mr. Chair, your commitment to systematic, sustained, and substantive engagement with stakeholders. At the same time, I want to express our deep regret that there are still 32 non-governmental entities without ECOSOC consultative status that have been denied participation in the upcoming UN Open-Ended Working Group session. It raises serious questions on inclusiveness and the recognition of the responsibilities, expertise, and relevant activities of the multistakeholder community. Over the past year, the Czech Republic has been working very closely with two non-governmental entities, Cyber Peace Institute and Microsoft, as a part of multistakeholder projects to implement standards for responsible state behavior in cyberspace in the healthcare sector. Our collaboration was very fruitful, and both institutions showed tremendous commitment. In addition, a questionable added value, both were denied access to our meeting. The same has happened to many other entities, among them institutions as renowned as Chatham House, the German Council of Foreign Relations, the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE), the Stiftung Nürnberg, and the Stimson Center, and many others. It is very unfortunate that they have no opportunity to contribute with their knowledge and experience to our debate. This creates a rather absurd situation. For example, the draft annual report mentioned the need to strengthen cooperation among computer emergency response teams. At the same time, the main entity dealing with this issue, the Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), is denied participation. It is inconceivable to us that anyone could label their institutions as unfit to participate in our discussion. It is remarkable that none of the entities from our region without ECOSOC consultative status can participate at the current Open-Ended Working Group session. This leads us to serious doubts that the exercise of these rituals was based on an objective assessment of the organization’s relevance to the scope and purpose of the Open-Ended Working Group. The Czech Republic fully respects APER’s agreement on modalities of multistakeholder participation, as you, Mr. Chair, mentioned in your opening remarks. However, in accordance with this agreement, I would like to call the countries that have used the veto, namely Russia and Ukraine, to voluntarily share their reasoning with us. I am convinced that this step will significantly contribute to mutual understanding and greater transparency in our discussion. In closing, I would like to assure you, Mr. Chair, that the Czech Republic will continue to constructively contribute to the UN work on advancing an open, safe, secure, and stable cyberspace for all. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Czech Republic, for your statement, which is very well noted. I also express my appreciation to your delegation and the group of delegations on behalf of whom you spoke for having made a statement once as a way to save the time of the committee. Thank you very much. I give the floor now to the delegation of Ukraine, to be followed by Cuba. Ukraine.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The delegation of Ukraine would like to make a statement on the issue of stakeholders’ participation in the work of the OEWG. At the outset, our delegation would like to stress that Ukraine has always supported the broad participation of stakeholders in the work of various UN bodies, including the OEWG. We proceed from the fact that all interested stakeholders of cyberspace, civil society, and academia can make significant expert contributions to our work, which would allow us to better understand all of the key issues on the agenda of the Working Group, including the issue of existing and emerging threats in cyberspace. Moreover, the analysis and proposals made by stakeholders are important contributions during the negotiation of the text of the report of the OEWG, which contains conclusions and effective recommendations in the field of cybersecurity. In addition, Ukraine believes that the full-fledged participation of stakeholders testifies to the inclusiveness, openness, and transparency of our discussions in the Working Group, which is fully in line with paragraph 74 of the report of the previous OEWG. Mr. Chair, since the issue of inclusiveness and transparency is also related to the accreditation process for the participation of the OEWG sessions, we would like to draw the attention of UN member states to the following. After careful consideration of the list of the non-governmental organizations, which do not have consultative status within ECOSOC, and that submitted applications for accreditations in accordance with the modalities agreed upon by us, we have concluded that a number of NGOs do not meet the criteria of independence and impartiality. In particular, a few organizations from the Russian Federation are clearly state-affiliated entities, while the OEWG should benefit from contributions made by non-governmental independent organizations from the technical community, whose expertise is crucial for our work. In this regard, we have decided to object to the accreditation of such entities for participation in the third session of the OEWG. However, we cannot but mention that Russia has blocked a large number of non-governmental organizations from participating in the work of the group. Many of those organizations are some of the most prominent in the field of information communication technologies. As a result, the OEWG has been deprived of the opportunity to listen to the views and recommendations of many leaders in the field of ICTs on all agenda items of this important UNGA subsidiary organ. Therefore, in conclusion, Mr. Chair, Ukraine stands ready to continue actively contributing to the work of the OEWG, as well as contribute to the establishment of open, secure, stable, and peaceful cyberspace. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Ukraine. Your comments are noted. I give the floor now to Cuba, please.

Thank you, Chair. On behalf of the Delegation of Cuba, I reiterate our support for your work as Chair of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of information and communication technologies. Our Delegation wishes to avail itself of this opportunity to recall the need for the host country to provide in a timely fashion the visas which delegations require, with no discrimination, in order to ensure the participation of all states under equal conditions. Thank you very much, sir.

Thank you very much, Cuba. Your comments are noted. Syrian Arab Republic, you have the floor, please.

Thank you, Chair. My delegation welcomes the third substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of ICTs. We would like to extend our expression of gratitude to you and to your team, Mr. Chair, for all the efforts that you have expended. My delegation has listened to the various concerns of some colleagues here with regard to the delays in providing the necessary visas for delegations, and in this regard, my delegation would like to underscore the need for every host country to fulfill their legal obligations based on the Headquarters Treaty and to provide the necessary visas for all delegations on an equal footing, in a timely fashion, and in a completely depoliticized manner. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Syrian Arab Republic. Your comments are well noted. The Russian Federation has asked for the floor. I intend to give the Russian Federation an opportunity to speak, since the matter of stakeholder participation does involve the position of Russia, and I’d like to give them the floor to hear their perspective. Russian Federation, you have the floor, please.

Thank you, Chair. I’ll keep it brief. This is because my country was mentioned in this segment, so I’d like to stress that the main criteria for NGOs to which we adhere is the readiness to adhere to the mandate of the Open-Ended Working Group without politicization of the discussion. In all of the organizations that were mentioned, we have information that gives us cause for doubt. This is the sovereign right of any member of the UN. More detailed information we’re prepared to submit if there is a specific request in writing regarding a particular organization. That said, Mr. Chair, I wish to note that representatives of two Russian NGOs that received formal status as participants in this Open-Ended Working Group were not issued a visa by the United States. We believe that this is a very serious violation and not only neglect of Washington under its agreements as the host country of UN headquarters, but it’s also a violation against member states. I thank you for your attention.

Thank you, Russian Federation. Your comments are well noted. There are no further speakers who are requesting the floor. In any case, I had closed the speakers’ list. It is my intention now to draw the attention of delegates to the question of modalities for the participation of stakeholders in the Open-Ended Working Group. Distinguished delegates, as I had mentioned in my opening remarks, after more than 10 months of intense negotiations and consultations, the question of modalities is settled. As you will recall, we reached agreement on modalities through a silence procedure on the 22nd of April 2022. Today, we are required to formally adopt the modalities so that the agreed modalities can be reflected in the records of the meeting. Accordingly, please allow me now to read the elements of the modalities on stakeholder participation as agreed through silence procedure. I read from our agreement, quote, “Member States of the OEWG are committed to engaging with stakeholders in a systematic, sustained, and substantive manner. Relevant non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council in accordance with Resolution 1996-31 would inform the Secretariat of the OEWG of their interest to participate in the work of the OEWG. Other interested non-governmental organizations relevant and competent to the scope and purpose of the OEWG should also inform the Secretariat of their interest in participating by submitting information on the organization’s purpose, programs, and activities in areas relevant to the scope of the OEWG. These organizations would accordingly be invited to participate on a non-objection basis as observers in the formal sessions of the OEWG. Accredited stakeholders will be able to attend formal meetings of the OEWG, make oral statements during a dedicated stakeholder session, and submit written inputs to be posted on the webpage of the OEWG. Encourage Member States to utilize the non-objection mechanism judiciously, bearing in mind the spirit of inclusivity. Where there is an objection to a non-governmental organization, the objecting Member State will make known its objection to the Chair of the OEWG and, on a voluntary basis, make known to the Chair of the OEWG the general basis of its objections. The Chair will share any information received with any Member State upon its request. The Chair of the OEWG will organize informal consultative meetings with stakeholders during the intersessional period, building on the practice of the previous OEWG. The OEWG is an intergovernmental process in which negotiation and decision-making are exclusive prerogatives of Member States. The modalities for this OEWG shall in no way create a precedent for any other UN process.” Distinguished Delegates, I have just read out the elements of the agreed modalities for stakeholder participation. May I take it that it is the wish of the OEWG to formally adopt the modalities for participation of stakeholders in the work of the Group, as I have just outlined? I see no objections. It is so decided. I would now like to address the attendance of stakeholders at this third substantive session. In accordance with the decision earlier taken on modalities for the participation of stakeholders in the OEWG, a list of non-governmental entities which submitted applications to participate in the current session was made available. Together with accompanying relevant information to all delegations before the session, that list of non-governmental entities is contained in Document A-AC.292-2022-INF.2. May I take it that the OEWG approves the attendance of the non-governmental entities contained in Document A-AC.292-2022-INF.2? I hear no objections. It is so decided. Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, we have now concluded at this point the relevant items under Organization of Work. Before moving on to Agenda Item 5, it is my intention to give a little coffee break, keeping in mind that the OEWG in itself is a confidence-building measure. I recognize the need that many of you would need to speak to each other as well as take a comfort break. We will resume in 10 minutes. The meeting is now adjourned and we will resume in 10 minutes.

The group shall now begin its consideration of Agenda Item 5, Discussions on Substantive Issues contained in Paragraph 1 of General Assembly Resolution 75-240, and begin our consideration of the draft Annual Progress Report. Delegates, you would recall that in my letter dated 22 June, I had circulated a Zero Draft, and subsequently, we had an inter-sessional informal meeting convened on 12 July, during which I had the opportunity to hear feedback on the Zero Draft and the various proposals contained therein. Following the informal consultations on 12 July, I carefully reflected on the comments and inputs that were provided to me, both at the informal consultations as well as subsequent to that, written submissions that were provided to the Chair. On the basis of those inputs, I issued a revised version of the Annual Progress Report, which has been made available to all delegations, and the revised draft Annual Progress Report dated 20 July 2022 has all the revisions reflected clearly in bold and edited strikethrough text so that the changes are visible to all delegations. In presenting the revised draft, I do not intend to repeat some of the comments I made earlier this morning with regard to the need to adopt an Annual Progress Report at the end of the week. It is my intention now to begin discussions and consideration of the Zero Draft, and I would like to also share with you the timeline that I have in mind for the rest of the week, of course, keeping in accordance with the draft program of work. It is my intention to listen very carefully to all the comments that will be received in this meeting on the different sections of the revised Annual Progress Report. On the basis of the comments that I will receive today and tomorrow, it is my hope to prepare, hopefully, another revision sometime in the middle of the week to give delegations the time needed to consult capitals, but also to give delegations the time to consult here as groups, if needed, and also to give delegations a sense of what could be an eventual balanced package of an Annual Progress Report that could be acceptable to all delegations. Given this timeline, it is important that we continue with our work on the revised draft of the Annual Progress Report at a steady pace. I would like to remind delegations that we are not in the mode of a general debate, we are not in a mode of making general statements, and therefore I would like to invite all delegations to be very focused and very specific and precise in their comments, so that their comments will help me to make further revisions to the text before us, but also help other delegations understand your positions and understand your concerns. So, once again, I do urge delegations to avoid making general statements and do be as specific as possible. On the basis of these initial comments, it is now my intention to begin the first round of consideration of the revised draft Annual Progress Report, and the floor is now open. And in accordance with the earlier discussions we had in the morning, I will give now the floor to the Russian Federation, to be followed by the other speakers who request the floor.

Thank you, Chair. I wish to address a number of substantive issues, specifically the Russian initiative to create a contact group. We believe there is a strategic and urgent task, namely establishing ties between the related states and agencies. Without that, it’s difficult to talk about achieving information security. Agreeing on a registry of contact points will facilitate the establishment of pragmatic cooperation among the main international structures when it comes to responding to computer incidents. It will also ease threats and tensions regarding conflicts, misunderstandings, and incidents in the ICT realm. Our initiative is grounded in the preparatory report of the OEWG, paragraph 51, and the UN Expert Group Support, point 78. The concept notes will be circulated to the Secretary, and we ask that it be passed along to all the negotiations. This is very important. It will ensure mutual trust and counter the situation that has arisen in this area. The situation in ICT is comparable to a jungle where the stronger prevail and make their own laws, and those people are de facto developed countries. Contractors and others in ICT, in a quest for profit, do what they want, sometimes even in defiance of national legislation. The norms and principles of the West have become the norm in international security for ICT. These ambitions are understandable on the part of those who have capital, but responsibility for issues of international peace and security can be shouldered only by states. They are the ones who will determine security in the informational realm. The Open-Ended Working Group is the only genuinely democratic organization that is able to ensure information security with the due consideration of absolutely all states. This strategic idea also underpins the Russian Federation’s idea. There’s a need to take practical steps to move the approaches of states together to ensure a legal regime to regulate the informational sphere. In lieu of legally binding agreements, we think it is premature to look at a voluntary code of conduct. Russia doesn’t agree with such forms of accountability. It would be better to look at more detailed positions of states to draw up new rules and look at the results of the first Open-Ended Working Group. Chair, the priorities of the Open-Ended Working Group are also to develop further measures to enhance capacity in accordance with the program. It is vital to ensure assistance based on an impartial, depoliticized measure and to ensure the sovereignty of states. In order to ensure socioeconomic development, we need resources for NGOs, including large companies that make many billions of dollars on the data of the citizens of developing countries. Chair, we are thankful to you for your creation of the interim report on the progress of the Working Group. We ask you to continue providing timely information to the delegations of draft documents at least two months before these sessions begin. The states and the competent authorities should have to coordinate positions on very complicated issues regarding information technology. We view the draft document as a basis for coordinating practical steps and plans for the future. In this regard, the adoption of the document in this session is of substantial significance, but the report needs to be balanced. It needs to reflect the opinions of all those states’ parties participating in negotiations. We have meticulous work, and it will end up losing sleep over it. To work on this text, Russia is prepared for this work. Our delegation will also ask for the floor on a number of different aspects on today’s agenda. I thank you for your attention.

Thank you for the statement, Russian Federation. I omitted to emphasize the fact that this morning we will begin by looking at the draft annual progress report, the revised draft, section by section. So we will begin now with sections on introduction and existing and potential threats. I’d like to proceed in a manner that is focused, so I’d like to welcome comments on the introduction as well as existing and potential threats, and then we will go on to the rules and norms as well. So please be focused and specific in your comments. Thank you very much. Sorry, I have a list of speakers here. United States, you’ve asked for the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Good morning, colleagues. I want to commend first the Chair’s action-oriented approach to the draft annual report. I am hoping that by the end of this week, the report should serve as guidance for the OEWG’s work over the next year. I would ask that as all of us evaluate this report, we must continue to keep in mind the question of what constitutes progress, that word being used a great deal in talking about the effect of adoption of a report. We must face squarely the fact that it is the use of ICTs for malicious and irresponsible purposes by states that should be our focus. How is it that this report and the measures in it characterize the threats we face? How does it reduce risk by adoption of measures and approaches? So having a report that omits answers to these questions, that dances around the key issues, will mean failure. It does not mean progress. Proposals that we advance that have no effect on the action of aggressive and malicious states will also mean failure. So that said, we have a few overall concerns with the draft. First, we believe the draft needs to have a clearer, more foundational affirmation of the framework of responsible state behavior to which all states have committed. And this needs to be at the start of each section. This will be particularly helpful given the draft’s emphasis on implementation of the commitments created, the political commitments created by all of our affirmation of the framework. Such an affirmation should recall the commitments states made in UNGA Resolution 7619 to be guided in their actions by the OEWG and GGE reports of 2021. Second, this draft fails at this juncture to articulate the evolving threats that we face and what must provide the context in which we consider and develop answers and approaches to state behavior in cyberspace. The threats we face that we only imagined when we concluded the 2021 reports have not only evolved and come to fruition, but they are the tip of the iceberg regarding the future that we must look to. These include effects on critical infrastructure, cascading irresponsible effects in violation of the norms that we have agreed to. And I would dare say it would bear a significant mention to look at what is coming down the road, that is, emerging technology and how it will affect the framework that we have constructed here. Is the framework sufficient? Does it cover enough issues? Or is there a whole new category and set of threats that we must take into account? It’s only when we have a sufficient outline and articulation of those threats that we can possibly move forward and talk about what else is needed. Third, we’re concerned that the draft does not accurately reflect the operational capabilities of the OEWG and the UN Secretariat. The OEWG is not an operational entity. The Secretariat is also not an operational entity on cyber matters. Some of the proposals in the draft have appeared out of nowhere without prior discussion, appear to be an expansion of the Secretariat’s role, may have significant budgetary implications, all of which gives us pause. If any of these proposals are to be considered, they must be carefully considered one by one in terms of their role, their duplication, because I believe that there are existing mechanisms for states to contribute views and assessments, such as the annual report to the Secretary-General called for in OP6 of Resolution 7619 and UNIDIR’s cyber policy portal. Those mechanisms are already important compilations of states’ views and should be leveraged as much as possible rather than creating new and duplicative processes. Third, while the updated draft has some improved references to non-UN efforts in this area, the text still downplays the significant importance of regional organizations, non-governmental entities, and multistakeholder groups and others. We have taken, since 2009, the product of GGE and other reports and recommendations, taken them to regional organizations to implement, and there is significant and sophisticated work being done on those processes, all of which should be considered carefully in terms of the value it adds to our consideration here, and it should be acknowledged. Lastly and importantly, the draft often, certainly in the threat section, strays from the remit of the UNGA First Committee and the mandate of this group. We are here to talk about international security. We are talking here about issues of war and peace, that is, how do we prevent conflict between states in cyberspace? We are not here to talk about best practices and network defense, et cetera, et cetera. We must stay focused on that mission and approach at all times, and that includes in the areas of capacity building with a view toward looking through that lens. On the issue of stakeholders, which I did not speak earlier, while I am pleased to see that we resolved the modalities issue, the result has been less than perfect. The use of the veto, as we have said for months, is regrettable and should have been reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Many of the vetoed entities are leaders in their fields and have important expertise and could have helped the OEWG in its work. That is why the U.S. has invited members of vetoed entities to be part of the U.S. delegation in this session and we will in future sessions as well. As we have previously stated, multistakeholder participation is essential to our shared purpose in the OEWG and non-governmental organizations ensure the functioning of cyberspace. They play an integral role in implementing our decisions and we are nonetheless pleased that a majority of stakeholders made it through the vetting process. Thank you, Chair, for your efforts. I am looking forward to our discussions this week.

Thank you, United States. I now give the floor to Canada, to be followed by Kenya. Canada, please.

Thank you, Chair, for this opportunity for Canada to express our views on the report in general terms and also for the introduction and threat section. Before getting into that, I would like to briefly address the stakeholder issue. I would like to say that Canada supports the statement made by the Czech Republic on behalf of a number of states. We especially regret the unexplained vetoes of a large number of stakeholders by Russia for the reasons outlined by my Czech colleague. I will have more to say on this at the stakeholder session on Wednesday afternoon. I also wanted to thank you, Chair, for organizing a very successful informal meeting with stakeholders on Thursday. It showed how stakeholders, including those who were vetoed, have a lot to contribute to this process. Canada has pledged to consult stakeholders on any major tech suggestion that we put forward, as we did at the last Open-Ended Working Group. The modalities are one thing, but ultimately it’s up to states to take on board suggestions from stakeholders. That is what we will do, and we encourage other states to do this as well. Turning now to the report, Canada is generally supportive of the report as currently drafted, which we see as a major improvement over the previous version. We think it offers a very good basis for discussions today and tomorrow. For example, I was very pleased with the additions on gender that you included at the suggestion of ourselves and several others. We have a number of comments on each section on how the report could be further improved that myself and my colleagues will be providing throughout the week. For this morning, let me start with the introduction. I think the introduction on page 1 was overall quite good. It was a reiteration of the acquis that has been developed over 15 years. I’ll use this opportunity to disagree respectfully but strongly with my Russian colleague, who seemed to indicate that cyberspace is an ungoverned space, the law of the jungle. In fact, as the introduction of the report points out, there is a framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace that has been developed over more than 15 years, including under Russian leadership. We really profoundly disagree about this characterization of cyberspace as the jungle. We will have more to say on this during the norms and law sections. Overall, the introduction, in our opinion, is fairly solid. We may have some small comments on edits to provide at a later point. Moving now to threats. The threat section, in our opinion, needs a little bit of work. It frankly does not include that many threats. It is important for it to do so because that lays the table for the rest of the report, which is about basically how to address those threats. In our remarks at previous OEWG sessions, Canada provided some suggestions for inclusion of elements in the threat section. Ransomware was one of the threats that we mentioned and that several others mentioned as well. This is an example of a cyber threat to critical infrastructure that we think should be included in the OEWG report. Cyber operations by Russia and Ukraine is another ongoing threat to peace and security. On this, I will make a very short general statement. This meeting is not taking place in a business-as-usual context. Rather, we are now five months into President Putin’s unprovoked and unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine. In addition to its conventional threats, Russia has undertaken many cyber operations against Ukraine, some of which have been attributed publicly by Canada and our allies. This malicious cyber activity directed at Ukraine and others goes against the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. This ongoing and current threat should be mentioned in the threat section of the report, in our opinion. So this section needs to include some of the key threats that we and others listed during previous OEWG sessions in order for those to be addressed later in the report. I understand that several of my colleagues are working on text proposals that they will provide to you that will have more concrete issues. But just to reiterate, for Canada, ransomware would be a critical one. So I will save my remarks for norms for this afternoon. But overall, I would say that the introduction is quite good, but the threat section definitely needs a little bit of work. And I look forward to taking the floor later to express our comments on the other sections. Thank you.

Thank you, Canada, for your comments and also for your very concrete contributions. Kenya, to be followed by Jordan. Kenya, please.

I thank you, Mr. Chair. Kenya will make comments on the existing and potential threats. Excellencies and colleagues, I would like to thank Ambassador Burhan Gafoor, who is the Chair, and Kenya commends your efforts in ensuring the continuation of this important process, including your timely efforts in furnishing members with a draft annual report for consideration. Specific to the current draft of the annual progress report, my delegation welcomes the inclusion of the importance of common understanding of the applicability of international law. Further to this, we would like to emphasize recognition of state efforts to establish national legal mechanisms in the area of cyber security in alignment with the UN Charter and other agreed legal mechanisms. We also note that the draft progress report speaks to the cooperation between regional, cross-regional, and inter-organizational exchange as a valuable avenue for collaboration. Within our context and from our experience, we have seen the value of the application of this principle of sub-regional and regional collaborations when it comes to the work of our computer emergency response teams. Mr. Chair, the draft progress report also rightfully notes the importance of developing and disseminating comprehensive best practices on the classification of critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. My delegation would further like to also encourage discussions around the importance of states establishing deterrence and response infrastructure in dealing with threats and vulnerabilities to their nationally identified critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. Excellencies and dear colleagues, in regard to the issue of existing and potential threats, Kenya acknowledges and appreciates the efforts by the international community to cooperate and collaborate in addressing the issues on existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security, including data security. Kenya also notes the central role played by sub-regional and regional bodies in the sharing of technical information, including relevant threat intelligence and compendiums, technical training, and management of interactions with interested stakeholders. In its quest to secure its digital space, Kenya has, among other things, established the National Kenya Computer and Internet Response Team, National KCRIT, implemented the National Public Key Infrastructure, NPKI, and recently inaugurated the National Computer and Cybercrimes Coordination Committee, NC4. The NC4 has inclusive representation from key ministries, departments, and agencies, with an established secretariat to ensure effective implementation of decisions. Excellencies, the ubiquitous, programmable, and data-driven nature of emerging technologies, although beneficial, has also opened a door for misuse by cyber-threat actors, including armed groups and terrorists. Kenya strongly urges for global collaborative efforts in combating violent extremism and terrorist activities in the ICT ecosystem. Kenya also underscores the need for focused discussion on online threats related to child safety and vulnerable groups, including the visually, mentally, and physically impaired persons in cyberspace. As part of our efforts to address this threat, Kenya, through the Communication Authority, is running community awareness campaigns and promoting cyber hygiene through accessible media platforms. In view that most countries are technology consumers, we urge enhanced global collaboration to ensure that the media platforms, especially social media, remain safe for our children and vulnerable groups. In conclusion, and in this segment, Mr. Chair, Kenya affirms its readiness to contribute to enhanced global efforts, legal frameworks, and norms that will promote a free, peaceful, and stable cyber domain and mitigate the existing and potential threats. Thank you.

Thank you, Kenya. I give now the floor to Jordan, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. First, allow me to commend your efforts to facilitate the early circulation on July 20, 2022, of the revised draft of the report. Jordan affirms that the revised version of the draft report substantially captures the ideas and suggestions put forward by a number of Member States. Jordan underscores the importance of acting to achieve consensus on the report as per the group mandate and as the fitting outcome of a results-focused process. Jordan welcomes the draft report as a balanced text that captures the ideas and proposals raised during the first and second substantive sessions and the concrete action-oriented proposals made by Member States to address existing and potential threats. Jordan particularly welcomes the inclusion of Section F on capacity building and the proposals to enhance action on capacity building in the report to advance and to enhance tailored capacity building efforts that serve to strengthen international law, increase training, and the exchange of best practices. In light of the revised version of the report and the next steps of the OEWG for further focused discussions, it’s a crucial moment at the end of this results-focused process. In this respect, Jordan strongly encourages Member States to show flexibility in order to achieve consensus and to support the work of the OEWG to deliver a reward. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Jordan, for your statement. Costa Rica, to be followed by the European Union. Costa Rica, please.

Thank you, Chair. We appreciate the effort to present the second document for the third session of the Open-Ended Working Group. As you yourself have said, we also hope to reach consensus at the end of this session. Version 1 of this document is an excellent basis for our discussions. We believe it reflects the discussions of this first year of work, as well as the suggestions of delegations during the informal session of last July 12th. About the participation of non-state actors, we will refer later, especially when it comes to capacity building, at Wednesday’s meeting. Let me share some suggestions and observations. First, about section A, the introductory paragraphs. In paragraph 1, it could be valuable to incorporate a reference to international humanitarian law. Although Costa Rica is satisfied with the way in which the topic has been addressed in the chapter on international law, we prefer that this reference be also made in the introductory paragraphs. In paragraph 4, on regional and sub-regional efforts, we understand the spirit of the text. Perhaps it could be considered using the phrase, “when applicable,” to clarify that not all states have regional mechanisms, or not all of them develop security issues. Costa Rica gives high value to the bottom-up efforts that regional and sub-regional capacities can provide to the working group, as expressed in paragraph 7C. States propose that there is value in regional and sub-regional organizations sharing relevant experiences at the OEWG as appropriate. In paragraph 10.2, about points of contact, taking into account available best practices, such as regional and sub-regional experiences, where appropriate, we believe that the word “complementary” may not be fully appropriate. Perhaps “mutually complementing” or “complementing each other” will be better understood. And section B, existing and potential threats. First of all, in developing countries, ransomware becomes a security problem, even a national emergency, when state institutions themselves are targeted by the attacks. This was the case in Costa Rica and has been since April 2022. We believe that evidence is solid enough to include the issue of ransomware as a real and current threat. Second, recommendations 2 and 3 could be designed to include peer-to-peer exchanges between technical experts in different regions. These exchanges are a golden opportunity for member states and policymakers to be exposed to and to more fully understand the technical aspects of issues related to incident response and mitigation, and critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure protection. Lastly, the information about threats and the response to incidents is an area where stakeholders such as CSIRTs, CSIRT communities, and tech companies have greatly added value. The Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is an extremely valuable resource in this regard, providing insight on best practices for such operational cooperation. Thank you very much, sir.

Thank you very much, Costa Rica, for your statement. I now give the floor to the EU, to be followed by China. EU, please.

Thank you, Chair. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. As it is the first time that I am taking the floor, let me start by thanking you and your team for all the work over the past year and for your revised draft Annual Progress Report. The EU and its Member States align with the comments made by the Czech Republic in its initial comments with regard to the objections raised against a large number of multistakeholders. Mr. Chair, the EU and its Member States welcome the draft Annual Progress Report of the second Open-Ended Working Group and express their support to the Chair to identify commonalities and to use the draft Annual Progress Report to set out a concrete agenda for 2023, allowing the OEWG to make concrete progress in its discussions. We note that the Russian aggression against Ukraine has made our discussions here in the OEWG more difficult, however, also more timely and needed. Russia’s flagrant breach of the United Nations Charter has shaken not only Ukraine but also the entire world-based international order. Before addressing the threat section, the EU welcomes the strengthening of the improved introduction of the draft, including the clear objective to set out a roadmap for more focused discussion. We also welcome the better reflection of the role of the multistakeholder community and the objective to address the gender divide. As regards PARA2, we support the Chair to include the mandate of the OEWG in a balanced manner, and in that light, we request to further clarify that it is all the pillars of the UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior in the use of ICTs that are equally addressed, such as threats, norms, international law, confidence-building measures, and capacity-building. On PARA3, it is important to recall the commitment agreed by all member states to engage with stakeholders in a systemic, sustained, and substantive manner. We would suggest, however, to delete the last sentence, particularly as we differ in views about how much flexibility was shown, certainly also looking at the outcome of the process for participation of non-governmental organizations and other non-governmental entities. Mr. Chair, threats to the territorial integrity and independence of any states are a threat to us all, and it is important to establish a common understanding of the threat landscape, which allows us to shape common responses to prevent and respond to these threats and activities and to better protect key targets of malicious actors. In that regard, the EU requests to better reflect in the revised draft report the heightened cyber threat landscape as requested for the zero draft. At this stage, the revised draft contains a mere reference to the previous GGE and OEWG reports, which is, in our view, not sufficient to enhance our common understanding of the cyber threat landscape. The EU agrees that it is ambitious to include an exhaustive list of threats, but the current drafting of the report suggests that the OEWG only addresses a few, such as threats against critical infrastructure, supply chain, and data. Let me outline a few more that are relevant and which are of great concern to international security and stability. First, ransomware attacks conducted by state and non-state actors remain one of the main cyber threats for the EU and its member states, with a prediction to hit 11 billion euros in damages globally in 2022. The ransomware attacks show how such malicious activities can have implications for security and stability and how much we need international cooperation to tackle this type of threat. The EU is not alone, as shown by a recent ransomware attack experienced by Costa Rica, which affected even its critical infrastructure. Second, as noted last week in our declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union, we are seeing a striking and concerning number of hackers and hacker groups targeting essential entities globally. These malicious cyber activities, which have significantly increased in the context of the unjustified Russian aggression against Ukraine, create an unacceptable risk of misinterpretation and possible escalation. Third, let me recall the risks that Russia’s aggression in cyberspace brings to our broader security and stability, and let me recall the EU and its member states’ attribution of the malicious cyber activity targeting the satellite KA-SAT network to the Russian Federation on 10 May 2022. This cyber attack took place one hour before Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, facilitating the military aggression. It had a significant impact, causing indiscriminate communication outages and disruption across several public authorities, businesses, and users in Ukraine, as well as affecting several EU member states. It is of utmost importance to explicitly reflect that since the OEWG report adopted in 2021, the existing and potential threat landscape has dramatically changed with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including the use of cyber means. Furthermore, as a general remark, the focus of the existing and potential threat sections should be on the threat landscape itself rather than on the means to address it. In other words, the technical and cooperative measures to address the threat landscape are already articulated under the other pillars. We see redundancy between the recommendations with guidance on the implementation of norms such as the cooperative measure three with the norms E – I, sorry – and the redundancy with confidence-building measures in regional settings or capacity building, such as the cooperative measure eight. Furthermore, the two measures six and seven do not fall under the remit of the first committee but fall under the cyber crime domain. The list includes also controversial elements. First, the proposal to agree on the terminology and the list of critical infrastructure is an example of a proposal that, in our experience, will not allow for consensus discussion between states. Based on experiences in prior multilateral and regional settings, these discussions are considered divisive, time-consuming, and could imply in the case of the list of critical infrastructure that they are acceptable targets. In addition, welcoming discussion on data security initiatives remains premature, including as it is not clear whether the first committee is appropriate for one to take forward this discussion. At the same time, we have reservations toward limiting the revised draft report itself on addressing only the use of harmful heightened functions, and we perceive that this has a very narrow and limiting description of malicious use of ICTs that are contrary to international law, rules, and norms of responsible state behavior. Rather, the EU supports next to enhancing our common understanding of the cyber threat landscape to recommend holding discussions on how to prevent and appropriately respond to cyber threats and malicious activities in cyberspace, taking into account the inter-regional cooperative approach on the security of and in the use of ICTs. In addition, we’ve been working with our international partners, industry, and academia to be able to defend ourselves against the adversary’s latest techniques and tactics. This exchange has supported not only a good level of situational awareness but also strengthened and accelerated cooperation processes and improved reporting. It is, therefore, essential to reflect the role and interaction with the multistakeholder community, although we will not limit this interaction to the protection of critical infrastructure. However, paragraph 70 looks more like a recommendation, and we suggest changing it and not using the conditional tense. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, European Union. Please do make your written statement available, at least to my own team. Thank you very much. I give the floor now to China, to be followed by Spain. China, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m delighted that after three years of videoconferencing, I have finally come back to this conference room, meeting with my dear friends and colleagues, to be able to communicate with you face-to-face. In particular, my colleague from Colombia, the same colleague from Colombia, nothing has changed. Regarding the revised annual report that you have prepared, Mr. Chair, first and foremost, I appreciate all your efforts that you have made in preparing this zero draft. However, after reading through the revised draft, my feelings are complex. If we compare this report to the previous OEWG and GGE reports, indeed, this revised draft lacks some substantial elements. To be more specific, regarding data security, China has been pushing the discussion as data security, the security of supply chains, and we should never use abuse arguments on national security to oppress – suppress other countries. We have – we are trying to push forward these elements. And regarding the implementation of the framework on responsible state behavior in cyberspace, there is the issue of double standards. On the other hand, China is aware that this year is a special year. Outside our conference room, many big events have taken place, and unavoidably, these big events will have an impact on our deliberations. After considering the aforementioned elements, although this revised draft is not a satisfactory one, I would like to proceed from a pragmatic approach, and I’m ready to discuss the revised draft with all my colleagues. At the beginning of paragraph 6, you have indicated that this session marks the initial stage of our five-year cycle. In other words, we have four upcoming years to deliberate. So if this year this report fails to include important proposals and comments from China, and yet we still can maintain the momentum of our deliberations in this process, then I think this itself is progress. Second, regarding regional organizations and multistakeholder participation, China believes that regional organizations and multistakeholders can make their own contribution to our process. However, we need to have our own objective judgment on their contribution. We are a UN platform. I don’t think discussions by any regional organization would be more important than deliberations here at the UN, and I don’t think that any multistakeholder participation would be more important than the participation of UN member states. So on the one hand, we need to form our own judgment and assessment of their participation, but on the other hand, we need to put them in the right place. Regarding NGOs’ participation in our session this morning, I have listened to the complaints from two groups of member states. One comment is the host country failed to issue visa to the representatives of UN member states, and the host country has failed to honor its commitments and obligations. And second, due to objections by certain member states, some NGOs have not been able to participate in this session. I believe these two complaints are totally different by nature. Issuing visa to officials or representatives of UN member states so that they can participate in UN meetings is the obligation of a host country. The host country must honor this obligation unconditionally. Regrettably, for some time now, not only for our session but also for other meetings, UN meetings, the host country has failed to honor its obligation. Not only has the host country failed to comply with this obligation, but the host country has used this visa issue and turned it into a political weapon. Also, we have seen – we have been advised that we need to abide by the rules-based global order. So my question is the fact that the host country has failed to comply with the host country agreement, the headquarters agreement. What kind of a rule is that regarding the issue of NGO participation? Well, different member states have – may have their own different judgments, but according to our rules of procedure, sovereign countries have the right to determine their own decisions and judgments based on their national interests. So these two issues are totally different. Even on the issue of NGO participation, during our previous informal meetings, Chinese NGOs and NGOs from other developing countries complained that they have not been granted a visa to travel to New York to participate in this meeting. They applied for participating in the July meeting, but their visa interviews have been scheduled to December. So if we want to say it clearly that we support NGO participation, then we need to consider all these issues. I’ve heard some delegates mention that some NGOs have been rejected. Then the NGOs will be included as part of their national delegation. I think this is just a show-off. Only the host country has this privilege. For other countries, if their NGOs have been denied a visa, then they don’t have any choice. So such action has only deepened inequality among countries. Third, I have listened to the statements of previous speakers or representatives, and they have made some comments. I believe they just repeated what they have said and the approach that was used during the first and second sessions. In other words, what they stated is just politicizing our session. I hope that all our member states will cherish this valuable one week, this week-long opportunity to focus on our draft and discussing the draft. Fourth, regarding the ransomware, my understanding is that by discussing the issue of ransomware, we want to crack down on cybercrimes. Of course, cybercrime has always been on the agenda of our working group. As far as I remember, for the countries that have made comments on ransomware issues, well, previously these countries have stated that discussions on ransomware is not within the purview – it’s not – should be the focus of our – discussions on cybercrime should not happen at our committee, at our working group. So I want to clarify. Have we decided to start discussing cybercrime issues? Mr. Chair, regarding the introductory part, the part on threats in the chair’s revised draft, paragraph 4. Let me read it in English. So paragraph 4, we would like to change the word, say, the OEWG recognize that a regional and a sub-regional organization, we add, could play an important role in implementing the framework for responsible state behavior in the use of ICT. Then delete the rest part of this sentence. And in the end of this paragraph, we change the wording into the efforts are complementary to the work of the OEWG. We add OEWG and delete the rest part. On paragraph 5, is gender balance part of our mandate? So I want to clarify. Many countries have emphasized that we need to focus on our mandate. We should not discuss issues that are unrelated to our mandate. So is gender balance part of our mandate? I just want a clarification on this question. Regarding the issue of gender balance, we support gender balance. So on the podium, there are more ladies than gentlemen sitting on the podium saying the same thing holds true for the Chinese delegation. There are more women than men. So we have no problem supporting gender balance. Regarding the issue of threats, paragraph 7, let me read it in English. So actually, we changed the paragraph to the states exchange views on existing and the potential threat and the possible cooperative measures to prevent and account such threats. States also express concerns over the risks and the consequences of division of the ICT environment. And this sentence will take place the first sentence of the paragraph 7. I would like to talk about divisions happening in the ICT environment. In reality, regarding the trend of how the ICT environment is becoming more and more divided, I believe this is – all the colleagues present here is aware of this trend and reality. UN Secretary General Guterres in two successive general debates of the UN General Assembly has reminded the international community of the threat of the ICT environment becoming – the cyberspace becoming more and more fragmented. So the fragmentation of the ICT environment is directly related to our deliberations. So if this world is divided or fragmented into different parts, then no single set of rules would apply. Then it would be impossible for us to reach consensus on the implementation or applicability of international rules, let alone any confidence-building measures. So I hope on the part on existing and potential threats, we need to include some deliberations on how to tackle the most important, most prominent issue in the ICT environment right now. Let me read it out in English. So the last sentence we have changed to propose the OEWG as a UN intergovernmental body could be an open, inclusive, and democratic multilateral process to force global cooperative approaches and measures in this regard. On the paragraph B, we hope to delete in the last line the potential threats with regard to security in the use of ICTs through appropriate forum. We hope to delete this phrase. And on the B2 about CI, we hope to change the wording cooperation and assistance to the classification and the protection of CI and CII, rather than just developing and disseminating comprehensive best practice. On the paragraph 3, we hope at the phrase at the end of this sentence says harmful hidden functions by inter-area developing and implementing global interoperable common rules and standards while ensuring an open, non-discriminatory business environment. I believe this issue and China’s position is well known, so I will not have a further explanation for this. And I hope to delete the B4 paragraph. On the B6, that says undertaking international exercise and we hope to delete the exercise and because we are not know what this exercise means, whether it’s including the military exercise, which we believe on the contrary to the goals of our process. And this end of this sentence says including law enforcement officer in coordination with other relevant process and entities. We hope to delete in coordination with other relevant process and entities because it seems unclear to China what that really means. And we do have concerns with some process and entities out of the United Nations. On the paragraph 7, we add the phrase on the basis of a respect for sovereignty of states at the end of this paragraph 7 and delete the same phrase in coordination with other relevant process and entity. Actually, I don’t want to repeat that we want to delete all this kind of in coordination with other relevant process and entities. And we want to delete the paragraph D because we believe the CII and say protection CII and CII is important and it should be part of the norms other than threats. And we believe that the protection of CII is the key part of the norms. So we believe that the part of C norms rules norms is a better place to discuss this issue. On the recommended next step on the paragraph 1, we notice there’s some phrase added to this paragraph comparing to the zero draft that to security in the use of ICT. We believe maybe we just replace with say existing threat within the mandate of OEWG and cooperative merits to address them. To avoid the description that may be needed to misunderstanding. So the mandate is the common ground of all member states. We want add a new paragraph as one piece says state commit state commit to and reaffirm observation and implementation of the framework for responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs, which is essential to addressing the existing and the potential ICT related threats and the risks. And delete the paragraph 2 and 3. Let me switch into Chinese. The part on threats. If we compare this draft with previous reports, well, in previous reports, the previous reports basically described what the threats are. However, this year there are new language, a new wording. My understanding is that this year, since this year is a special year, the chair is trying to find a compromise when drafting the part on threats. But I want to emphasize in our previous framework of responsible state behavior is a complete framework, a complete structure. Norms, international rules, CBMs, and capacity building measures, all these measures are all about responding to the threats and challenges that we face. As for specific actions and specific measures, well, these specific detail measures can be included in other parts. And for this part on threats, we need to put emphasis on general rules and principles regarding the one piece that China has proposed. We hope that before implementation, we want to add the concept of observation before implementation. Just as China has previously stated, given the current circumstances, only by relying on implementation, states are not doing enough to respond to the threats. States should honor our commitments. In particular, big countries need to make these commitments and honor these commitments, which is of great special significance given the current environment. I think these general rules and principles should be included in the part on threats that would be appropriate in our opinion. Perhaps different countries have different positions, but we all have felt keenly the major changes that have taken place in the international landscape. So in China’s view, given the current circumstances, we need to stick to multilateralism and to uphold the UN and UN central role, and we need to honor our previously made political commitments. This is of great significance, special significance under the current circumstances. And this is the most important position that China holds for this session. I hope that all our colleagues will constructively reflect on China’s proposals. At the same time, we are ready to take a constructive approach to discuss the specific language proposals with all of you. Mr. Chair, I have been spoken for a bit too long. I hope that my statement can facilitate the upcoming discussion and can direct our deliberations onto the track that you want to see, Mr. Chair. So we should refrain from making any political statements, and we should focus on discussing the specific language. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you.

Thank you very much, China, for your statement. Could I also invite you to share your detailed proposals with all delegations and also with the Chair’s team? At long last, I’d like to give the floor to Spain. You have the floor, please.

Thank you very much, Chair. Spain supports the statement made by the European Union, and allow me to begin by thanking you and your team for the work that they have been doing to prepare the two working drafts of the annual report. We share your hope that this report will be approved at this meeting, if possible during this week, and it will make it possible for us to deal with the important work of the Open-Ended Working Group in the weeks and months to come. We are aware of the difficult context in the international scenario, especially after the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, which once again has brought to the forefront the importance of cyberspace as a new area. This is why it is important for all of us to reach a consensus on this annual report. We believe the introduction should show that the working group is not starting from scratch by highlighting the recommendations of the previous reports of the OEWG and the GGE to which you have referred, and we share with you the importance of this. We also believe it is important to make the most of the platforms and initiatives that are already in existence, and avoid the duplicating efforts of other regional and international fora. There are broad networks of cooperation in various areas formed by security incident response teams. We use the CERT acronym to denominate these in Spanish. We also offer our experience and knowledge to be shared with the development of the work of these teams. When it comes to cyber threats, we propose that the report describe these, reflecting the existing problems in cyberspace and the problems that they imply for the working of digital society, privacy of citizens, and the working of state institutions through technical and standard setting. Effective protection of personal data should be ensured as well as intellectual property in transboundary and international exchanges. We have a general data protection regulation in Europe, which sets high levels of stability and security in the exchange of data. The safer and the greater these guarantees of protection are, the greater protection there will be and the greater the willingness there will be for citizens and businesses to exchange data. Tools for financing should be identified as well as technology transfer mechanisms. We will only be credible in our efforts to cooperate on an international level to build a technical and human capacity if we commit ourselves to share, apply technology, and mobilize the financial resources which are needed in order to do this work. We strongly support the Program of Action as a solidarity mechanism to move forward with capacity building. We will spare no effort together with our European partners to implement this initiative during the upcoming sessions of this Open-Ended Working Group. Spain supports effective stakeholder participation in the work and tasks of this working group. The contribution of stakeholders to the debate is indispensable, and it could be focused around a permanent dialogue mechanism, including representatives of states and the private sector, as well as the director of contact points of the private sector and the technology community. With the awareness of the difficulties that have been faced to reach the agreement on modalities of participation of stakeholders, especially NGOs, Spain believes that the practical application of this agreement in this session should lead to a consideration of the results obtained. A large number of entities with high levels of knowledge and experience have seen themselves rejected because of reasons which they are unaware of. Even when information is requested, a blank appears when it comes to the justification of these rejections. Lastly, allow me to quickly cover the issue of gender equality, which some members of this working group believe is not mandatory. We believe that this working group and the set of resolutions of the General Assembly has major work to do to avoid that the process of digitization, which our shared agenda calls for, to ensure that women are not marginalized in this process. And it is important to be cautious when it comes to incorporating a cross-cutting view of the entire process of digitization, that’s cybersecurity. We believe it is important to carry out the mandates of the General Assembly. In other words, to stress and emphasize gender equality. We hope that this will be a successful session, Mr. Chairman, under your guidance, and we wish you the greatest success and ourselves the greatest success as well. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Ambassador. I thank the Permanent Representative of Spain for his remarks. Just finishing telling it, it’s one o’clock, and we’ll have to continue with the rest of the speakers this afternoon. But before we do so, I wanted to make some important points for the afternoon session. First, we have about 25 delegations which have inscribed to speak. I think we have had a good start this morning. The tone has been very constructive, and there have been many very concrete comments expressed with regard to the revised draft of the Annual Progress Report. I very much welcome this approach. This afternoon, we will continue with the section-by-section reading of the revised Annual Progress Report. And this afternoon, we will also consider the section relating to rules, norms, and principles. So, in other words, for those of you who have inscribed to speak, you will be given the floor this afternoon. I’d like to welcome your comments on the introduction, the threat section, as well as the section relating to rules, norms, and principles. Given that we have about 20 delegations which have inscribed to speak, time management is an issue. While many delegations have come prepared with fairly elaborate statements, I would like each one of you to be as succinct as possible, aiming for statements around three to four minutes. I would welcome each one of you to make your comments focused and concrete, and to focus on amendments that you might have to propose to the text. Of course, I would encourage all of you to circulate your statements so that everyone can have sight of your contributions. Hopefully, this will enable all of us to find a way forward and achieve compromise. The meeting is now adjourned, and we will resume at 3 p.m. Thank you.