Session 3-8 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

This is an unofficial transcript

Ambassador Gafoor

Distinguished delegates, good afternoon. The eighth meeting of the third substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group on the security of and in the use of ICT 2021-2025. Established pursuant to GA resolution 75/240 is now called to order. Distinguished delegates, dear friends, we will continue our discussion under agenda item five. On the revised draft annual progress report, the second revised draft annual progress report, on which we had begun a discussion just prior to lunch. I had made some brief introductory comments to introduce the second revised draft resolution, and I had also in my covering letter, which conveyed the second revision, made it clear that in our discussions over the last few days, I sense that there is a very strong commitment to adopting an annual progress report by consensus at the end of the week, which is tomorrow. And of course, there are very strong divergent and strongly held views on certain issues, but it is also my sense that there are sufficient commonalities on some important issues for us to collectively take a step forward. There is, of course, no easy solution, and if we are to adopt a consensus annual progress report, we will have to respect the need for balance. And balance is always delicate and fragile. And in a document that is finely balanced as this one, there is a certain equilibrium, and there is also the risk of disrupting the equilibrium if we tried to reorder things, to our own preferred outcomes. I’d like to this afternoon continue with the speaker’s list, but before I do that, I once again would like to say that while we have this draft document before the working group, I still do not know whether it’s a viable document, and whether it offers a potential pathway to consensus. It is, of course, my assessment in drafting this document that ref two offers possibly the best potential pathway available to us towards a consensus adoption have an outcome at the end of this week, and given the very limited time at our disposal. But that determination as to whether this is indeed a pathway to consensus is not for me alone, to announce from the podium. But it is also something that the working group has to share, and share collectively, because if we are going to take a step, all of us have to take that step collectively. And this is what I’d like to get from you today. A sense of where you stand on this second revised document. And it is my hope that we can all take that collective step forward. So with those introductory comments, I’d like to continue with the speaker’s list. And I have from this morning’s session, four remaining speakers. So we will start with them, Canada, Germany, Vietnam, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. And then we will continue with the speaker’s list will continue with those who request for the floor this afternoon, if you wish to speak, do indicate and the secretariat will keep track of the different requests for the floor. And I do ask you to be as succinct as possible so that we quickly get a sense of your position. So not really needed to make general statements, but I would like a sense and so do other members like to have a sense of your position with regard to the second revised document. So the floor is now open, and I give the floor to Canada, please.


Thanks, Chair. Thank you Chair for the hard work of you and your team. On this draft, which continues to improve from one version to another, I tend to agree with you certainly in our delegation that there is a strong will to adopt this draft, which I would definitely consider viable. I’ll go section by section for the introduction. Canada generally supports the AQI in the introduction, and we also support the references to the role of stakeholders, regional organizations, and gender. On threats, we see this section as improved as well. It now includes a list of threats that captures some key threats that are relevant today. We however, regret that the list does not include ransomware, or the cyber activities of Russia and Ukraine. I understand that some colleagues will soon table some threats text that will hopefully address some of these issues, and that we hope you and other states will be willing to support. We’d like the reference to states needing to follow international law and norms in their cyber operations. However, we have an issue with the wording in paragraph 13, the talks about information security, we support some edits that another state is working on and we’ll be submitting them shortly. Moving to norms, we also are quite supportive of this section. The reference to potential norms guidance is retained, which we are pleased about. We noted this morning, that our colleague from ASEAN, who supported that somebody should do norms guidance text, and that remains a project that Canada is actively considering, and which, frankly, we haven’t heard anybody speak against. So I’m, I’m leaning more and more towards it, but we will talk to you in due time. We also liked the reference to the survey proposal, and we encourage states to provide updates on what they have done to implement the norms. Using this tool. We are not keen on the reference to potential new norms. As I said earlier this week, we feel the current norms are sufficient. But we can accept the current reference in the name of consensus. on international law, we regret that the references to briefings from experts have been removed. And we would propose that they be reinserted. We see nothing in the text that would preclude this, which is implied in paragraph 15 D, where capacity-building measures on international law include workshops and training courses, and exchanges between states and with regional organizations. Canada does not believe that new legally binding obligations need to be developed at this time. But once again chair, in the name of consensus, we can live with this mention. We are very glad to see the inclusion of IHL on the list of topics that would require further in-depth discussion. However, we would prefer to see it moved to the list above where it originally was. But we can accept it being here once again, in the spirit of consensus. We welcome the encouragement in the text for more states to publish their national statements on how the law applies in cyberspace. As I mentioned earlier this week, Canada has done this recently. We encourage others to do the same. And we renew our offer of assistance in this regard. And finally, on law, we welcome the reference to international law capacity building, which we view as essential to the work of this OEWG. This section could perhaps have benefited from more examples. But it’s a good starting point, and one that we can build on perhaps next year. So the OEWG report in short, Canada supports the International Law Section, which we find quite strong. On CBMs, I’m a little bit less impressed I must admit, Canada supports the directory of POCs. We were a bit disappointed that it was being delayed. But once again, we can support the text in the name of consensus. We think that the points of contact directory should however, be delinked from any of the ideas related to a UN role in capacity-building, which is perhaps not enjoying consensus, and we would not want one proposal to bring down the other. The previous version of the text included Canada’s proposed transparency measure that was about states voluntarily sharing information about their cyber capabilities and doctrines. That measure has been weakened in this version, which is disappointing. Some of the other elements from the cross-regional group paper that Canada is part of have been removed or watered down, and this is disappointing as well. Whereas the CBM section used to be one of the strongest in the text. It is now a lot less ambitious. I must admit Chair, I’m more of a booze guy than a smoothie guy. So I’m gonna switch the analogy a bit, and say that there’s an awful lot of water that’s been added to this wine. Nonetheless, we can swallow it down barely in the name of consensus, and we can build on this later. Moving to capacity-building quickly, candidate supports dimension of gender in paragraph 17 F, and the dimension of the role of stakeholders in 17 G. There’s one issue that we have had a problem with is the second recommendation on funding for capacity-building. It wasn’t clear to us if this is meant to be, you know, a reference to a new UN role. This needs to be clarified. We can continue discussing this, but we cannot at this time support any explicit reference to new UN roles or mechanisms in capacity-building. Lastly, on this one, Canada supports dimensions of gender and the role of regional organizations and stakeholders. Moving to the final topic of the future mechanism, we’re okay with the language on POA. However, we have an issue with the language on the quote centrality of the OEWG. While the OEWG is indeed currently the only and therefore central UN mechanism. This sentence almost implies that this will always be the case. Canada is part of a group of countries that supports the creation of a POA, and we hope that it will be created soon and be equally central. Therefore, we suggest a change, perhaps an alternate wording could be, ‘the OEWGs current central role’. We have a number of other smaller edits that I will be sending to you in writing. So, I guess overall Chair, I’m saying, this draft definitely improves on the previous one. There are a few little ways in which it could perhaps be strengthened more, but as you’ve heard me say several times today, we are willing to accept it in the name of consensus, and we hope that others will do the same. Thank you.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, Canada for your comments. Germany please, to be followed by Vietnam.


Thank you Chair. Germany acknowledges the immense balancing work that has gone into producing the second draft in front of us, and wishes to thank you and your team for the great efforts in taking us towards the document that can find consensus in this group. At this point, I would like to limit my remarks to the CBM section. Building on the comments just made by Canada. The open and former cross-regional group led by Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Israel, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Singapore, has submitted proposals to build a strong CBM section for this report. On behalf of the group, let me say that we are prepared to support the text and the CBM section as it stands. Our proposals were more far reaching and detailed than those reflected in the second draft. However, we are prepared to support the current language as a minimal solution, and in the spirit of compromise. The draft retains the important decision to establish a global director of points of contact. We see this as central as it will establish the first basis for communication and information exchange between your member states from all world regions. The report acknowledges the existence of regional POC networks and underlines that the UN directory will take into account lessons learned in establishing and using these regional POC networks. Given the complementarity between global and regional efforts on CBMs. Looking forward, it will be important to keep the momentum for building CBM at the UN level. We’re therefore encourage to see that the request for a dedicated inter-sessional meeting focusing on CBMs has been retained in the report. In closing, let me reiterate that our group believes that the current draft report does not do full justice to the CBM discussion in the Open-ended Working Group, which we see at a more advanced stage. However, we also fully recognize the progress achieved by the suggested decision to establish the Global Director of POCs, and hence we give our support to the section. Thank you.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you, Germany. Vietnam, to be followed by Iran. Vietnam please.


Thank you Chair. In this second intervention would like to reiterate our full support for the chairmanship of this working group, and I’d like to appreciate your team’s hard work in preparing the second draft of the report, and we have a very optimistic sense that with a lot of aggressive language in the draft, we might arrive at something concrete tomorrow. For us most of the texts are acceptable, and we hope that the other delegation will be flexible to retain the tax entities, however, as the section on international law, we would like to have a minor addition, after sovereign equality, will hope to insert, ‘no threat or use of force’. We think that this addition is in line with resolution 240, which mandates the working group, and also the topic was mentioned quite heavily in the previous OEWG report. I hope that the conference would consider possibly about our proposal. Thank you, Chair.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, Vietnam. Islamic Republic of Iran, please.


Mr. Chairman, and let me first and foremost, thank you for all your tireless efforts. Well actually my request for intervening this morning was related to the statement made, and then the clarification that was made by a distinguished colleague from Iraq. So far as the ref two is concerned, we are yet examining very carefully these texts, and we defer our intervention on the different parts of the text later on, if you don’t mind. Thank you so much.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you, Islamic Republic of Iran. Yes, I do not mind. We’ll be happy to hear your views later. I’ll go on with the speaker’s list, for those who have indicated their interest to speak or go through the list. We have Ecuador, Kenya, Chile, Argentina, Philippines, Mauritius, Colombia, China, United States, Brazil, Netherlands, and the floor remains open. And I’ll take the speakers as they indicate the interest. Ecuador, please.


Thank you, Chair. Ecuador supports your leadership of this process. It is a difficult task to achieve a consensus position on such a sensitive issue for all countries, including developing countries. With regard to the document presented Chair, Ecuador believes that this ref two does not take into account what was discussed at this Open-ended Working Groups’ meeting. Since it does not stress cooperation as the main tool for the international community to respond to cyber-attacks. I reiterate the weaknesses in the system. A single state has protection means that all states are vulnerable. Unfortunately, the current version of the document in paragraphs B and F, does not fully reflect what we have been just discussing about resolving our symmetries. For Ecuador, it is essential to reincorporate into the text, the importance of technical and cooperation measures to deal with existing and potential threats. With regard to security in the use of ICTs, for cooperation and technical assistance. Our discussion should go beyond listing cyber threats or not listing them, we should focus our efforts on how to protect and prevent the malicious use of cyberspace. Thus, for the reporter to reflect on the progress, we request Chair, that it be considered to include in paragraph B. The average of capacity, the improving capacity according to the ability of each state and improving the capacity of developing countries in order to close the digital divide. Lastly, we support India’s proposal to incorporate the importance of creating a permanent mechanism within the framework of the United Nations for exchanges related to capacity building, as more effective coordination is needed to ensure that all states, particularly developing countries have access to the creation of opportunities, and thus be able to develop our own security infrastructure on the basis of the standards for responsible behavior in cyberspace. We are confident Chair, that your leadership will make it possible for us to make more progress to strengthen the document. You have Ecuador’s full support in this effort. Cooperation is of the greatest interest to my country, as well as the building of capacity and strengthening capacity for all developing countries. This is an essential element in order to achieve greater security in cyberspace. Thank you, Sir.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, Ecuador. I give the floor now to Kenya, please.


Thank you, Chair. my delegation joins in thanking you for all the efforts you put in managing the deliberations, during the last three sessions and compilation of the draft annual progress reports. We have and also listened keenly to the inputs tabled so far, and it is our hope that we can reach a consensus on a substantive and action-oriented outcome. Regarding rev two, on the existing and potential threats section. We agree with the text provided, but also suggest for inclusion in paragraph nine that cyber terrorism or ICT-enabled terrorism is a threat. Therefore, we request that cyber terrorism or ICT a number of terrorism threats be captured in the annual report for discussion in the forthcoming sessions. On the rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior, we take note that from the various statements from member states, many states have begun national or regional initiatives toward the norm implementation. And therefore, it would be better if we include these efforts, and they are noted in the report as part of the steps towards building consensus. On the matters of international law, we would like to emphasize in the report the state’s efforts in establishing national legal mechanisms in the area of cybersecurity in alignment with the UN Charter, and the eleven norms and other agreed mechanisms, as highlighted in various discussions by various states. On confidence building mechanisms, my delegation concurs with a textbook contribution by Colombia, Croatia, and Sri Lanka, that the collaboration of CSIRTs is of great importance. And therefore, we recommend that in the report that the texts that was in paragraph 10 D in the rev one, be reinstated in the report. On the matter of capacity building, Kenya welcomes the recalling of the importance of regionally focused cooperation and also the gender dimensions in capacity building. And as noted in our annual text, that we would request that the unique needs of the children and people with disabilities and marginalized groups and gender considerations be as well captured in the reports. Kenya appreciates and welcomes the recognition of the centrality of the OEWG mechanism within the UN as a tool, or as a central point of regular institutional dialogue, and we’re in agreement, that Program of Action should be further elaborated and included in further discussions of the 2020-2025 Open-ended Working Group processes. Thank you, Chair.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, Kenya. We you give the floor now to Chile.


Thank you very much, Chair. Thank you very much for your work and the work of your team in drawing out this new draft text. We appreciate your efforts to try to consolidate a document that contains depositions of all countries present here. Our intention is not to repeat what was said previously. However, we believe it is important to use this opportunity to make some general comments on this new version of the report. Firstly, we are grateful that the request to mention regional and sub-regional organizations in a cross-cutting fashion was observed. The representatives of various regional organizations, and their work is essential for the progress of this working group. However, we must still remember that the United Nations Charter recognizes the existence of regional agreements in developing functions especially when it comes to maintaining international peace and security. Chile is a Latin American country with challenges and features that are all so, unlike every other country here. However, not all of us have the same tools and ability to develop and face the challenges created by cyberspace. I am saying this Chair, because we were struck by the fact that several mentions throughout the document were deleted when it came to measures relative to cooperation. We support Colombia, Croatia, Costa Rica, and other states, when it comes to the mention of CSIRTs in this document. We openly express our support for the language presented by the delegation of Colombia on the subject. In our region, the work and other CSIRTs have been strengthened through the CSIRTs Americas initiative visited this morning by the OS, which includes cybersecurity alerts. We believe it is essential for this group to promote the role and the work of the CSIRTs, which are essential to deal with attacks and incidents in cyberspace. There are essential components to developing and building resilience. We also wish to support what several delegation says about the need to specifically mention ransomware as one of the threats that affect our lives in cyberspace, now. Although we may not fully agree with a drawing up of this, we are flexible. When it comes to this idea, we believe it is important to list this kind of malicious tool, because we can all be victims of attacks of this kind, as my country has. It is essential to generate mechanisms and bodies, where we can exchange our experiences and lessons learned. Once again, cooperation is important. Real and potential threats no longer consider the possibility of this of countries using this framework to exchange technical information about threats involved in the use of ICTs. When it comes to Confidence Building Measures, it appears important to us that the text should have more fully cover the elements of the proposal on a network of contact points made by Australia, Brazil, Canada, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Singapore. Regarding international law, we would have liked a broader mention of international humanitarian law. We believe this is an essential component of international law. We also agree with what was said previously about the importance of mentioning the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has carried out prominent and historical work in this area. As you have indicated previously Chair, this version of the draft also contains many positive and valuable elements. We are also grateful for the special treatment that was given to the concern that malicious activities in ICTs can affect the critical infrastructure of countries, as well as the open mention of the way in which the COVID 19 pandemic demonstrated to us amongst other things, the risks and consequences of the misuse of ICTs. Likewise, we welcome the mention of the high level of participation of female delegates at these meetings and the relevance of the gender perspective in this discussion, especially when it comes to the use of ICTs in the context of international security and capacity-building. As we indicated in our previous statement, it is relevant to recall that these subjects respond to United Nations mandates, especially the well-known agenda of women peace and security where we continue to work in a committed fashion. The Chair, distinguished delegates, we know that this report should be approved by consensus. We know that this working group can work as an effective tool to offer progress in the areas of communication and technology, including Confidence Building Measures. We were asked this morning, if we believe that this document is viable for consensus, and we believe it is. We can contribute not only for this report to be balanced, but also for it to be a path towards the future, and offer the international community common understanding and progress, which will make it possible to successfully respond to the threats in cyberspace. We are willing and able and can convince your worker Chair, and that award delegations can lead to specific results that can jumpstart our work in the coming years. We advocate consensus, flexibility, and the acknowledgment of the pillars that this group stands upon. Thank you, Sir.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you, Chile. Argentina, you have the floor.


Thank you Chair. Argentina wishes to begin by thanking you, Sir, the Secretariat, and your team, for drawing up a second revision of the draft report. It must have been very difficult to bring together a single document all the comments made in recent days. For the delegation of Argentina, it is important to have a final report at the end of this week, which will keep this process up to date. We support this process and we are therefore grateful for the inclusion of language which will provide the space to deepen the debate and future substantive sessions of this working group. Nevertheless, Argentina wishes to express its concern at the weaker presence of certain issues in the text. Issues which are important for the developing world. We have noted a lack of substantive language on regional and intra-regional cooperation in the relevant thematic sections such as capacity creation. We support India, Croatia, Chile, and other countries in this regard, and we support the text presented by Colombia. We attended a special meeting this morning on regional organization and its efforts to create capacity. Their presence is part of a consensus created, which we should not fail to pay attention to. The deletion of the mention of the CSIRT networks, is a very useful tool of reference to share experience information and become aware of best practices or frequent mutual cooperation mechanisms, and these are surely needed. We support the position of several members on the need to continue deepening the debate on several threats, including ransomware. We hope that this will have a substantive place in our next meeting. Thank you, Sir.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, Argentina. Philippines, please. You have the floor.


Mr. Chair, excellencies distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. The Philippines aligns itself with a statement on capacity-building delivered by Cambodia on behalf of ASEAN. The Philippines highly appreciates the Chair’s effort and his team in steering the work and his team in steering the work of this group. We remain supportive of your work, Mr. Chair, and we are very much appreciative of your efforts in producing the revised draft annual progress report. We know that it is not an easy job, and we commend you for all your hard work. We view the current draft annual progress report is sufficiently effective and balanced that can pave the way for more focused and action-oriented steps toward an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment in the coming years. Mr. Chair, on existing and potential threats, we note that specific mention on the need for focus discussions on the protection of critical infrastructure, CI, and Critical Information Infrastructure, CII were omitted, which is one of the priorities of the Philippine National Cybersecurity plan of 2022. We prefer the same to be included in Part D. Nevertheless, we remain flexible on the matter, and we acknowledge that paragraph eight still recalls the threats identified in the 2021 OEWG report, wherein CI, and CII are included. On Confidence Building Measures, we welcome the retention of the establishment of the global points of contact directory on ICT. And we highlight the importance of taking into account the best practices of regional and sub-regional experiences, in particular, the ASEAN’s developing a points of contact and technical expert personal directory on cybersecurity. On capacity-building, while we prefer the version of the previous draft, we note that there are some reservations on how these capacity-building efforts be best implemented. We note, however, and we reiterate our view, in the previous substantive session, that the two significant concerns that this group can address are sufficient coordination and complementarity in the identification and delivery of capacity-building efforts. We prefer in particular, the request to designate an ICT capacity-building focal point that would foster coordination efforts, and requests for capacity-building be retained, as it would have been a positive step forward in addressing these concerns. These capacity-building efforts could have been limited to those efforts related to the use of ICTs in the context of international security. Nevertheless, we stand ready to support consensus on the matter. On gender, we join others in supporting reference, to the OEWG welcomes the high level of participation of women delegates in its sessions, and the prominence of gender perspectives in the discussions. To the OEWG underscoring the importance of narrowing the gender digital divide and of promoting the full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership of women and decision-making processes related to the use of ICT in the context of international security, and the states continuing to raise awareness of the gender dimensions of security in the use of ICTs, and promote gender-sensitive capacity-building at the policy level, as well as in this election and operationalization of projects. We look forward to this discussion on gender dimensions of security, and the use of ICT in the fourth and fifth sessions of the OEWG, as cited under Item F. Finally, Mr. Chair, we appeal to all members to exert utmost flexibility and work together to reach consensus on the annual progress report, so we can all have a good smoothie, and we can enjoy tomorrow afternoon. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you, Philippines. Mauritius to be followed by Columbia. Mauritius, please.


Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and colleagues. Let me begin by thanking you and your team for coming up with the right to have the annual report of the OEWG within such a limited timeframe. We appreciate your efforts. After reviewing the revised draft, we would like to share our views. In the introduction of paragraph one, Mauritius support the fact that emphasis is being laid up on the rising concern over malicious use of ICTs by state and non-state actors targeting critical infrastructure and essential services. We also support the suggestions made by other member states with regards to regional and sub-regional organizations. Coming to Section B, existing and potential threats, we suggest the following changes, paragraph 11, to remove the word, ‘characteristics’, and replaced with the word ‘sophistication’, also to remove the word, ‘vectors and vulnerabilities’, and replaced with, ‘new avenues’. Hence, the paragraph to be read as, ‘new and emerging technologies are expanding development opportunities. Yet the ever-evolving properties and sophistication also expand the attack surface creating new avenues for malicious ICT activities’. Paragraph 13, to remove the word, ‘information security’, and replaced with, ‘cybersecurity to widen the scope of the statement’. With regard to section C, rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior, we suggest the following changes, paragraph A, to remove ‘definitions of technical ICT terms’, and replaced by, ‘experiences on norms implementation at national level’. Paragraph B, Mauritius does not support the creation of additional norms and is of the opinion that the focus should be on implementing the existing ones, as many developing states are still at a stage where they are struggling to implement them. Mauritius welcomes the recommendations stipulated in sections on international law, Confidence Building Measures, capacity-building, and regular institutional dialogue. To conclude, we would like to state that the right to report is an improvement of the previous draft, and that Mauritius remains fully committed to provide its inputs for any future work of the OEWG. Thank you very much, Sir.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you, Mauritius. Colombia to be followed by China. Colombia, please.


Thank you Chair. My delegation once again, is willing to reach an adoption by consensus of the annual progress report. We are grateful to you and to your team for your efforts in presenting the second draft to us. Besides the comments we already made, we have some specific points to raise in some of the sections of the report. With regard to point A of the introduction, we reiterate the proposal we already made 4.5. In addition, we see that the majority of recommendations that were made on technical and cooperative steps to respond to threats and challenges, were deleted, both the list and the recommendations. On this particular point, we wish to support the proposal made by Croatia, Costa Rica, and several other countries with regard to including a mention of ransomware in this part of the report, and as indicated by Costa Rica as well, we believe that some of the measures that were proposed, particularly those related to cooperation could be retained. It appears important to us to retain them, and especially those having to do with critical infrastructure, including Critical Information Infrastructure in this section, we believe that they should be retained. As we indicated previously, we see that the value of interaction between member states at the regional sub-regional levels was deleted also, in point three here and we reiterate the importance of acknowledging these efforts. When it comes to the existing and potential threats, when it comes to rules, norms, and, principles point C. In point A of paragraph 14, we believe that after action-oriented proposals, the implementation of the agreed rules, norms, and, principles should be included also in the same section and recommended next steps. The second line, recommendation one, as well as facilitates the implementation of the agreed rules, norms, and principles. We made the same proposal which was not discussed yesterday because of the lack of time, but we sent it in writing. We did this because my delegation like others that spoke previously believe that the priority is to implement the network or rather the centers of responsibility behaviors states, leaving the door open to the adoption of further standards, but we do believe it is important to include this one. Likewise with regard to what I said previously, on point D, on international law, as I said, the important thing is not to make progress to the binding instrument, but rather to approve what we already have agreed upon. Even though it is not our position, we will agree with the adoption of the language which some delegations have suggested. With regard to the section, my delegation would have preferred to retain more elements of a joint statement made by Switzerland on behalf of several countries, including Colombia. In the spirit of compromise, we could be flexible, and we could accept this action as it stands. When it comes to Confidence Building Measures, we welcome the inclusion of the directory of the contact points, and here, too, we made two proposals. My colleague made a proposal about the CSIRTs, saying we should keep point D on CSIRTs, because we believe that this is a very important tool. And several delegations, as you may have heard, have also referred to this proposal. Turning to capacity building, we see that a large part of the list of proposals was deleted. And also in the recommended next steps here my delegations concern is how are we going to realize the efforts for capacity building if we delete the ideas and the proposals that were made on this front, and I repeat capacity building is essential for the application of the guide on responsible behavior, for Confidence Building Measures, if we do not have this, you will not be able to respond to the challenges facing us. My delegation would prefer this case 4.8, which has to do with capacity-building to be retained, because it refers to the presentation of offers to share resources, supporting efforts to create capacity or build capacity. And if we are to make progress in realizing measures and actions for capacity building, this will be necessary. Periodic regular institutional dialogue point G, like Canada, we would prefer that when we refer to the Open-ended Working Group, it is the current forum for discussion is not going to be the forum eternally. So it should be mentioned. Those are my comments. So thank you very much.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you, Columbia. China, to be followed by the United States. China, please, thank you.


Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the onset, like the other delegations, I’d like to thank you and your team for your outstanding efforts invested in developing rev two. Compare it with the rev one, it is of the view that this version is professionally drafted, which has solved many issues and divergence. Compare to the first version, we see significant improvement. At the same time, we have noted that in rev two, in order to address the concerns of some countries, many substantive elements has been added. Undoubtedly, such substantive elements will lead to substantive concerns. Compared with ref one, the concern of this delegation in terms of quantity, there is a decrease. However, when it comes to the significance of our concerns, we see an increase. However, there is good news, which is, China is of the view that our concerns can be fixed. In order to fix such concerns or issues, I’d like to put forward the Chinese proposals or propositions. In paragraph five which is about regional efforts, in line three, it mentions establishing new avenues. To be honest, I’m not quite sure what revenues referred to here. As far as I know, there is only the well known Fifth Avenue in New York. Therefore, I don’t know what the avenue here refers to in this context. However, at the end of this paragraph, I would like to propose an addition after mutual learning, on implementing the framework. In paragraph six which is about the gender equality, line three, ‘narrowing the gender digital divide’, is mentioned. In other sphere, the biggest digital divide concerns development. I’m wondering in the introductory section, instead of referring to the development divide, why do we talk about gender digital divide here? I don’t think this is a balanced approach. Therefore, it is my hope that narrowing the gender digital divide can be deleted, while the rest of this paragraph or the sentence can be maintained. With regard to the section on norms in paragraph 14 C, which is about supply chain it is our hope that the original proposed text by China can be added here ADEA developing and implementing globally interoperable common rules and standards for staff oh, what for further clarification on this very important issue. The above-mentioned text originates from the 2021 GGE report. In other words, this is a previously agreed text. In 2021 GGE report included supply chain security or integrity of supply chain IHL among other important issues which meant a balanced solution was achieved. However in paragraph 1500, a section on international law 15 b sub paragraph B and Roman numeral two here the contents in 2021 and 2015 reports about IHL is reiterated here in its entirety. However, as an integral part of the 2020 One report supply chain was not mentioned here which has broken the balance achieved in the 2021 GGE report as a result, there are two options. First, in the paragraph concerning supply chain, we add what is mentioned in our 2021 report if some delegations do not see this sign as mentioned the alternative is in paragraph 15 b two we delete everything about the IHL front as was written in 2020 Why report from here? If we would like to go for the second option in that case, we suggest at the end of paragraph 14 C, we add something why ensuring an open NAM discriminator a business environment full stop Do you only on the issue of the integrity of supply chain over understanding is many countries attach great importance to those. However, in reality in practice with the most cases we see some countries are politicizing the issue of the supply chain. As a result, we propose something after the integrity of supply chain as a balanced approach which is of crucial importance. If some countries cannot go along with the addition, I will then I would then suggest that subparagraph C be deleted in its entirety. What I have so far mentioned is nothing new. All the options have been attempted in previous OEWG and GGE sessions. Therefore, I’d like to emphasize that on this issue, we’re not proposing anything new, but rather we call upon everybody to adopt a balanced approach and respect the agreements we have achieved in previous sessions with regard to paragraph 14 D, at the end of it, we would like to add something about capacity-building on norms. Actually, we have already touched upon such proposals in a previous version there is a paragraph about capacity-building in a section on international law. I do not understand why capacity-building is not included under the section on norms. Is it because that we do not need capacity-building when implementing the norms? Actually, my preposition My proposal is rather about a balance between texts and or norms and that under international law on the section about international law, Section D paragraph 14 subparagraph A. Paragraph 15A in the fourth line from the bottom the responsibility state responsibility and due diligence should be replaced with state responsibility and attributions semicolon to be followed by due diligence. Our understanding is the text here is a summary of what is mentioned in the GGE report in 2015 however, if we take a look at what is written in the report in 2015 due diligence and state responsibility or mentioned in two separate paragraphs and on state responsibility, it was not everything that paragraph was about at the end of that the said paragraph attribution was touched upon. So, the Chinese proposals is more in line with the agreement in the 2015 GGE report about paragraph 15 D it is our hope that everything after as well as be deleted jagah many of the Chinese proposal are about a very important issue, which is how we look at regional efforts. China recognizes that the regional organizations can play an important role in implementing the responsible state behavior framework. That being said, what we cannot agree is such an opinion that regional furs outweigh the UN norms. If regions develop their own norms what do we envision what the scenario will be there are several regions in a world that means, we will have we would have seven sets of norms governing cybersecurity. As a result, if we put the importance of regional efforts ahead of that of the UN in China’s opinion, it will lead to the fragmentation of international norms. This is a political issue as a result, rather than a technical issue in nature. What I’d like to stress here is China’s concerns are not about the roles of original organizations, but rather about how we elaborate the relations between regional organizations and the UN. Therefore, out of this principle about paragraph 16 A and or CBM by building existing regional, so on so forth, we suggest the deletion of the texts. In 16 B also at the end of this paragraph such that the global directory or the text afterward should be deleted. Under the recommended Next steps on CBM, recommendation two, we suggest replacing, ‘build on’, in line one with, ‘taking into account’. In paragraph 17 under capacity-building, subparagraph A, in line one, we suggest replacing, ‘could encourage’, with, ‘reaffirm’. Sub paragraph D, the first word, ‘acknowledging’, should be replaced with, ‘noting’, subparagraph E, we should replace the first word recognizing, with, ‘noting’. All the proposed changes under capacity-building also concern a substantive issue which is how we see capacity-building programs outside the UN system. Undoubtedly there are many constructive programs which have played an indispensable role for capacity-building for developing countries. However, we have also seen some new trends. Many countries use capacity-building as an instrument to serve geopolitical purposes. It is not China’s presumption, but it is a reality being as a result of our description of capacity-building, in a nutshell, China has two proposals. Our proposal reflects two points, first the 2021 OEWG report has principles on capacity-building which should be reiterated here that is, capacity-building should be politically neutral. That second point about programs outside the UN system. I cannot make a blank check. That is to say, I do not know what these programs are. Without knowing what these programs are, I cannot say that the UN should work with such programs. Of course, we do not want to throw the baby together with bathwater. Therefore, we have proposed many replacement of acknowledging and recognizing with note, as a constructive compromise. Also under capacity-building, Paragraph to add our next steps. We said we suggest the deletion of the second part of A, that is everything after, ‘through potential coordination’. About two B, leveraging on existing initiatives, we also propose its deletion. when it comes to regular institutional dialogue Section G, paragraph 18, subparagraph B, line three, we suggest in their use of ICTs, be replaced with, i’n the framework’. Recommended next steps in this section, we concur with what many countries have expressed, that is, all the discussions on the POA should be conducted under the framework of the OEWG. Just now, some delegates said that they would rather keep the possibility of building the POA outside the UN. Of course, it is the liberty or freedom of such sponsors. But, such declarations show that the concerns of many countries including China are reasonable. We are convening and on the platform of the OEWG, therefore, we cannot agree with a practice that the OEWG supports the POA outside the UN framework, on the basis of this position, we suggest that in paragraph two under the recommended next steps, line five similarly, ‘the use of ICTs should be replaced within the framework. Then in the next line, it is our hope that it be revised as a focused discussion on the role the POA can play within the OEWG. The text as it stands now, says that, ‘discussions should be conducted on the relations between the POA and the OEWG’. It is our feeling that at least currently, these are not the issues at the same level, these are the major editorial suggestions of China on ref two our hope given the importance and the sensitivity of such issues then the Chinese proposals do not alter any case the structure of rev two, nor do they make any disruptive changes under any section. The reason is, we would like to adopt a constructive approach to addressing the concerns of China. At the same time we should facilitate the adoption of the final report in a faster and better manner by all parties. Before closing, I’d like to say that I support those statements by Colombia and Chile. That is to say, we would like to see suggestions or recommendations on CSIRT, not I’m saying this now, because these two delegations are sitting next to me, they’re my neighbors. Or rather, their proposals are supported by many countries. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, China. I do endorse the idea of neighbourly cooperation. And it’s good that we support each other. We’ll see where we can go with all the different proposals that are coming in. United States, to be followed by Brazi. US, please.

United States

Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon, colleagues. Chair, I do want to thank you and your team for preparing this updated draft. The text is much improved from our perspective. But like others, we have several remaining concerns. In the introductory section. I want to point out that we do not support the use of the term initial framework, which seems to have been done through universal replacement throughout the document, as this term downplays the significant new consensus we achieved in 2021. Instead, we believe the text should use the 2021 GGE reports formulation of, ‘cumulative and evolving framework.’ In this paragraph, and throughout the document, we think this is an apt, an accurate description of the currentacquis. In the threat section, we believe the threat section is much improved. But, I must underscore what I said earlier this week, the international community will look skeptically at our group, if we fail to acknowledge that ICTs are being used right now, in the context of an armed conflict. How could we possibly omit that fact? What we had predicted years ago, as we approached this point is happening now. We need to find a way to acknowledge that in the threat section. We’ve been warning of this possibility for more than a decade. How can we omit that? To that end, we note that the first sentence of paragraph nine is an incomplete quotation of the OEWG text. The next sentence in that text is extremely relevant and should be included here. It says, ‘they also recalled that the use of ICTs in future conflicts between states is becoming more likely.’ The text should then have a sentence acknowledging the current reality. We would propose adding the following, ‘the group notes that the international community is currently witnessing the use of ICTs in armed conflict.’ All of this is very important in that, acknowledging what the threats are that we face, threats to our national security, threats to war and peace, will determine the flow and the direction of our final efforts and our final reports, because any consideration or discussion of new norms must be guided by a clear-eyed understanding of the threats. It is the effects of the threats we face. That should be the focus of our efforts. In the CBM section, at the end of paragraph 16 A, we would propose adding the following sentence to clarify the potential role of the United Nations. ‘If established, the role of the UN would be limited to administering the points of contact directory’, unquote. Also in the CBM section, paragraph two of the next steps section includes a vague reference to capacity-building. This has been noted earlier. We do not know what this is referring to, particularly in a paragraph about a new intergovernmental POC directory. We propose deleting this reference here less there be some intimation that we are creating new mechanisms. Under the section, regular institutional dialogue, paragraph 18 A. We agree with comments from others who question the term, ‘centrality’, with regard to the OEWG. This recognition of the OEWG’s extensible centrality reads as if the OEWG has always been, and will always be the only UN platform for these issues. This is not historically accurate, nor it is predictive. It’s not something that this report should assert. Instead, we suggest replacing centrality with current central role. Thank you Chair for your time.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you for the statement. I give now the floor to Brazil.


Thank you, Chair, I have six comments. Let me see how fast I can make those without making translators go crazy. So the first one is to express support to you Chair and your team, and answer your previous question. Yes, in Brazil’s view, this is a viable text, and it has a brilliant future ahead in the next hours. Second, we should calibrate expectations, which may vary across the room. For my delegation, if we consider the context in which we are operating. After two major achievements last year 2021, two very important reports, a single resolution, we have a strong basis to work with. But in this group, we spent two sessions informally discussing basically modalities. And we are also in a very challenging geopolitical environment. So if we take this context into account, having this draft adopted tomorrow is very strong progress from our perspective, even if the text itself in some sections is not as ambitious as each one of us would prefer. This reflects the investment of developing countries, particularly small delegations as mentioned by India, and people that come from capital and to which we are accountable to, in order to show that we are here for a reason, and we have a written expression of the progress we have achieved so far. So we strongly expect the adoption of this draft tomorrow. Brazil has one priority, which is reaffirming the acquis not to retrocede one word on it. And we feel that redraft begins with that. We agree with the US that it would be better to just refer to the framework dropping the word, ‘initial’, we understand that the word, ‘initial’, is used at some point of the previous OEWG report, but it’s not every time. And we think that since the proposal of referring to the acquis in every chapter was taken into account, it would be more balanced to refer just to the framework or other formulation that doesn’t limit it with the word, ‘initial’. Besides that, we have just one priority, which is re-established the POC directory, which yesterday I called the focal point, to much confusion, I would like to clarify that we support the POC directory. And this is a small win, but it’s a concrete one, and it’s particularly important for developing countries that may not achieve this result through bilateral or regional existing channels. We support the comments to be made by Germany on behalf of a group of countries in this regard. But I would like to highlight with India and South Africa said about the pertinence of adopting the POC directory. I would also like to take note of Russia’s proposal regarding the POC, and to say that in our delegation’s view this proposal is perfectly compatible with a more generic establishing of the POC right now. And noting that we need to further discuss its precise institutional design, and Russia’s inputs for that should be taken into account when considering this next step in the intersessional period, and also in the next session. The third point on threats, we believe that many delegations are pushing for stronger language in particular threats, which we appreciate. But we see also as an opportunity to refine language for the next sessions, and on ransomware, in particular, we see across the globe increasing concern, and unfortunately, this particular threat is not going anywhere. So I would propose that intercept delegation create a kind of group of friends of any other arrangement to figure out a language on ransomware in the inter-sessional period, that takes into account the mandate of the OEWG which is international security, and a way to refer to it in an eventual future report. That does not create confusion with the Cybercrime track. And I think we have many good ideas in the room, but we may be not ready yet to adopt the language today. So I invite delegations to work in this language for it to be acceptable for everybody, maybe in the next session. On capacity-building, many developing countries referred to the report as not having enough language on cooperation, reducing inequalities and asymmetries. We agree that these sections should be developed, but we also see this as an opportunity as a roadmap for developing countries in particular, to own the narrative of development and capacity development and work intersectionally on how to strengthen this part of the report. We think that the role of the UN is one of the topics we need to discuss better. We agree with China that regarding regional initiatives, the role of the UN is not only a complement for regional, but the UN also has a centrality, and its this is compatible with having synergies with regional initiatives, but acknowledging the centrality of the UN as the global multilateral entity. We also agree with many that CSIRTS should be mentioned in a future report, and the way to do so should be mindful of the need not to politicize private CSIRTS, or give the impression that we’re trying here from the UN to direct their work because many CSiRTS are from the private sector, and they have their own terms of cooperation and ways of interaction. And it’s not up to us to direct that. But the fact is that many developing countries are creating CSIRTS now, and we need to acknowledge these governmental CSIRTS work and see how this group can support it. And for us, it’s very important to keep in mind the principles for capacity building, it’s so much easier, Chair to refer to paragraph 56 of the previous report that South Africa did, instead of just reopening the conversation of all the caveats we need to keep in mind when we do capacity-building in a very political subject. On norms, we think the report is acceptable, if we correct the dimension to the framework that is not initial. On international law, it is also acceptable, we would prefer to see the dimension to the International Law Commission. But we can accept that, no comments on regular dialogue. In conclusion, Mr. Chair on the process, we see the points that require improvement in the report in two ways. Some of them may require some tweaks, and I would like to point out that it’s very common in human nature to see your own proposal of the tweak as very sensible, focused and uncontroversial. And the other people’s proposal is a controversial one. So everybody’s making a lot of very reasonable tweaks, but the Chair will have to add them up at some point today, and this may not work. So please, let’s keep our mind open that we may have to treat the tweaks sometimes, as further work for intersessional period and the next session, this is only the beginning. And secondly, I invite developing countries and their capitals, because of course delegates here at the UN will be totally overwhelmed by the GA session and the First Committee with particularly people here from the capitals. Brazil would like to have bilateral exchanges and the briefings on the session and see how we can accelerate preparation for the next session, particularly on the capacity-building chapter and we would like to be in touch with you before March, not only March, and I would brand these attending to dance Canada suggestion that we need to broaden the scope of beverages that are informing our metaphors. I will brand this approach the caipirinha approach. Mr. Chair, thank you.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, Brazil. I think if we expand the list of beverages, it will lead to happy hour And I hope that we’ll get to happy hour tomorrow when we adopt a consensus, agreed outcome. Thank you for your statement. And I want to underline in particular what Brazil said about the context in which this working group is operating. And I think it’s worth recalling that last year was, in some ways a high for the process. We had two outcomes, one from the OEWG, and one from the GGE. And then, at the First Committee session, last year, we had a consensus resolution, which was unprecedented. And I should say that it was at that high that I agreed to be Chair of this working group. I’m having buyer’s remorse now. But the reminder of the context is an important one, because this year, and it is in the nature of international relations that things ebb and flow. And I alluded to it this morning, that this year, we are in a very challenging environment, geopolitically, politically, and economically. And because I work here, and that’s my day job here at the UN on a daily basis. It’s a very palpable sense of challenge, tension, and difficulty. And it is in that context that we are operating in such a context, and outcome, like the one that is before us, in ref two is not insignificant. On the contrary, it will be a very strong signal to the international community. Not only that the UN and multilateralism is working, that this working group is capable of demonstrating, or this working group is capable of taking small steps. And I think it’s important that we think about this context. And I think we have a responsibility to demonstrate to people outside and also to the stakeholder community who are watching us from the beginning of this week, that states, governments and delegations are capable of taking a step forward collectively, in spite of differences. But in the nature of this process. It’s precisely because things are challenging that we need to demonstrate that the OEWG can be a confidence-building measure. I don’t want to belabor this point, but it struck me that it is this context that we need to keep in mind. I have a long list of speakers. So we will go through this. There are no shortcuts to consensus. So we will go through this list of speakers. I’ll just read out the list of speakers. So you have a sense, it’s about 10 minutes to five. We’ll need to get through an evening session if need be. But I will go through the list of speakers before I give the floor to the next speaker. So we have the Netherlands, Switzerland, Singapore, UK, Japan, Pakistan, Australia, Peru, El Salvador, Cuba, Mexico, Russian Federation, European Union, Republic of Korea, and France. I think that’s about maybe 15 delegations waiting to speak. And I’m continuing to be in listening mode. But if each delegation expresses its preference for what it would like to see in the revision, then in some ways, we, again, will be in a very challenging situation, given the very limited time that we have so I invite all of you to reflect very carefully on what you would like because one delegation’s preference or tweak is another delegations. Non-starter or red line could be so this is the reality we have to deal with. But I will listen at this point to all of the Netherlands pleased to be followed by Switzerland, Netherlands.


Dear chair, I would like to Firstly, thank you for ref two of the draft annual progress report. We can see the hard work and careful thought put in to it by you, your team and the secretariat. Thank you. The Netherlands thinks that this new version is a step towards a consensus progress report. We still have some outstanding concerns. But we are ready to engage constructively on these issues with you and other delegations. With a view to achieving consensus by the end of the week, it won’t come as a surprise that we have lots to say about the report. But in the spirit of consensus, I will limit myself to a few key points. We welcome that the document is clear in reaffirming the consensus reached in previous groups as the basis for our future work. Well, we regrets that some of our proposals on international law that we presented yesterday, were not incorporated in the report, we can see a delicate balance has been struck by using consensus language from three previous reports, ref two captures the essence of our proposal. And we think the many delegations who gave input and or support it’s our proposal. We also have a few points of concern. First, we welcome the reaffirmation of the UN framework for Responsible state behavior at the beginning of the substantive paragraphs. However, we do like Brazil, the United States and Austria, not support the use of the word initial at the beginning of each paragraph. This is for the same reasons, as the other delegations have indicated. We support the US proposal to solve this. Second, on the threat section, we support the points made by several delegations on the importance of recognizing the malicious use of ICTs by states and non state actors in the context of armed conflict, which has sadly become a reality. Third, in paragraph 10, still on the threat section, we appreciate the notion on the specific concern of malicious, malicious ICT activity, affecting Critical Information Infrastructure. However, we would like to add a reference to critical infrastructure in the second sentence as well. In the same paragraph 10, we believe that only a part of the Critical Information Infrastructure is addressed, while an important part that was previously noted under threats in paragraph 18 of the 2021 Open-ended Working Group report is now omitted, including a reference to threats against critical infrastructure that undermined political and electoral processes. The Netherlands therefore, would like to also see the consensus language on this issue from paragraph 18 of the 2021 Open-ended Working Group report. In paragraph 13, still under threats like Mauritius, we do not support the reference to the phrase information security, which is not consistent with previous reports, where security in the use of ICTs is the consensus term. We therefore propose the following change. States also recalled the O E WG mandate to continue to study with a view to promoting common understandings existing and potential threats in the ICT environment, inter alia, data security, and possible cooperative measures to prevent encounter such threats. Lastly, I have an editorial comment in the International Law Section, paragraph 15. A, we would like to insert a semicolon between state’s responsibility and due diligence. So the semicolon is to replace the word and we stand ready to constructively discuss these proposals chair and we hope that we can all together find a way forward for our conceptual progress report. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you for the statement, Switzerland, to be followed by Singapore, Switzerland, please.


Mr. Chair, and thank you for all your efforts and the efforts of your team to come up with this revised version of the draft. We think that the revised draft is a balanced and improved product. And thank you also to remind us of the context we are working in here. And I think we should also it’s also important that we remind ourselves that we are discussing about the progress report and not the final report. We welcome your approach to use consensus language for the most contentious issues. We think this can help address concerns expressed by several states and should allow us to reach consensus. The draft is not perfect. There are parts we like elements that we are missing and others we are not liking. To mention some of these points. We will compare or five another reference is to regional and sub regional organizations and their role. We believe that there is no competition between the United Nations and regional organizations. But that cooperation between both is important. We can benefit at the global level from the work at the regional level and vice versa, as the session we had this morning has proven we still believe that the priority of this group should be the implementation of existing norms and not the creation of new ones. But in the spirit of compromise, we can accept paragraph 14 B. We support supports the inclusion of ransomware and the threat section or reference to cooperation between certs as proposed by Colombia, Chile and other delegations. And we support the US Brazil and the Netherlands to delete and replace initial before framework throughout the report. On the international law part with which is for my delegation, the most important part of this report that we have stated in our opening statement. Mr. Chair, we’re disappointed that the ICRC is not mentioned anymore, and that expert briefings have been deleted. We think that we would have we could profit a lot of such briefings by independent experts and by the ICRC in our future work. We will also have preferred IHL to be mentioned in paragraph 50 and a under the Topics to be discussed. But the understand that you have chosen consensus language that strikes a delicate balance and should allow us to adopt the report at the end of the session. In the joint statement, Switzerland had the honor to make on behalf of a group of states explained why the discussion on international humanitarian law is important and useful. And many more delegations in this room are supported this discussing does not mean agreeing on everything. But it’s necessary to better understand the respective position of state. For Switzerland. It is essential that IHL is mentioned in the report and will be part of our future work. In the spirit of compromise. We therefore could support this text. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, Switzerland for your statement, Singapore to be followed by the UK, Singapore please.


Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’d like to express my delegations appreciation for the chairs efforts and tirelessly working on finding the second revision of the annual progress report. In this regard, consensus and compromise from all sides is much needed, especially after a difficult year. We were heartened to hear specific and constructive comments from all delegations. On the introduction section of the annual progress report, Singapore like Brazil welcomes the language that reaffirms the key of past consensus reports of previous GGE s and the inaugural Oh, ew G, which provides us a sturdy foundation to build upon for future progress. The changes to the section on existing and emerging threats were significant. And it seems that the report has opted for a more pragmatic approach to reference threats in a broader manner, with an emphasis on ICT security threats that most directly relate to our work at the UN First Committee. We are supportive of this new approach. Even though Singapore, together with many other countries this year had originally highlighted that threats like ransomware posed a significant concern to all of us. That said, it is true that compiling an exhaustive list that applies to all may not be productive at this juncture. Furthermore, not having an exhaustive list in the annual progress report will not prevent us as member states from raising new threats in the future, of which I sadly assure all of us there will be many, many new threats. We appreciate the chairs efforts to reference cross border CIS, which was raised by Switzerland, Netherlands and ourselves in paragraph 10. We can go along with the new language, which highlights harmful ICT activity against critical infrastructure that provides services domestically, regionally or globally. Singapore has no major objections to the clauses and recommendations under the rules, norms and principles sections. We support the reaffirmation of the framework of responsible state behavior, as reflected in paragraph 14, which is a timely reminder that our work in this session builds upon a broad corpus of work on responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs. As a member of an operational technical agency, we place emphasis on the cooperation and sharing of more technical platforms like cert to certain networks, and would have preferred to retain that reference However, in the spirit of compromise, we’re willing to go along with this and discuss how best to include this issue in future sessions. Singapore is glad to see that the revised draft has retained the important decision to establish a global inter governmental points of contact directory on security in the use of ICTs. In the Confidence Building Measures section. We note that the proposal has received broad support from delegations across regions and should continue to ride on the momentum that the proposal enjoys, even as we discuss how to address some of the legitimate operational and administrative concerns raised by Member States. We appreciate the regional focus of the section which takes into account lessons learned from regional and sub regional processes for CPMs given the complementarity between global and regional efforts on CPMs. While you note that the language proposals by the cross regional confidence builders group was not fully incorporated in this draft, Singapore can still go along with this section. on capacity building, we welcome the chairs focus to recognize existing cyber capacity building efforts as well as relevant coordination platforms and portals. And we agree with the recommended next steps as listed in the section and welcomed the formulation for capacity building on security in the use of ICTs. On regional institutional dialogue, Singapore welcomes references to the POA and agrees with the recommended next steps. In conclusion, we are satisfied with this annual progress report, noting that the OEWG is a five year process for achieving consensus every year will not be straightforward, but deferring consensus to the fifth year alone will be much worse. So in that sense, we are satisfied. However, many smaller and developing countries are here to try and achieve tangible progress to learn from and to participate in action oriented proposals that raise the cyber baseline for all and are in line with the chess original vision. In that sense, it is important for us to remain ambitious and bold and to try our best to support concrete proposals that are put forward. As the chairs mentioned, this report is at least half a step forward. Amidst the difficult geopolitical context, consensus based forward movement of any distance should be cherished and celebrated, even as we continue to push boldly for the remaining half step in the coming years. To stretch that smoothie analogy even further, the process of making smoothies is sometimes messy, difficult and tiring, made harder by different dietary constraints and preferences. But eventually, hopefully, it will be good for us. Thank you.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much a Singapore for your statement. Every time I hear smoothie, I get a little hungry. And I have to say that the repertoire at the UN cafeteria is woefully inadequate. I have to get into the fifth committee in December to try and relook the contract for catering. The secretariat is hereby warned. Let’s continue with our speakers list. UK to be followed by Japan.

Thank you chair. I said on Tuesday that we need a clear roadmap for our discussions, which will allow us to move from general statements to drilling down into the topics we really care about. And that that’s really necessary, we’re going to move forward together in the future. So I think that adopting this report would take us in that direction. Chairs sometimes speak a little directly and I’m going to do that now because the until Guerra was intervention, just then the mood was feeling a little bit flat in the room. Delegates need time to clear drafts and capital. We have to have a final version of our text today. So I’m asking states to consider whether they would genuinely be willing to break consensus on the asks that they are putting forward and reduce that asked to those which would really make them walk away from this process. The UK can accept minor and specific amendments to this report if needed. And we’re happy to discuss how we reach consensus wording on a handful of specific issues. But we can’t redraft this report. The cost of doing that is no report. So the UK is unhappy with several aspects of this report. But the interest of the group will show flexibility where we can but only up to a point. We agree with Brazil and Singapore’s very sensible comments. Everyone has to temper their ambition here. We have a very short amount of time to team up and get this solved. We have minor requests for amendments. We support the request for the inclusion of the tech that submitted at paragraph nine. It’s been in every resolution and report as long as I’ve been working on this topic and now is the wrong time to remove it. We hope a solution can be found to the issue raised by the Netherlands at para 13. A minimal as it may be, the request by China and the Netherlands for a semicolon between state responsibility and due diligence would help us. We support the US request on the POC directory. And we also support Canada’s proposal for language at 18. A, but we can be flexible on working on that with anyone who has a problem with it. Chair we really welcomed the inclusion of a reference to international humanitarian law in this report, and the flexibility of others to accept that inclusion. We would appreciate the opportunity to review China’s comments in writing as I struggled to keep up. However willing we may be though some appearance appeared extensive and challenging to manage at this late stage. But we remain willing to work together to resolve those issues where we can. We’re also open to discussing existing international legal obligations on the threat or use of force in a future session as raised by Vietnam. But we would definitely caution against inserting language into this report at this stage on that issue, given that it has been historically extremely challenging to reach consensus on that, that point. I’d like to clarify that I previously noted that the OEWG is not a technical forum. I wanted to clarify that because we do remain open to the inclusion of language on cooperation and certs in our report, as raised by Kenya, Colombia and Chile and others, where this is at the strategic level. And we can of course, also accept language on ransomware, which we note remains important to some, particularly Costa Rica, but we would not break consensus without it. It’s been a really long year. So whether it’s a Caipirinha, a smoothie, or a glass of wine, I don’t really care. I just like us to drink it tomorrow, please. Thank you.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, UK, I’ll buy you a cup of tea tomorrow. Japan, please, to be followed by Pakistan, Japan.


Chair, I thank you very much for giving me the floor. Our delegation, you’d like to express our sincere appreciation for you to you and your team’s efforts to come up with Ref two. During the morning session, you had mentioned that you had wanted our reaction to the draft report. Our delegation is of the view that Ref two represents a genuine effort in some cases using a heat language to visit different views that have been expressed during the week and leave this draft report is a sound basis for us to reach consensus. Japan would like to make just a few comments on issues that we believe are important under existing and potential threats. As I noted earlier in the week, Japan is deeply troubled with the malicious use of ICTs in conjunction with military action that is taking place now and support a reference to such threats. We also support suggestions by several delegations include ransomware as a threat, we have seen ransomware that have affected the security of a state. Under Confidence Building Measures. As I said during the second session, we are of the view that information sharing through the existing certs and csirts is an important CBM. But we accept its deletion and like to take Singapore’s approach and see how we can take this up in future sessions. This is the first annual progress report and far, you know, in a five year process, we can have further discussions in future years to build on what we have discussed so far. Japan agrees with the UK and other delegations on the importance of having the report. Japan would like to continue to work with other delegations constructively to reach consensus on this first annual report. i Thank you, Chair.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, Japan. Sakee for you tomorrow. Pakistan, please.


Thank you, Chair. Pakistan exchanges deep appreciation to you and your team for sharing the latest draft annual report. We thank you for your leadership in guiding the group in a transparent and inclusive manner. My delegation believes that the current draft is a step towards consensus and is more balanced and streamline it captures the important progress we have achieved so far. The current draft could be a good basis for the adoption of a consensus annual report at the end of the session. Coming to the revised draft for my delegation capacity building is of utmost importance. Pakistan welcome said the report stresses upon the importance of narrowing the digital divide through tailored capacity building efforts. As mentioned in my earlier intervention, Pakistan, once again calls for the inclusion of the language relating to ensuring non discriminatory and fair access to products, technologies and services relating to cybersecurity impacts. About 17 C, we also support that this group should focus on delivering concrete and action oriented proposals on capacity building. On existing and potential threats, Pakistan believes that the current text could be a good compromise for all delegations. As for listing of new potential threats is concerned, we believe that there is a need for further discussion within the group and inclusion or lessening of additional threats should be only made through further discussions and taking into account the views and considerations of all member states. on international law, Pakistan’s position is well known, we welcome the reference to the legally binding obligations. Pakistan shares the view that it is essential to develop a legally binding international instrument specifically tailored to the unique attributes of ICTs to provide a regulatory framework that creates stability and safety in cyberspace. We support Chinese proposal pertaining the inclusion of reference to attribution in the area of CBM. Pakistan welcomes retention of reference to the formulation of a global directory of POCs on the regular institution dialog box and considers the central importance of the UN therefore support proposal made by China that all discussions on the POA should be conducted, conducted under the OIG framework. Taking this opportunity, I would like to renew Pakistan’s commitment to the oId WG process for a safe, stable and secure cyberspace for all and I assure my delegations will support and concerted, constructive engagement leading to the adoption of the this annual progress report at the end of this session. I thank you.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you, Pakistan for your statement. Australia with the floor please.


Thank you, Chair. And thank you cheering your team and the Secretariat for all your hard work. As you said, trust and confidence is fragile, and consensus is fragile. And last year was a high watermark. I often refer to 2021 as the year that the stars aligned for cyber in the UN. From Australia’s perspective, this draft is not perfect. But we can see that chair you and your team have woven together the various strands of our discussions into something that’s productive, ambitious and forward looking. And you have indeed listened very carefully to our views. You asked us this morning whether this draft is viable, I am very optimistic that this draft is very, very close to being something that we can all agree with. With a few tweaks, Australia remains committed to the process to this report and to supporting the chair. There are many things that Australia would have liked to see in the report like many people in this room, but we are content to leave almost all of these as they are. There are some tweaks that I’ll elaborate on a little bit. But before that, I do want to note that there are many very good things in this report. And I think it’s important not just to focus on our concerns. Australia likes the references to gender, particularly the gender digital divide in paragraph six of Rev two, which I noticed identical to the consensus agreed text of the 2021 OEWG report at paragraph 12. We really like the reference to the 2021 OEWG Capacity Building Principles and mainstreaming the SDG goals. We think that the recognition that threats may be experienced differently by states according to their levels of digitalization capacity, ICT security and resilience in paragraph in the sea confidence building section is also very important. And I’m very pleased to say steps towards establishing a global point of contact directory. Before turning to some proposed amendments, I’d like to note that using consensus text is not always without its pitfalls, sentences, phrases, and paragraphs that have been agreed by consensus, are agreed in the context in which they sit. And often there is a balance that is struck between the sentences in between those paragraphs. As you said, Chair balance is fragile. And turning to the threats text. I want to sincerely thank the chair and your team for your very considerable work on this chapter. The chapter is looking like a real threats chapter. It sets out a description of the threats landscape and provides an important role for the measures the proposals and the recommendations to address those threats. And I also appreciate that much of the text here is sourced from content consensus, agreed text. My foremost request for the whole report is to revive balance to that text. And to that end, it’s very important for Australia to see the opening sentence of paragraph nine to be included in its completeness. Drawing from the 2020 UNGGE report, the sentence should read states recalled that a number of states are developing ICT capabilities for military purposes, and that the use of ICTs in future conflicts is becoming more likely. This is also repeated in the 2021 OEWG report at paragraph 16, the 2015 GGE report paragraph four and summary in the 2013 report, but I don’t have the paragraph number. On threats Australia has also heard many in the room, including Israel, Austria, Costa Rica, Japan and several others, raising how important it is to refer to ransomware in this chapter, while this isn’t a red line for Australia, the point of this chapter is to set out the existing and potential threats. And we’re all very aware that the threats landscape is continuing to evolve, threats that face us in cyberspace and not frozen in time and our identification, acknowledgement and work to address these threats should not be frustrated by limiting ourselves to what has come before. Australia can therefore insert support the insertion of a reference to ransomware. And we propose that it is included in paragraph 10 At the end of the first sentence. Similarly, Australia agrees with us that the threats landscape is very different today to the threats landscape that we faced the last time our predecessors met and agreed text in March and May of 2021. And therefore, we can support the insertion of a sentence in the threat section that reflects his evolution in the threat reality faced by every single country in this group. We can also support the Netherlands proposal to include a reference to threats against critical infrastructure that undermine political and electoral processes, which is coming from the paragraph 18 of the OEWG 2021 report. And we would support either Mauritius or Netherlands proposals to amend paragraph 13. Turning to norms, I support and very much like Colombia’s proposal for paragraph 14, to say action oriented proposals on the implementation of agreed norms, rules and principles. I can support Austria’s proposal for NAM for paragraph 14 A. And I do want to address a point that was raised by my esteemed the esteemed delegate from China, who spoke incredibly eloquently about the careful balance that must be maintained. Respecting this balance and acknowledging the importance that China places on the references to supply chains. In paragraph 14 See, I suggest that we replicate that balance, which was so very, very carefully struck in the 2020 UNGGE report on this text. Similar to the approach that has been taken in the international law chapter at paragraph 15 V, I suggest we replicate in full the two paragraphs from the 2021 GGE report. That is paragraph 57 D, which was referred to by my Chinese colleagues, and paragraph 57 B is helpful, I can read out what this would say. So we would start with the opening. That is in paragraph 57 of the GGE report of 2021, which says reasonable steps to promote openness and ensure the integrity stability and security of the supply chain can include and then we will go to paragraph 57 B, which says establishing policies and programs to objectively promote the adoption of good practices by suppliers and vendors of ICT equipment and systems in order to build international confidence in the integrity and security of ICT products and services enhance quality and promote choice. And then we would include paragraph 57 D, which says cooperative measures such as exchanges of good practice at the bilateral regional and multilateral levels on supply chain risk management, developing and implementing global interoperable common rules and standards for supply chain security and other approaches aimed at decreasing supply chain vulnerabilities. Turning to the international law chapter, I agree with the Netherlands that while we regret that several proposals on international law, presented by groups of states that we supported yesterday were not incorporated in the report. But we can see that a delicate balance has been struck by using consensus love language, and we can accept this chapter as it is. If there is a possible possibility to reopen this chapter, we would support the proposal by Croatia and Canada to reinsert the reference to expert briefings. Turning to Confidence Building Measures. I fully aligned with the statement made by Germany on behalf of the informal cross regional group of confidence buildings and builders. While we had more comprehensive proposals, we can see the balance has been struck here and we’re very happy to support this chapter. I look forward to elaborating the details of this point of contacts directory in our session next year. And I also note the circulation of a paper on aspects of the global point of contact directory. It was circulated this morning to inform these discussions. And I further welcome advice and input from all delegations from regional organizations and stakeholders to help us get this right. I note there’s a reference to capacity building in recommendation two of this chapter. And I understand this to be a reference to capacity building for countries to identify to develop and to implement their point of contact for this directory. I also note the US proposal to amend recommendation two and in the spirit of compromise, very prepared to support and insertion to that. That limitation. I also want to support and Brazil, you have ruined my alliteration because I was going to support Croatia, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica and China. And now Brazil on reinserting cooperation at the technical level, regarding cert cooperation cert cooperation CBM is chapter turning to capacity building. Australia can live with the text as is, we can accept it. But after hearing from those in the room, I would like to support voice support for proposal from Croatia on paragraph 17D to add and future initiatives. And also the proposal from Canada on recommendation to turning finally to regulate institutional dialogue. I support the US proposal to amend the reference in paragraph 18A to the central role of the Open-ended Working Group. Australia can accept the formulation of paragraph 18B on the Program of Action, noting this replicates paragraph 77 of the 21 OEWG report. And we can support recommendation to as as it is currently and very carefully drafted. A couple of other general tweaks that we would support we support increasing the references to regional organizations or reinserting. Those which Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile and Mauritius have spoken about. And we will also support Austria, Brazil and others on the proposal to delete the initial out of the initial framework throughout the report. I’ve been speaking for a long time, I thank you. I will provide these in writing.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you, Australia. Peru, you have the floor please.

Thank you Chair. First of all, with the last latest version, which reached us last night on which you’re going to work, and in which I’m certain we will achieve a consensus. I will be very brief and make a few points which some countries have my region already raised, but which I believe should be reiterated so we can see them reflected in the progress document, as Colombia and other countries have indicated on the relevance of the role of regional and sub regional organizations. Second, on ransomware, as the delegate of Costa Rica indicated, we would have liked to see an express mention when these attacks affect state institutions. Thirdly, on international humanitarian law, we would have preferred stronger language about his prominence. And in line with the statements Switzerland made on behalf of different countries, to which Peru adds it support. We also wish to support the statement of the delegation of Ecuador on cooperation and capacity building and how these were weakened and the latest version of the document. I believe that negation of Ecuador explained it very well. And there are other developing country delegations, especially Latin American ones, that have spoken about this, about Confidence Building Measures, we believe that the certs should be mentioned as chair and other countries have pointed out. Now see, we are pleased that in version two of the document presented the references to the development of further standards which can take place in parallel with the implementation of existing standards as in 14B, as well as a possibility of legal the binding provisions, as in 15B. We hope that this wording will appear in the final version of the progress report which I’m certain we will adopt tomorrow. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, Peru. El Salvador please

El Salvador

Thank you chair. I will begin by responding to your Question, if we believe that the document presented can be viable, an effort or to reach common ground, which will lead us to a consensus result, confirming the importance of this working group. However, we wish to put on record that we believe it is important to mention the role of regional organizations, which was broadly dealt with by several countries in their statements. This was the new to them the latest version, we also deploy the fact that certs have been has been deleted, which was also used by Croatia, Colombia, Chile and other countries, we would have liked to see specific references to run some more. This is broadly dealt with by a server in its initial statement, and supported by over 30 delegations at this meeting. With the elements, we are pleased to see the global references of the Global Director of contact points, which is important to our delegation, showing flexibility and a constructive spirit. We believe that the document is a good basis for building your mandate. And we were at reiterate the willingness of this litigation to achieve a result tomorrow, which we can all be equally unhappy with. Thank you.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, El-Salvador, I hope that we can also be equally happy. It’s possible. Thank you very much. Cuba now to be followed by Mexico, Cuba, please. Gracias.

Thank you, Chair. Firstly, we are grateful for your intense efforts directed towards achieving a progressive consensus annual report to which we will continue to contribute constructively. With our delegation will continue studying the latest version of the draft report for which we reiterate our thanks for your contribution and for what was included based on what was documented by the delegations. In the case of our own delegation, we would like to make some comments. Firstly, in the introduction, we know the paragraph referring to the role of regional and sub regional organizations. As is clarified and rev two, not all states are members of regional organization. This should be reflected in the text as is only appropriate. You also believe that in certain regions, there are organizations which could not serve as the regional interlocutor representing all the countries concerned. Second, we note that the text seems to place itself at the same place at the same level, the report of the previous Open-ended Working Group and the reports of the Group of Governmental Experts, including the most recent GGE on which our delegation has consistently expressed serious reservations as to his content. We recall that the GGEs are of limited composition and like the inclusive format wishes provided by the open ended working group. We therefore propose that this reality be duly taken into account in the drafting of the progressive annual report. We deploy the fact that there is no reference made to the proposal of beginning of the discussion in the framework of the Open-ended Working Group on a multilateral mechanism to find those responsible for cybernetic events. My delegation believes that it would be appropriate to include this. As the section See, our delegation supports the inclusion of a reference to the possibility of developing legally binding obligations among And the recommendations of next steps to be taken. We also reiterated that they should not be a reference to international humanitarian law in the text of the report. Since we do not believe that in the scope of ICTs, it is not appropriate to mention it. Since this would mean tacit acceptance of the possibility of an armed conflict scenario in that context. With regard with regard to periodic institutional dialogue, we do not favor parallel mechanisms once again, which would act as a substitute for the work of the Open-ended Working Group. Thank you very much, sir.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you, Cuba for your statement, Mexico to be followed by the Russian Federation, Mexico, please.


Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. Let me begin by acknowledging your work. Thank you for your leadership, as well as the dedicated worker of the support team and the Secretariat, in bringing forth this ref two now before us chair, a report, which as many that delegations have indicated, generally represents a step towards confidence in this open ended working group, and therefore, the role of the United Nations in the discussions on the challenges and opportunities presented by cyberspace. Further, considering the current context, as has also been mentioned, allow me to recognize too, that this rev two is a comprehensive deliverable. Which makes it possible to strike a balance between the various sections, and which is substantive in nature. Although not everything we would have wished for is contained in this text. I must sincerely believed the chair, that with all the notes that delegations have taken, that we have ample, valuable material with specific ideas for the upcoming sessions, as well as the intersessional work of the Open-ended Working Group. Stressing Mexico’s wish to support the adoption of this kind of a text. Let me point out the matters which are essential for our national position. On the introduction. We support what result by the delegations of United States Brazil, Netherlands, Austria and others, and requesting the deletion of the adjective initial since beyond the fact that this is not agreed upon language chair. It is the only framework we have and which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. In a section on international law, Mexico wishes to retain and paragraph 15 be to the explicit mention or other possibility that United Nations experts, particularly from the International Law Commission, could enrich either through studies or briefings the worker of the Open-ended Working Group in the section a chair, we also would have liked to retain the specific mentions of international humanitarian law, however, precisely for the purpose of consensus, we are work we are willing to continue working on these ideas that have arisen throughout our work in the threat section, basically listen closely to the proposals to strengthen this section, and we agree with them. However. I believe that the printed version of the Express for we Asia in this drafter, not to present a list which is not exhaustive is to be respected. However, for the future, we must keep in view the fact that threats do exist. Even though the delegates of the countries participating here in the halls of United Nations may not agree on mentioning them. The fact that we do not mention them specifically does not mean that they do not exist. In the rules version section we wish to eliminate or to delete the word initial before the word framework. And we acknowledge the work that has been done to indicate the importance of serving or reporting efforts to implement these standards. MySQL is convinced that the more we report and share information, the more clarity we will have about what more is needed. And what the more most pressing needs would be as well when it comes to capacity building. In the Confidence Building Measures section, Mexico has supported various statements of countries, which believe it is very important to move forward and creating Confidence Building Measures, we welcome the specific mention of one of them which was previously mentioned, which are the contact points. In the same section, we would like to note the specific mention not only of the regional organizations but also a regional efforts in the same sense, without being a neighbor of Chela, Colombia or China. Although very close to them and thinking we would have liked to see the specific mention of cooperation between csirt have been retained either to consolidate them or to create them. Last thing in the section on capacity building share, Mexico would have liked to see the retention of specifics mentioned by other delegations, which indicate the growing and timely cooperation or South South cooperation. Thank you Chair for giving me the opportunity to bring up these specifics. And I welcome the fact that we are not talking about drinks, because I’m certain we would never reach a consensus as to the choice of tequila, or between tequila and mezcal, thank you very much.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, Mexico for your statement and also for your offer of your beverages of choice. I’m looking forward to that. I give now the floor to the Russian Federation, followed by the European Union, Russian Federation floor please.


Chairman, distinguished colleagues. Russia was in the unprecedented difficult situation during this session, work on the draft progress report was extremely difficult than we were forced to bring the process into line with the national interest remotely given the working round the clock with our departmental experts, Russia was at the beginnings of the idea of organizing this open and transparent and genuinely democratic format of the CWG. At the same time, on this basis, we’re making concrete proposals to strengthen security in the ICT sphere, taking into account state sovereignty. We see this as something that the United States doesn’t like ultimately, actions aimed exclusively at important negotiations and constructive participants in the group, and therefore any state might fall under this visa below. We would have every reason therefore, to block the work of the DWG. However, we and our colleagues in Moscow are driven by joint efforts to achieve mutual understanding on the issue of international information security and to preserve the positive momentum of the EW G. The work of which Mr. Chairman, can quite properly be called Confidence Building Measures. We hope that the third session will conclude with a significant constructive outcome in order to avoid repetitions of unfounded visa restrictions that hinder multilateral negotiations within the UN. We boasts that we include the following amendments. In the opening part of the report, we would rephrase the section on gender in the context of information security. Before we deal with these issues, we need to ensure the barrier free participation of delegations in international negotiations on issues of international peace and security in the information sphere. This measures is aimed first and foremost at the states that host un institutions. Substantively, we are prepared to give a purely provisional assessment of this report. And once that has been considered by Moscow will send concrete amendments to the secretariat will be guided by the outcomes of the initial OEWG and building on its results. Given the time distance, the logistical difficulties that’s also very difficult. Proposals are along the lines of the joint position of the group of states on the annual draft report and deliveries to Venezuela, Iran, Cuba, Russia and Syria. The substance of that is to strengthen the foundations of interstate cooperation and to ensure feedback from competent departments in various different countries. In order to prevent a misunderstanding, disagreement and conflict including in the internet sphere. This is important for a timely response to the full range of threats in the information sphere, rather than the individual manifestations in the form of ransomware, which is a form of cybercrime. In order to consider this issue, under the UN’s auspices, we already have a relevant specialist committee. The optimal thing to do would be to delete from the section on threats theory, excessive detailing of those threats and the information sphere, taking into account the opinions of individual states to engage in reporting on norms of responsible state behavior. in cyberspace. We’re convinced that before we begin doing that we need to reach an agreement on the legally binding nature of that and only then create an oversight mechanism a control mechanism. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be clear how it would be possible to carry out that oversight or control over the upholding or compliance with voluntary norms. There’s no recommendation in the text on the development of new norms, rules and principles. Because that would be dictated by the mandate of the OEWG we insist on reflecting specific provisions, leading to the development of legally binding norms. This would balance out the proposed the sections on existing norms and will also help support the implementation of the mandate of the group. We welcome the reflection in the draft report the idea of creating a global POC directory. We noticed inter governmental nature and we are convinced that implementing this measure would help achieve a real practical step to strengthen cooperation between states. We support the aim to resolve capacity building issues, it’s important that this priority be strengthened within the OEWG. We need to work without additional resources in or we need to work on finding additional resources to help support states in the use of ICTs. We’re prepared to provide developing countries with all sorts of assistance first and foremost when it comes to training specialists in this area. We agree with the views of Cuba and Nicaragua on international humanitarian law. Thank you for your attention.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you, Russian Federation for your statement. European Union. You have the floor please.

Mr. Chair, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European Union and its member state. The EU and its member states would like to thank the chair and his team for their tireless efforts and for presenting the second revised draft annual progress report of the Open-ended Working Group on security of in in the use of ICTs. The thorough draft report reflects the rich and substantive comments among the members of the OEWG. However, let me start with a clarification. The EU and its member state cherish and wish to reaffirm the AQI and indicate that we are not starting starting from scratch. This was the gist of the EU and its member states proposal limited to the introductory section of this report. Since 2010, the cumulative building blocks of the 2010 2013 2015 UNGGE consensus reports were found in the UNGGE 2021 and OEWG report. The UN community has established the framework for Responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs in the context of international security. To avoid misleading language as underlined by the delegation before me We therefore suggest to delete the word initial in the introductive chapeau of each sections and to refer to states we reaffirming the framework. Let me now add a few substantive comments. Under the introduction section and paragraph five. The use reports language suggestion to strengthen the role of regional and sub regional organizations in implementing the framework for Responsible state behavior in cyberspace. As requested by Columbia this morning we suggest to delete could continue to play. So could continue. We had this morning six regional organization that all reaffirmed a common objective in view to support states to implement the UN framework for Responsible state behavior in order to increase stability and security in cyberspace. Under the threat section, the US reports the revised structure and the focus on the threat landscape that the UN community is mandated to address within this OEWG. However, the EU wishes to echo all these delegations, which are requesting to include threats posed by ransomware, rising to the level of national security. In addition, the EU requests to explicitly mentioned that since the OEWG report adopted in 2021. The existing and potential threatens cave have dramatically changed, including the use of cyber means in harm conflict and can support the proposal by Australia. As was raised by the Netherlands as with more issues, we do not report the reference to the threats information security, which is not consistent with previous reports, and we support the Neverland proposal. Under Confidence Building Measures, we joined the supports to the reflection of the role of regional and sub regional organization to support this to discuss the support and foster confidence building. And we also joined the request by some delegation to reinsert the rule of cooperation between certs. Turning to the capacity building section, and in line with our previous comment. The EU and its member state welcome the revised version, which answer to the need to avoid duplication of existing efforts and to take into account initiatives aiming at strengthening coordination and capacity building efforts globally. We will also welcome to reflect this as well in para 17E. Here the OEWG recognize existing initiative for coordination and for funding capacity building. Finally, under regular institutional dialogue, the EU and its member state thank the chair for its proposal on the articulation of the role of the POA under under this section. However, we wish to seek clarity on the role of the OEWG within the UN. What recognizing the importance of our work here, the EU and its member states wish to highlight that in this section, we are mandated to explore the establishment of regular institution that institutional dialogue that could play a permanent role. So we should not preempt the conclusion of the OEWG. And it’s possible recommendation. The UN and several of its agencies have a role in fostering cooperation, dialogue and coordination among all nation, as well as with the private sector and other stakeholders on global cyber security matters. For instance, ITU is also playing a role in building confidence and security in the use of information and communication technologies. Therefore, the EU suggests to recognize the role of OEWG as one of the platform to foster dialogue within the UN on security in the use of ICTs and propose to delete the word Central. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much. European Union. I have four more speakers who have asked for the floor five now. And I don’t want to stop anyone from speaking it’s important that I hear all of you but also it’s important that you hear each other. So we will exhaust the speaker’s lists, even if it means going beyond six o’clock, as seems likely. But after 6pm We will have to continue in the mode of an informal meeting, which means there will be no interpretation. And I am a big champion of multilingualism. I mean that in all seriousness because English is not my mother tongue. None of the human languages my mother tongue, but I know the importance of it interpretation. So this will require that all of you agree that we continue to hear the rest of the speakers in informal mode without interpretation beyond 6pm. So, is that something that is acceptable to everyone? Thank you for your understanding. So, we will continue with the rest of the speakers I have Republic of Korea, France, New Zealand, Islamic Republic of Iran and the Czech Republic five delegations. So we will continue with the rest of the speakers Republic of Korea, please thank you.

South Korea

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Republic of Korea expressed its gratitude for cheering his team for their productive efforts. We’d like to briefly elaborate our views and touch on points raised by other delegations during the session. To start with the conclusion, we do view a ref two as a viable summary of our discussions. Although not all of the points we raised in our previous interventions are reflected in the documents. For us the priority lies in flexibly working towards a consensus outcome rather than insisting all our preferences be taken into account. That is especially so considering the nature of this document, in that it is an annual summary of non exhaustive nature as repeatedly expressed in the current documents. on international law, we welcome that the international humanitarian law is retained in ref two the principle that existing international law applies to cyberspace has already been agreed to. And during these three sessions, many emphasis on on the importance of IHL has been mentioned by numerous delegations. Therefore, we believe IHL merits inclusion in the documents. Furthermore, as Croatia, Chile, Switzerland and other delegations have mentioned, we also had hoped to include mentioning of expert briefings including from those such as ICRC in the document, but in the spirit of consensus, we can accept the current version, and we do not believe that it precludes future activities of the assault on capacity building. We initially hoped for adding POA as an example of a permanent mechanism. But we can live with its current version mentioned in regular institutions institutional dialogue chapter and we look forward to focus discussion on this topic later in the OEWG discussions. Lastly, I’d like to briefly echo points raised by other delegations on threats we can support mentioning ransomware as various states have proposed on Confidence Building Measures, we can support delegations proposals to include cooperation between csirts. Lastly, on a regular institutional dialogue, we support the US, Columbia, Canada and others proposals regarding the expression of OEWG centrality considering past discussions conducted in GGE setting and possible future discussions in the POA. We believe a current central role is a more objective and appropriate expression in this regard. Once again, we’d like to thank the Chair and the team for their dedication and their effort and hope all delegations can flexibly work towards consensus outcome by tomorrow. Thank you.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you, Republic of Korea, France, you’re the floor please.


Thank you chair. My delegation with once again like to thank you for the efforts that you and your team have made to put together a progress report that can enjoy consensus and provide a basis for further deepening our work. We think that this new version of the progress report is a significant improvement on the previous one. In the introduction, we welcome the clear reaffirmation of the consensus reports of the GGE and the first area WG and an acknowledgement of the essential role of regional organizations in implementing the framework or responsible behavior. The statements made this morning by various regional organisers. Asians provided a clear illustration of that role when it comes to the use of the term initial to describe the framework for responsible behavior. We acknowledge here that this is agreed language, which is included in the introduction of the previous hour ew G, its use in the introduction of this report is thus entirely justified. We however, we do think that its systematic use at the beginning of each part could create misunderstanding when it comes to the value of this framework. It’s precise to say that this could be further developed in future. And indeed, it’s one of the objectives of this work. But the framework does have uncontestable legitimacy, and as Mexico recalled, it was adopted in consensus resolutions of the General Assembly. We therefore support the proposal of the European Union to only use the term initial in the introduction of the report. Turning to the section on threats, we recognize that this section has been significantly improved, and now effectively offers an analysis of the existing and potential threats. We do, however, support the comment made by several delegations that this section should refer to the malicious use of ICTs. In the context of an armed conflict, which is a threat that is now no longer hypothetical, like Australia, El Salvador and others, we would like to see a reference in this section to ransomware. But we are prepared to show flexibility. We support the proposal by the Netherlands to reword paragraph 13 to remove the non consensus idea of information security. That aside, we believe that this section is broadly satisfactory on international law. We of course, regret as Switzerland said that IHL it hasn’t been mentioned in paragraph 15. A, and that the idea of expert briefings, which is a useful thing has been deleted. Nevertheless, this section is acceptable for my delegation, in that it allows us to envisage more in depth discussions at the next session. on capacity building, we commend your efforts to clarify the language and to draw a link between capacity building efforts and the implementation of the framework for Responsible state behavior. Lastly, turning to the section on regular institutional dialogue. We believe that it is also an improvement in this version, we acknowledge the importance of the role played by the OEWG as an inclusive discussion forum for cybersecurity related issues, we would nevertheless like to support the proposal of the European Union. to reword the language concerning its role. On the proposed Program of Action, we would first of all, like to rectify some imprecise an improvised statement that we heard to the effect that some countries would intend to develop the POA outside the framework of the United Nations. There is in no way a question of developing the POA outside the United Nations. Aside from that, our position remains in line with the consensus recommendations adopted last year by the first Open-ended Working Group, according to which the POA should be elaborated, including in the 2021 2025 Open-ended Working Group, taking into account the views and concerns of all states. We’ve applied this recommendation throughout this year, including by submitting a working document on the POA that was put together with all of the co sponsors. And we would like to thank them. It is in this spirit that we will continue to develop this initiative. We believe that the Open-ended Working Group has made a substantive contribution to the would make a substantive contribution to the elaboration of a POA in the future as a standing instrument. And that is why we support recommendation to have this section which intends for discussions to take place in the fourth and fifth sessions in 2023. And we encourage all states to participate in those discussions. Thank you once again, Chair for your efforts. And we would like to see these efforts lead to the adoption of a report by consensus.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much, France, for your statement and I want to take the opportunity to thank the interpreters for giving us an extra 10 minutes Thank you for your time, extra time. I get now the floor to New Zealand to be followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, New Zealand please.

New Zealand

Thank you very much chair. And thank you for the extraordinary efforts of Have you your team and the Secretariat and pulling this report together your efforts and finding a balanced summary of the discussions very clear. And we’re very hopeful, and including on the basis of the discussions here this afternoon that we are well on our way to finding consensus. In the interest of time, and noting the very sage advice from Brazil, the UK and yourself chair, I will just very quickly run through our top line reflections on this, on this vision, and some of the proposals offered by states this morning in this afternoon. On threads, we think it is important that as this is an annual report that it reflects the current context in which this OEWG is taking place. And therefore, we would like to see a reference to conflict in the section. And however, we’re grateful for Australia’s efforts to find a path forward and support the text proposal for the inclusion of the consensus line. And that the use of ICTs in future conflicts is becoming more likely at the end of the first sentence of paragraph nine. And we support the interventions of Costa Rica and others who proposed the reinclusion of rents and we’re in the section. And we strongly support the text and text amendment to paragraph 13 proposed by the Netherlands. And we support the interventions by Croatia, Costa Rica, Kenya and many others today, on reinserting, the reference to suit to suit cooperation on international law, like many here, we prefer the language in the ref one on international humanitarian law, but in the spirit of consensus can appreciate and support the ref two language, finally on capacity building, and we greatly appreciate the roadmap that you have created, which will lead to a detailed and focused discussion on how they’re already WG can best contribute to click to capacity building in the area of security of ICTs. And we’re very much looking forward to that discussion next year. Thank you.

Ambassador Gafoor

Thank you very much. New Zealand, Islamic Republic of Iran, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to take the floor to present my delegations views on ref two for the annual progress report. First and foremost, my delegation would like to thank you, Mr. Chair, and your team for tireless efforts throughout this week to prepare the second version of the annual progress report. Mr. Chairman, we have been carefully considered this revision so far. What we have our comments on different parts of it. First and foremost on the introductory part, as we have bilaterally discuss with you, for us, it is very important to add a sentence regarding the non-binding and voluntary actually voluntary status of anything that we are adopting here regarding this report. And we propose the sentence that first, second and third substantive sessions of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of information and communication technologies ICTs 2021 2025 as an inter governmental body within the United Nations, working by consensus and developing voluntary non-binding recommendations to be followed by member states on the security and the use of information and communication technologies. This is the sentence that it’s very important to us to be added in the introductory part. Other issues related to introductory part is that we welcome actually reference to consensus resolutions of the General Assembly in this part, in line six of para one we suggest to use the agri language of states call called be upon to be guided instead of states agreed they should be guided. This is a departure from the agreed language of the previous and we want that the agreed language as we have stated state agreed that it should be guided instead of states called be upon to be guided. One important thing is that as distinguished colleague from Cuba has mentioned, we have also our reserved, strong reservations on the GGE reference reports here. And in this regard, also, we mentioned the resolution of 73 Slash 27 Then as 13 nodes that was enshrined in the UN GA resolution should be included in paragraph two also, different status of 2021, or ew G report and reports of the GGE is should be reflected in this era, we do not see the equal treatment of the OEWG report with the GGE. That has not been democratic, and actually has been not been open ended and as a result of 25 countries, in para four, we believe that the notion of interaction with the stakeholders have been already captured in the first line of paragraph four. Therefore, there is no need to replicate this notion in the last three lines of this paragraph in paragraph seven, which says that the progress report sets out the roadmap for focus discussion on specific topics with the within the OEWG we believe that it should be indicated that this specific topic for discussion at fourth and fifth session because it has been generally notion that such a focus discussion is generally for the whole OEWG so far as in the other parts of focus of attention is that, to give a roadmap and discussion for the third and fourth, therefore, it it should be fixed in that context. Regarding the existing and potential threat section, we believe that the use of ICT against sovereignty of states and unilateral coercive measures against states in the ICT environment should be added to the list of existing and potential threats. In paragraph 12, the phrase inconsistent with their obligation under the framework should be replaced by inconsistent with their obligation on the international law. There is a confusing, Mr. Chairman in this regard, that the states have obligations under international law, the overarching obligation under international law would be the the United Nation actually the main dark charter, actually, but in the in the meantime, it has been mixed with the non-binding agreements and norms and rules. So there is a mix. Of course, there might be interpretation that the overarching international law is the charter. And then the rules and norms are complimentary. This approach is not accepted by this delegation. Actually, we believe that in this regard, we need a obligation in terms of international law in terms of legally binding document, therefore, Mr. Chairman, there is also yet I know we to an extent you’re attached to these two terms in here and there of the text that the concrete and action oriented proposals have been taken these two terms as I have already mentioned, what is concrete or what is not a subject of judgment. So, it would be better to take a neutral term rather than something as a controversy on the issue of concept of action oriented, we believe that if we have that, here and there in the text, it means that we would not take the approach of legal binding documents since we are satisfied with the action oriented with it coming from the league political binding and it is the interpretation of the some of the lawyer lawyers actually in this case. Therefore, we once more believe that it is no need to to have such a terms instead of saying that the states have proposed and those proposed are going to be discussed. Mr. Chairman on rules on rules norms and principles section on paragraph 14. Little he proposed that the phrase with the view to develop a universal terminology in the field of ICT, the added to the end of the sub paragraph in paragraph 14 levy a strongly believed that the current notes does not consider all consents of estates and should be completed by new norms. Therefore, instead of saying additional laws could continue to be developed over time. We prefer to say additional laws should be developed. And also once more let me know refer to the resolution that has been regarding the 13 norms on. On paragraph 14 E we propose to use agreed language of para 18 of 2021 OEWG instead of if I’m not mistaken, it is in the footnote and other paragraph has been referred in paragraph 40 that we are saying, which says the elaboration of new norms should be further considered in the future you and processes, including in the OEWG. On paragraph two of the recommended next step, the phrase “along with other tools” is also vague in our view, and we propose to be deleted. Also in this recommendation, next step, we already suggested in the zero draft and also in ref one that a stage or group of state could also be invited to submit working papers to contribute to the development of additional norms. We would like that this suggestion will be reflected in ref two as well on international law. In paragraph 15A second sentence should be deleted because discussion on specific topics which listed in this para not only could identify areas of convergence, but also could help to find areas of divergence. This notion means that legal binding approach would be the secondary, which has come to the paragraph thereafter. Therefore, we believe that regarding the list of topics for further discussion in paragraph 15A, we would like to add one more important topic which is national jurisdiction of states as well as discussing the legal binding document. Paragraph 15Bi regarding the possibility as I have said additional legal binding obligation with refer earlier format in ref one, which which this issue had been identified as one of the topics for the further discussion. In line with our well known position, we propose the deletion of IHL which has been considered as a matter of controversy by some other delegations, on Confidence Building Measures, this section has been improved and we are pleased that this improvement has happened on that on capacity building. On In contrary to the confidence building section, we are not satisfied with capacity building section section of ref two, we believe the capacity building section in ref one was a stronger than the new version. for improving this section we propose the following amendments could take place in paragraph 17D and 17E we would like to retain important notion of the ref one regarding permanent mechanism and dedicated found for ICT security capacity building in paragraph 17F we propose to delete new criteria for gender sensitive for selection of projects. Of course, gender parity has no problem as other delegation has indicated but since this gender sensitive is also criteria for selection of the projects, we cannot understand how could would be applied in that case whether the project should be defined if the ladies are doing those projects are limited to the ladies, this is something vague in our understanding. In recommended next step in paragraph two, we would like that the important concepts of permanent mechanism and dedicated funds for ICT security capacity building be reflected We also suggest that the last line of this recommendation is to be changed as following: experts could be invited to make presentation on these topics to facilitate further discussion on the non-objection basis and considering the principle of equitable geographical representation. This criteria is important to the fact that only one group of states, or all the experts coming from the Western countries

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