Session 5-5 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

Good morning, distinguished delegates. The fifth meeting of the fifth substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of ICT is now called to order. Dear friends, we will now continue our consideration of Agenda Item 5, which is the first reading of the draft Second Annual Progress Report. We will today begin our discussions on Section G, namely on Regular Institutional Dialogue. Just to recap as to where we are, we have gone through the different sections, A to F. The discussions have been rich, with many different proposals, which gives me material to reflect on. But as I said yesterday as well, there has also been an element of restating of positions and restating of preferences in terms of what you would like to be included in the draft document. As we continue the discussions on Section G, once again, I’d like to urge all of you to be as succinct as possible, to prioritize the most essential aspects of this section that you think need to be improved. And as you do so, please also keep in mind that we need to find balance within each section, but also we need to find balance in the document as a whole. And that is the exercise that we are all engaged in collectively. So with regard to Regular Institutional Dialogue, I’d like to now open the floor and invite delegations to press the button if you wish to make an intervention. And if you are speaking on behalf of a group, do let us know. I’ll be happy to allow you to make your intervention earlier so that your statements can be made on behalf of a group earlier in the list of speakers. Good. Several of you have indicated the floor, and I also wish to say before we take the speakers that the morning session is for Section G, but it is my hope that we don’t need to spend three entire hours on this section. If we are able to finish Section G earlier, then what I intend to do is adjourn the meeting so that I have some time to go back and look at the amendments and start work on preparing a Rev. 2 of the Draft Annual Progress Report. So I would welcome and appreciate the time that I would have this morning if we finish earlier. So it’s certainly not my intention to continue this meeting to 1 p.m. since we only have to deal with the final section, Regular Institutional Dialogue. And once again, I will urge all of you to follow the three-minute recommended timeline, send us your full remarks if you need to, but convey your most essential points on this section. So we’ll start now with the first speaker, which is India, to be followed by France. India, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, we are going to make a cumulative statement on Sections E, F, and G. Please give us permission. India would like to make the following three brief points on the elemental paper, while we will submit the full statement in writing. Under the Purpose and Principles section of the elemental paper on the POC Directory, India recommends rephrasing Para 4. It may read as: The POC Directory will take into account and complement the work of the regional and sub-regional fora on accident response, incident response, and security CIRTs and CSIRTs networks. Regarding modalities, India would like to reiterate its recommendation of having three points of contact: domestic, policy, and technical POCs for the Directory. While we can agree on having a common diplomatic POC, we should remain flexible on having multiple technical or operational POCs. The Indian recommendation is based on our national CIRTs’ experience interacting with various other countries’ CIRTs and CSIRTs. It is often observed that based on the nature of the ICT incident and threat vectors, a single technical POC may not be able to address the objectives that the POC Directory is envisioning. On the interaction between POCs, the sharing of information, and subsequent cooperation, the channel of communication is according to the mutual agreement. India is particularly interested in elaborating the mutual agreement. Mr. Chair, the integration of the POC Directory module with the Global Cybersecurity Cooperation Portal would lead to increased information exchange, as the portal may be an option for broadcasting information to a larger number of member states and regional groupings in the future. My delegation appreciates and welcomes the language in the capacity building section, in particular the text on the Global Cybersecurity Cooperation Portal in paragraphs 40E and 44. The text in the paragraphs is a true reflection of the working group’s consistent deliberations on the GCSCP, and we support having them carried forward to the final draft. We are glad to inform the working group that the revised working paper on REV.1 of the GCSCP is shared with the Secretariat. The REV.1 document is based on the feedback received from multiple delegations on the portal and the importance they attach to its potential role in the capacity building exercise. My delegation would also like to acknowledge the regular institutional dialogue statement that Brazil would be delivering in a short time on behalf of the IPSA Forum. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, India, for your statement.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Looking at Section G on regular institutional dialogue, my delegation believes that the new draft in this revised version does contain some improvements. However, we have the following comments to make. Regarding paragraph 49, we think that the wording could be simplified and made more succinct. Two paragraphs don’t appear to us to be necessary, looking at the general balance in the report. Paragraph 49C, in our view, adds no value to 49B. Paragraph 49Cbis, inasmuch as there’s already an identical paragraph in Section D on international law, is there. We see the need to reflect different ideas and proposals, but the repetition here of the paragraph does not appear to us to be necessary, looking at the general balance of the report. On paragraph 53, we support the organization of an inter-sessional, dedicated meeting looking at proposals for a Program of Action. As you are aware, France, as well as the other co-sponsors of this proposal, wants to see this group being held in the OEWG in 2024 and 2025, holding far-reaching, transparent, inclusive discussions in order to establish a Program of Action. Organizing an inter-sessional meeting which is dedicated is relevant in several respects. Firstly, it would allow all states, as well as non-governmental actors who may be interested, to voice their views and, if they wish, to suggest proposals for a future regular institutional dialogue geared to action. Subsequently, it would be consonant with the recommendations set forth in the report on the POA published on 12 January last year. This possibility of a dedicated meeting would emphasize the role that this OEWG has in fulfilling its mandate to 2025, looking at the establishment of the POA. Lastly, we welcome the request made to the Secretariat to brief the OEWG in the sixth session on the report of the Secretary-General on POA that has been recently published. We would here suggest to the Secretariat that they distribute this early to the entire group. We would also like to see the report from the Secretariat should brief the OEWG on the discussions pursuant to 6722, the resolution there. Thank you.

Thank you very much, France, for your statement. Brazil, to be followed by Vietnam.

Thank you, Chair. Mr. Chair, I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the IPSA Dialogue Forum, comprised of India, Brazil, and South Africa. We commend your efforts towards advancing our discussions on the topic of regular institutional dialogue on international security related to the ICTs. This is a key aspect of the mandate of the OEWG, as it will define the future of the global dialogue on how to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful cyberspace. The continuation of this dialogue is essential to allow countries to both benefit from the digital transformation while preventing threats to peace and security stemming from the already ubiquitous and borderless digital realm. The IPSA Forum would like to reiterate that any proposal to put forward a regular institutional dialogue should be considered in this OEWG and assessed on its own merits, including their capacity to garner consensus. A future framework must be established by consensus and include all the UN Member States. In order to further promote broad, common understandings, we must strive to maintain the unity of our discussions on international security related to the ICTs in a single-track reporting to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. We therefore ought to avoid duplicating efforts and alienating Member States. The IPSA Forum recommends that a regular institutional dialogue mechanism must integrate various key aspects of the ICT environment, such as building trust and confidence and encouraging deeper study and discussion of areas where no common understanding has yet emerged. The future framework on institutional dialogue should be intergovernmental, open, inclusive, permanent, flexible, transparent, and action-oriented, as well as fit to adapt its work as new technology develops and new cyber threats emerge. It should reaffirm and promote the incremental development of the key norms related to international security and ICTs. Our decision-making should operate on the basis of consensus while preventing the stagnation of the process, for instance, through a possible de facto veto power. Mr. Chair, we should not forget our collective responsibility to uphold multilateralism and prevent short- and long-term threats to international peace and security stemming from malicious ICT-related activities. Our delegations welcome the common elements identified in paragraph 51 of your revised draft of this year’s Annual Progress Report and invite delegations to assist the efforts on expanding this list. Perhaps this may prove fruitful in bridging differing proposals. The IPSA Forum remains committed to you, Chair, in this endeavor. I thank you.

Thank you, Brazil, for the statement on behalf of a group of countries. I give the floor now to Vietnam, to be followed by the European Union. Vietnam, please.

Mr. Chair, thank you for giving me the chance to speak, and I’d like to make a few comments on Section G of the Draft Annual Progress Report, which looks at the topic of regular institutional dialogue. At the outset, we would like to reiterate that the establishment of any permanent dialogue mechanism on ICT security should be discussed within the framework of the OEWG, based on consensus and equal participation of all Member States. Mr. Chair, Section G of the 2nd Annual Progress Report should emphasize the complementary role of the Program of Action (POA) to the OEWG and acknowledge that parallel tracks would be unduly resource-heavy, reduce overall productivity, and create challenges for developing countries to participate. On another note, we see that paragraph 49Cbis does not really fit into the section. When acknowledging the diversity of views, perspectives, ideas, and proposals discussed in the Working Group using language of the 2021 report of the OEWG, we think that this paragraph should be put in the introductory part of the report. Turning to paragraph 51C, this delegation suggests the removal of the phrase “under the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs” and suggests some additional words. The paragraph should accordingly read as follows: “The future mechanism would take as the foundation of its work the consensus agreements endorsed in previous OEWG and GGE reports, including this Working Group. We consider the work of the previous OEWG and GGE to be essential for any future mechanism, not only the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs, but also the consensus agreements on the threat landscape, how international law applies to the ICT environment, and how CBMs and capacity building efforts can serve as the basis for the work of the future regular institutional dialogue mechanism.” Regarding our work in the upcoming sessions, we suggest this Working Group have focused discussions on the scope of mandate, format, as well as the scope of participation of the future mechanism, together with those agreed common elements as stated in paragraph 51. Mr. Chair, this delegation would like to express its views on the new cyberspace governance vision in the future permanent mechanism, which reflects the new reality of the 21st century. First, it should focus on cyberspace. We should treat this space with the same respect as outer space or maritime space. We collectively should exercise our ownership of this space for the benefit of mankind in an equal manner. The current formulation, such as the ICT environment or security of and in the use of ICT, does not fully encompass all the cyberspace components. Second, it should be ambitious and comprehensive. With more than 5 billion active internet users and a global digital transformation, cyberspace is impacting an even larger population and governments than other spaces. New technologies are being introduced, trained, and proliferated in cyberspace at greater speed and will soon help generate more data, more applications, and conduct more activities online than actual human users. We need an ambitious and comprehensive agenda to govern the cyberspace we build for our own good and for our own survival. Only state-responsible behaviors will not suffice to size the cyberspace we want. Third, leadership should be clear, transparent, fair, and inclusive. The United Nations, its specialized agencies, and its member states have discussed different aspects of cyberspace in the last 25 years and have matured in their understanding of cyberspace with its unique features in physical, logical, application, and social layers. Cyberspace deserves serious discussion and efforts at the United Nations to build up an appropriate mechanism to accommodate its multistakeholder nature under a state-led platform. Fourth, it should not lose sight of a human-centered cyberspace. There are people in front of the computer screens to design, direct, and defend cyber acts. There are also people behind the screen who suffer, get frustrated, and get hurt by cyber acts. We need people to understand, share, and defend the peaceful nature of cyberspace. We need every government’s commitment to acknowledge this objective and inform, train, and support its agents, corporations, and citizens in protecting the cyberspace they deserve. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Vietnam. European Union, to be followed by Portugal. EU, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The overwhelming support at last year’s First Committee for the resolution on the Program of Action to advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace reaffirms the commitment of states to focus on the implementation of the agreed-upon normative framework through an operative and action-oriented process. It clearly demonstrates a common aspiration of a vast majority of states to promote peace, security, and stability in cyberspace through a permanent and cooperative model. The group has repeatedly stressed the need for a practical implementation of the current Open-Ended Working Group recommendations, as well as the implementation of previous consensus reports of the GGEs and Open-Ended Working Groups. In this respect, the POA has a unique chance to foster and facilitate both the implementation of and further dialogue on norms, CBMs, and to stimulate capacity building, and we should not miss this opportunity to take our work forward in a stable environment. The POA is also an opportunity for comprehensive engagement with the multistakeholder community. Their inclusion will result in a more impactful outcome and contribute transparency, credibility, and sustainability in the implementation of decisions. As stated before, the tasks in hand cannot be handled by states alone, and given the multistakeholder nature of cyberspace, civil society, industry, academia, the technical community, and other experts must be part of a regular dialogue on cybersecurity. We welcome that the current drafts suggest that states will, at the sixth, seventh, and eighth sessions of the Open-Ended Working Group, as well as in dedicated intersessional meetings, continue to engage in focused discussions within the framework of the Open-Ended Working Group to further elaborate on the POA, including on the basis of the report by the Secretary-General, as well as the regional consultations. A platform that recognizes the progress on achievements of the Open-Ended Working Group under your chairmanship and elevates the work to have a permanent home, the POA can be used to further elaborate the UN framework on responsible state behavior in an inclusive manner, and we look forward to having these discussions, including in the Open-Ended Working Group. At the same time, we do not see discussions about a legally binding obligation as a proposal for a regular institutional dialogue. These are two different things, and therefore we suggest deleting 49CBs from the draft. Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you, EU, for the statement. Portugal to be followed by the Philippines. Portugal.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Portugal aligns with the statement of the European Union we have just heard but would like to add some remarks on a national basis. Last November, after three years of extensive consultations by the co-sponsors of the initiative, 157 countries, 80 percent of the global UN membership, voted to task the Secretary-General to submit a report on the modalities of a Program of Action to advance state accountability in cyberspace after the current Open-Ended Working Group ends in 2025. For Portugal, one of the first co-sponsors of the Program of Action initiative, this permanent track is meant to enable us, on the one hand, to concentrate on effectively matching demand and supply of national capabilities from a long-term perspective by fully co-opting all available resources, including from civil society and especially from industry. And, on the other hand, this permanent track is also meant to continue to provide for the continuation of open-ended discussions to improve the application in cyberspace of the existing international security binding law and of the voluntary norms that have been repeatedly endorsed by the UN General Assembly. By improving the application of the normative framework, we mean not only monitoring of implementation but also further codification of voluntary norms of behavior whenever it will be politically viable, such as, for example, of due diligence in cyberspace. The current Open-Ended Working Group has been able, thanks to your very able chairmanship and extensive engagement by member states, to build constructively on the previous work about needs and means for wide state accountability, including on basic tools such as a global POC directory and repositories of best practices in crucial areas such as in capacity building, as highlighted yesterday by Timo Leste. These are, in our view, highly useful preconditions for the successful work of the future permanent track, which ought to replace the current Open-Ended Working Group from the fall of 2025 onwards. And, therefore, we look forward to an intersessional Open-Ended Working Group meeting dedicated to further discuss the modalities of the future Program of Action, including the recommendations that the Secretary-General made in his report, as proposed by the French representative. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you. Article Philippines, to be followed by Bangladesh.

Looking at Section G on Regional Institutional Dialogue, the Philippines supports all your efforts, including in capturing the convergences in a highly publicized manner. The Philippines welcomes the common elements you’ve itemized in paragraph 51A to D, and the importance of the principle of consensus regarding the establishment of a future mechanism of cybersecurity, as indicated in paragraph 52. The Philippines maintains its position that the creation of a permanent regular institutional dialogue should be decided by this OEWG, given the inclusive, transparent, and consensus-based mandate of this group. The Philippines therefore reaffirms the principles contained in paragraph 74 of the Consensus Outcome Document of the OEWG and ICT in 2021 that, quote, any future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations should be an action-oriented process with specific objectives building on previous outcomes, inclusive, transparent, consensus-driven, and results-based, close quote. Aside from these core principles, the Philippines maintains the view that any future dialogue should take into account the importance of narrowing the gender-digital divide, promote effective and meaningful participation and leadership of women in decision-making processes, and be gender-sensitive. The Philippines also reaffirms the conclusion reached by the group in 2021 that the future dialogue should, inter alia, raise awareness, build trust and confidence, and encourage further study and discussions on areas where no common understanding has yet emerged and recognition of the utility of exploring mechanisms dedicated to following up on the implementation of the agreed norms and rules, as well as the development of further ones, as contained in paragraph 73 of the same Consensus Outcome Document of the group in 2021. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Philippines. Bangladesh to be followed by Pakistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good morning, colleagues. Bangladesh recognizes the importance of regular institutional dialogue on security in the use of ICT, and we appreciate the concrete proposals put forward by States during the Open-Ended Working Group sessions. In an interconnected world, the threat of malicious ICT use looms large, endangering humanity. Member States alone cannot confront this challenge. My delegation emphasizes the need for a robust multistakeholder approach that brings together States, the private sector, civil society, and academia. Without the participation of multistakeholders, the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue, in our view, would be incomplete. Therefore, we propose to add 51 DBs, and the paragraph would read: “The future mechanism will adopt a multistakeholder approach, engaging the private sector, civil society, and academia to collaboratively address security challenges in the use of ICT.” In paragraph 50, after “future regular institutional dialogue with the broad participation of States,” we would like to add “and relevant stakeholders, including the private sector, civil society, and academia.” In paragraph 54, we propose in the second line, after “the broad participation,” to add “particularly to facilitate the participation from developing countries.” Finally, Mr. Chair, we are of the view that parallel tracks of discussions that require more resources to participate in pose a serious challenge for developing countries, including my own country. Therefore, we highlight the importance of upholding the centrality of the Open-Ended Working Group as a single and inclusive process under the UN auspices. I thank you.

Thank you, Bangladesh. Pakistan, to be followed by Kenya.

Thank you, Chair. Pakistan has an unambiguous and consistent position regarding the scope, structure, and format of future regular institutional dialogue to be established after the conclusion of the existing OEWG in 2025. Pakistan maintains that the future mechanism must be based upon the principles of inclusivity, consensus-driven decision-making, multistakeholder participation, and comprising all member states. Moreover, the future mechanism must encompass discussions on topics including capacity building, norms development, CBMs, and deliberation on the application of international law in cyberspace, including legally binding instruments. Pakistan also asserts that the existing OEWG is the most suitable and the only forum to discuss the modality of the future mechanism of regular institutional dialogue. In this regard, Pakistan agrees with the views expressed by other states that parallel tracks will be time-consuming and resource-consuming. Chair, Pakistan also agrees with the common elements of the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue as outlined in Paragraphs 51 and 52 of the APR, such as a state-led single-track process that is inclusive, transparent, sustainable, consensus-driven, and established under the auspices of the United Nations. However, Pakistan is proposing certain amendments in this section as well. We propose that Paragraph 49A of the APR may be amended with the inclusion of an additional sentence at the end of the paragraph, which could be read as, “and for all the discussions on scope, structure, and content of any future mechanism for the regular institutional dialogue.” Similarly, in the third line of sub-paragraph D of Paragraph 49, Pakistan would like to insert the words “with consensus,” after which the line could be read as “states would identify with consensus some common elements that could underpin the development of any future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue.” Lastly, Pakistan looks forward to the, with consensus, adoption of the APR by the end of this week. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. Pakistan. Kenya, to be followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Kenya, please.

Thank you, Chair. Kenya acknowledges and appreciates the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) format. It has offered states an unprecedented opportunity to meet and exchange views on security of and in the use of ICTs. The recommendation captured under paragraph 51 on the principles that should guide our future mechanisms for regular institutional dialogue is a good starting point for consideration. Chair, in regard to paragraph 49C concerning the establishment of a future permanent group, commission, or conference, this would be a useful initiative that should be discussed within the OEWG framework. We believe this will provide a continuous platform for peer reviews, convergence of technical expertise, and a learning platform between member states and regions. To strengthen discussions on ICT security at the UN, an inclusive approach is useful to maintain a unified conversation which members can follow in action while ensuring that consideration of this issue on institutional dialogue does not result in fragmentation of efforts. Thank you, Chair, and I submit.

Thank you, Kenya, for your statement. Iran, to be followed by Egypt, please.

Mr. Chair, before proceeding to share our textual proposals on Section G, I’d like to provide brief feedback on some of the ideas and proposals put forward by a number of delegations thus far. Firstly, I want to underscore the utmost importance we place on addressing the issue of disinformation and misinformation, and we firmly believe that it should be prominently highlighted in the APR. We are aware that this matter also has been considered in the recently published initiative by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the new Agenda for Peace, proving the importance of this issue in cyberspace. Secondly, regarding the proposal to include a chapeau paragraph in the section on international law, asserting the applicability of the UN Charter to cyberspace in its entirety, I wish to express our agreement with Cuba’s position, as we do not support the said proposal. Furthermore, building upon our previous proposals for the main body of the draft APR, we have received some additional suggestions for its Annex A, focusing on the establishment of a Directory of Points of Contact. In line with our well-known position on this idea, we believe that this decision should be a provisional step. However, due to time constraints, I will share these proposals in writing with the Secretary. Now, our concrete proposals for Section G. For paragraph 49C, we would like to add a sentence at the beginning of the subparagraph, reading: “Further to the recommendation in the 2021 OEWG report, and in the first APR of the OEWG, states continue to discuss proposals by states to facilitate regular institutional dialogue on the security of and in the use of ICTs. In this regard, so on and so forth.” And also another addition, in the third line from the bottom, the phrase would read: “including by preparing a draft legally binding international instrument on ICTs.” And this should come after the phrase “norms and principles.” For paragraph 51A, in the first line, we would like to add the phrase “intergovernmental” after “state-led.” And for subparagraph B, at the end of the first line, we would like to add the following phrases: “fair, non-discriminatory, and transparent.” For subparagraph D, in the first line, after the word “transparent,” we would like to add “non-political.” For paragraph 52, we would like to add, at the end of the paragraph, another sentence, reading: “States also recognize the importance of interactive and paragraph-by-paragraph negotiation exercises on any outcome document within the future mechanism.” For paragraph 53, we would like to enumerate the steps or measures that should be taken, starting from the third line, to further elaborate the POA as point A. And to add another point, which will be point B, at the end of that sentence, to read: “Further elaborate the proposal identified in subparagraph 49C with a view towards the possible establishment of a permanent group, commission, or conference as a mechanism to advance responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs.” In the same paragraph, and in the next sentence, we’ll have some additions that the final version should be reading the following from our perspective: “At these sessions, states will also engage in focused discussions on the relationship between the POA or permanent group, commission, or conference, and the OEWG, and on the scope, content, and structure of a POA, as well as a permanent group, commission, or conference.” And with that, I conclude our proposals. And again, as I mentioned in our initial statement, Mr. Chair, we hope that the report not only should be balanced but also should be factual. We had some discussions in the margin of this meeting with some other delegations, and we noted that there could be some observations about the length of the APR. However, we believe that we shouldn’t mind if these additions could add further length to the report, because there is a formulation that sounds like some views were expressed during our consultations, which were not supported by all. Then we had to put a group of states or some states said this or that, so we believe that it is fair to treat all of the proposals like this formulation. So we emphasize the importance of having a factual report that reflects all of the proposals. Those proposals that have been very important for the respective delegations and for the process, and it will be a loss if we do not reflect them in the report, because if we incorporate all of them in the report, this will help us to further follow up on the proposals in the future. So again, in order to join consensus, we believe that we should not follow the previous experiences, which on the last day the delegations had to opt for either take it or leave it. We want to be very constructive and definitely we hope that, Mr. Chair, you will reflect all of the proposals, including those raised by my delegation during last year’s consultations and specifically in this substantive session as well. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Iran, for your contribution. Egypt, to be followed by Cuba. Egypt, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. For Section G on the Regular Institutional Dialogue, we would like to highlight the following. Egypt appreciates the updated text under this section, and let me add the following remarks. We commend the factual references to the proceedings of the discussions that took place over the last year under this item, in particular on the Program of Action (POA) proposal that has been incrementally evolving since 2020. In this context, we support the principles of the future mechanism listed in paragraph 51. We also took note of the appreciation the ESRI report on the POA reflected in document A-78-76, and we echo the request addressed to the Secretariat to circulate the ESRI report to all member states, perhaps through the OEWG email. We also wish that the Secretariat would be able to brief member states on that report in the earliest meeting dedicated to the Regular Institutional Dialogue. In this vein, we believe that it would be rational to include language highlighting such a briefing. Moreover, we support the continuation of discussions on the POA proposal within the OEWG at its 6th, 7th, and 8th sessions, as well as in a dedicated inter-sessional meeting that also aligns with the conclusions listed in the ESRI report. Hence, we support the language of paragraph 53. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, we express our readiness to further engage with all interested parties on the future Regular Institutional Dialogue with the aim of narrowing the gaps and reaching consensus on it, noting the points of convergence of the proposals under this section, and I thank you.

Thank you, Egypt, for your statement. Cuba, to be followed by Nigeria. Cuba, please.

Mr. Chairman, Section G on Regular Institutional Dialogue must ensure equal treatment for all national initiatives put forward. The proposal of a Program of Action (POA) must not prevail or condition a future mechanism for the responsible behavior of States when it comes to ICTs. Therefore, at the beginning of paragraph 49C, there must also be reference to the recommendation of the first POA to exchanging opinions in the OEWG on regular institutional dialogue and the proposal from States to facilitate such a dialogue on the security and the use of ICTs. This would therefore be consistent with the initial wording of paragraph 49B on the POA. When reference is made to forthcoming discussions of the group on the POA, the POA must also make recommendations about the discussion on the other national initiatives for the establishment of a future dialogue mechanism which is regular institutional. In addition, paragraph 51A must specify that the future mechanism under the aegis of the UAE must be an intergovernmental one. So here we support the delegation of Iran’s proposal. In paragraph 51C, we propose deleting the reference to the reports from the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) or, if this is not done, some alternative wording should be used, making it quite clear that they are not on the same footing as the previous reports and the reports of this OEWG. We propose that in paragraph 52, the importance of negotiation paragraph by paragraph should be recognized for any future outcome document on the future mechanism. Thank you.

Thank you, Cuba, for your statement. Nigeria to be followed by New Zealand. Nigeria, please.

Since Nigeria will be speaking for the first time at this session, my delegation would like to commend you and your team for your tireless efforts and commitment in producing the revised draft of the Circulating Annual Progress Report. The document, though a work in progress, proves the utility of multilateralism in resolving the rising concern over the malicious use of ICT by state and non-state actors. We recognize that the content of the revised draft encapsulates most of the concerns raised by different delegations, which is crucial to enhancing global cooperation on international security as it relates to ICT. As we forge ahead in our negotiations, common ground must be found to enhance divergent opinions. For us, it is crucial in mainstreaming any inclusive program that will effectively capture the peculiarity of all member states. Within the context of existing and potential threats, Nigeria is concerned about the rise of violent extremism in cyberspace, particularly the recruitment of children and young adults by terrorists, human traffickers, and other criminal groups. These nefarious acts have evolved over the years and have spread across the globe due to ineffectual regulation on the dark web. Malicious ICT activities, impacting uncritical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure with negative ripple effects on society, are worrisome and must be tackled head-on. In addition, the spread of misinformation and disinformation on the internet is generating undignified mistrust among people, building avoidable conflicts, and causing mayhem. It is therefore pertinent to tackle this menace holistically by disrupting its sources without undermining fundamental human rights. We must work together to reach a consensus on how to regulate unfettered digital abuse. Mr. Chair, my delegation wishes to suggest that under rules, norms, and principles for responsible state behavior, an online child protection mechanism should be included alongside the provision for combating online gender exploitation. Nigeria considers children as the most vulnerable target and therefore calls for the integration of this aspect into the implementation norm. My delegation is of the opinion that to prevent the malicious use of ICT, a global legal architecture that will ensure the peaceful use of cyberspace between state and non-state actors needs to be advanced for the common interest of mankind. This could be achieved by strengthening the existing international law and continued sharing of national views on international law, including state practice related to the use of ICT by states. Capacity building, in our view, should focus on promoting research and development in diverse ICT fields while incorporating indigenous technology development as a pathway to reduce dependency on external solutions and systems. In essence, capacity building activities should be demand-driven, tailored to specific needs, and sustainable. Capacity building should also be gender-conscious as women must be mainstreamed in all discussions and training to build a formidable society in the context of ICTs. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, Nigeria calls for the inclusion of measures that target the promotion of economic growth of developing countries through initiatives that promote poverty alleviation and the creation of job opportunities. We are of the view that such an approach could serve the dual purposes of building confidence while also helping to bridge the digital gap among member states. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Nigeria, for your statement. New Zealand, to be followed by the Russian Federation.

Kia ora everyone. There are four elements of progress that we have observed over the past 12 months regarding regular institutional dialogue. Firstly, the detailed and focused discussions that have taken place in this room and during inter-sessional meetings, where states have exchanged views on the potential content and modalities of a Program of Action. Secondly, adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 7737, welcoming the proposal to establish a UN Program of Action to advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace in the context of international peace and security. Thirdly, publication of the report of the UN Secretary-General as requested by the General Assembly. And fourthly, regional discussions facilitated by UNIDIR, which have further facilitated the exchange of views on the Program of Action’s content and modalities. We agree with France, Vietnam, and others who have said that paragraph 49C and 49CBIS are covered in other areas of the report and, as they are not a good fit for this section and are duplicative, could be deleted. My delegation is of the view that matters of legal principles are best addressed in the section on international law. We can support Bangladesh’s suggested new texts that a future mechanism include multistakeholder participation. Regarding paragraph 52, we recognize the importance of striving towards consensus regarding the establishment of the future mechanism as well as the decision-making process of the mechanism. And finally, we support paragraph 53, calling for a dedicated inter-sessional meeting to continue to engage in focused discussions to further elaborate the Program of Action within the framework of the OEWG. Thank you.

Thank you, New Zealand. Russian Federation, to be followed by the Syrian Arab Republic.

Mr. Chairman, dear colleagues. Following the recommendations of the Consensus Final Report of the First Open-Ended Working Group, which says that duplicating efforts to ensure information security within several bodies is unadvisable, and also taking into account the provisions of UNGA Resolution 7736, we believe that the OEWG should remain the only negotiating mechanism under the auspices of the UN on international information security until the completion of its mandate. A decision on the future format of regular institutional dialogue, whether by continuing the activities of the group or by transforming it into a permanent mechanism, can and should be worked out by States on the basis of consensus within the framework of the existing Open-Ended Working Group. In this context, the Russian Federation supports, in general, the joint statement made by Brazil, India, and South Africa, as well as the statement made by Pakistan, Vietnam, and Cuba, and several other delegations who have supported that thesis. It is unacceptable to divert the exchange of views on this matter to other parallel platforms, doubly so to impose ready-made solutions on countries that are only beneficial to a small group of States. In this regard, the section on regular institutional dialogue needs to be balanced. At the moment, the course of discussions on this topic is not reflected objectively in the draft report. First of all, this concerns the provisions on the Program of Action, POA. In the current wording, this initiative is highlighted unreasonably and presented as settled. Such an approach is absolutely unacceptable. As discussions in the Open-Ended Working Group showed, not all States share the idea of a POA, and we propose that this be reflected in paragraph 49B. Within the group, there was no detailed discussion of the scope, content, and structure of the Program of Action, and thus the relevant provision should be deleted from paragraph 49B. Finally, the Program of Action is but one of the proposals put forward in the Open-Ended Working Group on regular institutional dialogue, and this should also be taken into account in the future report, and here I’m speaking of paragraph 49B. We consider it fair to discuss any initiatives from States aimed at ensuring security in the use of ICTs on an equal footing without singling out one initiative. Chairman, at the fourth session of the Open-Ended Working Group, Russia presented its vision of the future regular institutional dialogue. Our proposal, supported by a number of countries as cosponsors, deserves no less attention in the framework of the Open-Ended Working Group and its annual report. We note that the essence of our considerations was objectively stated in the original wording of paragraph 49C in the zero draft of the second progress report. In particular, the need to focus the efforts of a future body on the recommendations of the current Open-Ended Working Group and to provide for the possibility of developing within its framework a draft of a legally binding instrument on ICTs. We insist that the relevant wording be restored. It seems appropriate to recommend that the OEWG study the existing proposals on regular institutional dialogue in more detail, paragraph 53. At the same time, it is fundamentally important to emphasize the key role of the principle of consensus in deciding on the future negotiation format on security in the field of the use of the ICTs at the UN. This is paragraph 52. Now, specific concrete amendments to the text will be provided additionally. Thank you for your attention.

Thank you, Russian Federation, for your statement. Syrian Arab Republic, to be followed by China.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With regards to the regular institutional dialogue, my delegation stresses maintaining the central role of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) as a main platform for negotiations to ensure security in ICT use under the UN umbrella. We stress the need to hold on to genuine multilateralism to ensure progress and build a comprehensive mechanism for regular institutional dialogue under the UN umbrella with equal participation by all parties. My delegation believes that the Open-Ended Working Group is comprehensive, democratic, and transparent. It is therefore the best platform to find effective consensual solutions together to challenges facing ICT security. The draft report focuses on the Program of Action (POA), giving the impression that states have agreed that it is the best platform to continue the current dialogue to ensure safety or to ensure security and stability in ICT use. However, this is not in line with the Working Group’s mandate, according to which it should look into all initiatives to ensure the security of ICT use. Moreover, discussions in the Open-Ended Working Group reflected different assessments by countries of the POA. They proved that many countries believe it is an initiative that should be discussed in the Open-Ended Working Group to assess its effectiveness before taking any next steps. In this regard, we would like to support the amendments introduced by the Russian Federation, Cuba, and Iran, reflecting this understanding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Syria, for your statement. China, to be followed by the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With regards to Section G, we support the Chairman in compiling common elements from different positions and proposals of all parties, which is conducive to reducing the differences and exploring convergences. We are also of the view that this part should reflect the positions of all parties in a more balanced manner, especially Paragraphs 49 and 53. When it comes to 49B, China is of the view that the APR from last year in Paragraph 18B is the maximum common understanding we can reach at this stage with regards to the PLA, which includes the continuous discussion of the PLA under the OEWG framework. China is of the view that we should not prejudge the outcome of our negotiation. The future mechanism should be decided by all parties on a consensual basis. At the same time, China has some proposals with regards to the other paragraphs. When it comes to 51A, China supports the proposals made by Cuba and Iran, among other countries, that is to change state-led to intergovernmental. With regards to Paragraph 53, the last sentence, China is of the view that this is the requirement of the EUGA resolution as opposed to the consensus of the OEWG. Therefore, we propose its deletion. Moreover, China is concerned that too many dedicated intersessional meetings will cause too much cost for countries, especially for developing countries. Therefore, I think we should carry on the practice of this year, that is to hold one or two intersessionals. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, China, for your statement. United States, to be followed by Japan. U.S., please.

Chair, thank you for your efforts in drafting this very important section. The section has modestly improved in Rev. 1 but should go further. We support the proposal from Bangladesh to add the inclusion of the multistakeholder community in the list of elements contained in paragraph 51. While the Rev. 1 contains a number of important elements, the text does not reference one of the main areas of progress over the last year, that is the 2022 UNGA resolution welcoming the proposal to establish a new Program of Action (POA) to advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which was supported by an overwhelming majority of states. The resolution affirms the POA should support states’ efforts to implement and advance commitments to be guided by the framework of responsible state behavior, as articulated in the consensus GA resolutions, the GGE reports, the 2021 OEWG report, and the consensus reports of this group. The resolution says that the future POA should discuss and further develop this framework if appropriate. The POA resolution also calls for the SG to produce a report on states’ views on the scope, structure, and content for the POA and the modalities for its establishment. This report was released earlier this month and provides helpful recommendations to further the work of this group. The 2022 resolution tasks the SG’s office to submit the report to the GA and provide the report to this OEWG for further discussion. Therefore, we propose the addition of the following paragraph as a new 49B-BIS. Quote, states discussed the 2022 UNGA resolution, A/RES/77/37, welcoming the proposal to establish a new Program of Action to advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace and recognize the resolution’s call for an SG report on states’ views on the scope, structure, and content for the POA and the modalities for its establishment to be delivered to the UNGA and for further discussion at the OEWG. The group noted the July 2023 release of the report and encouraged discussion within the OEWG to take it forward. Unquote. Paragraph 49C-BIS repeats a paragraph currently in the international law section of the draft. We see no need to have this paragraph twice and request its removal from the section. Finally, I am compelled to respond to the request from a few states to include their proposal for a convention that is essentially an authoritarian rewrite of the consensus framework. Those who have expressed support for this proposal are seriously outnumbered by those who have expressed opposition and concern. This proposal has in various forms been peddled by a few countries for more than a decade and has never gained broader traction because it was just as unmerited then as it is now. Our understanding is that this APR is intended to capture areas of consensus and capture new proposals that are gaining wide traction. If the threshold for inclusion in this report is simply that a proposal was made, we’ll have additional edits to more comprehensively reflect the proposals that we have made this year in the threats, norms, and international law sections that are not reflected in the current document. For example, we believe the report needs to say and reaffirm that international humanitarian law applies in cyberspace, reaffirm that the law of state responsibility applies and allows for attribution to states of their behavior in cyberspace, and affirm the expectation that states should be held accountable when they act contrary to the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. We have heard support for these proposals from many states. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, United States, for your statement. Japan, to be followed by Colombia.

Mr. Chair, thank you for giving me the floor. With regard to Section G, Japan welcomes the progress of the discussion on the Program of Action to concretely advance the implementation of the agreed normative framework. Considering the fact that the co-sponsors of the POA come from all UN regional groups and with the support of 157 states at the First Committee in October 2022, it is clear that this proposal has broad support. As we stated earlier on Section D, we are of the view that this annual report should reflect the current discussion. In this regard, quoting paragraph 80 of the 2021 OEWG report is not appropriate. Therefore, we’d like to propose a deletion of paragraph 49Cb, as France, the EU, New Zealand, and the U.S. have just stated. Also, on paragraph 49C, we’d like to support France and New Zealand and propose to delete the paragraph. Our goal should now be to promote an inclusive discussion on the basis of views submitted by member states. In this context, Japan strongly supports a dedicated intersessional meeting on the POA recommended in paragraph 53. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Japan. Colombia, to be followed by Belgium.

Mr. Chairman, we are grateful to you for your endeavors to arrive at a consensus and move forward on identifying common elements regarding the future mechanism of regular institutional dialogue. Regarding the reference of paragraph 51B on this, we suggest the following addition: The aim of the future mechanism will be to promote responsible state behavior and the use of information and communication technology (ICT) in the context of international security. As Colombia has stated in sessions in this working group and as the co-sponsor of resolution 7737, we believe that the Program of Action is the permanent mechanism which is appropriate to move forward in this aim. Colombia presented the report of its point of view on the POA, including specific proposals on its scope, content, and structure, as well as considerations on the relationship between the POA and this working group. Looking at the scope of paragraph 53, we state once again our willingness to continue to discuss this matter in the framework of this working group. Additionally, sir, I would like to indicate the fact that Colombia took part in the informal consultations in UNODA and the OAS by means of CICTE on the Program of Action on the 8th of June. We believe it’s important that the conclusions of the informal discussions be circulated to states in order to identify the principal areas which are shared as well as aspects requiring more discussion. We once again state that we are willing to continue to work constructively to drive forward the regular institutional dialogue and arrive at a state consensus for its appropriate implementation. We’d just like to point out that the intersessional meeting as proposed in paragraph 53, which is something we support, would be the forum for further developing this. And lastly, we say that we do wish to continue to move forward the regular institutional dialogue and to arrive at a consensus on it and to see it implemented appropriately. Sir, with your indulgence, I would just like to say something. Yesterday, we did say that we co-sponsored the side event at one o’clock in the afternoon in room seven. I would just like to say that it will be taking place and we trust that you will be with us. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Colombia, for that invitation to all friends here. We’ll go to Belgium now, to be followed by Argentina. Belgium, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My country aligns with the statement delivered by the EU and wishes to make the following remarks in its national capacity. We welcome your efforts, Mr. Chair, to bring this group to convergence and the balance you have sought to find in the section on regular institutional dialogue. My delegation reiterates the view that the establishment of a Program of Action (POA) is the best means to materialize the regular institutional dialogue with broad participation under the auspices of the United Nations. Turning to your revised draft, Mr. Chair, we would like to stress the following points. In paragraph 51, the common elements put forward are a good basis to help our group reach convergence on the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue. Regarding paragraph 53, we welcome the inclusion of operational language on the POA as well as the reference to the Secretary-General’s report and the proposal to hold a dedicated international meeting, which we support. We welcome the recent release of the report by the Secretary-General on the POA as requested by the resolution adopted in the First Committee with 157 votes. We second the EU delegation in requesting that the APR reflect and welcome these two important developments. We also support the U.S. proposal for a new paragraph 49b BIS. The draft APR should also clearly call for the further elaboration of the POA in an inclusive manner with a view to its possible establishment. In paragraph 53 again, we believe that the language on the relationship between the POA and the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) is not a relevant topic for our discussion next year. We would request a deletion of that language. The group has indeed already held that discussion this year in a comprehensive manner and has already reached the conclusion that the POA is a legitimate part of the OEWG’s work. In our view, it is imperative that the sixth, seventh, and eighth sessions of the group be dedicated to more focused discussions on the POA. It is not useful to repeat work that has already been done this year in the coming sessions. Finally, Mr. Chair, we second France’s comments on paragraph 49c and 49c BIS and request a deletion of these paragraphs. We also do not support proposals to include language on a legally binding instrument in the APR. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you. Thank you, Belgium. Argentina, to be followed by the Republic of Korea.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We’re halfway through the temporary mandate of the OEWG, and here then are discussions on how to pursue the regular institutional dialogue of increasing importance and center stage, particularly over the next few months. We acknowledge how this is a center stage indeed in the UN in order to dialogue about the use of ICTs in an inclusive and transparent fashion. And essentially, we acknowledge the need to increase this dialogue, firstly in the experts group format and then in the OEWG with defined temporary mandates, and we would also like to have a permanent institutional platform for dialogue within the UN. Argentina wishes to support such a permanent dialogue being carried out under the aegis of the Program of Action, something that is standing in order to guide inclusive, transparent action, and it takes as its basis what has already been acquired, which is evolving when it comes to the framework for responsible state behavior. Likewise, we believe that discussion on the configuration and content must be held within the OEWG. This is therefore why we support the convening of inter-sessional meetings for this. We support paragraphs 49a and b and the suggestion of the US here. We also welcome the inclusion of paragraph 51, which sets forth the principles for any regular institutional dialogue. We support Bangladesh’s proposal that we include the many interested parties here. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Argentina. Republic of Korea, to be followed by Israel.

Mr. Chair, as a co-sponsor to General Assembly Resolution 77/37, let me reaffirm our position that we support the Program of Action (POA) as a regular institutional dialogue to be established under the auspices of the United Nations. We believe that the POA is well-positioned to serve as a regular institutional dialogue, as its General Assembly Resolution 77/37 has earned a vast majority of support from Member States. We appreciate the extensive discussion on the POA in the previous session and inter-sessional meetings and look forward to further elaborating on the scope, contents, and structure of the POA in future sessions. My delegation appreciates the Rev. 1 of the APR’s Regional Institutional Dialogue section for providing a detailed description of the POA in comparison to the 2022 APR. We especially welcome mentioning the mechanism as permanent, action-oriented, inclusive, transparent, and results-based, which are the core elements of the POA. We suggest further mentioning the relationship between the POA and OEWG, and that both are complementary, which has been expressed by many Member States. Furthermore, as an evolving mechanism, there is a possibility for adjustment in how the POA should operate. The UN Office of Disarmament Affairs has collated views of Member States on the scope, structure, and content for the Program of Action, and the preparatory work and modalities for its establishment. Various ideas have been proposed, which opened up an opportunity to discuss States’ views on how the POA should operate through their interests. Moreover, since we do not favor the expression “draft legally binding international instrument in the use of ICTs,” which is included in paragraph 49C of the Zero Draft, we support the deletion of it in accordance with our position that such a legally binding instrument is premature. In this respect, we also question the necessity of incorporating such a notion of legally binding obligations in a separate paragraph 49Cbis, which other delegations have also duly noted that it is also a repetition of paragraph 28b1 in the international law section. We also lend our support to Bangladesh, New Zealand, and the United States on the incorporation of a multistakeholder approach in the operationalization of a future regional institutional dialogue. Lastly, we welcome paragraph 53, because it is a fair reflection of our discussion on this issue and also a reasonable way forward, which is to have a deeper and more focused discussion on the elaboration of the POA. We also support mentioning the request of the UN Secretary-General to brief the OEWG at the sixth session on the Secretary-General’s report on the scope, content, and structure of the POA. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Korea. Israel, to be followed by Canada.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning, colleagues. With regard to the section on regular institutional dialogue, in particular paragraph 49B that addresses the POA, Israel wishes to repeat its position that we should refrain from duplication of venues for addressing the same subject matter, especially given the heavy burden that already exists on member states. We are not opposed to the creation of a Program of Action, but before we create such a mechanism, we should have clarity as to the exact scope of the POA’s mandate and that it would not duplicate other channels. This is especially relevant given the proposed permanency of the forum. In addition, it is important that the consensual decision-making process be clearly reflected in the language of the text. With regards to paragraph 49Cbis, and consistent with our position on norms, we wish to remind this forum of our position that the additional legally binding obligations are premature. First, we need to understand how current obligations are implemented, and only then can we decide on the need to embark on the road to creating additional ones. In this respect, we would like to support the suggestion made by the EU, the U.S., Japan, and other delegations to delete this paragraph. I thank you.

Thank you, Israel, for your statement. Canada to be followed by Australia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The OEWG does not exist separately from the UN General Assembly and from the First Committee. It is this committee that gave the OEWG its mandate. And that same committee was very clear in its support for a Program of Action, with 157 states welcoming this proposal, which was put forward by a strongly cross-regional group of co-sponsors. This is hardly a proposal aimed to meet the interests of only a small group of states. The OEWG should respect the will of the First Committee and work to deepen our discussion on the POA within this body. We must also respect the call by the UN Secretary-General in his recent POA report that this body play a key role in the development of the POA, which he notes is a worthwhile endeavor. We therefore welcome the proposal for a dedicated inter-sessional session on the POA, as well as focused discussions in the sixth, seventh, and eighth sessions of this body. As important as our work in this body is, it is not permanent, and Canada, like many other states, recognizes the need for an action-oriented, flexible yet permanent mechanism as a natural follow-on from the OEWG after 2025. The POA can be this mechanism, and it can be developed collectively and on a consensus basis by the members of the OEWG if allowed to do so. It can further advance discussions on the implementation of existing norms and international law, create a focused environment for the application of capacity building, and allow for consideration of new norms as needed. We welcome the fact that the APR as currently drafted offers the opportunity for all states to engage in its development and to allow the development of the POA to be based on the current and future work of the OEWG. Mr. Chair, we heard and understood your message that developing balance within an APR is not a question of simple algorithms. That said, I wish to be clear that given the extensive support for a POA, we cannot accept equivalency between this process and the proposals made by a small group on a convention, which clearly do not command the support of the majority of states in this room. We would support the U.S. proposal to include other proposals raised in this room should the language on a convention be included. For the sake of brevity, I would note also that Canada supports the textual proposals by the EU, France, the U.S., and Bangladesh’s proposal on multistakeholder participation. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Canada. Australia, to be followed by Indonesia.

Thank you, Chair. This chapter on regular institutional dialogue is crucial, and as paraphrasing Brazil, it defines the future of our global dialogue. From Australia’s perspective, the current draft regular institutional dialogue chapter is a good basis to begin from, but it is not perfect. In fact, it could be very much improved. But we are conscious that what Australia considers perfect, and how we would suggest improvements, may be difficult for some others to accept at this point of our negotiations. So instead of aiming for perfect, we’re here to find the space in which there is a possibility of garnering consensus. On specific proposals, Australia agrees with New Zealand and the European Union that paragraph 49Cbis does not add to this chapter, given it is already set out at paragraph 28Bbis2. I note Vietnam’s proposal to move this paragraph to the overview chapter, and while potentially a more logical location, we are still not convinced that we need two separate quotations of a full paragraph from a previous report in this report. Australia also supports the proposal from France that paragraph 49C does not add anything and should be removed. And we would support the proposed new paragraph 49Bbis from the United States. We have a few suggestions regarding paragraph 51. First, we suggest moving it from the recommended next steps to our discussion section, perhaps as a paragraph 49Bis, as it may be premature from our discussions here to state that we have agreement. We would also recommend that paragraph 52 be moved to become part of a sub-paragraph of paragraph 51, a paragraph 51E, so that operating on a basis of consensus is included as a principle for the future mechanism. We’d also request that a reference to consensus is specifically included in paragraph 51D, so that it would read, it would be an open, inclusive, transparent, sustainable, and flexible process which would be able to evolve by consensus in accordance with states’ needs, etc. We support the considerations raised by the Philippines and Nigeria on the importance of closing the gender digital divide, promoting gender sensitivity, and recognizing the importance of the participation of women in future regular institutional dialogue, and this could be included as a principle under paragraph 51. And we also support Bangladesh’s proposal to recognize the importance of the role of stakeholders in this paragraph. We would like to add at the end of paragraph 53 a reference to the regional consultations which have been undertaken by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 7737, and these were the consultations referenced by Colombia. Australia welcomes the substantive discussion on the Program of Action (POA) within the OEWG over the past year, and in fact over the past three years since February 2020, and also the reflection of this discussion in the APR, and we support the recommendation to continue this work through a dedicated intersessional meeting of the POA set out at paragraph 53. Finally, Chair, we recognize that this report is proving a very difficult needle to thread, but I am encouraged from the many substantive and constructive statements made this week that we will find a way through the eye of this needle and come out at the end of the week with something that we can all agree on which reflects appropriately and realistically and concretely the progress we have made over the past year because this is an annual progress report. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Australia, for your remarks. Indonesia, to be followed by Germany.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On Section G, we welcome the way the section is presented. My delegation thinks that it is important that Paragraph 49A put emphasis on the characteristics of the work of the OEWG that seeks to build on the progress of previous agreements. We also recognize the centrality of the OEWG as a single-track, state-led, and action-oriented forum to discuss ICT security issues. Therefore, any future mechanism that will follow should be discussed within the current OEWG, and this includes the discussion of scope, content, and modalities. We must avoid creating parallel tracks. My delegation wishes to highlight that the OEWG’s approach on achieving incremental progress and a step-by-step approach has been very helpful in finding convergence and taking the understanding of ICT security forward. We could also support Paragraph 51, outlining the common elements for future regular dialogue. Specifically, on Subparagraph C, we echo the proposal by Vietnam to remove the reference of, quote, “on the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICT,” end quote, instead only making reference to past OEWG and GGE reports. We need to ensure that any future discussion will also make a balanced reference to other aspects such as the application of international law, capacity building, as well as confidence-building measures. We could also support Paragraph 52 of this section. It is important that we maintain the working principles of the OEWG and any future mechanisms, especially the importance of a consensus process in information and decision-making to ensure the effectiveness and ownership of these decisions. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Indonesia. Germany, to be followed by Czechia.

Thank you very much, Mr. President, and good morning. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the OEWG’s statement delivered by the EU and make the following remarks in a national capacity. Important progress has been achieved on Section G, which reflects the strong shared sense of all delegations that a single-track, state-led, permanent mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations is needed to create an institutional home for cyber security at the UN. It is good to see important guiding principles of the Program of Action listed in the draft APR in Paragraph 51 HD. This resolution should be mentioned in this report, and Germany therefore supports the proposal made by the United States to insert a new Paragraph 49 B BIS. Germany also supports the proposals made by France on amendments to Paragraph 49. As time allocated for advancing the Program of Action further in the framework of this open-ended working group has been limited, Germany looks forward to making substantial progress in this regard at the dedicated international meeting mentioned in Paragraph 53. UN member states’ contributions made during the series of regional consultations on the Program of Action this year should inform these discussions. Germany would like to invite the delegations of Iran and Russia to consider placing their proposals for exploring legally binding obligations in the section on international law. Legally binding obligations do not provide a forum for dialogue, so this item seems out of place in Section G. Germany shares China’s concern that the proposed number of international meetings may turn into an expensive and potentially non-inclusive practice, and would therefore welcome holding these meetings in a way that allows for the widest and most meaningful participation of UN member states. Thank you.

Thank you, Germany, for your statement. Czechia to be followed by Chile.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Czech Republic fully aligns itself with the EU statement delivered earlier and wishes to emphasize a couple of points of national capacity. First of all, I would like to appreciate that the APR very clearly summarizes that there is agreement among states that the new institutional framework under the auspices of the United Nations should be built on the best of the work of OEWG and GGE. It should be a single-track, state-led, and permanent mechanism, and it should continue to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and operable ICT environment. As one of the co-sponsors of the Program of Action (POA), the Czech Republic sees as very positive that POA is exactly the platform that meets the criteria stated in APR. In this context, I would appreciate more emphasis on the POA in the chapter of APR, primarily for the following reasons. The POA has been discussed since 2020 and it currently represents the most thought-out proposal for the functioning of ICT discussions within the UN. It has been mentioned in a number of consensus reports, including those of the previous and current iteration of OEWG, and enjoys broad support of interest across various regions. For example, 40 national submissions to the UN Secretary-General report mandated by Resolution 77-37 were made as of June 2023. The Czech Republic fully supports positions presented by France and supported by other countries. Today, we also support a proposal of Bangladesh that the stakeholders should be involved in the discussion, as well as we support the proposal of the United States. But I would like to point out that our understanding is the discussion about the POA within the Open-Ended Working Group so far has been successful and has answered a number of important questions. For example, we all already know that POA is not intended to duplicate the work of the Open-Ended Working Group or create a parallel process. Now we can proceed to the next phase of the POA debate, that is to start talking about details of how specifically POA should work, in other words, the substance of the POA. We truly believe that this discussion will finish in a way that POA is the most suitable platform for our future dialogue and works for the benefit of all member states. I can promise that the Czech Republic is going to be active in the future debates in this way. As for legally binding obligations, we are also of the opinion, as many other countries, that this issue is related to the chapter of international law and if addressed in APR, it should be treated in the chapter of international law. When we talk about the POA, we are talking about a platform for structured, complex, comprehensive discussion. A possible legally binding obligation is just one element we might discuss, but there are many other elements which are very important for us, like the implementation of norms of responsible behavior and cooperation among countries in capacity building. POA is a complex and inclusive approach for us. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Shakir. Chile, to be followed by Switzerland, please.

Mr. Chairman, regarding regular institutional dialogue, we welcome the mention of the Program of Action (POA). Our country was an original co-sponsor of this initiative. The broad support obtained for resolution 77/37, GA resolution, set up a UN action group to promote responsible state behavior regarding the use of ICTs in the context of international security. This is a reflection of the interest and hope that it will be possible to delineate a mechanism that will enable us to make progress on the implementation of the current work framework on responsible state behavior. We agree with what the EU pointed out regarding eliminating paragraph 46bis. And then lastly, on paragraph 41, we would suggest that there be an inclusion of a sub-paragraph which would refer to a future mechanism. Although it would facilitate an open and inclusive process, it would promote the participation of all interested parties. Thank you.

Thank you, Chair, for your statement. Switzerland, to be followed by the UK.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Switzerland supports the ongoing discussions on the establishment of a UN Program of Action on cyber security. Switzerland believes that dialogue on international cyber security at the UN level should be held in a format that is long-term and permanent to ensure its institutional stability and sustainability. We are pleased to see that the concept of the POA has gained very broad support with the adoption of resolution 77-37. This should be reflected in the annual progress report. In this regard, we support the proposal by the U.S. for a new paragraph 49bbis. The Program of Action would contribute to the shared goal of an open, free, peaceful, and secure cyberspace. It would provide a permanent structure for regular institutional dialogue at the UN level to support member states in their national efforts to implement and operationalize the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The POA would be action-oriented, inclusive, transparent, consensus-driven, and results-based. And because it should be inclusive, we support the proposal by Bangladesh to include multistakeholders in paragraph 51. We think the relationship between the POA and the Open-Ended Working Group should be guided by the consensus recommendations of previous reports. As recommended by the 2021 GGE and Open-Ended Working Group reports, the POA should be further elaborated, including at the 2021-2025 Open-Ended Working Group. Therefore, there should be within the current Open-Ended Working Group process dedicated sessions on the POA. In this context, we welcome the proposal in paragraph 53 to hold a dedicated inter-sessional meeting. Outcomes of discussions in regular sessions and inter-sessional meetings should be reflected in the respective annual progress reports of the Open-Ended Working Group. And we support that the Open-Ended Working Group should be briefed by the Secretariat on the report of the Secretary-General and the regional consultations. Finally, we agree with France, Vietnam, New Zealand, and the others that paragraphs 49C and CBMs should be deleted. The section on regular institutional dialogue is not the right place to mention possible new legally binding obligations. If at all, they may be mentioned in the section on international law. Thank you.

Thank you, Switzerland. United Kingdom to be followed by Ireland. UK, please.

Thank you, Chair. In common with many states, the United Kingdom has shared its priorities for regular institutional dialogue through the Secretary-General’s consultation on the Program of Action. Our report should acknowledge the ways in which states have participated in elaborating their views, including through GA Resolution 7737, the publication of the Secretary-General’s report, and consultations with regional organizations. A dedicated inter-sessional meeting is the logical next step. The United Kingdom agrees with many others that the Program of Action should be elaborated through this OEWG, and we have made progress in discussing the principles that should shape it. We support the language proposal from Bangladesh on stakeholder participation, and we support the proposal by Australia that paragraphs 51 and 52 be moved into the descriptive section, as we continue to elaborate and seek consensus on principles for regular institutional dialogue. We consider paragraph 49C to be unhelpful and propose that it and 49Cbis be deleted. In striving to identify common principles, we should be working towards a common outcome. The potential subjects for a possible conference, implementation, confidence-building measures, and capacity-building are true of this working group and are not unique to any single proposal. And we consider paragraph 49Cbis to be unhelpful in quoting last year’s report in the regular institutional dialogue section of this year’s report. Where there have been proposals to elaborate aspects of the framework, they would be better described in the relevant section of the report. This group and its predecessors have long considered the possible elaboration of future binding obligations if required, and this draft already references this in the international law section. Thank you.

Thank you, UK. Ireland, to be followed by Poland.

Chair, Ireland fully aligns itself with the comments made by the European Union earlier this morning. We would like to make a number of brief comments in our national capacity. As a co-sponsor of the Program of Action, Ireland was enormously encouraged by the overwhelming support of the First Committee last year for the resolution on the POA, reaffirming as it did the commitment of States to implement the agreed-upon normative framework through a permanent, operative, and action-oriented process. In that context, we welcome the U.S. proposal for additional language referencing the resolution. Considering the level of support for the resolution last year, we think that such a reference is important. We welcome the suggestions in paragraph 53 for a dedicated inter-sessional meeting to further elaborate the POA. This is aligned with the report on the POA by the UN Secretary-General. We believe that such a dedicated meeting would offer an important opportunity for States to discuss the Secretary-General’s report on the POA and exchange views. In paragraph 53, we also suggest including a reference at the end of the paragraph to the consultations of regional organizations as mandated under Resolution 7737. Our understanding is that these are ongoing. These consultations offer another important avenue for discussions about the structures and substance of the POA based on input from all regional groups. And we, like France, would also like the report to invite a briefing on these consultations. Chair, from the outset, Ireland has viewed the POA as an opportunity for comprehensive engagement with the multistakeholder community. The scale of the issues in cyberspace demands that all the expertise and perspectives available to us are mobilized with the objective of development of an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful cyberspace. In that context, Ireland supports the proposal of Bangladesh for a reference for the future process to have a multistakeholder approach. We also support the addition of references to closing the gender-digital divide and agree with Australia that these could be best included in paragraph 51. Such a reference will be consistent with the overwhelming weight of discussion and views in this group. Chair, finally, we support calls from other States for the removal of paragraph 49C and 49Cbis. Our assessment is that questions of international law are best retained in the international law section of this document.

Thank you. Thank you, Ireland, for your statement. Poland to be followed by the Netherlands.

Thank you very much, Chair. We appreciate your efforts to come up with a language that will satisfy all the needs and views of this wide family of states here. Poland aligns with the EU and many other countries’ position that the UN Program of Action is the way forward for all of us. The POA enjoyed overwhelming support in last year’s First Committee and UNGA. We assume that calling 157 positive votes for the POA, coming from all regional groups, a small number of countries refers to some different kind of arithmetic not known to me personally. More importantly, the POA as proposed meets all the requirements for the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue as described in paragraph 50 of the proposed report. Therefore, we believe that the POA should be further discussed and developed so all states can provide constructive suggestions and inputs to its future form. In this context, we welcome a dedicated intersessional meeting to discuss in an open, transparent, and inclusive manner all the possible views on how the POA can fulfill all criteria for a permanent platform, meeting all needs expressed through the discussions in this very Open-Ended Working Group. We hope such discussions will clarify that the POA is designed as an action-oriented platform serving all urgent cyber-related needs of the whole UN family of states. It is not designed as some kind of tribunal as we had in this room yesterday. We support the number of comments made by the delegations in the earlier statements, but for the sake of time, I will not bring them here, trying to achieve my new personal best in the shortness of my statement. Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you, Poland, for your brief statement. Netherlands, to be followed by Malaysia. Netherlands, please.

Thank you, Chair. The Netherlands aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and welcomes the reviewed APR draft and the valuable progress it makes on future regular institutional dialogue. We support the points put forward by France with regard to the language on the Program of Action, as well as the Philippines’ point that future dialogue should also include closing the gender divide. We support the proposal of Australia to include the principle of consensus in paragraph 51 instead of paragraph 52. We support the proposal by Bangladesh to include stakeholder engagement in paragraph 51. In this section, like others, we consider that paragraph 49C is already sufficiently addressed in paragraph 28B1 in the international law section. In paragraph 53, we welcome the proposed briefing on the ESG report. We would also find it useful to receive a briefing on the regional consultations. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Netherlands. Malaysia, to be followed by Vanuatu. Malaysia, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Malaysia appreciates Section G of the REF1 draft. Malaysia supports the emphasis placed on discussions of the future work and mechanism of regular institutional dialogue within the OEWG, whose mandate runs into 2025. Malaysia supports FARA 50. Malaysia further supports FARA 51, as well as the proposal by Australia to incorporate FARA 52 on the principle of consensus as part of FARA 51. Malaysia also shares the view of Indonesia and others on FARA 52 regarding the importance of the principle of consensus. Malaysia welcomes FARA 53, especially in terms of focused discussions on the relationship between the Program of Action (POA) and the OEWG on the scope, content, and structure of the POA with a view to building a clear pathway for our future work principles stated in FARA 51. Malaysia believes that with the shared aim of advancing our efforts, regular institutional dialogue should be clear, transparent, fair, and inclusive. And as mentioned by Vietnam, in our deliberation, we should not lose sight of the human-centered aspect of cyberspace. Conversion and consensus remain essential as we strive for a more open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Malaysia. Vanuatu is the last speaker on my list now. Vanuatu, you have the floor. Thank you.

Thank you, Chair. First, I would like to continue to appreciate the work made and achieved so far, as this is the only intervention we’ll be making this week. I ask for indulgence as I briefly cover Sections A to G. Section A: We support the provisions reflecting the important contribution that stakeholders, regional and sub-regional organizations, and women can make to the process, and support the suggestion by Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, and others to reflect the capacity building in the overview section. Section B: We welcome the language on an extended list of threats. In Paragraph A, we support the proposal by the distinguished delegate from Germany to include a reference to spill-over effects of the use of ICTs in conflict settings. We also support the proposal by the Republic of Korea and others to include the energy sector in Paragraph 10B. We note that criminals are increasingly using new technologies such as AI and machine learning to pose new threats. This APR will be a foundational text in international cyber cooperation, and a broad list of existing and potential threats allows us to work together towards countering them. Because Vanuatu has experienced this firsthand and is still in its recovery state, we would also like to emphasize the destructive nature of ransomware attacks, the number of which is increasing catastrophically. The devastating effects of such attacks can cripple entire branches of government and damage the operation of critical infrastructure. The resulting harm is not limited to cyberspace but has very real implications for human well-being and livelihoods. Section C: The Republic of Vanuatu remains fully committed to implementing the agreed-upon rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior. As a small island developing state, we consider it particularly important for the OEWG process, as well as the future POA, to further assist states in implementing the agreed norms. As such, we strongly support the inclusion of Paragraph 22, Subsection E, 3B on identifying and studying the associated challenges. We consider this to be of utmost importance. Section D: Vanuatu would like to reaffirm our commitment to the principle of international law, including the Charter of the UN, being applicable in cyberspace. In that light, we support the edits included in the Rev. 1 version of the APR and are supportive of the statement delivered by Uruguay on behalf of a group of states. We are supportive of suggestions by the U.S., Netherlands, Fiji, and others to include a reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms in Paragraph 29E. Section E: On confidence-building measures, we would like to confirm our support for the creation of the POC directory in this section, as well as Annex 1. It is important that we avoid duplication with existing mechanisms, including set-to-set networks, and can support proposals to that effect. It is also important that the implementation of any CBM is manageable for small island developing states, given pre-existing capacity constraints, and support be made available to allow every UN member state to fully take part. Section F: Vanuatu would like to express their appreciation for the inclusion of new language in Chapter of Paragraph 40, Subparagraph A’s integration of a gender perspective, and B, C, and F. We believe all three additions stand to strengthen the text and better reflect the results of our discussions in the last year. Capacity building remains the single most important factor in building equity in cyberspace, as well as resilience to cyber threats, and we are reassured of the OEWG’s commitment to the issue. Lastly, Section G: We remain committed to continued discussions on the establishment of the POA, and as a result, support the reference to a dedicated intersessional meeting in Paragraph 53. Also, Vanuatu supports the drafting suggestions put forward by the Australian delegation, as we believe these summarize the vast majority of views at this open-ended working group. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Vanuatu, for your contribution. Friends, there are no further speakers who have asked for the floor. It’s almost 12, and it’s my intention to wrap up and conclude our discussions on the first reading of the draft annual progress report. I want to say that so many of you have taken the floor on Section G, but also on all the different sections. We’ve also heard from many delegations who have not previously participated in the discussions, and I find that to be encouraging that so many of you are committed to engaging, committed to shaping the outcome of the discussions this week, and I find that to be very encouraging, and also I think it’s good for the process. That is what happens in a multilateral process that is open-ended, that everyone puts their views forward, everyone is committed to an outcome. Second, I’m also encouraged by the discussions over the last two and a half days, but also with regard to Section G, that many of you want a consensus outcome. In fact, all of you want a consensus outcome, and on Section G, I do see some degree of common ground, but I also see some stark differences in views and positions, and we need to thread the needle, as Australia put it, or we need to square the circle in a way that can find consensus. On Section G, the fact that there have been so many views put forward is a good sign, because all of you want to shape the future of this process post-2025, but it’s also important to keep in mind that as we engage to shape the future, we should not jeopardize the present, and therefore it’s important that we continue the path of taking incremental steps, adopt a step-by-step approach, because what we do in the present, what we do this year, what we do this week, will provide that foundation for the future mechanism. So if we allow the struggle for the future to be so intense that it paralyzes us in the present, then there will definitely be no future. That much I can say. So keep that in mind. There are some gaps in this section, and we cannot take a my-view-or-the-highway approach. We need to find a middle way that can hopefully bring everyone together, that can bring everyone together to take another step forward, another step forward in July. Now as we wrap up the first reading, I also want you to keep in mind a few points. First, this is an annual progress report to be adopted by consensus, so it is not a chairman summary where I can describe what I wish, what I want, but it has to be a progress report adopted by consensus, which means that what goes in there has to command consensus. I’m stating the obvious, but I want you to keep that in mind. And that ultimately will require me to make some judgment as to what should be the content of this annual progress report that can enjoy consensus. So it’s not reflecting every single word that has been uttered in the last 12 months, but it’s about capturing the spirit of our discussion in a way, and capturing the content, capturing the spirit, capturing the substance in a way that could command consensus. So please keep that in mind. The annual progress report has to command consensus. That is part of the mandate of this working group. That is the mandate we have. We do not have the possibility of putting things to a vote. We do not want that in any case, because there’s an inherent value in a mechanism that works on the basis of consensus. We heard that in Section G, how many of you have said that the future mechanism should also work on the basis of consensus. So if this process is going to work on the basis of consensus, then all of you must recognize that a consensus process, if it is to deliver an outcome, must also be able to produce an outcome that commands consensus. So the content of the report has to be based on consensus. So we can’t possibly capture every word that has been put forward over the last 12 months. It’s simply not possible. So do keep that in mind. I do have a predicament, and this is my second point. The predicament is that how do I capture everything that has been said, all the ideas and proposals? And I can say at the outset that it’s going to be impossible for me to satisfy all your requests, your preferences, your wishes, and your proposals. It’s impossible. So keep that also in mind. I have to capture the spirit and substance of the discussion, but it’s going to be impossible for me to satisfy all of you. I will do my best to satisfy all of you to the extent possible, but it’s going to be difficult, if not impossible, for me to satisfy and fulfill all your wishes, requests, and preferences. Keep that in mind. The other point that I think is worth keeping in mind is that the annual progress report, this is the second one. This is not the final report. This is not the end of the process of the open-ended working group. We are midway, so we are trying to take another step forward, and so the work will continue. The second annual progress report is not the final word. It’s not going to be the exhaustive and final conclusion of our work, and some of the proposals, some of the ideas, in fact, many of them will need to be discussed in a continuing way to build up, to be refined, to be developed further, and hopefully as we continue to discuss, we enlarge the circle of consensus so that at the end of this process in 2025, we would have taken a series of steps, but more importantly, the work of the OEWG provides the foundation for the future, post-2025, future mechanism that all of you are so passionate about. But if this foundation is shaky, if there is no trust, if there is no building of confidence or rebuilding of confidence between delegations, then there is no future for a future mechanism. So I think we need to balance the immediate need of making step-by-step progress, but also continue our discussions on the need for a future mechanism. So these are some random reflections at this point. It’s quarter past 12. I’m going to retreat into a cave at this point and with my team, and we are going to put our minds to revising the annual progress report, and we hope to make that available this evening. I’m hesitant to give you a very specific time, but I think it would be hopefully early in the evening today that we will make it available to all of you. Now, having made these sort of concluding comments after the first reading, let me remind all of you that this afternoon, we will have the dedicated stakeholder session, which is being held in accordance with the agreed modalities for the participation of stakeholders. And so that’s the interactive session with states and stakeholders. That will be held here this afternoon at 3 p.m. We have about 20 speakers who have participated. I think it’s important that all of you are present and listen to the stakeholders. And to the stakeholder community, you have been part of this process, sitting at the back of the room, following the discussions. So you are aware that we are engaged in very serious and intense discussions, and time is of the essence. So this afternoon, I’d like the stakeholder community to also come prepared with three-minute remarks. So please be fair to us and to all your government representatives here. Time is of the essence. So much as I would like to give you the opportunity to listen to as many to your lengthy statements, but do come prepared to summarize your key points. And of course, you are welcome to make available to me your written remarks, which we are prepared to share on the website so that all delegations can be aware of your contributions. So my friends, with those comments, the meeting is now adjourned, and I wish you a pleasant afternoon and enjoy your lunch. Thank you for your participation.