Session 3-5 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

Good morning, distinguished delegates. The fifth meeting of the third substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies, 2021-2025, established pursuant to GA resolution 75-240, is now called to order. As I had indicated yesterday, we will continue our discussion today under Agenda Item 5 on the Draft Annual Progress Report. We will continue with the speakers list, and as I also indicated yesterday, we have a speakers list of about 20 delegations. I had mentioned yesterday as well that it is my intention to ask delegations to restrict their comments to three minutes, in the interest of giving everyone an opportunity to make their interventions heard. It was also brought to my attention that in the speakers list for today, there are delegations, quite a few, who have not yet made any statements. So it is only reasonable and fair that I will give them a little longer of five minutes to make their statements. I know that this is not going to satisfy everyone, but I do hope that delegations making a statement today will be as succinct as possible. And of course, do make available to me and the Secretariat copies of your statements, so that we can take a closer look at the various amendments and proposals. It will be useful if in your interventions, you give us a succinct summary of your main concerns or issues with regard to the Draft Annual Progress Report. So with those comments, I’d now like to begin with the speakers list today, starting with Thailand, which has yet to make any statement in this working group. So Thailand, you have five minutes. The floor is yours, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thailand aligns itself with a statement to be delivered by Cambodia on behalf of ASEAN later. Thailand appreciates the efforts of the Chair and his team in producing this latest draft of the Annual Progress Report and all Member States that have provided inputs thus far. We support the Chair’s appeal to all Member States to work together to reach consensus on a final text during this first substantive session. We would like to briefly touch upon two topics, capacity building and regular institutional dialogue, and we will submit our first comments in writing later. Thailand appreciates that the section on capacity building as currently reflected is well-balanced, eloquently capturing many good proposals that have been raised by Member States. We particularly agree with paragraph 11A on the mainstreaming of principles of ICT capacity building as adopted in the 2021 OEWG report, as well as better integrating ICT capacity building efforts into the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. We support the proposals to consolidate the capacity building efforts in paragraph 11C, particularly on developing a list of regional and sub-regional centres of excellence. On paragraph 11D, Thailand sees merit in principle in the establishment of a permanent mechanism to foster more efficient and targeted international cooperation. On paragraph 11E, we agree that effective funding could benefit from integrating with larger development programmes, including through multi-donor trust funds. We also agree with paragraph 11F on the inclusion of gender issues. The recommendation section provides clear and feasible guidelines for our future work, including paragraph 2 on the focus of our discussion. We support in principle the recommendation in paragraph 4 to request the UN Secretariat to designate an ICT capacity building focal point. We are also pleased with the formulation in paragraph 6 on the call for States in a position to do so, to continue to support capacity building programmes, including in collaboration with regional and sub-regional organisations. Mr. Chair, Thailand believes in a regular institutional dialogue that is inclusive and action-oriented, and takes into account the outcomes of our discussion at the OEWG as well as the GGE. A regular institutional dialogue should serve as an important step towards the achievement of our common goal of maintaining international peace and security in cyberspace. Thailand generally agrees with the recommendations in paragraphs 1 and 2 that the discussion on a regular institutional dialogue, or POA, should take place within the OEWG framework to keep the conversation open and inclusive. We also support the role of the dialogue in advancing capacity building and strengthening the implementation of the norms of responsible State behaviour, including by providing a structure to address States’ capacity building needs, fostering international assistance and funding, and developing guidance and recommendations on how to put norms into practice. At the same time, Thailand is of the view that a regular institutional dialogue should also serve to progress other mutual interests, that is, first, to serve as a global CBM, and second, to assist in developing a common understanding in the areas of international law. Therefore, while Thailand supports a dialogue to have an emphasis on advancing capacity building, it should not be limited to just that, but it should be ready to take on other current and future challenges. It is important that this dialogue should not pose excessive burdens on States, especially on developing ones. Assistance and partnership should be encouraged to allow States to fulfil their commitments. We would be pleased to see these issues reflected clearly in the draft progress report. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Thailand, for being very, very succinct in your comments. I now give the floor to Pakistan for three minutes. Pakistan, please.

Thank you, Chair. Pakistan welcomes the part of the report on the application of international law in cyberspace and believes that the foremost task of the OEWG is to agree on defining how the existing international law can be applied in cyberspace. The non-exhaustive list of topics in Para 9A is comprehensive and encapsulates all those areas of international law, including IHL, which demand further politically neutral discussions among states for the development of common understanding. We also propose to add the topic of cyber attribution as identified by Indonesia. We also greatly appreciate that the draft report acknowledges the fact that considering the unique attributes of cyberspace and the transnational nature of cyber technologies, international law has certain gaps which must be addressed. Chair, to make the report more balanced, Pakistan proposes that the following two recommended steps may be added at number five, which could be read as: states on a voluntary basis are invited to engage in discussions on getting definitional clarity on terms such as cyber attack, critical infrastructure, critical information infrastructure, and unlawful ICT activities. And at number six, the recommended step could be read as: states shall continue to exchange views and engage in discussions on the formulation of a legally binding instrument for responsible states’ behavior in cyberspace. On CBMs, Pakistan considers cyber CBMs extremely important for fostering trust, cooperation, transparency, and predictability among the member states. Pakistan has always supported the idea of CBMs and further proposes the following recommended step, which calls for increasing cooperation among the respective CSIRTs of the member states to address investigation or trace-back requests of the internet protocols and to resolve the technical impediments in the way of cyber attribution. On capacity building, Pakistan believes that capacity building has a crucial role to play in effectively responding to current and potential cyber threats. Coming to the annual progress report’s capacity building portion, Pakistan welcomes it and considers it as action-oriented. Pakistan acknowledges that the report is cognizant of the digital divide and welcomes the capacity building proposals such as compiling the calendar of capacity building programs and developing lists of regional and sub-regional centers of excellence. Pakistan has a proposal for amendment in the annual progress report. We recommend that the proposal could be added at Para 11H, which could be read as: the OEWG to play a role in ensuring non-discriminatory and equitable access to cybersecurity-related technologies, products, and services. Taking this opportunity, I would like to renew Pakistan’s support for this intergovernmental process of OEWG for a safe, secure, and stable cyberspace for all.

Thank you very much, Pakistan, for keeping within the time limit. Ecuador, you have the floor, please, for five minutes.

Mr. President, Chair, we would like to express the appreciation of Ecuador for the way in which you have been leading the meetings of this working group. We agree with you on the need to agree on the annual progress report submitted based on the broad deliberations and comments of the various delegations since the beginning of the process. Thus, Ecuador reiterates its support for the proposed text. It is clear that there is a marked digital divide among countries, and there is little that we can do as developing countries if urgent measures are not adopted in order to reduce that divide through cooperation and capacity building. As Chair, cooperation and international assistance are not only important but also indispensable. The threats that we face are ever more transnational, and the only way to fight them effectively is through international dialogue, cooperation, and capacity building, as well as confidence building. So we appreciate particularly the content of point B, which, in addition to the threats, also refers to cooperation as a means to deal with the current and potential threats. But it would be worth highlighting even more the relevance of cooperation for the creation of opportunities in order for countries to be able to develop their own security infrastructure to deal with cyber threats. We do not want to be mere spectators or consumers of what other countries develop. Rather, we want to participate and work together in that development process. Ecuador now already has a national cybersecurity strategy, which will allow us to support the efforts of the international community when it comes to the development and implementation of the rules of responsible behavior in cyberspace based on the relevant reports of the GGE, including that of 2021, as well as the report of the first open-ended working group on cybersecurity, also of 2021. So we reiterate the value of cooperation—bilateral, subregional, and regional cooperation—not only to share best practices when it comes to critical infrastructure protection but also to move towards minimum standards in terms of capabilities based on the premise that any weakness in the protection system of one state leads to vulnerability for the rest of the states. Ecuador joins the Swiss statement on behalf of a group of states reiterating that international humanitarian law should apply in cyberspace. Furthermore, we support maintaining in the text the reference to the ICRC, the International Committee for the Red Cross. We also support the reference to the cybersecurity capacity maturity model, as well as the reference to the national points of contact and the National Implementation Survey. Likewise, we believe that the development of voluntary rules of behavior, as well as the development of mandatory rules, are not contradictory. Rather, they’re complementary. We also highlight the need for the process to be increasingly inclusive, where all stakeholders can participate. In conclusion, I should reiterate that the meetings of the working group bring together the various efforts to promote trust. Therefore, we must take advantage of that role. We must do so constructively, avoiding polarization. Ecuador will continue to contribute in that spirit and will insist on the need to stop the militarization of cyberspace. Finally, as highlighted by various delegations, we support the relevance of including a gender perspective, a cross-cutting gender perspective, in these negotiations on cybersecurity, and we recognize the positive impact of the scholarship program for Women in Cyber Fellows. This is another more detailed proposal that will be sent in writing. Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you very much, Ecuador, for your statement. I now give the floor to Botswana for five minutes, please.

Thank you, Chair, for the opportunity to take the floor. We wish to congratulate you on the draft report and the stellar job in steering the discussions and your dedication to the attainment of a consensus in the discussions. Chair, we note that the report acknowledges the gender dimension, which signifies recognition of the important role of women in providing expertise in cyber discussions, a development we wholeheartedly welcome and support. On existing threats and potential threats, Mr. Chair, we endorse the joint proposal submitted by Australia on behalf of a group of states, that includes Botswana, on refining paragraph 7. We also concur with speakers before us, including Australia, that paragraph 7B, Roman figure 7, on mutual legal assistance should be removed from the report since it is under discussion at the Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime. Mr. Chair, on the international section of the report, Botswana is agreeable to the inclusion of further discussions on topics related to international law and would, in fact, benefit from the use of existing avenues and tools, as well as expert briefings from the UN and any other interested stakeholders in an effort to gain a deeper understanding and to develop a country position on how international law applies in cyberspace. Chair, we note and welcome proposals on capacity building. Coming from the developing world, where states lack the capacity to adequately secure their cyberspace, this report’s focus on capacity building and the unique challenges faced by developing states is well appreciated. This is imperative for leveling the cyber security playing field. We are, however, grateful for the existing efforts made by organizations such as the GFCE and its supporting states in their capacity building efforts in developing countries in this regard. We further encourage the use of the Cyber Maturity Model Tool, which Botswana had the pleasure of using in 2019, to determine its level of cyber capability. With regards to the CBMs track, we welcome the inclusion in the report of the recommendation for a global directory on ICT points of contact, as well as voluntary information sharing between states on their national strategies, policies, institutions, critical infrastructure, and ICT capabilities. Furthermore, the proposals for new CBMs provide increased certainty that states wish to prevent potential conflicts that may emanate from cyberspace. Mr. Chair, we agree with what is contained in this section on rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior, as it is reflective of past discussions on the topic. We agree with many delegations that spoke before us that focus should be on creating a common understanding of the norms and on the implementation of the existing norms, on the notion that additional norms would be developed over time, since it cannot be done at the same time as implementing the existing norms. In this regard, we agree with South Africa that developing additional norms would be placing a burden on small states. In conclusion, Chair, we support your determination to have an agreed outcome as a basis for further discussions in upcoming sessions. We pledge our support to this effort. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Botswana, for keeping within the time limit and for your contribution as well. I give the floor now to Mauritius, please, to be followed by Nigeria. Mauritius, three minutes.

Good morning, Mr. Chair, Excellencies, and colleagues. Thank you for giving the Mauritian delegates the opportunity to express our views on the Draft Annual Progress Report. Mr. Chair, Section B of the Draft Annual Progress Report states the importance of developing and disseminating comprehensive best practices on the classification and protection of critical infrastructure. Mauritius supports other Member States who have stressed the importance of protecting critical infrastructures and strongly agree that cyber threats such as ransomware against critical infrastructures are becoming increasingly frequent, sophisticated, and impactful. In this regard, appropriate measures should be taken to allow cost-effective business, service continuity, sustained revenue, and uninterrupted delivery of essential services. We believe that this could be achieved through a combination of institutional structures, people, processes, technology, and cooperation. Mr. Chair, with a view to enhancing the resiliency of critical infrastructure, Mauritius has come up with a series of measures including mandatory incident reporting by CIIs, best practices for the protection of CIIs, and development of a cyber threat information sharing platform for a membership program to facilitate exchange of information and intelligence on risk to critical infrastructure. Sharing cyber threat information and intelligence is another approach proposed in the OEWG Drafted Annual Report to address existing and potential threats. Through this initiative, Mauritius believes in the establishment of a community of trust between the government and critical owners and operators. The members of this platform can share cyber threat incident and vulnerability information to collaborate and better understand the taxonomy of cyber threats. With regard to international law, Mauritius supports this section and recognizes that activities conducted in cyberspace raise new challenges for the application of international law, including issues of sovereignty, attribution, and jurisdiction, given that various actors engage in a range of cyber activities which may involve multiple national borders. To deepen understanding and clear set expectations, Mauritius is of the opinion that states should be transparent in how they interpret existing international law as it applies to state conduct in cyberspace. Thank you, Mr. Chair. We will also submit our written statement.

Thank you very much, Mauritius, for your contribution. Nigeria, to be followed by Singapore. Five minutes for Nigeria.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation appreciates your efforts in producing the reverse drafts of the first annual progress reports and wishes to assure you of our full support in helping to achieve the objectives of this OEWG. Nigeria recognizes that the content of the reverse drafts captures the dynamic, imagined, and rapidly expansive nature of ICT, which is crucial to any roadmap for enhancing national development, global cooperation, and international security. On the reference to the roles and responsibilities of other actors, including the private sector, academia, and civil society, my delegation wishes to reaffirm that Nigeria remains a supporter of multistakeholder participation in this OEWG and will continue to support transparent processes for the participation of intergovernmental organizations, including women delegates’ participation, well-accredited civil society, relevant industries, technical community, and academia in contributing to building trust and confidence in the use of ICTs. However, my delegation believes that additional improvements will further enrich the reverse drafts. For us, this is crucial in mainstreaming an inclusive program that would effectively and adaptively capture the peculiarities of all member states. In this regard, my delegation wishes to suggest the following. Under rules, norms, and principles for responsible state behavior, we suggest that similar to the provision of combating online gender exploitation, the document should also highlight the need for online child protection mechanisms. Nigeria considers children as the most vulnerable target and therefore calls for the integration of this aspect into implementation now. We are also of the view that capacity building initiatives should focus on promoting research and development in emerging ICT fields, as well as indigenous technology development for member states as a pathway for reducing dependence on imported solutions and systems. In particular, my delegation stresses that reference to the principles of making capacity building activities demand-driven, tailored, sustainable, and recognizing the importance of national ownership is essential and should be preserved in the report. Mr. Chair, on international law, Nigeria shares the same view with most delegations and agrees on the applicability of existing international law in cyberspace. We also fully support the call for the advancement and operationalization of the 11 norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace to address the current challenges in the domain. We believe that the final report of the GGE precedence set by the concluded OEWG should be a baseline to the progress as a way forward for this OEWG. In this regard, my delegation would like to reiterate that international law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability and in promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment. Therefore, it is pertinent to ensure that the use of ICT by member states is in accordance with the principles of existing international law supported by voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behavior as a basis for the state’s commitment to prevent conflict and maintain international peace and security in cyberspace. On confidence-building measures, there is a strong consensus on the importance of CBMs and their ability to increase interstate cooperation, transparency, and predictability. They can lower tensions and prevent disputes from turning into conflicts. My delegation acknowledges the value and relevance of CBMs recommended in the GGE report of 2013 and 2015. We also appreciate the elements related to CBMs in the report of the concluded OEWG, both in the descriptive and recommendation sectors. In the same vein, my delegation reiterates that voluntary measures at the national level may no longer be sufficient to address the rapidly widening scope of global threats of the malicious use of ICT. Moreover, Nigeria underscores that CBMs should not in any way be abused to infringe on the national sovereignty of states or internal affairs. Generally, Nigeria supports the following elements: the central role of the UN in the development and implementation of global CBMs, the relevance of 1988 UN-DC guidelines for CBMs, the need to translate confidence-building measures into concrete actions that are implemented by all states, the proposed establishment of global reciprocity of CBMs, and the secured directory of OPC are very important recommendations with Nigeria’s support. The modalities for securing the proposed directory should be prepared by the Secretariat. Also, the reference to the roles and responsibilities of other actors, including the private sector, academia, and civil society, in contributing to building trust and confidence in the use of ICT is also a very important element. On capacity building, the OEWG should also focus on the components of the global architecture for capacity building, including cybersecurity training and education. Under the auspices of the United Nations, it should guarantee a balanced, non-discriminatory, and demand-driven global cooperative arrangement for ICT-related capacity building, ensuring security, safety, and capacity of ICT supply chains. Mr. Chair, finally, my delegation recommends the formulation of the first draft and review it as a laudable roadmap for driving the efforts of member states towards attaining progressive national development, international cooperation, and global security. We remain hopeful that the action-oriented mechanism under the United Nations would promote the responsible use of ICT to instill sanity and reduce its potential threat to national and international security. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Nigeria, for your contribution. I now give the floor to Singapore, to be followed by Australia. Singapore, your three minutes, please. And I’m sure Singapore will comply.

Mr. Chair, I’ll speak very quickly. I’ll try my best. First, on international law, we support the recommendation for states to share on a voluntary basis their national views on how international law applies in the use of ICTs as set out in sub-paragraph 9b, including through the UNIDIR Cyber Policy Portal and the report of the Secretary-General on developments in the field of information and communication technologies in the context of international security. We further support strengthening capacity building efforts on international law as identified in the first part of sub-paragraph 9c, including getting insights and best practices from regional organizations. It’s important to equip member states with the necessary expertise to participate meaningfully in the discussions on international law in cyberspace. One example of how we support this is through the UN Singapore Cyber Fellowship, which contains a module that discusses specifically the challenges and opportunities in applying international law. On the recommended next steps, we agree with the proposals in section. In particular, paragraph 4 is a welcome initiative for states to voluntarily share their needs and priorities for capacity building in the area of international law. Such an initiative will help the OEWG Secretariat conduct the needs assessment, which will help sharpen and focus the capacity building programs on international law to be more customized so these programs can benefit the recipients. Singapore looks forward to the background paper and presentation prepared by the Secretariat in due course. I move on now to the confidence building measures. We support the proposals in this section. In paragraph 10a, we continue to support the value that having a global points of contact directory will bring as it would strengthen coordination and communication between member states, especially in times of crisis and if countries need to contact each other outside their regional grouping. We’d like to suggest that it might be useful to propose that this POC directory be coordinated by the UN ODA, which would be a reputable, trustworthy, and neutral entity to take on this role. And we propose to add specific language, which we’ll pass to the Secretariat on this. Singapore is part of the cross-regional confidence builders group led by Germany, with Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Israel, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, and the Netherlands. The group has put forth a joint proposal on specific amendments to this segment for states’ consideration. The proposal of implementing the global point of contact directory has received broad support, and hence in the recommended next steps, we think there’s value to mention it in paragraph 4. I turn to capacity building. We agree with the proposals under this section and would like to reiterate the need for coordination of capacity building efforts and for states to leverage existing mechanisms for this purpose. On the recommended next steps, we agree with and welcome the next steps listed in this section. In terms of the new threats like ransomware, capacity building also supports it, and Singapore will do our part as the incumbent president of the Financial Action Task Force to support efforts to build counter-ransomware initiatives and capabilities. On coordination, states could leverage the proposed ICT capacity building focal point designated by the UN Secretariat to consolidate and coordinate information on forthcoming and existing capacity building programs. Finally, on regular institutional dialogue, Singapore welcomes references to the POA in this section, which can be further discussed under the regular institutional dialogue section of the OEWG, and we agree with the recommended next steps detailed under this section, including exchanging views on proposals to facilitate our regular institutional dialogue on international cyber issues and supporting sponsorship of programs like the UN Singapore Cyber Fellowship. Thank you. Slightly over, apologies. Thank you very much. And apologies to the…

Thank you very much, Singapore, for your statement. I now give the floor to Australia, to be followed by Colombia.

Thank you so much, Chair. Australia fully aligns with the statement of the Pacific Island Forum Member States delivered by Fiji yesterday. Turning to international law, on paragraph 9, Australia supports the proposal by the Netherlands to insert consensus text recalling the application of international law. On paragraph 9a, Australia will support the proposal by the Netherlands to amend this paragraph. I believe this is going to be discussed a little bit later this morning. We support the proposal by Switzerland and a group of states on international humanitarian law and strongly support the proposal by the Republic of Korea and others to reinsert a reference to the ICRC. We could also go along with the alternative framing proposed by Costa Rica, Canada, Ireland, and others to speak about observer entities to the General Assembly, and we can go along with Switzerland’s proposal for the remainder of this paragraph. On paragraph 9c, Australia strongly supports the proposal made by both China and the United States to delete the second sentence of this paragraph. This is very important for Australia. Turning to confidence-building measures, Australia aligns with the comment by our fellow informal cross-regional confidence-building group members, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Israel, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, and Singapore. After listening closely to interventions yesterday on the CBMs chapter and the point of contacts directory in particular, we’ve prepared a joint proposal to amend the CBMs chapter referenced by my distinguished colleague from Singapore, and this is in a way that streamlines that text. Hopefully, it will be available on the website soon. I do have some printed copies here, as do others around the room, if you’d like to have a look. Turning to capacity building, aligning with the statement of the Pacific Island Forum, Australia believes that the proposals listed on this chapter could be streamlined for simplicity and should avoid duplication of existing efforts, and where relevant, clearly identify how they could work and be implemented in practice. As others have said, many of these proposals have not been discussed in detail by the formal sessions of the open-ended working group and warrant further discussion. The value add of this open-ended working group is its focus on those issues that relate to the security of ICTs in the context of international peace and security. Therefore, we support the proposal by Germany to make sure references in this chapter are all set out as ICT security capacity building, rather than simply ICT capacity building. Regarding paragraph 11a, we support the proposal from the Pacific Island Forum to amend this paragraph. Australia also has specific textual amendments to paragraphs 11b, c, d, and f. These are all based on consensus text and we’ll share these in writing in the interest of time. On the recommendations, we support the United States proposal to delete recommendation four and the proposal for dedicated sessions to discuss capacity building proposals, such as the one in that proposal at the fourth and fifth sessions of the open-ended working group. On regular institutional dialogue, and I beg another 10 seconds, on paragraph 12a, we request amendment to this paragraph to reflect consensus text, which will delete the second sentence and replace it with text from paragraph eight of the 2021 OEWG report. On paragraphs 12b and recommendation two regarding the Program of Action, we support France’s proposals. I’ll provide all of this in writing to the secretariat and to the chair and to the website. It gives me great confidence that so many of us are involved in finding a way forward in this report. And while I do not envy you, Chair, I have great confidence that you will bring us home. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Australia, for your contributions and your efforts at finding a language that could bring us forward. I give now the floor to Colombia, to be followed by Austria. Colombia, you have five minutes. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Chair. We appreciate your efforts in leading this session, as well as the presentation of the zero draft and the reviewed annual progress report. I also thank the statement of Ms. Nakamitsu, as well as the work of the Secretary of Excellency. We reiterate the support of Colombia to your management and are willing to continue participating constructively in the process of this working group. Sir, Colombia commends the adoption of the modalities for participation of the various stakeholders, as well as the presence of several of them in this session. Undoubtedly, our work will be strengthened by the interaction with them, and their participation is substantive, systemic, and ongoing. In our deliberations, Ms. Nakamitsu and you, Mr. President, have highlighted the need for us to reach recommendations that will lead us to concrete actions and the achievement of results. My delegation fully agrees with that. That’s why we believe it is important to adopt a first annual progress report of our work. In general terms, the revised version of this report is a good foundation for our negotiations, sir. We have pointed out that this group should approach its work based on the work we’ve done and also based on the progress achieved in prior agreements as part of its mandate, including the inclusive nature and transparent nature of the process as priorities. First, we should move forward in the effective operationalization of responsible state behavior. This was based on consensus and, furthermore, promote support to its implementation. Second, move forward in terms of common understandings of the implementation of international law in cyberspace. This is of particular interest, particularly in order to better understand the implementation of IHL in cyberspace. Further, broaden efforts in order to strengthen cooperation when it comes to cyber security and support capacity building in an inclusive, coordinated, and efficient way. It is essential for us to contribute to closing the digital divide, both when it comes to the economic capacity and development as well as the gender gap. Fourth, maintain transparency and inclusiveness in the process, allowing us to broaden and enrich dialogue with the various stakeholders and benefit from their expertise. Fifth, continue developing and implementing CBMs that will allow us to reduce tension, avoid misunderstandings, and avoid de-escalation of conflict. We believe it is fundamental to quickly ensure an ongoing implementation of the recommendations of the group of experts and the prior OEWG as well as the maintenance of an open space for dialogue on this topic. Sixth, establish a mechanism to promote responsible state behavior in their use of ICTs as well as follow-up and cooperation for its collective implementation, which will serve as a space for dialogue on achievements and challenges for its implementation as well as the promotion of future developments. For Colombia, this mechanism is the Program of Action, which should be established as a permanent, inclusive, action-oriented instrument to promote concrete cooperation to operationalize this framework and also as a platform in order to continue discussing future development in light of growing challenges and threats. Seventh, it is fundamental to take advantage of and strengthen spaces and processes at the regional, sub-regional, and inter-regional level in order to implement the responsible state behavior measures that have been agreed upon and, furthermore, foster capacity building and dialogue on this matter. Based on these priorities, we have the following comments for the report. First, we welcome the proposal submitted by Australia for the introductory paragraphs. Also, we agree with Costa Rica’s proposal to include a reference to IHL in paragraph one of the introduction. Two, in terms of current and potential threats, we agree with Costa Rica and other states in the need to include ransomware, which can be a threat to national security. Three, in section C, we believe it is important to refer to the implementation of the agreed-upon framework. We will submit in writing our proposal on that. Four, in terms of section D, we reiterate that the foundation of our presence here in the UN and in these discussions is international law and particularly the UN Charter. We underscore our support to the joint declaration on IHL by Switzerland on behalf of a group of countries, highlighting that moving forward in this discussion should not encourage militarization or legitimize any conflict in any area. On the contrary, we should avoid misunderstandings and increase foreseeability and stability. Furthermore, we support Costa Rica’s proposal for paragraph 9A of this section. My delegation, as well as Switzerland, Costa Rica, Germany, and others, laments the exclusion of the reference to the ICRC and its expertise in this section. Five, in terms of section E, we welcome its content and its recommendations. We also support Mexico’s proposal to include a paragraph related to the implementation of CBMs, which has been recommended by the GGE and the prior OEWG. We also highlight the regional and sub-regional experiences in this area, particularly within the framework of the Organization of American States and the potential to implement them at that level. Six, in terms of section F, we highlight the need for joint efforts among states, regional organizations, and sub-regional bodies and the various stakeholders for capacity building. We welcome this section and its recommendations. Seven, in terms of section G, we welcome this section highlighting the importance of moving forward in considering and structuring the Program of Action. Finally, sir, we highlight the importance of language related to the active and significant participation of women in the working group with a gender perspective in our discussions and the need to close the digital divide, including the gender divide. Thus, we support the comments made by Canada and Chile and other states as we highlight also the impact of the Women in Cyber Fellows program in this work and in the prior open-ended working group. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Colombia, for your statement. I give now the floor to Austria, to be followed by Egypt. Austria, three minutes, please.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. We align with the statements delivered by the European Union on various chapters of the progress report. In the interest of time, I’ll keep my statement in my national capacity very concise. On Monday, I spoke on threats with a view to more clearly outline the threat landscape we’re facing. In this vein, we’d like to support the cross-region proposal put forward by Australia and other delegations, which captures our wishes very eloquently. On international law, likewise, I can stay very brief as we can fully support the proposals put forward by the Netherlands. And like other delegations, we would also call for the reinsertion of an explicit reference to the ICRC, which in the REV1 has been deleted. The ICRC’s role in the development of IHL is unique, and as such, the ICRC has a key role to play in our discussions of how international law applies to cyberspace. In our view, IHL clearly applies in cyberspace, and as such, the ICRC’s involvement in relevant briefings is logical. IHL in general is a very important issue for my delegation. We therefore welcome the statement on IHL delivered by Switzerland on behalf of a group of states and their recommendations for the draft report. We’d like to support these points in their entirety. On CBMs, as just offered by my neighbors, I had the possibility to avail myself of a hard copy of their proposals put forward, and in our view, they seem very sensible to streamline and structure this section, so we’d therefore like to support the proposals put forward by Australia and others. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Austria, for your contribution. Egypt, to be followed by Indonesia. Egypt, you have three minutes as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On Section E, Confidence Building, we underscore the value of further developing the Directory of National Points of Contact proposal. However, it is important to discuss it first within the OEWG before we agree to its establishment. Therefore, we support reverting back to the original proposed language in the Zero Draft in Paragraph 2 under subparagraph recommended steps, which would encourage the States to engage in focused discussions on this proposal. With regards to Section F on Capacity Building, it’s undoubtable that capacity building is extremely important to the developing countries to address the challenges resulting from the increasing digital divide. Therefore, taking concrete action is timely and highly needed. We agree with the comments raised by the delegation of Brazil with regards to Paragraph 11D, as well as the importance of the linkage throughout the text between capacity building and its basic related principles, which are the consent of recipient states and the voluntary basis of this assistance. We also support the proposal of Pakistan’s delegation on the insertion of new Paragraph 11H as suggested. With regards to subparagraph recommended steps Paragraph 3, we would like to ask about the source of the proposed language, as we believe that this paragraph includes some vague terminologies, including gender-disaggregated participation records, which might require further clarity, while it’s important to avoid inserting similar references throughout the text. On Section G, we welcome the amendments made under this section and look forward to further improving its language in line with the progress made, as well as the consensual final outcome reports of the last GGE and OEWG. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Egypt, for your contribution. Indonesia to be followed by the UK. Indonesia, you have three minutes. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation appreciates a number of important elements which have been highlighted on the CBN section. We welcome actionable items related to the global point of contact directory, and we underline the need to develop operational procedures and standardized templates to guide states in appointing relevant institutions with due competencies. For example, to distinguish the difference between institutions focused on policy and technical. Indonesia also welcomes Recommendation No. 3 to request the Secretariat in providing a proposal for the operationalization of the POC directory. Furthermore, this initiative shall be built under the principle of efficiency and effectiveness. Moving on to the next issue, Mr. Chair, we believe that capacity building should be the low-hanging fruit of our process. We continue to reiterate the importance of strengthening technical, financial, and human resources of all states, particularly the developing states, in the effort to safeguard the global ICT environment. We appreciate the inclusion of reference to the principles of ICT capacity building in Paragraph 11A, and the interlinkage of capacity building to the SDGs achievement. We are also pleased to note that the draft contains fruitful initiatives, and we would like to propose the addition of the reference, voluntary basis, also in Paragraph 11B, to reflect the nature of implementation of those listed avenues. On another note, we also wish to reiterate the need to ensure initiatives are reflected in a balanced manner, and therefore we suggest Paragraph 11B and Recommendation No. 5 can use generic terms without having to refer to specific initiatives. We welcome proposals in Paragraphs 11C, D, and E, as well as Recommendation No. 2 of the draft report, and my delegation acknowledges that CBM and capacity building under the UN auspices is indeed important and very relevant, despite the existence of other cooperation mechanisms under bilateral, regional, and multistakeholder arrangements. Cooperation under the UN auspices would give space greater opportunity for fair and equal access to CBMs and capacity building, considering gaps between countries and regions. We can also mandate this august body to administer capacity building which is global or cross-regional and politically neutral in nature. On the issue of regular institutional dialogue, Indonesia supports the formulation in Paragraph 12A, which stresses the centrality of the OEWG as a negotiation mechanism in the UN on ICT security. We wish to reiterate that the OEWG should provide inclusive, sustainable, and outcome-oriented dialogue in the sphere of ICT security that is inclusive for all member states by taking into account previous recommendations as well as the existing mechanism. We take note of the reference in Paragraph 12B and welcome discussion on the POA initiative to take place in the OEWG, and we are keen to hear more on further development of the POA, including details on modalities, relationships with ongoing UN processes, and a clear timeline for implementation. More importantly, we underline that the initiatives regarding regular institutional dialogue should avoid overlap and duplication with the OEWG mandates. Indonesia stands ready to work together to reach consensus toward a concrete dialogue mechanism. I thank you, Chair. Thank you.

Thank you, Indonesia. UK, to be followed by the EU. UK, you have three minutes, please.

Thank you, Chair. We support the statement of a group of states delivered by Switzerland on international law, the proposal by the Netherlands, and the focus on capacity building in this section. We should delete the reference to due diligence at 9a; it is a separate topic from state responsibility and is considered under the 11 norms in previous reports. We welcome the reference to international humanitarian law and support Brazil’s wording on observers. At 9c, the wording “criteria for unlawful ICT activities by different states” should be replaced with the consensus wording, “common understandings of how international law applies to the use of ICT by states.” The paragraph should end here. We do not support the inclusion of a reference to mutual legal assistance. We support the concept at 10a of a POC directory for urgent situations and interacting effectively with existing directories. We do not engage in the provision of hotlines on this or other issues. We do not understand how a directory can respect state sovereignty. We must retain the intention of the consensus language on ICT capabilities at 10b. Cooperation between CSIRTs at 10d is very important. To address this proposal would require input from the Global Forum of Incident Response Teams or FIRST, who are currently not accredited to participate in the OEWG. We reiterate that the OEWG is not a technical forum. As US and India, we do not support the inclusion of language on a non-discriminatory environment and economic development at 10e or elsewhere. Recommendation six should end after “foster confidence building” in order to avoid limiting discussion at the proposed intersessional meeting. We welcome the promotion of better understanding of capacity building needs and the need to ensure member states are better informed. It is vital that language around the use of ICTs in section F must be standardized to reflect our mandate. Our mandate to develop capacity to mitigate threats is weakened and marginalized in this report when it should be at the heart of our work. The 2021 OEWG report did not propose principles of ICT capacity building, but of capacity building in relation to state use of ICTs in the context of international security. Diluting our focus here would be a mistake we would regret in due course. We support the Pacific Island Forum’s proposal for wording at 11a, and we cannot support the use of the word “ICT domain” in this report, which should be replaced with “environment.” The second sentence of 11g should end after “partnerships with states,” as the examples of stakeholder activity provided are unnecessarily limited. We fully support the Chair’s proposal to engage in focused discussions on this topic. Member states have put forward ideas to enable the OEWG to shape the role of the UN in this area. They must be properly considered and aligned in a holistic approach, including how they relate to the work of existing UN organizations and to the concepts in recommendations two and four. We should delete recommendation four and amend recommendation two as follows: “Mechanisms,” deleting “a permanent mechanism,” “potentially within the UN and in collaboration and coordination with other existing initiatives, to promote,” deleting “for exchanging views and ideas related to,” so it simply reads, “to promote capacity building on security and the use of ICTs.” And finally, we should delete the final sentence of paragraph 12a as it does not garner consensus. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, UK, for your statement. Please do send us your statement, like all the other delegations as well. Please do send us your statement. Thank you very much. I give the floor now to the EU, to be followed by China. EU, you have three minutes.

Thank you, Chair. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States on capacity building and regular institutional dialogue sections. North Macedonia, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Monaco align themselves with this statement, and a full statement will be made available online. The revised draft could be clearer about the scope, noting that ICT capacity building is a wide definition, also including potentially activities outside the remit of the First Committee. In that sense, it is for the OEWG to set the baseline for capacity building on the use of ICT in the context of international security, and allow Member States, regional organizations, and other relevant stakeholders to take this guidance forward in their capacity building efforts. Furthermore, in order for the international community to be effective and efficient, we suggest making the best use of existing platforms and initiatives, including the GFCE, which focuses on global capacity building coordination, having over 160 members and working through regional centres with partners on coordination of capacity building efforts. We therefore do not see a need to duplicate those efforts by a new UN mechanism, but rather ensure complementarity with existing proposals. We also request the Program of Action (POA) to be properly reflected in the revised report based on the paper shared by France on behalf of all POA co-sponsors. We also consider the request to the UN Secretariat to designate a capacity building focal point premature, and it deserves further discussion building upon informed presentation of existing practices within the UN. Therefore, we suggest reflecting in the recommendation available. First, the discussion on a permanent mechanism on coordination and capacity building should, however, focus on raising awareness. Second, where appropriate, by encouraging a start of discussion on the UN focal point, and third, to link the proposals reflected in the draft annual report to the POA. We will therefore support deleting recommendation four. On institutional dialogue, the EU requests refining the reflection of the POA in the revised draft, taking into account the progress that has been made since by the international community, notably that since the first OEWG report, as welcome to explore further the establishment of the POA. First, the amendment on the varying levels of support from states is misleading, as a further elaboration of the POA is a consensual proposal that has been endorsed by all UN member states in the prior OEWG. We also support the amendment from France of the recommended step. The OEWG should rather look ahead and reflect the progress made on the POA, welcoming further discussion, including in the OEWG, on the substance rather than the timeframe. Finally, the EU and its member states support the proposals by Australia and a group of states on the threat sections. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, European Union. China to be followed by France. China, you have three minutes. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. To demonstrate China’s attitude on gender equality, the head of our mission decided to send me to make a statement here. On Section F and Section G, the proposed changes to two parts have been submitted to the Secretariat. Here we just stress the two brief points. First, regarding capacity building, the 2021 OEWG report proposed important principles such as political neutrality. While we carry out international cooperation on capacity building, we should all follow those principles, and this should be reiterated in the report. Regarding the institutional dialogue, the formulation on the Program of Action (POA) should emphasize that all discussions on the POA should be conducted within the framework of the OEWG to avoid the fragmentation of the UN information security process. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, China, for your statement. France, to be followed by El Salvador. France, you have three minutes, please.

Thank you, Chair. I will try to be as brief as possible, and I will send you our proposals in writing and to all of the states that request them as well. Turning now to Section D on international law, my delegation believes that this section is overall satisfactory. We support, however, the proposal of the Netherlands with regard to paragraph 9 and 9a. This proposal reflects the logic of our discussions to deepen our common understanding of how existing international law applies. My delegation also supports the deeper discussion proposed in paragraph 9a. We commend in particular the matter of international humanitarian law. Unfortunately, circumstances have shown that cyber war is not hypothetical but a reality. In paragraph 9a, we also would like to see a mention of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and we would suggest that the second paragraph of 9c be supplemented on possible work carried out in other forums. Turning now to Section E on confidence-building measures, there was a working document submitted on the Directorate of Points of Contact, so we support it, and we would like to see more precise discussions on the operationalization of the point-of-contact directory. Turning now to Section F on capacity-building, we hail your efforts, Mr. President, to submit concrete proposals. We endorse the statement made by certain delegations on the need to better regulate proposals here, and we think that we could say ICT capacity-building in the context of international security. In paragraph 11d, we support Korea’s proposal to mention the Program of Action as a possible framework as a permanent mechanism for capacity-building. Now turning to Recommendation 4, which has to do with the focal point, we think that we should explore and make more specific the modalities for implementing it, and we’d like to participate in those discussions. Turning now to Section G on regular institutional dialogue, paragraph 12b could better reflect the outcome of the first working group as regards the Program of Action. There’s a need to continue exchanges, especially in the work of the open-ended working group. However, a lot of states have expressed their support or at least interest in this proposal, and they’ve favorably mentioned it. I think that we are very close to consensus as regards the need to give the UN a permanent mechanism, one that would allow it to accompany states in the implementation of the norms. It is desirable, though, for this progress to continue. We would like to reword the first recommendation to reflect the consensus-based, balanced, and still relevant language of the final report of the previous OEWG. Finally, we support the organization at the fourth and fifth sessions of the OEWG of more precise discussions of the content and the structure of the Program of Action, and we want all states to have the opportunity to express their views and proposals. I will be transmitting all these proposals in writing to you and to all the states that ask for it.

Thank you very much, France, for your statement. I give now the floor to El Salvador, to be followed by Canada. El Salvador, your three minutes, please. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Chair. The topic of capacity building is relevant for the Government of El Salvador, considering the technological transformation and digital process that’s being coordinated by our Secretariat for Innovation in the Presidency at the national level. This, with regards to the reduction of the digital divide, mentioned in Section 11B of the Progress Report. On this, at the national level, we are working on various topics of the digital agenda, such as the implementation of the National Strategy for Cybersecurity, as well as the state’s digital security program, the critical infrastructure plan, and cybersecurity training for public employees, and confidence-building measures, among others. In view of the foregoing, this delegation supports the agreement that was reached regarding the modalities for participation among the stakeholders in the GTCA. El Salvador recognizes that this working group is an intergovernmental effort. It is based on the expertise and the support of other actors, which is very relevant for us, considering, among other elements, private property, physical infrastructure, and logistical infrastructure on the internet, as well as the global nature of cyberspace. On this point, in strengthening Item 11B for our delegation, capacity building is a task that should include various actors, building on national capabilities and promoting cooperation and international assistance at all levels, and strengthening some of the regional experiences. As expressed before, the United Nations, through a subsidiary body, could collaborate on the issue of requests and offers in terms of capacity building and, furthermore, coordination, highlighting what is mentioned in 11D and the content in the next steps in the report. In terms of promoting institutional dialogue, we reiterate our support to the initiative to promote this under the auspices of the United Nations, as expressed in 12A. Our country focuses on dialogue as a way to build trust, as a way to create a peaceful and safe cyberspace that we can all depend on. Our country decided to join the over 60 countries who endorse the UN program, as established under 12D, which aims to become a permanent, inclusive, action-oriented program in order to monitor the implementation of standards that are agreed upon and support countries in the implementation of its security policies. In conclusion, Chair, we would like to make an appeal to continue strengthening our discussions in this working group, as established in the next steps of the report, in order to establish thematic priorities that are relevant for member states when it comes to information security as well as the use of ICTs. The discussions in this working group are, in and of themselves, a dialogue that should continue to be promoted. I would like to conclude with that. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, El Salvador, for your statement. The floor now goes to Canada, followed by New Zealand. Canada, you have three minutes, please.

Thank you, Chair, and for expediency’s sake, we will be submitting our statements on capacity building and regular institutional dialogue, but a few points to highlight. We are encouraged with the point in paragraph 11G on potential strengthening of coordination efforts through interested and relevant stakeholders. As noted several times, many stakeholders have specific expertise and knowledge and work with diverse communities. Their work contributes to an effective and sustainable capacity building process. Certain organizations, such as Cyber Peace Institute, play a key role in providing input on cyberspace, the landscape, such as the impact of cyber attacks, human rights violations, the implementation challenges, and implementing degree norms. Examples of their work include platforms and data analysis that have proven instrumental to map the spillover effects of conflicts, conflicts that affect states and sectors negatively. And this is especially relevant in the context of the unjustifiable and unprovoked attack on Ukraine by Russia. Chair, one point which we have concerns and seek further clarification is the suggestion in paragraph 11D to consider the establishment of a permanent mechanism for capacity building. As a start, we would strongly suggest that existing initiatives ought to be explored further. As we noted previously, cyber capacity building coordination bodies, such as the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, the GFCE, have an established track record and help maintain coordination and coherence as it relates to cyber capacity building efforts. I will now be giving my remarks on regular institutional dialogue in French. As you know, Canada is a co-sponsor of the Program of Action, together with all the other states. We believe that the creation of a permanent process that is inclusive and action-oriented would help states to implement the acquis. It would also allow us to periodically take stock of threats, and it would let us ensure capacity building. Together with non-state actors, we can work on all these tasks. In this regard, we believe that the language included in the new draft report represents an improvement. We believe it could be further improved. Canada agrees with France’s recommendation, according to which the POA could be elaborated. To sum up, we believe that the creation of the cyber Program of Action that is inclusive is needed. We believe that this permanent mechanism would further assist states in implementing the acquis in order to carry out capacity building efforts and to better take account of non-state actors. We believe that the draft is acceptable, but it needs some improvements proposed by France. Thank you.

Thank you, Canada, for your contribution. I now give the floor to New Zealand, followed by Malaysia. New Zealand, you have three minutes, please.

Thank you, Chair. New Zealand fully aligns itself with the statement by Fiji on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum members. On capacity building, referring back to our earlier articulation on the importance of stakeholders, we note the existing significant work already underway. And in the same vein, note the important and extensive work of regional, sub-regional, and other international bodies. We’re a strong supporter of the work of the GFCE and the civil portal, for example. As a small state, we do not have the capacity to support engagements in multiple fora for the same end, and therefore we must prevent duplication. We consider the proposals under 11D for a permanent mechanism under 11E, including the establishment of a trust fund, are potentially duplicative and require more detailed consideration. We support the textual amendments proposed by the Pacific Islands Forum for 11A and Australia under 11C and 11D. For these reasons, we would support a detailed discussion of capacity building for ICT security in the fourth or fifth sessions, and see great value in the annual report acting as a roadmap and flagging this as a future discussion. We support the UK’s amendment to recommendation two accordingly. We suggest that recommendation four for a focal point is deleted, and recommendations seven and eight are also discussed alongside these other proposals at a specific capacity building session. Finally, we echo the comments from Brazil and others on ensuring adherence to our mandate on cybersecurity, and request the addition of “on security and the use of,” or appropriate other alternative formulations throughout section F. Thank you very much.

Thank you, New Zealand. Malaysia, please, you have three minutes. Thank you.

Chair, on international law, Malaysia welcomes discussions on the non-exhaustive list of topics concerning international law in Para 9A and supports the proposal from Indonesia to add attribution as one of the areas to be further discussed. Malaysia also supports the proposal from Brazil to discuss international law by topics. Malaysia is also pleased with paragraphs 9B and 9C. Malaysia welcomes the recommended next steps for the topic of international law and supports the proposal from Indonesia to extend recommendation number one by adding focused steps by the OEWG with regard to the implementation of international law. On confidence-building measures, in general, Malaysia is pleased with this section. Malaysia welcomes paragraph 10A on a global intergovernmental POC and supports the Netherlands and other delegations which have advocated leveraging existing POC within regional platforms, if applicable. Malaysia supports the suggestion by Chile and other delegations for the inclusion of regional groups under item six with regard to the intersessional meetings in terms of recommended next steps on confidence-building measures. Malaysia also welcomes the continuous development of the UNIDIR cyber policy portal. On capacity building, Malaysia supports Brazil’s view that the objective of capacity building within the OEWG is to assist states in building institutional strength so as to enable responsible behavior as reflected in the norms. Malaysia appreciates the mention of the digital divide, which has a clear linkage with the level of cyber security readiness and the associated need to continuously assess the level of cyber security maturity as well as conduct national surveying. Mr. Chair, cyber security is not amenable to a one-size-fits-all approach. Capacity building is needed to allow states to have track visibility to identify, detect, respond to, and recover from cyber incidences. In this regard, Malaysia supports the statement made by Mauritius yesterday with regards to CSIRTs and believes that this is one of the most practical areas in which greater capacity building can be pursued. It will have a huge impact in helping states to realize the implementations of norms. CSIRTs communities have been practicing information sharing within established standard protocols with regards to cyber threats and incidents for the past 20 years. Learning from their experience will assist us in prioritizing what needs to be done for a more constructive and impactful result. Thank you, Chair. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Malaysia. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), you may advance to the floor. You have five minutes.

Thank you, Chair. This is the first time that my delegation has taken the floor. Therefore, allow me, just like all the other states that spoke before me, to hail the quality of your leadership since the beginning of the process. And we thank you for your commitment to directing our exchanges of views to ensure the adoption of a consensus-based annual report on our activities in accordance with the provisions of Resolution 75/240 of the GA. My delegation commends your initiative to present this draft report, which will certainly allow us to understand our evolving discussions before the end of the cycle of this working group. We think this will be a good basis for our discussions. Chair, while we are in the process of debating the first annual report of the 2021-2025 cycle, threats in cyberspace continue to intensify and evolve, and they have increasing implications for international peace and security. Developing countries are particularly vulnerable. We’ve seen divergent views in this hall. However, my delegation wishes to encourage us to proceed in a spirit of openness and to show flexibility. Having said that, allow me to share several concerns of my delegation. Turning to the introduction section, my delegation welcomes the participation of stakeholders in the meeting. This is because we think that they have a great deal to offer in the implementation of the normative framework of cyberspace. We welcome the inclusion of a reference on the importance of regional and subregional organizations, given the essential role that they can play in the cyberspace environment. We also welcome the inclusion of gender in the process of ICT. Turning to threats now, my delegation agrees with the threats that were identified in paragraph 7. We strongly support the adoption of an approach that is grounded in the responsible behavior of states. This is because we think that the malicious use of technologies, rather than technologies in and of themselves, are of concern, hence the need to reference threats to international peace and security stemming from the malicious use of ICTs by state and non-state actors. This includes terrorists and criminal groups. Thus, we support D of paragraph 7 and paragraph 2 on the recommendations to foster exchanges among stakeholders. Turning now to the section on norms, we agree with those who think priority should be given to the implementation of existing norms. But my country also believes that additional norms can be elaborated in time, given the fact that the implementation of existing norms is not an obstacle to the elaboration of new ones. We therefore encourage a common understanding of technical terms. This would allow states to have the same level of understanding in order to facilitate the implementation of rules, norms, and principles of responsible behavior of states in the use of ICTs. Speaking about the implementation of voluntary norms, my delegation believes that in order to prevent the malicious use of technologies in cyberspace and to protect states that don’t have the capacity to respond to these threats, it would also be desirable for, under the auspices of the United Nations, a legally binding instrument to be put in place, one grounded in the rules governing the use of ICT by states. We welcome the application of international law in cyberspace. My delegation endorses the Declaration of Switzerland on behalf of some other states on the promotion of IHL in cyberspace. We welcome as well discussions on specific subjects on international law with the participation of UN experts and stakeholders in order to have a common understanding of how international law can apply. Turning now to confidence-building measures, my delegation stresses the importance and the capacity to reduce tensions and to avoid divergences from turning into conflicts. Yet we think that these confidence-building measures should not be used in bad faith to impinge on the national sovereignty of states or to intervene in their internal affairs. Turning now to capacity-building, my delegation believes that it is highly important to bolster international cooperation to support all states inclusively in a coordinated and effective fashion through the building of their capacities and their national cybersecurity policies. Thus, we support the idea of India regarding the development under the auspices of the United Nations of a global portal of cooperation for cyberspace. However, we highlight the importance of taking account of the difficulties that could be encountered by certain developing countries as regards Internet access or as regards the designation of national contact points. Mr. Chair, I shall conclude by saying my delegation agrees with the rest of the text, and we hope that this draft is adopted by consensus at the end of the session. Thank you.

Thank you very much, DRC, for your contribution. I now give the floor to Uganda, to be followed by the Dominican Republic. Uganda, you have the floor, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I take this opportunity, as this is my first time, to take the floor. My delegation wishes to appreciate your leadership in steering the activities of this meeting and looks forward to a fruitful conclusion on Friday. For my delegation, we wish to underscore the importance of the role of gender participation in this process. For us, we don’t look at gender in terms of women on the panel or in this room, because for us, we think it goes beyond this, to involve women at the local level in participation and decision-making in this process of what we are talking about here in this meeting. For me to be here to participate in this meeting has been due to the generous support of the UK, Australia, Canada, and other countries who have seen value in supporting women to make a contribution in this process. And I’m sure there are also many other ladies in this room who have been here because of this support. So for us, the role of gender is very critical, and we hope that it will be reflected in the outcome document. We also wish to recognize the role of capacity building, which we think, as coming from the developing world, is very important for us to be able to be at par when in discussions of this level. Mr. Chairman, I wish to note that the role of gender for us is key and remains central to the participation of Uganda in future meetings. So I wish to join those other delegations who have spoken in support of gender participation, and I hope that other countries also join us in seeing the value of gender participation and those who can support more women to participate in this meeting. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Uganda, for your contribution, and your points about the importance of the gender dimension are very well noted. Distinguished delegates, I have three more speakers from government delegations, and the speakers list was closed yesterday. I am closing the speakers list again. So, those are the three last speakers, and then we will take two additional speakers from accredited observers to the General Assembly. I now give the floor to the Dominican Republic, to be followed by Costa Rica. Dominican Republic, please.

Thank you, Chair. Since it’s the first time that we are taking the floor, the Dominican Republic would like to recognize and congratulate you for your leadership and the progress that has been made in this working group, and we reiterate our full support. In general, we agree with the revised draft annual report proposed by you, as well as many of the observations that have been made by several states. We just have one comment in terms of the form. This is in paragraph 10 regarding capacity building. Several of the subparagraphs indistinctively mention capacity building in ICTs and capacity building regarding security in the use of ICTs, which is really the work of this group. Talking about capacity building in terms of ICTs is very general; therefore, it should be specified that we’re talking about security in the use of ICTs. That’s all. Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you very much, Dominican Republic. Your contributions are well noted. I now give the floor to Costa Rica, to be followed by the Lao PDR. Costa Rica, please, three minutes. Thank you.

Thank you. Gracias, señor presidente. Thank you, sir. Please allow me to comment on section F in terms of capacity building. We believe that this group – we believe that on this point it’s – we think it’s particularly important for states that have less developed cyber capabilities. I’d like to refer to topics 11A regarding this – the ties between this group and the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda, 11B, on fighting the digital divide, and 11C on the links with regional and sub-regional efforts. We believe it is extremely important to focus on these three items. We’d like to make an appeal to consider connecting this working group with the Sustainable Development Goals in general, but more specifically with SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions and SDG 17, partnerships with state and non-state actors. My delegation believes that multilateralism is strengthened through partnerships, public-private partnerships. This is what’s indicated in SDG 17, and a clear example of this strengthening relationship is reflected in 11.8 of the next steps section in terms of – in the section on capacity building. To invite interested stakeholders, including businesses, non-governmental organizations, and academia to submit offers to share resources in support of international capacity building efforts. Finally, in that same section, in terms of next steps, in item two, we’d like to refer to the important role that should be played by non-state actors, non-state sectors when it comes to financing capacity building programs, focusing particularly on those countries that have fewer capabilities to respond to cyberattacks. The reality is that this working group is working in a context in which the world is facing a great digital divide within countries and among countries, and we are pleased to see this reference in the text so that we can be aware of this in the development of our deliberations. We’d like to focus particularly on capacity building. Finally, as was mentioned earlier on, Costa Rica gives great importance to the efforts – the bottom-up efforts that regional and sub-regional efforts can provide to this working group, so therefore we’d like to appreciate that reference in this document. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Costa Rica. Lao PDR please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Distinguished Delegates, the Lao PDR welcomes the Kulin DAF report and assures you of our full support for the constructive OEWG process, working towards the consensus annual progress report. My delegation would like to commend you and your team on this progress. It is gratifying to note that, throughout this session, many important initiatives and ideas have been proposed. In this regard, the Lao PDR supports developing guidance on norms implementation as well as establishing a common understanding of ICT terms. This would enhance state-to-state exchange of best practices and cooperation, ensuring security in the use of ICT. At the same time, to equip ourselves with the evolving and emerging threats and challenges, we support the OEWG’s open forward elaboration of additional rule norms and potential deliberate instruments. Mr. Chair, on confidence-building measures, the Lao PDR supports the establishment of a global point of contact on ICT at diplomatic and technical levels. As an LDC country, capacity building is an essential element to fulfill our common objectives under the OEWG. Under this section, the Lao PDR welcomes and appreciates the concrete action-oriented proposals. We also support the recommendations contained in this report. To ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of capacity building, the design of such programs should be tailor-made based on national needs and circumstances. More importantly, capacity building should be conducted without pretext and carried out in a neutral, transparent, and non-discriminatory manner. Lastly, on legal and institutional dialogue, we reaffirm our support for continuing our discussion in the OEWG under the UN auspices. While we appreciate the recommendation on focusing on the discussion on the Program of Action and advancing capacity building, we also would like to welcome more valuable proposals for further discussion. We believe that various proposals will make further contributions to strengthening our negotiations under this OEWG. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Lao PDR, for your contribution. We’ll now move to statements from accredited observers to the General Assembly, and they are the International Chamber of Commerce and the ICRC, which have requested the floor. So the floor is now to the International Chamber of Commerce. You have three minutes. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Chair, for the opportunity to share a few comments on behalf of the International Chamber of Commerce, the institutional representative of 45 million companies in over 100 countries, and good afternoon to all colleagues here. First of all, let me express our appreciation to you and your team, Chair, for the skillful leadership of this process that has led us to an annual report which we hope can be adopted by the end of this week to provide a roadmap for the future work together, now with the substantive involvement of all stakeholders throughout the remainder of our mandate. On this point, let me note, Chair, our appreciation to you and all delegations that continuously called for and supported the meaningful participation of all stakeholders in the work of the Open-Ended Working Group. We are delighted that many could join us this week but remain disappointed that many were not given this opportunity despite their proven interest in and unquestionable value-add to this work. With regard to the draft annual report, many thanks again to you and your team, Chair, for providing a zero draft and to the Member States for their very thorough revision and input over the past two days. I will refrain from concrete textual proposals in my intervention due to the shortness of time and in an attempt to avoid adding more ingredients to your smoothie, but I do wish to underline three ingredients that we should not miss. First of all, an overall recognition of the role and contribution of stakeholders across all themes discussed by the Open-Ended Working Group. A holistic approach involving dialogue among business, government, civil society, academia, and the technical community is necessary not only to ensure policy measures are evidence-based and informed by the realities and experience of all stakeholders involved but also an effective way to lower the risk of unintended consequences from policy decisions. Inclusive dialogue also increases the legitimacy of policies that are adopted because numerous parties have had a stake in their development. Over the course of the past year, the Open-Ended Working Group has heard from stakeholders on four separate occasions thanks to the consultations, and there will be another opportunity this week as well. The annual report should also note these consultations and make reference to the summary of these discussions as input for our collective work going forward. Secondly, an overview of the growing and evolving ICT security threat landscape that reflects actual threats. In our previous contributions to the Open-Ended Working Group, we have offered a number of examples of such threats and both the financial and non-monetary costs that they pose to businesses and to the economies and societies that they serve, including the growing threat of ransomware and especially ransomware as a service, which should be included in the annual report as an example of a cyber threat to critical infrastructure. And thirdly and lastly, a laser focus on concrete measures and actions that enable at the national level the implementation of the existing international cybersecurity acquis. We have spoken before of the need for such common understanding. On the model of sustainable development goals, we think of these as the cyber development goals, the CDGs, that would define the necessary technical, legal, and policy capacities needed in order for the acquis to be implemented at the national level and to facilitate collective action between states at the regional and international levels. CDGs would primarily be a common capacity-building tool at the nation-state level and would depend on states’ commitment to systematically track and report on implementation. This would bring clarity to what remains to be done to implement the existing cybersecurity framework in all states and allow the development of targeted capacity-building programs to address any challenges to implementation or gaps in capacity. As always, the International Chamber of Commerce and its global network is committed to providing continued support and meaningful business contribution to the working group and looking forward to further discussing these points with everyone in the room. I thank you and apologize for the slight overtime.

Thank you very much, International Chamber of Commerce, for your contribution. They are well noted. I now give the floor to the ICRC. You have the floor for three minutes, please. Thank you.

Mr. Chair, Excellencies, dear colleagues, The International Committee of the Red Cross is grateful for the opportunity to participate in this third session of the Open-Ended Working Group. We would like to submit our main concern and position for your consideration in the finalization of the International Law section of the Annual Progress Report. I would like to mention that it is an abridged version of this full statement. In several recent armed conflicts, cyber operations have been conducted alongside conventional physical warfare. There can be no doubt that these operations are subject to the long-standing rules and principles of international humanitarian law. Cyberspace is not a lawless space. Yet, states need to provide further clarity on whether the contemporary interpretation of IHL provides sufficient protection for civilians in the context of military cyber operations, or whether gaps in common understanding exist. In our view, it would be of great concern if views prevail that consider it lawful to disable civilian infrastructure and civilian government agencies through cyber operations. States should not accept claims that civilian data may be damaged or destroyed because it exists today in a digital and no longer in physical form. Many states have raised concerns about disinformation. While information operations are not new to warfare, using ICTs to incite physical violence or cyber operations against civilians is unlawful. As more and more individuals, private actors, and state proxies participate in armed conflicts, it is essential to reaffirm that they too must not target civilian infrastructure and that states are responsible for all actors that operate under a state’s instruction, direction, or control. Discussion on the established international legal principles of distinction, proportionality, necessity, and humanity are an important starting point. However, these principles only reflect a small part of international humanitarian law. IHL contains, among others, important rules on the imperative to protect medical facilities and on safeguarding humanitarian relief operations. Medical and humanitarian actors must be protected and respected offline and online. As an observer in this OEWG, and a humanitarian organization with a mandate to work for the understanding and dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, we are available to support states and the chair in ways that are mutually agreeable. Concretely, and in relation to the draft progress report, we are available to engage in thematic discussions on IHL with a view to finding common understanding. We will also continue to support exchange between states and capacity building on international humanitarian law, for instance, through consultation and training courses in different regions of the world. We are especially grateful to Estonia and Mexico for partnering with us in this work thus far, and we stand ready to partner with additional states to organize consultations in other regions. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, ICRC, for your statement and contributions. I’ve exhausted the list of speakers for today, and there are no further speakers because we have closed the speakers list. As I indicated yesterday, I’d like to invite both Australia and the Netherlands, who have been engaged in some informal consultations on sections of the Draft Annual Progress Report, to see if they can give us any update. So, at this point, I’d like to ask Australia if they are ready to share whatever they might have with the rest of us at this stage. Thank you, Australia.

Thank you very much, Chair, for the opportunity to speak to you all on the proposal that Australia and a group of states, including Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have pulled together. This proposal aims to add text to the threats chapter. I also very much welcome the support that I’ve heard in the room this morning from several countries on this proposal. It’s uploaded on the website, and I believe my lovely delegation has been walking around the room with some hard copies for everyone to have a look at. We have had a couple of suggestions to make some amendments to some of this text, so if others have ideas to amend, we’re very open to having a look at those. What this text is trying to do is to pull together a way that we can reflect the context under which we are operating and under which the rest of our work derives in the Open-Ended Working Group and in the chapters that follow. So the chapters on norms and international law, CBMs, and capacity building, which really set out the measures that we are trying to implement in order to address the threats that we are setting out in this chapter. We’ve included many of the proposals that countries have suggested over the last several days as important for them to be reflected in the threats chapter. We’ve tried to reflect those that have been mentioned by many countries. This includes threats around malicious cyber activity, such as cyber crime and ransomware, because many have spoken about that, the terrorist use of the internet, the implications of new and emerging technologies, and also malicious cyber activity against critical infrastructure and the particular effects that that can have. Additionally, the threats can be experienced differently depending on the capacity and capability of different countries. So I very much welcome comments and ideas on how to improve this text if there are some to come. It’s a proposal that we hope will garner consensus. Much of this language does come from the threats chapters of our previous reports. We are trying to make it as uncontroversial as possible, and I very much, yes, welcome thoughts and ideas. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Australia, for sharing that update as well as the text. I very much appreciate Australia’s outreach to a group of countries and others. I take it that you and the group of countries are open to further comments and consultations. I encourage everyone to take a look at the text and to continue your consultations if needed with Australia. If there are further updates, I would also like to invite Australia to keep me and my team informed. Thank you very much. Could I now invite the Netherlands to share with the group whatever it might be able to offer at this stage? Thank you very much, Netherlands. The floor is yours.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor on this topic. We have indeed been working on a proposal for the international law section, and we have received input from some delegations and listened carefully to the interventions from the floor. I would like to highlight that this is an initial proposal that will require further discussions, particularly on the issue of additional legally binding obligations, but we do hope the proposal is a useful contribution to our common efforts to make progress towards achieving an outcome document by the end of this week. I will try to provide an overview of the changes before presenting the specific edits, while my team is actually distributing the full text to all of you. So, an overview of the changes. First, to start the chapeau of paragraph 9 by recalling the consensus agreement that international law applies in the ICT environment. Second, to start paragraph 9a with the intention to convene discussions on specific topics to deepen common understandings on how international law applies. Thirdly, to then provide the non-exhaustive list of topics, starting with the established concepts of international law that have been included in previous OEWG and GGE reports and are to be further discussed in this OEWG. And finally, to end the list with the notion that discussions can be held on whether there are any gaps in common understandings. At the end of paragraph 9a, we’ve left the possibility of additional legally binding obligations in squared brackets to indicate that this is something we have not been able to solve. Based on the views expressed so far, it is clear to us that further discussions are to be held on it. We nevertheless offer this text because we believe the edits bring the paragraph closer to the balance of consensus reached. Just also to clarify, our proposal only covers the chapeau in paragraph 9 and paragraph 9a and does not change anything in the remainder of paragraph 9. I will now read the text as we are proposing it, and hopefully everybody has received a copy by now, but I will read slowly. So our proposal is: Recalling that international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and essential to maintaining peace, security, and stability in the ICT environment, states made concrete action-oriented proposals on international law. The following is a non-exhaustive list of proposals with varying levels of support from states that may be further elaborated upon and supplemented at forthcoming OEWG sessions. A. The OEWG could convene discussions on specific topics to deepen common understandings on how international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, applies in the use of ICTs. A non-exhaustive list of topics proposed by states for further discussion under international law includes sovereignty, sovereign equality, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, peaceful settlement of disputes, state responsibility, due diligence, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. A non-exhaustive list of topics proposed by states for further discussion under international law includes the principles of proportionality, distinction, humanity, and necessity, whether gaps in common understandings exist on how international law applies, and then in between square brackets, and the possibility of additional legally binding obligations. Noting that the development of common understandings on international law remains the exclusive prerogative of states, it was proposed that discussions at the OEWG could benefit from briefings, as appropriate, by experts from the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN, such as the International Law Commission, as well as interested stakeholders, including business, non-governmental organizations, and academia. This was the text. I hope everybody would agree with us that this contributes to reaching consensus, while realizing that we’re not there yet. Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you very, very much, Netherlands. I’m very grateful for the update that you’ve just provided, and I’m also very grateful for the efforts that both the Netherlands and Australia have undertaken on their own volition to try and see if we can find textual formulations that will bring us forward, that will find consensus. I take note of the points that both delegations have made, that this is still in some ways a work in progress, and I am expressing the hope that we will be in a position to get indications that this text would be broadly acceptable. Now, at this stage, again in the interest of transparency, I’d like to ask for any views or reactions on the updates that we have heard so far. Does any delegation wish to take the floor with regard to the updates that have been provided by Australia and the Netherlands? Oh, well, thank you very much. I know a few buttons are being pressed, but we are not going into a general debate because that will lead us to another round of exercise, but I will give each delegation one minute to give a very quick indication because obviously the two proposals are works in progress and further consultations will be needed, but I will give the floor to each delegation which has asked for the floor one minute to give a very quick indication of their views and position. I give the floor now to Germany.

Thank you, Chair. Let me just make a very brief remark on the section on CBMs. On behalf of the Confidence Builders Group, we have distributed our suggestion.

Sorry, Germany, this would be something additional. Perhaps we can get reactions to the two proposals first, if you do not mind? Germany, I’m sorry to have interrupted you. I’d like to get reactions to the update that we have heard, because I’d like to get a sense of the room as to the updates that we have heard. So I’ll come back to you, Germany, if you don’t mind. I know you’re speaking for a group of countries as well, but maybe we’ll come to that in a while. Russian Federation, you have the floor. One minute, please.

Chair, distinguished colleagues, the Russian Federation wants to see states participating on equal footing in the OEWG negotiations. We don’t understand why there’s an amendment by one of the groups of states. Russia, in a timely fashion, before the beginning of the session, sent a proposal to the secretariat of the group. Also, many other countries did the same. For two and a half days, the states have voiced their comments on a number of matters, and other countries haven’t been able to voice their positions. Instead of that, we’re discussing the contribution by only one group of states. This gives the impression that there’s a prioritization of the contributions of certain groups in the OEWG. This undermines the inclusive, democratic nature of the working group as a whole. Questions arise with regard to the organization of the text. In essence, we are beginning our deliberations when there are only just a few hours left to discuss it. If we want to ensure consensus-based wording in the text, then it would be expedient to start from the very beginning, that is, with the introduction section and not the section on threats. We think it’s unjustified to look at certain parts of the report in isolation from the entire thing. Russia wants to ensure the principles of sovereign equality of all delegations and equal consideration of all of their positions. We call upon the secretariat of the OEWG to take efforts to ensure a balanced approach by all states. In looking at the draft, we recall that the head of the Russian Federation is in Moscow, unable to fully participate in the negotiations due to the actions of the U.S. So this is a force majeure circumstance. This should be considered in the organization of our work. Thank you for your attention.

Thank you, Russian Federation. Your points are well noted, but I’d like to explain that I had invited the two delegations to make a statement in the interest of transparency, and that is perfectly within the working methods of UN working groups. So there’s nothing untoward in the fact that I’ve given an opportunity for delegations to explain what they are doing in front of the whole working group. There is no undermining of any sovereignty of any country. On the contrary, a transparency exercise like this is meant to put everyone on an equal footing. And that’s precisely why we are having this discussion. No country or group of countries is being given any special privilege. These two countries had mentioned publicly that they were working. And as the Chair, I’d like each one of you to be helping me to work with each other as well as working with my team to help me build consensus. And I would welcome any group of countries who say they have found a solution to a problem that we might be facing. I would encourage any group of countries to reach out and talk to each other. I had said that at the beginning when I encouraged all of you to reach out to each other, to talk to each other, to build understanding because we need to build consensus. So any efforts made by any country to help the Chair is welcome. But instead of having private consultations with this country, I had chosen the path of having the updates provided in an open context because this is not the GGE where we have 25 members who may decide on things. This is the open-ended working group. And which is why from the beginning I have been committed to an open, inclusive, and transparent process. If there’s any group of countries who now wish to say to me that they are working on a proposal that could help to find consensus, I’ll give you the floor right away. So no group is being privileged. No special treatment is given to any delegation. But I take note of your comments. Thank you very much, Russian Federation. I’ll give now the floor to Brazil. One minute, please. Thank you.

Thank you, Chair. We appreciate your efforts to develop a new draft that is acceptable for our delegations, and we think that the proposals just made by Australia and the Netherlands, and to be made by Germany on behalf of interested countries, are an important contribution to that. On threats, we are ready to engage in the discussion of some language that reflects what the threat landscape is in this format proposed by Australia or also in a more streamlined format. However, we would urge Member States, in order to reach a final consensus, to be flexible on ways to reflect threats in a more generic way. Otherwise, the session could become too long unnecessarily. For my delegation, it’s really important to say something about threats. On international law, we support the proposal made by the Netherlands as the basis for our next draft, including the mention of the possibility of additional legally binding obligations. Not because we want to agree on them now, but because we think that some delegations have this proposal and it should not be excluded from the possibility of the discussion, which is what the text is about. And finally, on CBMs, we support the proposal to be made by Germany. One final note, we agree with the Russian delegation that this exercise should be inclusive and transparent, and we think this is what the Chair is attempting to do. We also welcome other proposals from the room, including the proposals made by Russia. We would like to see the writing form of it because we want to take them into account in our own national positions. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Brazil, China, one minute, please.

Thank you, Chair. I thank the colleagues of Australia for their proposals. The text lists some of the threats; however, it does not cover the full scope of the OEWG mandate. It does not include some threats that are of significant concern to China. If such an approach of enumeration is adopted, it will exclude some threats that are not included from future discussions. We therefore do not recommend the enumeration approach. At the same time, this text does not quote the original language of the previous reports on threats and has many new formulations. These contents are important and sensitive and need to be fully discussed. A colleague said at the meeting yesterday that content that had not been fully discussed should not be included in the report. Given the limited time available at the meeting, we believe that it is not feasible to reach a consensus at this meeting. We hope that more accurate and balanced exchanges of views on the threat section can take place at next year’s meeting. In addition, the last paragraph of this text excludes the possibility of developing new guidelines in the future. We hope that there will be room for all options. Therefore, China supports making some adjustments based on the ChSREP1 text. In principle, the threats raised in the previous reports can be recalled. Thank you.

Thank you. China, Switzerland, please. One minute exactly. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and the EU for Switzerland’s full support in trying to reach consensus and adopting a report on Friday. I just wanted to mention that we support the proposal by Canada on threats. It goes in line with what we asked ourselves in our statement, that we should have a list of threats and the developments in the threat landscape since the last report, and not just repeat what has been in the last report. On international law, we also can support this proposal by the Netherlands and thank both delegations for their efforts. I just wanted to mention that the language on IHL is slightly different from the one in the joint statement we made yesterday, but we can support that language too, and the reference to the ICRC is in, which is very important for us. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you. Switzerland. Egypt. One minute, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for the explanation and your efforts to reach consensus. We also appreciate the efforts of Australia’s Mission and the Netherlands delegation as well, to reach some agreed language in the two different agenda items. We have just received the written amendments of Australia’s amendment, and we believe that this particular agenda item is extremely sensitive to so many delegations. We believe that the discussions under this agenda item would need quite a little bit of time for capitals to have a final say on. We generally have supported the adding or inserting general reference to the agreed discussions under this section, as is reflected in the last version of the report, which includes again references to the report of the last OEWG. We supported including one more reference or a more comprehensive reference to resolution 76-19, which includes both the GGE report and the OEWG, and both are reflecting the threats that have been consensual. We believe that it’s either we include an exhaustive list that includes everything, or we include one general reference, so we have either way that could be more consensual. With regards to the Netherlands proposal, we are still waiting for the written amendment, and in general, we believe it’s important to avoid inserting or referring to non-UN organizations in a UN text. This is a basic principle, and I believe this was the case for the last report of the OEWG. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Egypt. Well noted. I’m closing the speakers list now. Uruguay, you have the floor. One minute, thank you.

Thank you very much, Chair, for giving me the floor. I’m going to be very brief, just regarding your prior comments. As we did at the beginning, we would like to mention that we support your decisions and the process that you are leading. We understand that it is very complicated, and therefore, of course, we understand that it is convenient for the various regional groups to work together in order to reach a result at the end of this process. And even though we haven’t consulted with the countries of the region, based on the statements that you have heard from the Latin American region, you can count on our support to reach that result, and we will present it at some point. We have no doubt about your transparency and the inclusiveness of the process you are leading, and also we value the proposals that are arising in the room. We understand that this is a living process, and therefore the proposals will also continue to arise through the various comments that are made regarding the Netherlands proposal. We will evaluate it, and we will have a response either tomorrow or later on this afternoon. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Uruguay. Islamic Republic of Iran, please, thank you. Thank you so much. One minute, exactly. Thank you, Islamic Republic of Iran.

Okay, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and we appreciate all your efforts to develop consensus. As far as the latest distributed proposals are concerned, we have received them just now. We haven’t been able to examine them and digest their connotation. Having said that, Mr. Chairman, it would be very difficult at this stage to have an immediate comment on these proposals. Although we appreciate those contributions by two delegations, it would be confusing to adopt a selective approach to the proposals unless and until we see them in the context of the whole annual report. But anyway, we appreciate those proposals, but we need time to digest them and give feedback on them. It would be very difficult to immediately comment on them. Thank you so much.

Thank you, Iran. UK, you have one minute, please. Thank you.

Thank you, Chair. We are just intervening to express our support for you and the process you are leading here. We thank everyone who is providing comments on these proposals, including, as Oran just noted, I think it is very reasonable to say that time is needed to digest, and we welcome that. Broadly, the UK can accept the majority of these, even though it includes elements that we don’t support, but we would offer the opportunity for discussion directly on any of these issues or anything else in the report that is of interest to anybody, bilaterally, in groups, or in any other manner. I think the process of listening and responding to people in this group is really important and very normal practice. We need to focus that if we want a report, we need to talk, and that is what we would hope to do from this date forward. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, UK. The last speaker on this topic is Colombia.

Thank you. The focus in leading our deliberations and negotiations, we would also like to thank the presentation of these three proposals, which we view favorably, especially regarding international humanitarian law, but we need some more time in order to review them in detail with our capital. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Colombia. Thank you for all the comments. Naturally, this is the first reaction, but it is important that we do this in a public setting so that everyone is able to hear and give their comments. Now, Germany had earlier asked for the floor to make some comments on behalf of a group, and I’d like to ask, before I give the floor to Germany, are there any other delegations or groups of delegations wishing to take the floor at this stage to offer any update on their efforts that they might have been undertaking, unbeknownst to perhaps the Chair or others in the room, who wish to take the floor now to share with us what they are doing in this open setting? Because ultimately, a consensus is not going to be produced in the podium, from the podium, or by the podium. A consensus has to emanate from this large conference room, which is the working group. So I’m providing this time and space so that delegations are in a position to share whatever they wish to share. So Germany, I’ll give you the floor. If any other delegation wishes to take the floor to announce any updates with regard to their own initiatives, to find consensus on some elements of the text, I’ll be happy to give them the floor too. So Germany, you have the floor. One minute, if you can, please. Thank you.

Thank you, Chair. I’m speaking on behalf of the Confidence Builders Group to briefly explain the suggested amendments to the CBM section, which we have distributed in the room and uploaded to the website. That’s why I’m not going through them point by point, but I’d just like to explain the general thinking behind the amendments we are suggesting. One important point is that our main amendments take into account the existence of regional mechanisms and regional POC networks that already operate. That’s why in the recommendation sections we have inserted that the POC directory should build upon existing regional efforts and should be complementary to existing regional efforts. Another point is that the amendments now make a stronger reference to the extensive work already done at the UN. And so there is a recommendation in the recommendation section that says that states should continue to put into practice recommendations on CBMs made by previous Open-Ended Working Group and GGE. The third point is that we have condensed a couple of paragraphs to make sure that we limit our suggestions to those points which we think can garner consensus. This, for example, means that we’re not spelling out in detail the modalities and uses of such a POC directory, since this can be done in later sessions. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Germany. As I take it, this is a proposal that you are making on behalf of a group, and I hope everyone has a text. I do invite delegations to approach Germany if you do not have a text. I’d like to, at this point, ask whether anyone has any comments with regard to the update provided by Germany. I see no request for the floor. I’d like to ask, at this point, whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor to make any points that they think are absolutely important that this working group be made aware of before we adjourn. Australia, you’ve asked for the floor. You have one minute, please. Thank you.

Thank you so much, Chair. Just taking the floor to align with and reiterate the comments of Brazil on sharing proposals. I would very much like to see proposals from other countries and groups of countries, but to update that since this morning and since the proposal on threats was put online, we have some other countries who have joined support for that proposal, including Canada, Nigeria, New Zealand, Switzerland, Czechia, Tonga, Fiji, the US, and the European Union. So a broadening group of countries and regions are supporting this proposal. Thank you.

Thank you very much for the update, Australia. I have no further requests for the floor, and we have exhausted the speaker’s list accordingly. We have completed the first reading of the revised draft annual progress report. Let me say, first of all, and I don’t intend to provide any summary at this stage, I want to say that I have been very encouraged by this first reading because we have heard very detailed contributions and very thoughtful contributions made by all delegations. Many of you have spoken, more than a hundred delegations have taken the floor, and quite a number of you have taken the floor more than once. I am also encouraged by the very strong sentiments expressed about the need for an outcome and the need for a consensus outcome at the end of the week. I am also encouraged by the fact that many of you have said that it is important to capture progress and have a roadmap that will enable all of us to continue on the path of building on the acquis, building on the foundation of the initial framework of norms, rules, and principles for responsible state behavior, and building on that by taking our discussions into a more focused and in-depth manner. Now it is quite clear that the annual progress report draft document that I had presented, the revised version, needs to be further revised. There is no doubt about that. And I have listened carefully to all the proposals that have been made, many, many very detailed proposals, and the challenge really is going to be how we can synthesize and distill these proposals into a document that will command consensus. That is why the Chair will need help and will continue to need help because it is not over. It is just the first reading. We are right in the middle of the week, and we have two more days to go. So it is not a given that we will have an outcome, and it is not a given that we will have consensus until and unless everyone can come along and, in the process, help each other, but also help the process and help the Chair find consensus. Of the many, many proposals that I have heard, and I have got a team of at least four people busily typing away, and I know some of them have been in contact with you, different members of my team have been in touch with you, please feel free to continue to be in touch with them. I think the challenge is going to be how we reflect all these proposals. If it is a question of compiling and collating the proposals, that is easily done, because I can give you an annex of 100 pages long that documents all the proposals that you have made, but that I think will not be very helpful as a roadmap. So there has to be some synthesis, there has to be some streamlining, and that is my inclination that the document that I have submitted before this meeting needs to be streamlined further and take on board as many possible amendments that will get us to consensus. There have also been a cluster of proposals that have elicited reactions, reactions that indicate that it may be challenging for some of the proposals made to find consensus. You have all followed the discussions as much as I have, and some of the proposals that have been made here have been made previously, and some of the proposals we know will be challenging because it is not something that other delegations might be in a position to accept. So there are a cluster of proposals that I think fall into that category. There have also been quite a number of proposals to go back to agreed language or to use previous language, and I think that is something that we will need to use as a way of finding a solution where we are not able to have textual formulations that can command consensus. So resorting to previously agreed language is, of course, one option, but if we resorted to previously agreed language for every single issue, then all we have is the previous OEWG report and the GGE reports, and we are not making any progress at this session. So while we reaffirm previous consensus and reports, we also need to take a step forward, and I think that indeed is the challenge. The final thing I want to say is about consensus. I think all of you in this process know that we work on the basis of consensus. Consensus is not an exact mathematical formula, and it is certainly not a question of numbers, but it is a question of getting a sense that the room will be able to accept a document. So we don’t have the option of putting things to a vote. That much is clear. We will need to find consensus on some of the most difficult issues, and I don’t intend to enumerate them here, because if I did, there is a risk that some of you will feel and say that your issues have been omitted, but I just wanted to let you know that I have not omitted from listening to any of your proposals. Some of you have given me your proposals directly. Others have given me proposals but also shared with other delegations, while yet others have also put them up on the website. It is up to each delegation as to how you wish to circulate your proposals, but I want to assure you as the Chair that your proposals have been heard. I will reflect very carefully on them, and I need to get started right away on working on a revised document. As I said earlier yesterday, I had mentioned that it is my intention to make available a revised document this evening, but I intend to do so only after I have listened to the stakeholders this afternoon. So this afternoon we will meet at 3 p.m. for the dedicated stakeholder session, and after that, at some point this evening, I hope to make available the revised document by e-mail, so do watch out for an e-mail from the Secretariat this evening. In the meantime, just before I adjourn the meeting, I once again would like to thank all of you. I would like to thank each one of you who have approached me and my team with your ideas and your proposals. I would like to thank all of you for having made your proposals here in this room, and I also want to thank all of you for having made efforts to find a consensus solution. I am very gratified by that, and I hope that you will continue your outreach and your discussions. We have often said that this open-ended working group is about a confidence-building measure in itself. This process is a CBM, and that’s precisely why you need to talk to each other. I am happy if all of you talk to me, but also please talk to each other. So, because of that, I will adjourn the meeting now, which gives you 30 extra minutes for your lunch and your smoothies or a cup of coffee. Please continue your consultations. If there are any other updates that you wish to offer to me, please approach my delegation, and we will meet at 3 p.m. for the dedicated stakeholder session. The meeting is now adjourned. Thank you.