Session 4-2 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

Distinguished Delegates, I hope you had a pleasant lunch break, and judging from the buzz in the room, I can tell that there’s a lot of informal conversations taking place, which is also an important part of the work of the Working Group. We will now continue our consideration of Agenda Item 5, which is in line with the program of work that we adopted, and we will continue our discussions on existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security. As I said earlier in the afternoon before we broke, we have had a good start with the various statements we have heard, and I’d like all Delegations to continue in this vein to be focused to identify elements that we can potentially capture in a new progress report, elements that will command consensus in order to be captured in the annual progress report. Any other specific proposals or comments you have would also be very useful for our deliberations, and if you could also in your interventions react to the comments made by other Delegations or suggestions put forward by other Delegations, that will also be very useful, not only for me, but also for all of you, to get a sense of how Delegations are looking at the discussion and reacting to different ideas and proposals. As I mentioned also earlier, just before we broke for lunch, that we have about 40 speakers. We have the list of speakers here captured in the computer here on the podium, so we will continue with that order in which we had registered the requests for the floor, which will mean that you need to be a little patient. We will get to you. Everyone will have the chance to have their views expressed, so do be patient. One last thing. I’ve had a request from the interpreters that you convey your statements in advance, if possible, to estatements at un.org. So it’s literally estatements, that’s the email address, estatements at un.org. That will enable them to do the interpretation smoothly. In addition, do send the text of your remarks to the Secretariat and to my team. I think we have a standard email for that. I don’t know the email address of that, but do send it to us. And if you have prepared statements, you could also choose to skip parts of it and just focus on the most essential elements. So that way we get to hear the essential elements in the room, but you can be assured that I will go through the statements, I and my team, so that we look through all the statements very carefully. Is there an email for the Chair’s team? Yeah, we do have an email. I’ve never emailed anything to myself, which is why I’m not familiar with the address. So it’s cyberoewgchair, cyberoewgchair at gmail.com. I’m not sure why we are using Gmail. It reflects no particular inclination on the part of the Chair, so I just wanted to make that caveat. So do send us your statements as well. So we’ll continue with the speaker’s list, and I have France to be followed by Canada. France, vous avez la parole. Thank you.

Mr. Chair, at the outset, I’d like to say that we very favorably welcome your proposal to enter a more precise discussion on the threats that we’re facing at the moment in cyberspace. Indeed, without a clear diagnosis of these threats, we will not be able to be effective in other work within this group. Our delegation would like to make five comments. First, we see that the use of offensive cyber capacities in armed conflict is no longer just a probability as noted in the 2022 report. It’s now a real reality. This has been noticed in the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, which we strongly condemn. I’d like to note the spillover effect caused by attacks, which affect many users and spaces, leading to destabilization and escalation. For example, I note the attacks mentioned by our Nordic colleagues and other countries. Another consequence is the multiplication of malevolent actors, leading to a risk of escalation in this context of armed conflict. Cybercriminal groups could align their actions with actions and interests of parties to conflict. The phenomenon of hacktivism can also be carried out in terms of war. This can affect websites or the dissemination of data and information. Second, we are seeing an increasing accessibility of capacities to carry out cyber attacks. These are zero-day vulnerabilities, malevolent programs, and other infrastructure. These are more and more freely available, and these can affect the security and stability of cyberspace. For example, proliferation of spy software is available on the Internet, and this should be the object of this group’s attention. There are also hacker-for-hire services available. These exist for economic and political spying for different types of clients. These could harm national defense and confidentiality. It’s very important to regulate that market. Third, we’d like to underscore the gravity of the threat posed by attacks on critical infrastructure, especially in France. For example, two hospitals were hit. We fully align ourselves with the comments of the EU and Kenya, Argentina, El Salvador, the USA, and other countries who have already spoken to this threat. Next, we need to further consider the implications that the use of new technological developments could have in terms of cyber security. The development of AI could also lead to a change in scale when it comes to the sophistication of cyber threats, and this should also be part of this group’s work. AI could facilitate the production of malevolent programs that could deal with defense systems, and they could work autonomously. This is something that’s already been mentioned by other delegations. For example, powers relating to this that could impact the integrity of cryptography and cyber security at the global scale. To conclude, then, I would like to note the systemic risk of digital products and services that are insecure. We need to reduce this threat. For example, the Internet of Things is now seeing increasing interconnection of items whose security is not always ensured. However, this is not a topic limited only to the Internet of Things. All products and services in the digital sphere are affected. I note the vulnerabilities here that are aware of but that are not corrected by users and service providers. Here, significant normative work needs to be carried out, and we could work on that within our work on norms. Thank you.

Thank you very much, France, for your statement. I now give the floor to Canada, to be followed by Romania. Canada, please.

Thank you, Chair, for this opportunity to share Canada’s views on cyber threats. This is an important part of the mandate because it sets the stage for the rest of the topics under discussion. Other topics hopefully provide solutions to the threats that we identify in this section. Canada is concerned with four main cyber threats that we could discuss further in 2023 and perhaps include in our July annual progress report. I would agree with the EU, Denmark, and Germany that ransomware has become an increasingly common and significant risk to governments, businesses, and individuals. The impacts of ransomware can be extensive and often include core business disruptions, data loss, and potentially significant recovery costs. Ransomware remains a profitable activity for cyber criminals and therefore continues to pose a threat to Canada’s and our collective security and economic prosperity. A second threat that this OEWG could discuss is cyber-related threats to critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. The severity of cyber incidents targeting Canadian and international CI and CII, both public and private, is growing. Critical infrastructure is increasingly at risk from cyber threat activity from both cyber criminals and state-sponsored actors. Many other states in this room no doubt face similar threats to their CI and CII, which is why we believe that this issue should be included in the threat section of our next APR. A third topic that might be worth mentioning in the threat section of the July APR is quantum computing. Thank you to the Czech Republic and France for also raising this issue. Quantum computing is on the horizon, bringing exciting opportunities but also a significant threat to the encryption methods that keep secure the digital systems that underpin our governments and society. Canada’s new national quantum strategy, which was released last month, is helping to stimulate that breakthrough through investment by both federal and provincial governments into Canada’s small but world-leading quantum industry. Canada is also pursuing opportunities to work with other states to accelerate the development of mutually beneficial key quantum technologies and to grow and diversify the collective talent pool. We would be interested to hear what other states are doing domestically on this front, as well as exploring what the OEWG could say on this topic. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, is the threat posed by Russia’s war in Ukraine, including its cyber activities there. On that, Canada condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s illegal and unjustifiable aggression in Ukraine. We align ourselves with statements heard today by Portugal, the EU, the Nordic countries, Greece, the US, Germany, the Czech Republic, and France on this issue. These unprovoked actions are a clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. They are also in violation of Russia’s obligations under international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. It has been reported that Russia conducts, on average, 10 offensive cyber operations per day against Ukraine. This shows a blatant disregard for the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace that has been agreed here at the UN. Canada strongly condemns these Russian cyber operations. Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected, and the Ukrainian people must be free to determine their own future. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Canada. Romania to be followed by Estonia. Romania, please.

Thank you, Chair. Thank you to yourself and to High Representative Nakamitsu for opening this formal session this morning. Kindly allow me to also welcome the attendance of the Women in Cyber Fellows to our session today. Romania is obviously fully aligned with the statement given by the European Union. The following comments are in my national capacity. And I also ask you, Chair, to put on the record that our acceptance of the methods of work today is subject to the same position as that expressed by France on the topic. Mr. Chair, as both yourself and the High Representative have noted, the threat landscape in cyber is complex, and its impact, origins, scope, and intensity remain equally complex. This landscape has been widely described in the products of both the previous GGE and the Open-Ended Working Group formats on this topic. State and non-state threats can be seen primarily acute in attacks on critical infrastructures, on essential services, on the work of humanitarian actors, and on potential threats to the systems that ensure the general functioning of the Internet. They all need to be managed through concrete and responsible action at the internal and international level and through the active involvement of all relevant stakeholders. Mr. Chair, one of the most visible and flagrant challenges visible today results from the systematic use of cyber operations in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The invasion, aside from being a flagrant and unjustified breach of the most fundamental components of international law, has included a systematic employment of cyber operations. Russia’s use of such operations constitutes the quintessential example of irresponsible state conduct in cyberspace. Aside from creating direct destructive consequences on a member of this Assembly, these operations have had visible spillover effects on the critical infrastructure of other members. This example has revealed not only how irresponsible conduct can create risks to international peace and security, but most importantly that the manner in which the Russian Federation chooses to promote its interests internationally has nothing to do with the nature, objectives, or fundamental principles of this Open-Ended Working Group or with the United Nations in general. Members of this Assembly need to be aware of this. Another set of threats that must be dealt with presently stems from the benevolent tolerance of certain member states in allowing offensive actions to be conducted through the use of their territories, whether implicit or sometimes even explicit blessing. Such an approach has allowed and facilitated the emergence of destructive phenomena, such as what we now call the ransomware phenomenon, which is ever-increasing and which threatens the security and imposes costs on the entirety of the membership of this Assembly. We welcome international evolutions directed towards combating this phenomenon, such as the evolution of the Counter-Ransomware Initiative, of which Romania is a proud member and looks forward to its consolidation as a coordinated international response to this set of threats. We use this opportunity to note for the attention of the Open-Ended Working Group that the Counter-Ransomware Initiative is now building tangible benefits to security in cyberspace in line with the framework of responsible state conduct. Mr. Chair, based specifically on your guiding questions, we can note that the development and implementation of what we now call new and emerging technologies can indeed pose challenges. The benefits and transformative effects of artificial intelligence will be enormous, to the extent that we’re not yet fully able to anticipate them at this time. A similar assessment is true for quantum computing. In other technologies, such as the development of the Internet of Things, we can already see that some of the associated challenges include the expansion of attack surfaces. However, Mr. Chair, technological development in and of itself is not a threat, and such attacks do not happen by themselves. Most importantly, and I sometimes think that in our work this premise needs to be made more explicit, although it represents the fundamental point of origin for all our negotiations, there is no structural force in the world, or in particular in the relations between states, which pushes us towards generating threats to international peace and security. No phenomenon, no event, category, or system of thought, treaty, or concept can be seen as the root cause of this. No, the threat landscape is about our intentions and our actions. It is primarily about state conduct, its responsible nature, or lack thereof. We understand a lot of the threat landscape and its origins, and we already hold the full set of instruments to mitigate them. We must, for the sake of international peace and security, and for the sake of fulfilling this group’s mandate, fully apply international law, including the UN Charter in its entirety, international humanitarian law, and respect the inherent capacity for reason of our citizens, as well as their dignity, by fulfilling the obligations we have under international human rights law. Multistakeholders are fundamental actors in the fight against threats in cyberspace and in the efforts aimed at increasing our resilience. The rejection of the input of a broad set of independent and reputable stakeholders in our work, and the abuse of this format in such a way as to promote one’s narratives to organizations whose purpose would be just that, reveals an intention to not really work towards the objectives of this Open-Ended Working Group, but simply simulate this intention. This is why we fully support the positions of Ukraine and Canada on the issue and consider the actions of Ukraine as legitimate. On the POC directory, we welcome the circulation of your document. We will address this in the later agenda topics. We consider this document as a good base for discussions, precisely directed towards identifying and agreeing on the specifics of what is needed for operationalizing such an initiative. We also echo the calls for substantial contributions of the entire membership of this Assembly to the UN Secretary-General’s work on the Program of Action on Cyber. And we assure you that you can count on our support in the uphill efforts to use this format in bringing contribution to international peace and security. The solution is and remains within responsible state conduct. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Romania, for your statement. I now give the floor to Estonia, to be followed by Malaysia. Estonia, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor, and dear colleagues. Malicious cyber operations are on the rise worldwide, and resilience against these threats forms an essential part of national security. An open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment cannot be taken for granted. Cyberspace is not something separate from the physical world. It is evident that increasing threats in the use of ICTs are leading to growing challenges, starting from negative effects on economic and social development and ending with implications on national security and international stability. Therefore, Estonia welcomes an open discussion on the existing and potential threats and possible cooperative measures to prevent and counter such threats. Estonia has continuously underlined during our last meetings how Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion against Ukraine has clearly illustrated that cyber operations are employed to support military objectives and are part of modern armed conflict. In addition to kinetic warfare, Ukrainian governmental authorities, critical infrastructure, local governments, the security and defense sector, and companies have been targeted in cyberspace. Equally, there has been an increase in politically motivated cyber operations against countries that support Ukraine. In the Estonian systems, we have witnessed an unprecedented number of denial-of-service attacks against Estonia, mostly guided by political motives. Phishing continues to account for the largest proportion of incidents recorded by CERT-EE, our national CERT. For us, the protection of critical infrastructure and services, as well as safeguarding the security of democratic processes such as elections, is an utmost priority. Another threat factor relevant in the international context is the increasing number of ransomware attacks, which may also be targeted against critical infrastructure providers and hence bring along devastating effects. We have witnessed how, for some countries, ransomware attacks have constituted a state of national emergency. Therefore, we hope to see the issue of ransomware reflected also in the next annual progress report. How to prevent and counter such threats? With a goal of information sharing and developing a deeper understanding of the threats, Estonia regularly publishes overviews about ICT threats as well as analyses with lessons learned from incidents occurring in Estonia. For example, several reports and publications by the Estonian Information System Authority, Estonian Internal Security Service, and the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service are translated into English and publicly available. In order to enhance resilience domestically, Estonia has introduced new tools that provide better protection against attacks, increased monitoring capabilities, and developed capabilities for timely and independent response. Often, the consequences of the vulnerabilities depend on the speed with which we act, whether we are able to patch them before criminals manage to exploit them. We must constantly be ready for new cyber incidents, analyze ongoing threats, counter them, draw conclusions, and take the necessary steps to minimize their impact. Equally, we underline the value of education, cyber hygiene, and awareness of the everyday user. The faster technology develops, the more extensive the attacks become, and the more resilient and capable our defenses must be. Finally, we would like to underline that any use of ICTs by member states in a manner inconsistent with obligations under the framework of responsible state behavior undermines international peace and security, trust, and stability between states, and may increase the likelihood of conflicts between states. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Estonia. Malaysia, to be followed by Kazakhstan. Malaysia, please.

Mr. Chair, at the outset, my delegation would like to express its appreciation to you for your continued efforts to advance the work of this OEWG. Rest assured of Malaysia’s full support as we work together to ensure that the OEWG comes through this important process. Malaysia welcomes today’s exchange of views on peace and security in cyberspace. Based on the recommendations agreed to in the reports, it is evident that with constantly evolving technological developments, a fundamental understanding of the impact is crucial in building and maintaining international peace, security, and trust in the ICT environment. While new and emerging technologies have accelerated the process of digital transformation, these technologies can be exploited as ICT activities. For example, cloud computing has made development so much easier, with characteristics such as on-demand acquisition, shared resources, and scalability as the aim to achieve economies of scale. However, if security and privacy considerations are overlooked in a cloud environment, they may pose a huge risk to ICT security. The fact is, security requirements are pivotal to the safety and resilience of new and emerging technologies. Artificial intelligence can undoubtedly drive inclusive economic growth and support scientific investment that improves the conditions of our world. It is also an effective tool for cybersecurity protection, as well as incident detection and response. At the same time, AI can also be used to automate cyber attacks, making them faster and improving the accuracy of the attack vectors. Malicious actors can use AI to send targeted, convincing phishing emails or create fake images and videos that may be used to propagate misinformation or manipulate public opinion. For this, Malaysia appreciates the detailed explanation of the characteristics of AI by El Salvador. Another emerging technology that will completely change the technological landscape is quantum computing. The widespread cryptography protocols today rely on computational limits on traditional computers to provide cybersecurity protocols. With quantum computing, most modern cryptography can be broken. Today, threat actors are stealing and harvesting encrypted data in anticipation of being able to decrypt it in the future, once the necessary quantum technology is available. For this, Malaysia appreciates the deliberations on quantum computing by Canada. Mr. Chair, the international community can collectively develop a deeper understanding of the potential risks brought about by these technologies by working together to understand their impact and manage the risks relating to their responsible development and use. This is essential because privacy and cybersecurity risk management considerations and approaches are applicable in the design, development, and deployment of these technologies. Research on potential vulnerabilities and identification of security controls, as well as the development of best practices for securing these technologies, are among the initiatives that should be pursued through collaboration with all relevant stakeholders. It is important to note that both new and conventional technologies are subject to rapid innovation and advancement and must be continuously monitored and deployed as we work towards a technological future underpinned by trustworthiness and responsibility. Mr. Chair, the balancing of security and privacy aspects without impeding usability or compromising safety requires participation from cross-disciplinary experts in applied research. Collaborative action between all stakeholders in the cyber ecosystem is required. In this regard, the OEWG can play a critical role in facilitating dialogue on specific technologies, such as AI or quantum computing, with a view to further elaborating how best to mitigate any threats to international security. For this, Malaysia supports the statement by Kenya, the Philippines, and others on the importance of engagement with the right stakeholders. Other collaborative initiatives that may be undertaken are responsible disclosures of vulnerabilities, development of security standards, and implementation of security baselines for national cybersecurity protection. Cybercriminals are now using advanced tools and networks that might target large organizations, increasing the complexity of cybercrime cases. The proliferation of illicit marketplaces for crime-as-a-service, including ransomware, has commoditized cybercrime. Barriers to entry for cybercriminals have reached an all-time low, and cybercriminals no longer need to be highly skilled. For this, Malaysia supports including ransomware in the next annual progress report, as suggested by many other states. While the work of the Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of ICT for criminal purposes is ongoing, states can already work to implement concerted, swift, and effective measures with hosting providers, internet service providers, and domain registrars. This includes blocking and taking down malicious sites at the level of hosting providers, especially those that affect critical national information infrastructure. For this, Malaysia supports the statement by Portugal on the important work of the Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of ICTs for criminal purposes. Mr. Chair, Malaysia believes that the ability of the international community to prevent and mitigate the impact of malicious use of ICT depends very much on the capacity of each state to prepare and respond effectively. Capacity building can help create a national culture of cybersecurity. Such a culture will support the development and maintenance of secure systems and infrastructure, deepen the understanding of key actors on salient issues, and promote clear threat visibilities, which are all essential to and align with the framework of responsible state behaviors. Depending on its existing capabilities, a state may require assistance in the following areas to develop and educate security infrastructure and mitigate threats to ICT security: First, effective national cybersecurity policy and governance to ensure appropriate national cybersecurity protection and response consistent with the framework of responsible state behavior. Technical expertise to assist policymakers in developing and implementing effective cybersecurity strategies and policies. Capacity building programs to build a national cybersecurity workforce and expertise. Adequate funding to invest in people, technologies, and infrastructure in supporting cybersecurity efforts. A legal framework that enables effective investigation and prosecution of cybercrime and regulation of the use of ICTs. Capacities to effectively assess and manage risks associated with the use of ICTs and enforce cybersecurity controls as baselines. And capacity to effectively respond to and recover from cyber incidents. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Malaysia, for your statement. I now give the floor to Kazakhstan, to be followed by Cuba. Kazakhstan, please.

Thank you. Kazakhstan fully supports the work of the Open-Ended Working Group, aimed at finding consensus on the key international agenda in the field of ICT. We believe that discussions within the framework of the current session will fully contribute to the achievement of the final goals of the OEWG, aimed at ensuring the security of ICT in accordance with UN General Assembly resolution 76-19. The influence of ICT in all spheres of activity of the state, organization, and civil society is increasing every day. Regarding specific measures to counter new threats, we believe that theoretical discussions of experts are important, but the emphasis should be on the practical cooperation of our technical specialists with the involvement of experts from the private sector. We believe that the practical cooperation will increase the level of countering new threats. Kazakhstan has established a coordinating advisory council with the participation of cybersecurity specialists from all government departments to discuss cases and make practical decisions. And in conclusion, the proposal to create contact points for responding to computer incidents is a concrete measure that will allow us to strengthen cooperation, including practical cooperation. Thank you.

Thank you, Kazakhstan. I give the floor now to Cuba, to be followed by Bangladesh. Cuba, please.

Thank you, Chairman. Member states face a variety of threats in the field of information security, the growing development of offensive cyber capabilities, and the inclusion by some states of the use of offensive cyber weapons in their national security strategies and the conduct of offensive cyber operations, as well as the possibility of preemptive cyber attacks to deter adversaries, may turn cyberspace into a new theater of conflict. This danger is heightened by doctrines that consider the use of force as a legitimate response to a cyber attack. The covert and illegal use of computer systems of other nations by individuals, organizations, and states aimed at carrying out cyber attacks against third countries can also be a trigger for international conflicts. The misuse of ICT and media platforms, including social networks and radio and electronic broadcasts, as a tool for interventionism through the promotion of hate speech, incitement to violence, subversion, destabilization, dissemination of false information, and distortion of reality against any state for political purposes and as a pretext for the threat or use of force also represent what is known as fourth-generation warfare, which is based on the manipulation of emotions from the use and information stored and processed in violation of the protection of personal data rights. Cuba has repeatedly denounced how access to platforms and services is limited, social network accounts are blocked, investments for the development of ICT infrastructure are hindered, and alternatives are hypocritically promoted to encourage services outside state control for subversive ends. In order to counter the above-mentioned threats, a global commitment for the use of ICTs for exclusively peaceful purposes and for the benefit of the cooperation and development of peoples is required. The use of ICTs as a pretext for the outbreak of war, the threat or use of force, or as a tool for interventionism, subversion, destabilization, dissemination of false news, misrepresentation to suit political ends—there must be a clear opposition to the militarization of cyberspace. The colossal technological gap and the obstacles imposed on developing countries to invest in the security of their ICT infrastructures, which limit their capacity to face the growing and complex existing and emerging threats, must also be addressed. Within the framework of the United Nations, we must adopt a legally binding international instrument which complements the applicable international law, responds to the significant legal gaps in cyber, and makes it possible to effectively address the growing challenges and threats through international cooperation. Finally, we would like to share some points that could contribute to addressing existing and emerging threats in the ICT environment. First, increase cooperation in dealing with cyber incidents by exchanging information that does not compromise the privacy of the states with respect to their capabilities, nor does it contravene national legislation. Two, implement technical mechanisms for capacity building, including those that prove the protection of critical infrastructure based on respect for the national legislation of states. Three, share practices in dealing with cyber incidents, especially among the computer emergency response teams, CERTs, as it’s known in English. Four, standardize to the extent possible the nomenclature of cyber incidents in the search for a common terminology to facilitate the exchange of information on incident response. And five, establish a multilateral mechanism to determine in an impartial and unequivocal manner the origin of ICT-related incidents. We have submitted the entirety of our statement, and we would thank you if you would make that available. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Cuba, for your statement. I give now the floor to Bangladesh, to be followed by Singapore.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I join other colleagues in congratulating you and your team for the excellent work done so far. We are encouraged to see your continued dedication and commitment to the work of this group. Mr. Chair, in response to your guiding questions on existing and potential threats in the ICT and cyber domain, like many other delegations, we share the concern over the growing prevalence of ransomware and attacks on critical infrastructure. Additionally, we would like to draw attention to the fact that deep fakes and digital identities are emerging as new vectors for cyber attacks and are likely to be targeted extensively in the future. We also identify quantum computing as an emerging threat as it could render current encryption systems obsolete. The geopolitics of quantum technology could act as a barrier to unlocking its full value. It is important to recognize and address these evolving threats in order to effectively mitigate their impact on the digital ecosystem. The rapid pace, complexity, and uncertainty associated with these technologies highlight the need for a common understanding of their implications to ensure our collective ability to promote resilience and maneuverability in the digital domain. To that end, we want to highlight the following points. First, we need to address the skill gap as a matter of priority. There is a sharp divide in skill and expertise in the field of digital technologies, and as new technologies emerge, the skill gaps in countering the malicious use of these technologies will widen. Therefore, we call for bridging this gap both within and among the states, which requires collective action, policy intervention, and improved accountability for government and business. Second, many of these emerging technologies are primarily being developed in the private sector. Therefore, we highlight the need for enhanced collaboration between governments and industry. Member states should utilize private sector expertise to identify risks posed by emerging technologies. Sharing best practices and lessons learned among all member states would be a significant achievement. In this regard, the operationalization of a global point of contact will be an important step to exchange information. Third, we call for creating a digital trust framework reflecting our shared objectives of ensuring security, reliability, accountability, oversight, ethical, and responsible use of technology. To conclude, Mr. Chair, we agree with you that we are on a long journey, and rest assured that my delegation is with you throughout this journey. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Bangladesh, for your statement and also for your ideas. You referred to the need for enhanced collaboration with the private sector, and I’d like to hear other delegations responding to that with additional comments, reactions, or suggestions as to how best we can do that. So, thank you for that, Bangladesh. Can I now give the floor to Singapore, to be followed by New Zealand? Singapore, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving Singapore the floor. A good understanding of existing and potential cyber threats in the context of national security may guide our thinking on what may be needed to tackle them. The guiding questions requested that we share specific threats and specific initiatives, and on that basis, we’d like to speak about three issues. The first is a future threat from artificial intelligence that bears watching and has been raised by a few delegates, including the Philippines, Malaysia, France, and Bangladesh, among many others. Many of us have heard about generative AI tools like ChatGPT, which is a natural language project that helps users write text passages and even software code. Just like a good steak knife that can be used to cut a delicious meal or cause harm, these tools can also be used for malicious purposes. Bad actors could use generative AI to more easily create advanced malware and write convincing phishing emails that could deceive users into executing them. Ironically, or perhaps appropriately, this paragraph itself was drafted by ChatGPT. The second threat we wish to briefly cover is the targeting of vulnerabilities in the tech supply chains and popular software, which has been raised by other delegations as well, including Germany. Targeting software supply chains allows cyber threat actors to increase the scale of their attacks. They can access multiple victims by leveraging the vulnerabilities of popular software or through a single initial compromise. This ensures that their attacks are more widespread. This echoes the issues that we’ve raised in the past about supply chain risk management, and we’re pleased to share that Singapore has published a critical information infrastructure supply chain program paper that acts as a blueprint for CII owners and sector leads, as well as vendors, to build security and resilience into their CII supply chains. We would be happy to share the paper and the link to that paper with any interested delegates. I move to the third threat, that of ransomware. Given how significant the threat is and how many delegates have mentioned it both in past and current sessions, we’d like to share some developments in our thinking about the threat and the specific initiatives that we’re implementing to tackle it. High-profile ransomware attacks on critical infrastructure firms have disrupted the provision of essential goods and services in recent years. Ransomware has clearly evolved from a cybercrime problem to become a significant national security issue. I’m pleased to share that as of last year, Singapore convened and completed a counter-ransomware task force, and we’ve released a report with our findings and recommendations, which serve as a blueprint for our government and respective agencies’ efforts to address ransomware attacks. The report delivered three key outcomes. First, a consolidated understanding of the ransomware kill chain, which government agencies can use as a basis to coordinate and develop counter-ransomware solutions. Second, a recommendation on whether victims should pay ransom to ransomware actors. Third, a suite of policies, plans, and capabilities under four pillars of action that the government should consider to implement to counter ransomware effectively. The four pillars of action are, briefly: first, to strengthen the defenses of our high-risk targets to make them harder targets for ransomware attacks. In this regard, the report recommended that organizations implement risk mitigation measures such as a sound credential management policy, network segregation and segmentation, robust offline backups, and restoration plans. Second, to disrupt the ransomware business model to reduce the payoff for ransomware attackers. Singapore strongly discourages the payment of ransoms and will continue to highlight the risks and implications of doing so. The report also recommended studying the implications of disallowing cyber insurance policies from including coverage on ransom payments. The key capability that we need to develop further is to be able to trace the illicit flows of assets paid in ransom, typically in cryptocurrencies. Third, to support recovery so that the victims of ransomware attacks do not feel pressured to pay the ransom, which fuels the industry further. The report recommended providing resources to help victims recover from ransomware attacks, including a one-stop portal for victims to access useful resources in an incident. Fourth and lastly, to strengthen collaboration with international partners to ensure a coordinated global approach to countering ransomware. The report recommended that we explore ways to expedite cross-border collaboration on a bilateral or plurilateral basis, such as through an international framework for information exchange and interdiction of ransom payments. If colleagues are interested, the full report can be downloaded from our website, and we’d be glad to assist colleagues in locating the report as well. Mr. Chair, it’s important for us to develop a better understanding of the threats we face, both existing and potential. In addition, sharing how we’ve tried to address the threats could help inform capacity building and enhance global cooperation in managing these threats to our national security. On that basis, we also support the proposal raised by delegates from Kenya, the Philippines, and others on the idea of setting up a global repository of issues, including threats. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Singapore, for your statement. I now give the floor to New Zealand, to be followed by Indonesia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for your work and the work of the Secretariat in support of this process. Aotearoa New Zealand remains concerned by the current cyber-threat landscape. In our most recent National Cyber Threat Report released in December, we found that 34% of cyber incidents showed links to suspected state-sponsored actors. A further 23% indicated links to suspected criminal or financially motivated activity. A key trend we are observing year-on-year is the blurring of the lines between state-sponsored and criminally or financially motivated actors. We remain concerned that the threat of ransomware and hiring of ransomware as a service continues to target critical sectors such as health care and social services, already feeling the pressure of managing the enduring effects of the pandemic and taking advantage of vulnerable people and communities, both in New Zealand and around the world. We agree with the many other states who have already said that the next annual progress report needs to include ransomware in its discussion of current threats. New Zealand also remains concerned about the current threat and role that cyber activity plays in armed conflict. It would be implausible to discuss existing cyber threats in this forum without referring to the disruptive cyber activity in the illegal war in Ukraine, malicious cyber actions that have and are being deployed by Russia in disregard for international law and established norms in cyberspace. In the context of today’s discussion on existing and potential threats, we recall that this group by consensus has agreed that international law, in particular the UN Charter and in the context of armed conflict, international humanitarian law, is applicable and essential to maintaining peace, security, and stability in cyberspace. Applied appropriately, existing international law as part of the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace provides an effective toolkit to regulate state behavior online, including addressing existing and potential threats. Finally, in response to the earlier discussion on stakeholder participation, New Zealand aligns with Canada’s… and others on the benefits of stakeholder participation in these… Thank the Women in Cyber Fellows for their participation this week. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Indonesia. To be followed by South Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, allow me to express my appreciation to you, Ambassador Burhan Gafoor, for your stewardship in leading the important work of the OEWG. Rest assured of Indonesia’s constructive engagement in the meaningful outcome of this important process in achieving an open, secure, stable, accessible, and positive environment. Indonesia remains concerned with the increasing malicious use of ICT and their serious impact on international peace and security. In the morning and afternoon sessions, we have heard many delegations identify existing and potential threats, including from AI and ransomware attacks. No country is immune to threats. In 2022, Indonesia experienced almost 1 billion cyberattacks, with more than half of the incidents derived from malware, with an amount of 56 percent, followed by data leak and information-related incidents, with an amount of 14 percent. We reiterate the need to acknowledge gaps related to capacity among member states in protecting their ICT environment, as well as mitigate and respond to threats. We also wish to reiterate that the protection of critical infrastructure also remains key in ensuring a safe and secure ICT environment, which requires a comprehensive approach from technical, institutional, and policy aspects. We are of the view that a national-scale cybersecurity strategy is needed now more than ever, as threats in the ICT environment continue to increase. In this regard, my delegation would like to share with you that Indonesia is currently formulating its national cybersecurity strategy. The draft Presidential Regulation on Cybersecurity Strategy and Cyber Crisis Management is currently being drafted and covers various aspects, such as cyber resilience, public service security, cyber law enforcement, cybersecurity culture, and cybersecurity in the digital economy. Finally, Mr. Chair, Indonesia also underlines the importance of continuing to improve the capabilities and maturity of the National Computer Security Incident Response Team, or CSIRT, as well as its network at the domestic level and how it can strengthen crisis response. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Indonesia. South Africa, to be followed by Costa Rica. South Africa, please.

Thank you, Chairperson. First, South Africa would like to express appreciation to you and your team’s consistent and action-oriented effort throughout this working group process. As always, you can count on our support and active engagement. We also look forward to fulfilling the aims of the first annual progress report and its recommended next steps as a roadmap for continuing our work building towards the adoption of our next substantive annual progress report. Chairperson, at this point, allow me to make a few points related to existing and potential threats in the sphere of ICT security, inter alia data security and possible cooperative measures to prevent and counter such threats. States have agreed via the adoption of the 11 rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior in cyberspace that we should cooperate in developing and applying measures to increase stability and security in the use of ICTs and to prevent ICT practices that are acknowledged to be harmful or that may pose threats to international peace and security. In this vein, South Africa believes that states can only operate as well as our current understanding allows us. Therefore, we agreed that the discussions in the open-ended working groups facilitate sharing of knowledge, information, and experiences on existing and potential threats. South Africa believes that new and emerging technologies have opened a new front for malicious ICT activity using the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, machine learning, cloud computing, quantum computing, and 5G. We have seen the number of unsecured IoT devices increase, allowing attackers to easily access confidential and sensitive data. The modality of working from home has created an opportunity for cybercriminals to infiltrate computer systems. The development of AI phishing attacks has made it difficult to distinguish between a phishing email and an authentic email. It is our understanding that the evolving nature of cyber threats requires a long-term cooperative approach between states. We believe that to counter existing and potential threats, states could improve the level of communication between them. It would be ideal if we were able to adopt protocols on how information relating to existing and potential threats could be shared. We note that some progress in the OEWG has been made in this regard. The establishment of a global points of contact directory is a commendable initiative that would facilitate discussions between states, in particular through the sharing of contact details for technical experts. This, in turn, will facilitate timely sharing of threat-related information and proactive ways to address them. Other methods of cooperation to mitigate extreme threats could include developing and sharing the tools to protect the security of ICT networks and applications. Chairperson, South Africa hopes that through this open-ended working group, states could agree on the importance of addressing rapidly evolving threats to their ICT infrastructure in line with Norm 1 of the rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Thank you.

Thank you very much, South Africa. I give now the floor to Costa Rica. Ambassador, you have the floor, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In April and May of 2022, about 10 months ago, Costa Rica was subject to two ransomware attacks. These attacks paralyzed computer networks and crippled essential state services. The attacks, carried out by two separate groups, caused significant disruption to nearly a quarter of the Costa Rican economy. The first group’s attack disabled online services offered by the Ministry of Finance, while the second attack, a month later, affected our social security system. Together, they temporarily prevented the government from collecting and verifying corporate and individual tax payments or customs fees, which together account for more than half of Costa Rica’s annual revenue. The initial attack demanded a $10 million ransom, which the government refused to pay. The group published 672 gigabytes of data belonging to Costa Rican public agencies, affecting more than 800 servers of the Ministry of Finance. The same group then urged Costa Rican citizens to pressure their government to pay the ransom, which the group doubled to $20 million. In another statement, the group warned, “We are determined to overthrow the government through a cyber attack.” This has been one of the few documented cases where a terrorist group not only attacks the government but openly promotes overthrowing it. On the 8th of May 2022, Costa Rica declared a national emergency in the entire public sector. In total, it is calculated that 27 different ministries were affected by the attack, as were municipal governments and utilities. It is clear to us that the biggest global cyber threat we face today is ransomware, and not all states recognize it, but we in Costa Rica have. Ransomware poses a threat to the national economic security of all states, and attacks are always unacceptable. However, when they target critical infrastructure, disrupt essential services such as public health, schools, finance, insurance, or government functions, we must spare no efforts. In this working group, we must discuss not only current threats but also potential threats. Technology is advancing by leaps and bounds, and keeping up with innovation is in itself a challenge. The ICT threat landscape continues to evolve at lightning speed, and malicious behavior in cyberspace is increasing at a rate that is difficult to predict. Moreover, these have human rights impacts, particularly on freedom of expression and privacy, in a way that disproportionately impacts vulnerable groups. We must therefore focus on the threats that groups like women, human rights defenders, and journalists could face by malicious actors. For example, artificial intelligence can become a threat to cybersecurity in a number of ways by being used to develop sophisticated and complex attacks that can circumvent traditional security measures, including malicious use of AI, automation of cybercrime, and exploitation of security vulnerabilities, among others. This week, the Group of Governmental Experts related to emerging technologies in the field of lethal autonomous weapon systems is meeting in Geneva. Costa Rica has followed this issue very closely in order to ensure compliance with international law, including the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter, International Human Rights Law, and International Humanitarian Law. Mr. Chairman, this group is an excellent opportunity to provide states and stakeholders with timely information for policy formulation, decision-making, and implementation of security measures, as well as to increase understanding, knowledge, and information on emerging threats associated with new technologies. For this, it is key that this working group work with stakeholders to better understand how the various existing and emerging threats can affect human security, with a particular focus on the groups who experience disproportionate impact. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Costa Rica. Thank you, Ambassador, for sharing the experience of your country. I think that’s a point of reflection for all members in terms of how we can share information, in terms of how we can cooperate to address these emerging threats, in particular the issue of ransomware. We’ll continue with our speakers list. I have Ireland to be followed by Australia. Ireland, please.

Chair, Ireland wishes to thank you and your team for preparing the fourth substantive session this week. Ireland fully aligns itself with the comments made earlier by the EU and would like to make some additional comments in our national capacity. Chair, we agree with previous speakers that ransomware attacks are a major current threat that needs to be addressed by the OEWG. Just last month, there were two high-profile ransomware attacks in Ireland, one of which was directed against a public university and impacted thousands of students and staff. As we work in this forum to address these issues, it is of utmost importance that we do so with a shared and clear sense of the threat landscape we face. This is the foundation for the other strands of our work. Chair, cybercriminals and ransomware groups are better organized, have more developed capabilities, and are more sophisticated than ever before. These attacks can cause real damage to society, particularly when they attack operators of essential services. Furthermore, ransomware as a service is reducing the barrier for conducting this type of cybercrime and allows for the proliferation of actors to engage in such attacks. It is with regret that much of this militant activity is made possible by some state actors who, contrary to the norms of responsible state behavior and in particular the responsibility for due diligence, allow criminal groups to further destabilize cyberspace to the detriment of us all. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly difficult to identify where criminal activity ends and state action begins for certain cyberattacks. Chair, to effectively challenge ransomware and criminals in cyberspace, it will require a concerted international effort. As referenced by Romania, the International Counter-Ransomware Initiative is a first-of-its-kind intergovernmental coalition uniting over 37 countries and the EU to tackle ransomware through a collective, coordinated, and comprehensive approach to ransomware resilience, disruption, illicit finance, public-private partnerships, and diplomacy. The work of the CRI supports the implementation of the agreed-upon UN normative framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. It would be useful for the OEWG to take stock of this work, and we welcome states to join this cooperative group. Chair, in response to your question, the best way to collaborate with the private sector is to ensure they are in the room. Given the ever-evolving nature of the cyber-threat landscape, the role of stakeholders from the private sector and civil society is more important than ever. Ireland fully supports the earlier comments made by the EU and Canada. We strongly advocate for the more active participation of stakeholders in the OEWG to enhance situational awareness and also to input their learnings and insights into the process. Non-state stakeholders are particularly well-placed to enhance our understanding, knowledge, and information of cybersecurity challenges related to new and emerging technologies such as quantum and artificial intelligence. The challenges that we see in the current threat landscape and the potential risks arising from new technologies are best addressed by utilizing all the talents at our disposal. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Arlen. Before I give the floor to Australia, to be followed by the UK, I think there has been an idea suggested about a repository to share information relating to emerging threats. I think attention was also drawn to the fact that there is a repository in the domain of cybercrime, and I think reference has also been made to UNIDIR’s Cyber Policy Portal as a database for various cyber aspects, trends, and elements. So, can I also get a reaction from delegations and their response, if they have any at this stage, to the idea of a repository within the context of this working group? So, we’ll continue with the speakers list. Australia, to be followed by the UK. Australia, please.

Thank you, Chair. I want to start by thanking you for focusing this session’s preliminary multistakeholder consultation specifically on the threats landscape last Wednesday. I found this incredibly informative, and I agree with the Philippines that the threats elaborated upon by those stakeholders are alarming. I simply want to echo the points that were made by Canada today regarding the value of stakeholder engagement and the modalities which we spent significant effort to negotiate and agree upon. What I took particularly from the multistakeholder session was that we should be focusing on understanding and assessing the risks posed by the malicious use of new and emerging technologies. I want to particularly thank Malaysia for its very informative and detailed threat assessment of the evolving technology landscape this afternoon. Last Wednesday, Global Partners Digital raised the growing malicious use of artificial intelligence to test cyber networks for vulnerabilities at exceptional speed, particularly to target technology supply chains. Chatham House noted that their research has shown that the malicious use of AI technologies can involve replicating and amplifying offline discrimination against women online, increasing its audience reachability and the end users’ vulnerability in cyberspace. Similar to Argentina, Chile, Sri Lanka, and several others, Australia believes that consideration of the gendered impacts and harms of new and emerging technologies is imperative for our work. We thank you, Chair, for bringing to our attention the confluence of our meeting this week with the Commission on the Status of Women, if anyone had missed it in the lobby, and the theme of which this year is innovation and technological change. Because technology reflects the society in which it is designed, developed, and used, gender bias is likely where data sets used for training artificial intelligence algorithms are not representative of women and girls. Meaningful participation, leadership, and representation of women, including in the design and development of new technologies, are therefore critical to ensuring the production of technologies that meet the needs of our societies as a whole. Chair, many states have highlighted the increasing implications for international peace and security where the effects of malicious cyber activity by non-state actors, including criminal groups, rise to the level of a national emergency, particularly the threat posed by ransomware. Since our last session in July, Australia has experienced two major national ransomware incidents. The first targeted our second-largest telecommunications provider, and the other our largest health insurance provider. Both resulted in the extraction of personal data of hundreds of thousands of Australians, and in some cases, incredibly sensitive health data, some of which was published and sold on the dark web. I won’t repeat the impacts of ransomware that have been eloquently set out by previous speakers, particularly by Costa Rica, just before me. But I do want to emphasize that the effects of malicious ransomware can be devastating and be whole of economy and whole of society in their consequences. Because we should always keep top of mind what it actually is that we are securing when we talk about the threats to international peace and security. That is, we are securing prosperity, we are securing development, and we are securing the stability for countries to determine their own future. I found very interesting the suite of proposals from the Philippines regarding practical ways to share and understand threat information. I very much welcome additional discussion on these proposals and ideas, particularly supporting the learning from what already exists. As you said, Chair, the UNODC Sherlock portal, we find it very informative. Australia has all of our legislation for cybercrime on that portal, and our cyber policy as well. We encourage other countries to do the same. The UNODC cyber policy portal, which is sort of a similar thing to the UNODC portal, but for more cyber security-related policy. And also the counter ransomware initiative that’s been mentioned by several countries already today. Chair, colleagues, Under-Secretary-General Nakamitsu made quite eloquent points this morning on the current and growing threats faced by us all, and that the use of ICTs to support active hostilities is now far from abstract. It’s no longer becoming more likely, but it is a reality. We cannot ignore the evolving threat landscape in and around conflict. Malicious cyber activity that results in cascading critical infrastructure effects in other states or spillover effects can play an escalatory role in and around conflict and have potentially devastating security, economic, social, and humanitarian consequences. Chair, I do want to thank you for allowing additional time in our agenda to have in-depth conversations about the threats that we face. These and the other threats that have been described by colleagues here today, and also in our past sessions, provide the context against which the following discussions under our mandate flow, and the context through which the work of this group becomes meaningful. The remainder of our discussions on recommendations and proposals for responsible use of cyberspace and technology must be concretely and specifically linked back to the threats which we identify, and I hope that these threats will be comprehensively reflected in our next annual progress report. Finally, Chair, I cannot conclude without supporting the many states who’ve made statements before me. Australia stands with Ukraine and the broad coalition of international partners to mark more than one year since Russia commenced its illegal and immoral full-scale invasion. Australia, in concert with our partners, has publicly attributed malicious Russian cyber activity directed in Ukraine. Others have already provided details of this malicious cyber activity conducted by Russia. This behavior is unacceptable. It undermines trust, confidence, and all diplomatic efforts to advance international peace and security in cyberspace. The Australian Government continues to call on Russia to immediately withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory, consistent with the legally binding decision of the International Court of Justice. I thank you for your time.

Thank you, Australia, for your statement. UK to be followed by Ghana. UK, please.

Thank you, Chair. I would first like to echo comments from Australia and many others on Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine, which is an egregious violation of international law and the UN Charter. The United Kingdom and our international partners stand united in condemning Russia’s reprehensible actions, and we underline the comments made by the UN Under-Secretary-General of Disarmament Affairs at the start of the session. Cyber attacks on Ukraine increased in advance of the attack and have continued since. We echo the concerns of others regarding spillover effects from the use of cyber operations in conflict. We should continue to discuss and address that threat in this group. In 2023, it is therefore more important than ever that the international community works together to establish a shared understanding of threats in cyberspace and to uphold the framework of responsible state behavior, which is central to international peace and security. Over the past year, the cyber security threat has evolved. As noted by many others, ransomware remains a major challenge to businesses and public services across all of our societies. Ransomware can cause incidents that rise to the level of impacting international peace and stability, and increased use of ransomware as a service provides disruptive opportunities to a wider range of criminal actors. It is therefore essential that we work collectively to implement the agreed norms of responsible state behavior. Each state must take responsibility through reasonable steps to address malicious activity, including the threat of cybercrime emanating from within their territory. We all need to demonstrate a meaningful commitment to these norms. The United Kingdom will continue to impose costs for malicious cyber activity and to support our collective resilience and international willingness to respond. To this end, earlier this year, the United Kingdom, alongside our allies, took action against seven individuals identified as being involved in cybercrime and the development of ransomware strains. The United Kingdom is also deeply concerned that the growing commercial market in advanced cyber capabilities has led to the widespread sale and use of high-end capabilities in ways that undermine human rights. It is important that the sale and use of commercial cyber tools happens in a legal and responsible way. Such tools must not be used in ways that threaten human rights. The United Kingdom is keen to work with the international community to help define responsible state behavior, and we will take active steps to support states in the responsible use of such technologies. We reaffirm our commitment to cyber capacity building and supportive responsible behavior in this context and others. Finally, the United Kingdom echoes the comments on the intersectionality between cyber and gender issues made by Argentina, Chile, Australia, and others. This week, the UK will host a ministerial meeting on increasing women’s representation in cyber and technology as a side event to the wonderful Commission on the Status of Women. We recognize the vital role that the stakeholder community makes in maintaining international peace and security in cyberspace, given their unique insights and expertise, and we thank those that contributed to last week’s informal consultations on threats. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, UK, for your statement. Ghana to be followed by Sudan. Ghana, please.

Mr. Chair, thank you for your hard work in steering the work of this working group and for sending guiding questions ahead of time to ensure a more focused discussion. As a nation committed to promoting the safe and secure use of ICT, Ghana’s position remains that international cooperation and collaboration are crucial in addressing the rapidly evolving challenges posed by the digital age. International cooperation is an integral part of Ghana’s cybersecurity development, as outlined in Section 83 of Ghana’s Cybersecurity Act, Act 1038. Therefore, we will continue to prioritize these engagements as we envision a mutually agreed-upon outcome document. In this session, my delegation aims to reiterate the areas that are of key priorities to Ghana and work with other member states to find consensus on diverging areas. Mr. Chair, since passing the Act, the Cybersecurity Authority has continued to work tirelessly to regulate cybersecurity activities, protect critical information infrastructure, and safeguard children online, among other areas that are of priority to us. Ghana continues to put in place measures to enhance the country’s cybersecurity posture and promote international cooperation in the fight against cybercrime, as it continues to address existing and potential threats. Thus, we are willing to show flexibility in order to achieve consensus on all substantive matters. Mr. Chair, on the substantive issue of threats, Ghana continues to recognize that the advent of the fourth industrial revolution and the increasing use of technologies, specifically AI, Internet of Things, blockchain technology, among others, continue to pose risks to international security, despite the significant benefits they offer. Some of these threats include impersonation, ransomware attacks, online fraud, online blackmail, unauthorized access, disinformation, publication of non-consensual intimate images, cyberbullying, among others. In view of this, Mr. Chair, it is important that the international community develops guidelines and interventions that will enhance the capacity of member states to address some of these threats, to ensure that cybersecurity efforts do not become a barrier to the wider adoption of technology and its potentially transformative value to the global economy. The guidelines developed must be holistic. Additionally, Ghana supports the proposal by Kenya to have a threat repository and believes it will be beneficial to the work of member states, especially CERT and CII teams, in their efforts to flag and efficiently address existing threats. Our cybersecurity efforts will go a long way, among other things, to instill confidence in people to utilize some of these digital platforms. Additionally, Ghana agrees with the points made by Malaysia and other member states on capacity. Mr. Chair, member states and the international community at large need to collaborate to provide equitable access to cybersecurity capacity. Frameworks should be developed for identifying national cybersecurity capacity in response to emerging risks and potential threats. There must also be policies and interventions adopted to ensure the strategic investment in such capacity. Collective action against non-cyber crime groups needs to be significantly enhanced, and interventions designed to close the gaps in collective investigation and promote a more robust deterrence model for malicious behavior in cyberspace. States need to have the technical expertise and personnel necessary to implement and maintain robust cybersecurity measures to address these threats. My delegation, however, will elaborate more on this under the section on capacity building. Beyond capacity, the existence of effective legislation is needed to ensure that cybercriminals are appropriately prosecuted and apprehended. Collaborating with relevant officials of the criminal justice sector, information sharing, and putting in place the necessary financial and technical resources to invest in cybersecurity and to respond to cyber incidents will also be beneficial. Regarding the recommended next steps, as highlighted in the section on existing and potential threats of the UN first annual progress report, Ghana fully supports the listed recommendations. Ghana believes it is important to continue exchanging views on existing and potential threats to security in the use of ICT that have the potential to undermine international peace and security, including holding focused discussions on the items outlined in paragraphs 8 to 13 of the annual report. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Ghana, for your statement. Sudan, to be followed by the Republic of Korea.

Thank you, Chair. At the outset, my delegation would like to commend the positive, encouraging, and continuous engagement of the Chair with the members of the group in a transparent manner, and we believe such engagement would help reach the desirable consensual outcome we all look forward to. The creation of a global points of contact directory is a practical confidence-building measure within the mandate of this Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG). Its establishment will favor the implementation of other confidence-building measures, support norms on the responsible behavior of states in cyberspace, and strengthen efforts of capacity building, particularly with regard to the exchange of information and cooperation in the event of ICT-related incidents. Considering threats ranging from phishing attacks to ransomware and attacks on infrastructure, and other alarming threats, are all but a testimony of the need to open channels of communication between governments, and the need to work collaboratively to bridge gaps in skills and data security. It should also be noted that norms of responsible state behavior, CBMs, and capacity-building measures are closely linked to each other and should be developed hand-in-hand to create a comprehensive cycle. We believe that communication between states, whether in a normal situation or in times of actual and potential conflicts, seeks to ensure that ICTs are used peacefully for the common good of humanity, and to promote the sustainable development of all countries, regardless of the level of scientific and technological development, with the understanding that threats may affect states differently depending on their different levels of ICT, digitalization, capacity, security, and resilience. Thus, the POC should be structured under the exclusive auspices of the United Nations, in accordance with its principles and purposes, and within the framework of existing mandates on security and the use of ICTs. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs may be entrusted with the management of the POC. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Sudan. Republic of Korea, to be followed by Armenia. Korea, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Let me begin by thanking you, Chair, for your leadership and efforts in this important process. My delegation also appreciates the beneficial discussions we had in the international inter-sessional meeting last December. My delegation takes this opportunity to welcome the participation of the non-governmental stakeholders and looks forward to hearing their views on Thursday. Again, we underline the important role played by various non-governmental entities in our efforts towards cyber security and continue to support a multistakeholder approach in this process. In this respect, we echo what has been said by Canada and others with respect to the transparency of the accreditation process. Mr. Chair, we have witnessed enormous technological advancements in digital technology. However, as much as this development has brought us unprecedented economic and social benefits, we face increasing and continuously evolving threats caused by malicious cyber activities. In the past few years, we have seen that digital data has become more open and accessible with the introduction of cloud-based technologies. The introduction of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing opens up new possibilities but also poses complex questions from a cyber security perspective, as pointed out by many previous speakers. In assessing existing and potential threats in cyberspace, my delegation joins previous speakers such as you, Argentina, the U.S., and others in expressing serious concern over the increasing threat from ransomware and critical infrastructure attacks. With the help of increasingly sophisticated data encryption and data theft techniques, ransomware attacks are expanding at a rapid rate, undermining global ISD security and stability as a whole. Therefore, addressing this particular threat has become a pressing task. The Korean government is taking various measures to counter this threat, including issuing advisory notices on the risk of ransomware and preventive measures to counter its negative impact. My delegation is also concerned over increasing cases of cryptocurrency theft and the use of cryptocurrencies to launder illegal proceeds and cash in illicit payments. Even more troubling is that these malicious activities are mobilized for the purpose of evading U.N. sanctions and financing the illegal development of weapons of mass destruction, threatening international peace and security. My delegation would like to underline the importance of curbing these particular activities through heightened vigilance and cooperation among member states. Given the transnational and multifaceted nature of malicious cyber activities, my delegation believes in the importance of multilayered cooperation between member states and relevant stakeholders. Mr. Chair, increasing stake in cybersecurity is indeed a reminder of the significance of the mandates of this Open-Ended Working Group. My delegation stressed the importance and urgency of developing and implementing non-binding voluntary norms in cyberspace. Also, along with sharing information in good faith and building confidence, supporting capacity building should be at the heart of the work of this working group. We also think that this working group can benefit from experiences and best practices of the established regional cybersecurity networks, particularly for our deliberation on the establishment of the POC directory. Mr. Chairman, before closing, my delegation would like to reiterate our position condemning illegal and unprovoked Russia’s war against – aggression against Ukraine. The Republic of Korea stands firmly with the government and the people of Ukraine in this difficult time. We also join in expressing grave concern over increasing cyber attacks against Ukraine in the context of the ongoing armed conflict, which poses a serious threat against the stability and security of cyberspace. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Republic of Korea. I give the floor now to Armenia, to be followed by Japan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, our delegation would like to thank you for your leadership in steering the work of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of information and communication technologies. We also thank the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, for her introductory remarks. The development of ICTs is becoming critical for the well-being of humanity and the promotion of peace, sustainable development, and human rights. Armenia is firmly committed to a global, open, free, stable, and secure cyberspace. We support the efforts within the framework of the UN aimed at mitigating the risks and countering threats stemming from the use of ICTs, promoting rules and norms for responsible state behavior, and confidence-building measures. We share the Secretary-General’s assessment reflected in his report on our common agenda that the complex digital issues can include the application of human rights online and accountability criteria for discrimination and misleading content. Digital technologies provide a new means to advocate, defend, and exercise human rights, but they can also be used to suppress, limit, and violate human rights. Hence, it is important not to overlook the implications of the malicious use of ICTs for the enjoyment of human rights, in particular the right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas regardless of frontiers as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ICTs can also be utilized to incite discrimination, identity-based hate, and spread misinformation, extremist ideologies, and violent practices, particularly on social media platforms. The growing use of cyberspace to disseminate racism, xenophobia, and instigate violence and hate crimes on ethnic and religious grounds, in particular when promoted at the state level, constitutes a dangerous trend which, if not addressed, can lead to grave breaches of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The nature of threats in the ICT domain requires innovative and forward-looking responses which should be based on a broad partnership between member states, international organizations, the private sector, civil society, and academia. Voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behavior can reduce risks to international peace, security, and stability and play an important role in increasing predictability and reducing risks of misperceptions, thus contributing to the prevention of the escalation of conflict. Armenia supports the activities of the Open-Ended Working Group as an inclusive and transparent platform for advancing the dialogue on the implementation of the rules, norms, and principles of responsible behavior of states. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Armenia. Japan, to be followed by Colombia. Japan, please.

Thank you, Chair. At the outset, we would like to thank you and your team for your dedication and efforts to convene this meeting. In cyberspace, there are increasing threats of organized and sophisticated cyber attacks. In Japan, the number of cases of damage caused by ransomware has increased significantly. Last November, a hospital in Japan was hit with ransomware, which caused some medical services to be suspended. In response to this situation, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare issued an alert to medical institutions nationwide regarding cyber attacks by ransomware targeting medical institutions. As Denmark, France, and others have indicated, we must be mindful of the importance of protecting medical institutions from cyber attacks. As noted in the annual progress report last July, cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, continue to be a threat which the OEWG needs to face. As Canada has stated, these threats have to be clearly stated in the upcoming July’s annual progress report. As other delegations have noted, threats could increase as attacks take advantage of emerging technologies. Using AI technology, cyber attacks could be carried out at a speed and scale that exceeds human capabilities. In the midterm, we must also prepare for autonomous attacks that are controlled not by humans but by AI. Also, as many delegations have already noted, our discussion cannot be separated from events in the real world. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is a clear violation of international law, inter alia the UN Charter, posing significant threats also to cyberspace. Lastly, as many of my previous speakers have stated, we would also like to highlight the importance of a multistakeholder approach in addressing the threats in cyberspace. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Japan. Colombia, to be followed by Belgium. Colombia, please.

Thank you, Chairman. We would like to thank you for your efforts and your leadership in heading up this working group, as well as the series of additional informal consultations and meetings held since the third substantive session of the group, in particular the inter-sessional informal meeting in December, as well as the informal consultations with a number of interested parties, and of course the preparation for the fourth session. Of course, we welcome the valuable comments of Ms. Nakamitsu, the work of the Secretary, and the work of UNIDIR. We reiterate Colombia’s readiness to support your work and our readiness to continue participating constructively in the process of this Open-Ended Working Group. On a number of occasions, we’ve referred to the enormous and rapid progress in ICT, and we’ve recognized that these are extraordinary tools for economic and social development, but that their misuse could have a negative impact on the integrity of state infrastructure and could be a threat to international peace and security. The increasing use of ICTs in all aspects of life means that we must continually be on the lookout for existing and potential threats and adopt cooperation measures to prevent and halt these threats, to guarantee a free, safe, and peaceful digital environment. The use of digitalization in all areas means that we need greater cooperation and codification. Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for your guiding questions, and in responding to them, we’ve identified crime as a service, ransomware as a service, as other delegates have said, or the seizure of data as a service, as well as the use of AI for malicious purposes. Canada, Estonia, and Singapore have referred to this and the development of AI for autonomous decision-making, as mentioned by El Salvador, as well as addressing emerging and potential threats. On this specific part of the agenda, we are particularly grateful for the valuable contributions made by a number of interested parties during the informal session on the 2nd of March. We believe their contributions are particularly useful in identifying new technologies whose properties and characteristics may create new vectors and vulnerabilities that can then be exploited for malicious purposes, thus contributing to potential and emerging threats. The informal meeting was a fruitful exchange, which once again reminded us of the importance of being able to discuss and have the assistance and support of the many parties, particularly given their technical knowledge and their expertise, as well as being the main source of developing ICTs. The interested parties have a role and responsibility to play in studying threats and in preventing them and halting them. Their support is necessary for the implementation of measures agreed upon by states, as well as to build capacity. Mr. Chairman, turning to specific concrete initiatives which could be provided by states and other interested parties in this working group to address new and emerging threats to international security, we would like to mention the following: 1. Strengthening information exchange networks between states through platforms such as the MISP so that the capacities of different countries can be mutually complementary and can create genuine synergy, which would make early detection of existing or potential threats possible in the shortest period of time and would help us to manage those threats early on. 2. We would underscore the development of networks, groups, and roundtables involving experts who carry out an analysis of threats, and even more important, to make recommendations to the members of these spaces so that we can manage threats in the best possible way and mitigate their possible effects. 3. It’s also important to work towards building a global culture of cybersecurity and protection of essential infrastructure. As we’ve said before, this is something the General Assembly has addressed in particular in Resolution 58-199 in 2003 and recalled in Resolution 73-27 in 2018. International cooperation and assistance are essential in this area. 4. We also believe it is important to develop specific and effective mechanisms for assistance and cooperation in order to develop and improve the human, institutional, and technical capacities in the area of cybersecurity and resilience. 5. Similarly, we must strengthen initiatives which will make it possible to gather resources to facilitate analysis, ensure detection, containment, and the eradication of threats such as the threat of ransomware. I’m referring to projects such as NoMoreRansom.org. These are initiatives which we must promote to halt these threats. 6. We support Kenya’s proposal on a repertory. I’m sorry, since the speaker – we also welcome the suggestion made to explore the possibility of using others’ portal so that it can be used for the purposes of our work. We also echo the proposals for cooperative action to disciplinary experts made by Malaysia and the cooperation mentioned by Singapore. In terms of specific capacity, states need to support the implementation of responsible state behavior and ICTs, and in order to develop appropriate security infrastructure to mitigate these threats, Colombia has identified the need to receive support in the following areas: 1. Training and updating of the technical human teams in cybersecurity. 2. Updating and extra technical tools to combat cybercrime. 3. Training for experts in the area of the misuse of ICTs for expert technical cooperation to establish comprehensive national protection plans, which cover cyber resilience as well. 4. Raise awareness on the importance of digital security and the existing threats and means of protection at the highest levels of public administration and institutions. I’m referring to public offices such as the Congress, high courts, and armed forces. 5. Raise awareness in society regarding digital security and its importance in daily life. Thank you.

Thank you, Colombia, for your statement. Belgium, to be followed by Nicaragua.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation appreciates your efforts to bring this group towards increasing convergence, and let me assure you of my delegation’s full support. My country aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and supports the statement delivered by Canada on stakeholders’ participation in France on the program of work. We wish to stress the following elements in our national capacity. Mr. Chair, the cyber-threats landscape has continued to expand significantly in recent years, and the continuing increase in incidents involving the malicious use of ICTs is cause for major concern, particularly in the current challenging geopolitical environment, and in light of the unprovoked and unjustified Russian aggression against Ukraine. In this context, my delegation stresses the important character of the threat pillar of our work. In your opening remarks, Mr. Chair, you stressed the importance for the group to deliver a substantial second annual progress report in July this year. To reach that important goal, we must build convergence and move towards greater common understanding on existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security, and build consensus. My delegation is of the view that the following threats should draw the specific attention of our group. One, as stressed in the APR last year, harmful ICT activity against critical infrastructure that provides essential services, such as energy, water, and communication, remains this year again a trend of great concern. Two, as mentioned by a vast majority of delegations today, ransomware. Of concern are their complexity, their illegal sources of financing, and the threats they pose to states’ sovereignty. Three, new threats emerging from the development of new and emerging technologies, in particular the increasing autonomy in AI, quantum computing, the use of cyber-attacks in armed conflicts, not only cyber-kinetic coordination, but also the increasing and unacceptable cyber-attacks against humanitarian actors. When it comes to mitigating cyber-threats, my delegation would like to stress the following elements. One, a strong focus on prevention and proactivity is a key component to I-threats mitigation. In this respect, the Center for Cybersecurity in Belgium has developed an active cyber-protection approach aimed at securing the digital space for all its constituents. It emphasizes proactiveness when striving to assist us in detecting and mitigating the most relevant vulnerabilities. It promotes a tailored, automated, and participative approach to the mitigation of cyber-threats and addresses both human and technical vulnerabilities. By developing preventive tools and practices to address cyber-security risks, it also builds trust in the digital environment. The collection of information is another key component of threat mitigation. Within the framework of the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, the new trend is to collect more information and evidence on ICT threats and cyber-attacks as a way to enhance our understanding of threats and foster a more adequate response. On the suggestion made by Kenya to put in place a repository of common threats, the group would draw from the experience of the European Repository of Cyber Incidents, which is an independent research consortium that provides evidence-based scientific analysis of cyber-incidents. Its resources include user-specific, reliable data, which aim to make this network a public forum on cyber-incidents, their characteristics, and relevant trends. Finally, this group would provide an avenue for the exchange of best practices and lessons learned on threat mitigation and response. Some delegations mentioned roundtables and dialogues. These are indeed useful avenues to explore in these groups. The POC directory will also be instrumental with regard to information exchange. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Belgium. Nicaragua to be followed by China. Nicaragua, please.

Thank you very much, Chairman. As always, we would like to thank you for your leadership in this process. Every day we are facing new threats which are ever-changing and ever more complex. It is important urgently to address the development of new technologies, the purpose of which would be to counter cyber-attacks because otherwise cyberspace will become a conflict zone. The politicization of cyberspace is another one of the existing threats. This goes hand-in-hand with the lack of clarity in the attributions to identify perpetrators, be they individuals, states, or organizations which carry out cyber-attacks against third countries. It is important to recognize the lack of preparation and training of developing countries to prevent and to respond to the misuse of ICTs against our country in violation of the UN Charter and international law, in particular when their use in bad faith interferes in our domestic affairs, affecting our economy and our infrastructure and our critical infrastructure. One of the specific solutions to improve cooperation in preventing and resolving these incidents would be to establish global points of contact, which we can discuss in depth later on. However, it would also be important to consider establishing an international security system under the auspices of the United Nations in order to draft the measures which would halt these threats, with the relevant resolutions and the UN Charter as our cornerstone, including the peaceful resolution of disputes. Similarly, we are obligated as an international community to commit ourselves globally to cooperate and to agree that the use of ICT must be for peaceful purposes and must benefit the development agenda for our people. In order to do that, there must be a serious commitment to oppose the militarization of cyberspace. Coercive, unilateral coercive measures have become an obstacle in gaining access to technology required for us to be better prepared in the face of a variety of threats and in order to have access to the benefits of the safe ICT environment. Therefore, it is important to eliminate these unilateral measures imposed on developing countries. In conclusion, it is essential to bolster cooperation and solidarity internationally so that we can have good best practices which will ensure a safe international environment for information and so that we can address future threats, including misinformation. We can protect personal data, ensure that there’s no monopolization of the ICT market, to mention but a few issues. Thank you Chair.

Thank you very much Nicaragua. China to be followed by Vanuatu. China, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for all the hard work you’ve done in preparation for this session. China believes that today we are witnessing three dangerous trends that should raise alarm bells for us. First, there is a further spike in the risk of cyberspace fragmentation. A scant few countries have deliberately brought ideological differences into cyberspace that politicize, instrumentalize, and weaponize technology and economic and trade issues, artificially cutting off the global internet, destabilizing the global industrial and supply chains, and obstructing global cooperation development in cyberspace. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has warned that two markets, two sets of standards, and two supply chains are emerging as regards cyberspace and digital technology. Therefore, we believe that countries should remain committed to unity over division, cooperation over confrontation, inclusion over exclusion, and on the basis of universal participation, elaborate international rules to prevent division and fragmentation in cyberspace. Second, cyberspace is fast evolving into a new battlefront. A scant few countries with dominant cyber capabilities openly admitted to launching offensive cyber operations against other countries, and for the first time, explicitly included other countries’ critical infrastructure as wartime cyber attack targets, leveraging one’s own cyber military advantages, flaunting and developing offensive cyber military capabilities, creating military alliances in cyberspace, advancing proliferation of offensive cyber technologies, and pushing for the development of rules of engagement in cyberspace. These actions will not contribute to the maintenance of peace in cyberspace, and no country or military bloc is able to lock in one-sided security in cyberspace by acting in this manner. Third, global cyberspace governance is being challenged. Cyberspace is a common space for humanity, and the future of cyberspace should be jointly shaped by all countries. Driven by the petty geopolitical considerations, a scant few countries have gone to great lengths to create exclusive cliques outside the UN, seriously holding back the efforts towards an international order in cyberspace. It is our hope that those countries will return to multilateral fora such as the UN, re-engage in the international process of inclusive consultation, joint contribution, and benefit sharing, and work with the rest of the international community to build a peaceful, secure, open, cooperative, and orderly cyberspace. On another note, we have noticed that some countries have proposed discussing the threats from emerging technologies. First of all, China believes that we don’t have a common understanding of emerging technologies. AI and technology like that are being discussed in other fora. We should not replicate those efforts. And secondly, in the emerging technology sector, the most prominent issue is that of peaceful uses. The Cuban delegation mentioned in their statement that the General Assembly last year adopted a resolution, A/RES/77/96, entitled Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security, stressing the need to safeguard developing countries’ right to peaceful use of technology and that no restrictions be placed on developing countries acquiring materials, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes in the service of sustainable development. Today, a minority of countries abuse national security as a pretext to hamstring and straitjacket the businesses of other countries. This runs counter to the OEWG consensus on global rules and standards setting that bring in ideological confrontation, knock together small cliques and exclusive circles, dictate discriminatory standards and export controls, thus severely compromising the right of other countries to peaceful uses of technology. In this context, therefore, China is of the view that securing the right of all countries to the peaceful uses of technology is a matter of great importance and urgency. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, China, for your statement. I give the floor now to Vanuatu, to be followed by Switzerland. Vanuatu, please.

Thank you, Chair. Since this is the first time for Vanuatu to make an intervention, please allow me to offer you and the Secretariat our delegation’s full support and confidence in ensuring that the OEWG progresses its work in an inclusive and productive manner, and thank you for the productive and dedicated work that you have undertaken so far. Chair, the Republic of Vanuatu was recently targeted by a ransomware cyber attack by a group called the Ransom House. The attack crippled our government’s communications and the essential services provided to the citizens, residents, and businesses. This ransomware attack also targeted vulnerabilities in the government broadband network. While our officials and developing partners work around the clock to mitigate its effects and patch any vulnerabilities, it highlighted the work that still needs to be done and challenges that Vanuatu, as a small island developing state, faces in the sphere of information and communication technologies. Vanuatu is no different from other countries where decision-makers and security professionals are struggling to keep up with the pace of the ever-changing cyber threats and threat actor behaviors. The likes of phishing attacks, online scams, ransomware, the rise of IoT bots, botnets, malware attacks, and defacing of websites are also threatening Vanuatu’s internet environment. In addition, the coercive emerging new normal significantly contributed to the massive increase of Vanuatu’s cyber threat landscape, thus exposing Vanuatu’s vulnerable existence to the vast increase of digital threat incidents that are recorded yearly. This is alarming and critical, whereby none or only a handful of experts in-country were identified to secure and protect systems and networks, particularly the government broadband network, on a day-to-day basis. In March 2021, Vanuatu launched the Vanuatu National Cyber Security Strategy 2030. It is a plan of action designed to improve the security and resilience of Vanuatu’s national critical infrastructure and services. The strategy establishes a range of national objectives and priorities that are achievable for Vanuatu within the next 10 years. It delivers six priorities – cyber resilience, cyber security awareness, cyber capability and literacy, addressing cybercrime, international engagement, and cyber security standards and legal frameworks. The Republic of Vanuatu also recognizes in the strategy that we simply do not have the abundance of technical skills or required technologies to mitigate the impacts of ICT threats on our security. As colleagues know, we share a common cyberspace, and we are all as vulnerable as each other. With that, we align ourselves with the statements made by France and Canada. We also support the existing cyber policies in the UN web, as well as suggestions made by Malaysia with regards to a more effective cyber security policy and governance to ensure appropriate national cyber security protection and response, consistent with a framework of responsible threat behaviors, and b, technical expertise to assist policymakers in developing and implementing effective cyber security strategies and policies, as they stem from the fact that any individual cyber threat any of us as a state face is a threat we all face together. We will make, intervene statements and contributions accordingly where we see appropriate for the rest of the agenda in the coming days this week. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Vanuatu. Switzerland to be followed by Israel. Switzerland, please.

Chair, thank you, you and your team for all the efforts in preparing this fourth session of our group. We highly evaluate the opportunity of having focused discussions, and the guiding questions are a good tool to structure them. I will seize the opportunity to provide remarks on a number of them. First, I would like to underline the importance of multistakeholders to our work, as Argentina, Canada, the Philippines, the US, and others have stated. We regret that the procedure of accreditation has been delayed and was not transparent. Mr. Chair, we meet here one year after Russia started an unjustifiable war against Ukraine. A permanent member of the Security Council has decided to attack its neighbor, an independent nation, a sovereign nation. For a year, we have all been witnessing the serious violation of the UN Charter, intolerable misery, death, and destruction in Ukraine. Every country in the world has been affected in some way by the consequences of this war. Its consequences are disastrous. As our Foreign Minister put it in the UN General Assembly on the 23rd of February, it is crucial that we send a strong message for peace and for the respect of international law. It is the international legal order that unites us, and as for any other area of interstate relations, this is also true regarding cyberspace. Mr. Chair, Switzerland maintains its position that previously conducted assessments on existing and potential threats remain accurate and valid. We are particularly concerned about cyber operations conducted, sponsored, and condoned by states in a manner that is inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter, international law, and the universally adopted normative framework on state behavior in cyberspace. In light of the current political situation, it is ever more important to provide essential services such as health and energy to the public. It is therefore worrisome to observe that state and non-state actors have been targeting and compromising critical infrastructures by means of cyber, including the spillover effects such operations have had. Cyber operations are a reality in contemporary armed conflict, exception and proof of this. Cyber operations are used to prepare and support military actions. I would like to highlight the fact that the ongoing armed conflict has drawn non-state actors to conduct malicious cyber activities in support or on behalf of the involved parties. While we think that the impact of their malicious cyber activities has been limited, the sheer number of these non-state actors may have important negative implications for the implementation of the norms of responsible state behavior. As mentioned by Germany, Denmark, Canada, the EU, and others, ransomware attacks on companies and critical infrastructures are increasing, and they have become more sophisticated. These attacks can have negative effects on international stability, which is why we think that the Open-Ended Working Group could further study this phenomenon and that the Annual Progress Report should mention this threat, as others have said before. I also want to reiterate that ICT supply chain attacks remain among the more concerning cyber threats, and there is potential to elaborate more concrete guidance based on previously adopted norms by the UN GGEs. Mr. Chair, companies and people are integrating a huge number of IoT devices into their network infrastructures in order to achieve higher functionality. However, if not secured properly, these digitally connected devices can be misused to conduct malicious activities. Chile, France, or South Africa have pointed to this earlier. Most IoT devices are not designed with security in mind. Malicious actors, criminals, state-sponsored groups, etc., can target IoT devices more easily and use them either to cause harm to the operator of the device or use them for malicious activities against other targets. Kenya, El Salvador, Chile, Singapore, and many others have pointed to the issue of artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence and also machine learning are strategic technologies. Therefore, securing them is essential. Today, the underlying technology that creates deepfakes is artificial intelligence. Deepfakes are a way to manipulate images. AI-supported deepfake technology offers improved capabilities, but it also increases the scale for manipulation and malicious actor intervention. Malaysia and Bangladesh have pointed out these risks. Deepfakes are simple to develop. This technology has the potential to propagate alternative facts. We expect more widespread abuse with more widespread availability. The international community is encouraged to continue to study these emerging technologies in order to understand how they can be misused for malicious purposes. The first step is to have an overview and a basic understanding of the technologies themselves. In Switzerland, the Cyber Defence Campus at ARMA Swiss is a federal agency that brings together players from research, industry, and administration in the field of cyber technology, helping to better understand emerging technologies and their potential risks. Sector-specific risks and vulnerability assessments could be shared and presented within this group. Switzerland could, for example, share its experience with the development and methodology regarding the ICT minimal standards that are voluntary in nature. Switzerland, like other states, has developed frameworks to manage vulnerabilities. Responsible and coordinated vulnerability disclosure is a crucial element of this framework as it allows researchers, companies, and ethical hackers to report detected vulnerabilities to the National Cyber Security Center. Under predefined rules, the National Cyber Security Center will coordinate the remedy to patch the vulnerability while at the same time bringing the vulnerability to the attention of the affected organization. More in-depth discussion in this group on vulnerability disclosure could be very valuable in our review. And finally, with regards to the proposal for a threats repository made by the Philippines, we think it makes most sense to use existing platforms and learn from them, like the UNIDIR Cyber Policy Portal. We had a very useful side event organized by UNIDIR over lunch, and they reminded us, and I reminded myself, that we quite often tend maybe to forget that we already have very useful tools and we should first maybe look at them before we create new ones. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Switzerland. Israel, to be followed by India. Israel, please.

Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor. Since it’s the first time our delegation takes the floor this week, we wish to thank you and your team, as well as the ODA, for your tireless efforts and dedication leading us through the Open-Ended Working Group process. We would like now to present the Israeli perspective on existing and potential threats. It is with deep concern that we witness the rise of cyber threats and the increased sophistication of malicious actors, strong capacities, and continued malevolent attempts, as well as how they aim to harm even infrastructures that affect essential civilian services. As the world recovers from the severe impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, and many states and enterprises have adopted new mitigation strategies, we have unfortunately also witnessed a rise in cyber risks and threats. We see more and more interactions and operations moving online, thus blurring even more the boundaries between public and private and expanding the threat surfaces. Major geostrategic developments have increased offensive cyber operations, and they are turning more sophisticated and harmful. Malicious actors are becoming more brazen. Ransomware attacks turn into a real global pandemic, targeting governments, public organizations, public enterprises, and essential services, including hospitals and health systems, water infrastructure, and the energy supply, while prompting enormous human and economic losses. The technological landscape continues to be more interconnected and interdependent and embedded in all areas of our lives, while the cyber professional workforce isn’t growing fast enough to supply the ever-growing demand. Mr. Chair, Israel continues to experience malicious efforts to penetrate and damage its digital infrastructure. So far, to no avail, due to the hard work, awareness, and combined efforts of the government and the private sector alike. It is the functional continuity of basic and essential services to the public that are at stake. In fact, according to the International Cyber Security Institutions, Israel was a victim of numerous malicious cyber activities, one of the highest rates in the world over the period of the last two years. Mr. Chair, civil aviation is a critical global sector, and we have seen growing interest from rogue states and malicious cyber actors in this sector. The last pandemic took a toll on the aviation sector, among other effects, and it also deprived resources from cybersecurity investments. Israel has launched its national initiative to build aviation cyber resilience and is working on this issue with our allies and partners. We have recently led multinational cybersecurity simulations together with leading countries to raise awareness and improve information sharing. The maritime sector is yet another crucial infrastructure, and Israel is working hard with its many partners to protect against cyber threats in the maritime domain, building resilience and improving the cybersecurity of seaports, vessels, shipping companies, and the whole supply chain connected to this strategic and essential industry. Israel believes that states need to come up with practical solutions for these threats. As for ransomware, we agree with the EU, Germany, Canada, and many, many others flagging today this is a serious threat. Israel is the founding member and takes an active part in the U.S.-led CRI, Counter-Ransomware Initiative, a multinational cross-regional coalition aiming to combat ransomware and cybercrime. We are very encouraged to see the recent creation of the ICRTF led by Australia. Diplomatic engagement together with professional cooperation continues to be an essential tool for the international community to fight against ransomware attacks. Israel is committed to continuing work together not only with the CRI members but also with other partners committed to fighting the scourge of ransomware, which has presented itself as a serious threat that impacts us all. Another phenomenon we should take into consideration is the cooperation between rogue states, criminal actors, and terrorist organizations acting as proxies. Too often, criminals and cyberterrorists providing hacking as a service receive a type of safe haven, which enables them to pursue their malicious activities with impunity. Israel suggests making the global info-sharing processes faster and more efficient. Information sharing is at the heart of building cybersecurity, and speed is of crucial importance. Israel has operated very successfully the CyberNet, an Israeli proprietary info-sharing system built for the cyber defense ecosystem, connecting professionals and decision-makers, allowing a many-to-many, on a large scale, a timely sharing of relevant, practical, and preparation information. Israel launched this initiative to allow cross-country sharing of information, which also serves as a place where various applications and investigation tools are available to explore and mitigate attacks, preventing them from propagating to sectors and markets, both domestically and internationally. Additionally, one of the most challenging threat vectors in cyber is via the supply chain, as many others alluded to today. One weak link in the chain, such as an under-protected IT vendor or compromised component, could end up becoming gateways for attackers. This is a multifaceted challenge requiring careful coordination with the private sector and building international trust. The world has never been so interconnected, and we are only as strong as our weakest link. Israel implements a methodology, a digital platform, and a certification scheme for supply chain security compliance officers in private cooperation. The cross-border interoperability of these schemes could help build trust and greatly contribute to cyber hygiene as an international mechanism. IT companies should be encouraged to embed more secure-by-design processes in the manufacturing of their products, including security-by-default systems, meaning that the end user will get a safer version by default, thus reducing the attack surface. Governments should cooperate with each other to foster the development of common cybersecurity standards for different industrial sectors. Mr. Chair, as we are trying to answer your guiding questions regarding the specific capacities that states require, we have highlighted today the need to improve our global info-sharing mechanisms, as well as the urgency for states to cooperate with each other and with the private sector to mitigate the existing and emerging threats. To conclude, Mr. Chair, Israel stands ready to share its vision and expertise in building a global cyber-dome, an overarching defense architecture based on information gathering, analysis, and sharing, and we are looking to cooperate with other states on the prevention and mitigation of risks and threats in cyberspace, aiming at building together a stronger global resilience. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Israel, for your statement. India to be followed by Brazil. India, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. India takes this opportunity to thank you for your able leadership and sincere efforts to take forward the mandate of this working group. We deeply appreciate your action-oriented approach and your efforts in taking forward various initiatives identified in the Annual Progress Report, including the Intergovernmental Point of Contacts Directory. We are glad that the progress so far is in the right direction, and we assure you of the constructive engagement and cooperation of my delegation. The program of work and the guided questions for the Member States to share their views on the agenda topics of the OEWG mandate have set a clear direction for this substantive session. Mr. Chair, as referred to in Para 11 of the Annual Progress Report, the new and emerging technologies, while on one hand expanding development opportunities for Member States, on the other hand create new vectors and vulnerabilities that can be exploited for malicious ICT activity. These technologies are multifaceted and transcend the physical boundaries of countries. The working group may need to underline a point that technological development, often referred to as disruptive innovations in the field of ICTs, is taking place beyond the horizon of the governments. The major concerns from new and emerging technologies, such as advanced AI, Internet of Things, big data, cloud computing, quantum communications, etc., are the intended and unintended consequences from these technologies, which form a major set of threats. The scope, velocity, volume, and intensity of threats and associated risks with these new technologies are difficult to predict at the present stage. Potential threats to the ICT environment with the increasing use of new and emerging technologies are creating a large canvas of online space open to attacks by multiple actors, including bioterrorist groups, trying to infiltrate and disrupt critical information infrastructure aimed at impairing economic development, social harmony, peace, and security of the Member States. Easy access and anonymity offered by these technologies carry the risk of using such technologies for purposes that are inconsistent with international security. In the form of steps that Member States can take to manage emerging threats and risks to international security, we would like to enumerate the following points that we believe would help in bridging the existing gap between potential threats posed by the latest technologies and the capacities of the Member States to address these threats. First, multiple cross-regional dialogues with the involvement of all relevant stakeholders sharing the latest technological trends, discovered vulnerabilities, threats, and scope of impact to individuals, organizations, and countries would build a deeper understanding of the latest technologies and associated risks with such technologies. The accountability aspect of the new and emerging technologies to help Member States better use and manage may also be explored as part of cross-regional dialogues. Second, to discourage potential threats from becoming threats of large-scale implications, it is important to encourage information exchange on discovered vulnerabilities and emerging threat scenarios to the ICT environment through 24 by 7 contact points with the involvement of the national CERTs or CSIRTs. In this regard, the intergovernmental point-of-contact directory would play a significant role. In addition, our delegation would also like to echo the views expressed by Kenya and the Philippines on the idea of forming a repository of threats. We would like to hear more views from the Member States and engage further on this proposal. Third, facilitating regular interaction between competent authorities to share the methods of response to particular potential threats or cyber incidents, along with established cyber hygiene practices, would assist Member States to work together and share best practices. Fourth, sharing the model governance frameworks at national, regional, and multilateral levels that put in place necessary recommendations for the development of emerging technologies and check threats posed by these technologies may help Member States to promote international cooperation, ensure cyber security, and resilience of the ICT systems and networks that are in place at present. Lastly, Mr. Chair, promoting public-private partnerships to develop practical mechanisms to exchange best practices and information may play an important role in responding to potential threats from the new and emerging technologies. Mr. Chair, the new and emerging technologies are progressing at an agile pace. While the government is prepared to address the existing challenges, a new range of challenges is already evolving due to the continuously developing nature of technological innovation. Therefore, we support, Mr. Chair, the approach set for this working group to continuously explore a wide range of ideas and initiatives which bring us closer to the preparedness required to address the threats in the information sphere. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Thank you, India. Brazil, to be followed by Jordan. Brazil, please.

Thank you, Chair. In the interest of time, my delegation will not repeat the important points already raised but would like to add a brief comment of a more general, yet essential contextual nature regarding ICT vulnerabilities. As mentioned by Germany, France, and Canada, other agenda items depend on understanding the cyber threat landscape. Chair, we constantly hear that ICTs are as strong as their weakest link, as Israel has just highlighted. The accuracy of this assertion will probably continue to make itself evident in the near future. In our discussions regarding cyber threats, we must not forget that digital inclusion is central for a stable and prosperous global digital community. Further, we should not lose sight that a resilient ICT architecture is essential to sustainable development and that digital development and inclusion remain the best ways to promote in the long run an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful cyberspace. Digital divides between countries as well as individuals pose systemic threats to cybersecurity. As mentioned earlier by Argentina, thus this topic should be viewed in a broader context along with our discussions on CBMs and capacity building. Enhanced cooperation among states, including on internet governance, is necessary to address digital divides, systemic threats, and build overall resilience. In the same vein, as mentioned by several delegations, states should also work together with interested stakeholders, including from the private sector, civil society, and academia. Finally, the OEWG should take into account the central work of the International Telecommunications Union, the ITU, within its mandate, especially in terms of capacity building and development regarding promoting trust and security in the uses of ICTs. I will end my point, Chair, as you ask for delegations’ reactions to suggestions regarding the repository of cyber threats and UNIDIR’s cyber policy portal. At this point, it seems useful to further discuss these ideas, and my delegation is ready to engage with proponents to develop on them. Thank you.

Thank you. Brazil. Jordan, to be followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Jordan, please.

Mr. Chair, at the outset, I’d like to thank you for your efforts and early engagement with Member States to ensure a productive session this week. I also extend our sincere thanks to your team and the Secretariat for their efforts. Mr. Chair, in reference to the first topic of substantive discussion, please allow me to refer to your guiding questions, specifically the one that addresses measures that States can undertake within the framework of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) to mitigate the impact of new and emerging ICT threats on international security. In this regard, I would like to make the following remarks. First, there is a need to identify key principles and values that can be affected by new and emerging technologies. States and relevant actors must articulate a vision of the principles and values such as equity, equality, inclusivity, responsibility, transparency, and accountability that might be negatively impacted by certain emerging and disruptive technologies and how those values might best be protected. Much wider public dialogue is required on the ethical values and principles put at risk by the development of emerging and disruptive technologies, as well as the nature and direction of change they engender. This dialogue would require new thinking on how to ensure certain technologies like predictive algorithms, biotechnology, or technologies allowing space resources exploitation do not exacerbate existing socioeconomic inequalities. Certain forms of research, like some aspects of biological engineering, may need to be restricted. Second, it’s important to promote certain principles to ensure shared opportunities and benefits of emerging technologies, such as the SLMR AI principles. There is also a need for international consensus on certain principles such as fairness, accountability, and transparency across all aspects of the production and life cycles of emerging and disruptive technologies. Companies must realize the need to create new governance structures and clearly define how emerging and disruptive technologies’ progress and implementation are managed. Third, there is a need to develop appropriate regulations. New approaches to policy and regulation are needed. For example, the focus and rationale of relevant policies and the most suitable type of regulation—precautionary, preventive, reactive, or a combination of all three—must drive multifaceted discussions. Given the cross-border effects of the technologies at play, as well as the growing convergences between them, uncoordinated national rules and policies will likely be ineffective. Fourth, we should enhance transparency, oversight, and accountability. New policy and regulatory approaches will require greater investment in transparency, oversight, and accountability mechanisms. This also entails tech companies accepting greater scrutiny. Finally, Mr. Chair, there is a need for an internationally recognized ethical framework for the design, production, use, and governance of emerging and disruptive technologies, more specifically AI, robots, and autonomous systems, such as the 2018 European Union Initiative on AI, the 2019 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Council Recommendations on AI, and the 2018 CCWGGE. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Jordan. I now give the floor to the Islamic Republic of Iran, to be followed by the Syrian Arab Republic. Iran, please.

Thank you. Mr. Chair, my delegation joins others to express our continued support for your leadership and the efforts of your team, as well as the Secretariat in heading the Open-Ended Working Group on Security and the Use of Information and Communication Technologies. We are committed to engaging constructively to achieve a positive outcome for the OEWG. Mr. Chair, throughout the previous and current OEWG, some States, including mine, have suggested specific threats emanating from the misuse of ICTs, which were not reflected in the 2021 OEWG final report and the first APR of the current OEWG. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to once again refer to the following threats, and we hope that they will get reflected in the next annual progress report: 1. Use of ICTs to destabilize and interfere in the States’ domestic systems and processes and create conflict among nations, races, and ethnic minorities. 2. Unilateral coercive measures against States in the ICT domain. 3. Disinformation campaigns, fabricated image building, and xenophobia against States through the use of ICTs. 4. Lack of responsibility of the private sector and platforms with extraterritorial impact in the ICT domain. Last but not least, my delegation would like to express appreciation for a number of relevant proposals put forth by some delegations. We reserve the right to provide proper feedback on those proposals or those to be made in due course. Mr. Chair, on another note, we reject the unsubstantiated allegations made by the U.S. delegate against Iran. We would like to highlight that it is irresponsible for a country that, besides an offensive cyber program, has maliciously initiated and supported numerous cyber attacks against different Iranian facilities, including by the notorious Star Snake malware, causing the first-ever cyber Hiroshima in the world, to raise such accusations. The U.S. must be held accountable for its malign activities in the cyber domain and other fora. Finally, we will share our statements at the end for your consideration. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Islamic Republic of Iran, for your statement. I now give the floor to the Syrian Arab Republic, to be followed by Vietnam. Syria, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the outset, I would like to thank you and your team for all your efforts in the conduct of our work and express our confidence in you. We are prepared to participate in any good effort to promote international cooperation within the field of cyber security, and in the service of our objectives since we had participated in the adoption of the General Assembly resolution establishing it, as well as our deep interest in international cooperation based on international law and the purposes of the United Nations Charter. My delegation would like to stress the importance of international cooperation in countering the malicious use of ICT, particularly in spreading terrorism and extremism, disinformation, and hostile campaigns with a view to interfering in the internal affairs of states, development of ICT capabilities for military purposes in a manner that runs counter to the principles of the Preservation of International Peace and Security, malicious malware in software programs that affect the safety and security of these programs, and also disrupting supply chains and the services they provide. We would like to stress in this context the importance of securing information systems, particularly transboundary ones, and protecting personal and private data. Mr. Chairman, the framework, the code of conduct for the responsible conduct of states in the use of ICT, contributes greatly in limiting the threats of malicious use of cyber security. However, it is not adequate since it is voluntary and does not tackle all the different aspects of effectively countering all threats or malicious use of ICT technologies. We stress the importance that all states, particularly developing states, must have access to ICT technologies with a view to bridging the digital gap and realizing the SDGs. And we stress particularly in this regard that the unilateral coercive measures imposed by certain Western states against others limit the possibility of attaining this type of information and technology and hinder the ability of states to develop their capabilities in information technology. We should also mention the negative implications of such measures in the field of ICT, and we believe that these coercive unilateral measures should be lifted without condition as soon as possible. The contact points across the world are an important measure to ensure effective countering of threats in ICT and the potential of malicious use of cyber technologies. It should be based on simple terms, and it should be understood that it would be applied in accordance with the characteristics of different states and according to their needs. It is also important to reach a common understanding of such measures, how they are to be applied, and what consequences they may have before they are implemented. In conclusion, we are prepared to contribute to all efforts with a view to reaching a conclusion that reflects our collective concerns and that will be in the interest of all our states in dealing with the current and potential challenges in the field of use of cyber technology in ICT internationally. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Syrian Arab Republic. Distinguished Delegates, I am conscious of the time. We have ten more delegations which have requested the floor, plus two accredited observer delegations. I intend to continue the discussions tomorrow morning. It is quite clear that we will not be able to complete the list of speakers today, but I would like to say that the discussion has been very useful, and the detailed and focused nature of the discussion is something that I very much welcome. In many ways, the discussion on this aspect of the agenda sets the context for many of the other issues. Now, at this stage, and in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, which governs the work of the Open-Ended Working Group, I’d like to, at this point, give the floor to a delegation that has asked for the floor in exercise of its right of reply. So I give the floor now to the delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. You have the floor, sir. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Since this is the first time for my delegation to take the floor, allow me to express my deep thanks to you and your team for the painstaking effort for the successful outcome of this meeting. My delegation is compelled to take the floor to make a comment on the outrageous remark made by the United States this morning. We categorically reject the provocative and reckless remark by the United States. We never recognize the alleged Security Council report manufactured by the so-called experts who blindly follow the hostile policy of the United States against the DPRK. The United States leaves no stone unturned to tarnish the external image of the DPRK and justify its anti-DPRK pressure. To this end, it is misusing even the cyberspace as a tool to pursue a sinister political agenda. It is none other than the United States who first devised the concept of cyber warfare and turned cyberspace into another war domain by deploying a large force capable of cyber warfare. Even in the cyber field, the U.S. seeks its block-forming policy, which incites division and confrontation by bullying and rejecting the countries that have different political views in a bid to misuse cyberspace for realizing its strategic hegemony. As already known, the United States is a hacking kingpin and a wiretapping kingpin that has long been notorious for committing super-large cybercriminal acts. For example, the prison plan intended for wiretapping even the leaders of its allies and TV screen action for launching hacking attacks on 45 countries and regions. The real purpose of the United States in picking up a row about the cyber threat is to create an atmosphere and condition for maintaining its supremacy in cyberspace and facilitating its cyber attacks like wiretapping and secret stealing without a hitch. It is ridiculous that the United States, with a criminal track record, is now making a fuss about cyber threats from others, posing itself as an international cyber police. The United States is truly the root of and main culprit behind cyber threats. To ensure security in cyberspace, we should first wipe out the cybercriminal acts committed by the United States, a hacking kingpin. Mr. Chair, we remain committed to opposing all sorts of cyber attacks. We have made it a policy to fully ensure cybersecurity and taken all possible measures accordingly. We stand ready to join the efforts of the international community to create an environment conducive to securing cybersecurity and space. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, DPRK, for your statement, which is well noted. I have also been informed that another delegation has requested the right of reply, and in this connection, I would like to remind delegations that, under the rules of procedure, the first intervention under the exercise of the right of reply is limited to 10 minutes. The Russian Federation, you have the floor, please.

Chair, colleagues, the Russian Federation, like our colleagues from the DPRK, would like to take the floor to respond to various baseless political statements by Western delegations. This includes in terms of the special military operation in Ukraine. It is a shame but completely expected that countries initially who oppose the work of the OEWG are now trying to hinder constructive negotiations and politicize the work of the group. We think that it’s no secret to anyone who sought the methodological work of the U.S.A. in relation to Russian hackers and so on. This is a destructive action in the information sphere itself. There is a desire of many UN member states to peacefully use ICTs. However, in counter to this, NATO countries are seeking to militarize the information space. They actively build up their offensive arsenal. They are updating methods for carrying out computer attacks. There are many documentation and evidence showing this, and digital sabotage has been carried out against our country. It would not be an exaggeration to say that since the beginning of the special military operation in Ukraine, Western states have waged a fully-fledged campaign against Russia. They are seeking to test economic, financial, and other sectors, and also main industrial sectors’ information infrastructure in Russia is subject to mass computer attacks, the intensity of which – since the beginning of the special military operation – has increased manifold. Most of them are carried out from the territory of foreign states, and these actions are unprecedented. They are coordinated. The Western bloc is prepared to use any methods and means to violate the viability of Russia’s information sphere. They recruit hackers and mercenaries, and they use the ICT capacity of their allies and other companies to, in a targeted manner, use this from around the world for these criminal purposes and activities. For this, openly accessible at these specialized forums and social networks, there is published instrumentation. There are instructions on carrying out and facilitating computer attacks. There’s a list of the targets, including specific state bodies, infrastructure facilities, the media, financial structures, and other services. Ukraine, in this scenario, plays a particular role. It’s a test. The West has sufficient financial resources. It trains personnel and supports the offensive ICT potential of the Kiev regime. It’s not by chance that Kiev carried out efforts in line with cyberspaces. We could call this a cyber-NATO here. Here, the heads of Western countries do not mention the IT army that they helped create in Ukraine. This is a conglomerate of criminal groups, too, and they are seeking to rob citizens and states. They’re already doing this, and this is supposedly in the civilized world. American authorities continue to flagrantly interfere in the domestic affairs of a state. They do not shy away from this. They have a system of espionage and a seizure of data. I note Edward Snowden, for example. The devices of users are affected around the whole world. Pegasus and other spy programs are used. Under various slogans, including the protection of human rights, recently there was a decision by the Biden administration relating to a law on intelligence. This is an infamous instrument used by the special services of the USA, and this does not reduce radio intelligence services around the world. It’s also remarkable that leading American IT corporations, including telecommunications operators, for example, Microsoft, Meta, Google, these are part – they are co-allies of the American authorities. They provide the special services with data they have. This is personal information, including discussions and conversations. This is another way for users to think about the confidentiality of their personal data. We mustn’t forget that American businesses will always be guided by neocolonialist sentiments of the U.S. administration. In conclusion, I’d like to ask all colleagues of the OEWG to refrain from politicizing the work of the group. Thank you.

Russian Federation, your right of reply is well noted. Distinguished delegates, I think it’s time that we adjourn for today. We will continue our discussions tomorrow under the agenda item on existing and potential threats, and then we will go on to the next agenda item, which is rules, norms, and principles of responsible behavior of states. Thank you very much for your very constructive comments, and I wish you a pleasant evening. The meeting is adjourned.