Session 5-8 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

Good afternoon, distinguished delegates. The eighth meeting of the fifth substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of ICTs is now called to order. Delegates, dear friends, we’ll continue our discussion under agenda item five, and we’ll continue our discussions that we began this morning of the final draft of the second annual progress report that I circulated yesterday evening. We heard preliminary reactions to the draft this morning, and as I have indicated this morning, we are here this afternoon to hear further remarks and contributions from delegations and groups of delegations. It is my hope that what you will say at this point in this meeting will provide potential solutions and will provide a basis for us to bring the document that is now on the table across the finish line. So it is now my intention to open the floor and take statements, and I’d like to listen to whoever wishes to make a contribution at this point in this discussion. The floor is now open. I give the floor to Chile, which I believe is speaking on behalf of a group of states. Chile, you have the floor, please.

Thank you very much, Chairman, for giving us the opportunity for an exchange of views on the second revision of your annual report, the draft. I’m making this statement on behalf of the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay. We would like to add our names to the thanks expressed to you and your team in drawing up this new document. We are aware that it’s been a major challenge given the broad spectrum of opinions manifest over the last few days. And in particular, for this reason, we thank you for including a robust section on capacity building. In this regard, we welcome the recognition in paragraph 5 of section 8, overview of the cross-cutting nature and holistic focus that this working party attaches to capacity building by identifying it as an essential element in the context of ICTs in international security and also as something which can build trust. Although we recognize that the document could still be improved, we find it particularly important that an annual progress report be adopted, which includes in particular concrete results which are oriented towards action. And at the same time, in future meetings, allows us to continue working to identify points of convergence with the goal of achieving common understandings. Finally, Chairman, given the fact that we’re still only halfway through this group’s mandate, our countries wish to express their wish for our work to have a flexible spirit so that in the future we can achieve a consensus-based final document. Thank you.

Thank you, Julie, for the statement on behalf of a group of countries. I give the floor now to the European Union, to be followed by France. EU, please.

Thank you, Chair, and thanks indeed again for the hard work by you and your team on this draft APR. I will keep my intervention short. As mentioned this morning, we see several elements in the draft that need some further work. In this context, the EU and its Member States have used the time you have given us over lunch responsibly. During the break, we have reflected, engaged, and listened to other delegations in view of seeking a consensus text. In their upcoming interventions, EU Member States will provide us all with the outcome of their efforts. We look forward to continuing the effort to have a positive result by the end of this week.

Thank you very much, Liu. I’m very happy to hear that the lunchtime was used productively. I look forward to listening to the views of members of your group later in this discussion. I give the floor now to Canada, also speaking on behalf of the group. Please.

Mr. Chair, I am taking the floor on behalf of the Open, Informal, and Cross-Regional Group of States to advance confidence-building measures within the OEWG. Our group would like to reiterate our strong support for the establishment of the POC Directory as a concrete deliverable of the work of the OEWG over the past year. We regret, therefore, that such a significant number of amendments have been made at the last minute to a document that has been subject to three previous discussions. That said, in the spirit of seeking compromise and bringing the POC Directory to fruition, we wish to make the following proposed change to the text. In Para 1 of Annex A, at the end of the para, we recommend the following additional language on the use of ICTs in the context of international peace and security. Thus, the para would read: This paper sets out elements that can guide the development and operationalization of such a directory on the use of ICTs in the context of international peace and security. It is the view of our cross-regional group that this addition should help allow all states to join consensus in the creation of POC. Mr. Chair, I reserve the right to take the floor again in my national capacity later in the debate. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Canada, for the statement on behalf of the group, as well as for your very specific proposal. I give the floor now to France, to be followed by Estonia. France, you have the floor, please.

Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Chairman. I’d like to start by thanking you again for your work and that done by your team in the Secretariat to find a very narrow path to consensus so we can adopt this annual progress report. We welcome and support, furthermore, the declaration made by the EU this morning and this afternoon, which reiterated the constructive spirit that we are taking as we enter the final phase of this negotiation. In section G of the regular institutional dialogue, in paragraph 56, my delegation would like to make the following observations. It has to do with the reference to the consensus rule. In terms of the decision-making processes for the future mechanism, France is very particularly attached to the consensus mechanism, particularly for questions of substance. For example, it would be indispensable from our perspective that any future decisions to further develop the regulatory framework be taken on the basis of consensus. However, a range of delegations have rightly underscored the need to reflect on ways of ensuring that the consensus rule does not lead to stagnation in any future process. At this stage in our conversations, it therefore appears to us that the annual report should underscore the importance of seeking consensus in the functioning of a future mechanism without, nonetheless, prejudging how consensus would apply in such a future mechanism. Turning now to the decision to establish a future mechanism, France, as it has indicated in its contribution to the recent Secretary-General report on the POC, wishes and intends to make every effort within this OEWG to find consensus for the creation of a Program of Action as part of the future mechanism. In this spirit, we fully agree with the Secretary-General in saying that it is imperative that we work towards consensus on the establishment of a future POC. However, if we can lift up consensus as something that should motivate our efforts, we should not prejudge the outcome of our efforts. For all these reasons, we therefore propose to revert to the initial version of this paragraph, as it was found in Rev 1 of the report. Turning now to paragraph 58, we are a little surprised by its current wording. We note that, in 2022, the same report on the matter of institutional dialogue invited the group to focus its discussions on the establishment of a POA for its potential creation or establishment. Given that, since our last report, 155 States in the General Assembly have expressed their support for the Program of Action, the current paragraph would appear to be a dilution of those efforts. It is backsliding rather than progress. In a spirit of compromise, my delegation is willing to accept the mention of other forms of regular cooperation and dialogue, as long as the intersectional meeting mentioned in the paragraph is devoted specifically to the Program of Action.

Thank you, France, for your statement. I give the floor now to Estonia, please.

Thank you, Chair. I am speaking on behalf of Australia, Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay, and my own country of Estonia. Let me begin by expressing heartfelt gratitude for the hard work you and your team have done with the draft APR. We understand that it is not easy to accommodate everybody’s visions, so we highly appreciate your efforts. Chair, our country submitted a proposal for convergence language on international law. While we are pleased to see that much of our initial proposal is indeed included in the draft, we cannot help but notice that the specific mentions of Article 33 and Chapter 6 have been omitted, even though the proposal received a lot of support in the room and was not objected to by any Member State. We therefore suggest including a respective reference to Paragraph 30B. Chair, we reiterate our country’s commitment to continuing to provide constructive proposals on international law and to continuing discussions that will allow us to deepen our understanding of these important issues. You can count on our continued support to reach a consensual APR tomorrow. Thank you, Chair. And now a couple of remarks in my national capacity. Firstly, I would like to support the comments made by France, and secondly, Estonia would like to propose alternative language to Article 32 to read, “States discussed the need to consider whether any gaps exist in how existing international law applies in the use of ICTs and whether to further consider the possible development of additional legally binding obligations if appropriate.” Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Estonia, for your intervention. There are no other speakers of ours for the floor, so it seems that everyone else is very, very happy. Russian Federation, are you going to make me happy? You have the floor, please. No pressure, Russian Federation.

Chair, thank you for giving me the floor. Chair, I hope that I will make you happy as well as all participants in the process, and I’d like to express and make a joint statement from the group of like-minded states on the updated version distributed yesterday of the second – of the annual progress report. By the Republic of Belarus, Republic of Burundi, People’s Republic of China, Republic of Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Nicaragua, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela, on the final draft of the annual progress report of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of ICTs. Mr. Chair, we would like to express our appreciation for the effort put by Your Excellency and your team into developing the final draft report. While there have been some improvements compared to the previous version, we must acknowledge the presence of significant drawbacks that are not acceptable to our delegations. Firstly, the draft is still, to a large extent, devoted to the implementation of rules, norms, and principles of responsible behavior of states in the use of ICTs, while ignoring the priority task to further develop these norms. It is concerning that references to the latter have not been added but removed from some paragraphs. This clearly contradicts the mandate of the OEWG as enshrined in the UNGA Resolution 75-240 and supported by the consensus of all states in the UNGA Resolution 76-19. The balance should be ensured. Furthermore, we know that the report lacks any reference to the initiative on the legally binding instrument, which we believe is an important aspect to be addressed. In this regard, our countries strongly object to an attempt to eradicate any reference to the concept of a UN Convention on International Information Security co-sponsored by Belarus, DPRK, Nicaragua, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela, submitted as an official document of the 77th UNGA session. We insist on the need to reflect this important proposal in the final APR. Equally troubling is the lack of reference to the chair’s summary of the previous OEWG, which holds substantial merit and should have served as a valuable foundation for the current OEWG work. Another concern consists in the deletion of capacity-building related language across sections of the report. This risks undermining the significance of capacity-building and its potential to address critical challenges. Moreover, we are disappointed by the inclusion of language on human rights, international humanitarian law, as well as the overemphasis on gender issues, despite the clear disagreement of like-minded delegations. Such contentious topics should not have been incorporated without achieving a consensus. We would also appreciate clarification of the meaning of the new addition referred to international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty in the section on international law. The role of other interested parties in ensuring information security should not be overestimated. The OEWG is an intergovernmental process in which negotiation and decision-making are exclusively prerogatives of the member states. We stress that only accredited representatives of business, NGOs, and academia, including legal experts, have the right to participate in the activities of the OEWG. Almost at the end of this substantive session, we stress the urgency to resolve the visa issue in a full and timely manner, adhering to the legally binding obligations of the host country. We reiterate our strong desire to adopt a truly balanced and factual report. However, we stress that consensus cannot be achieved at the expense of the key interests of our countries. Therefore, we advocate for a revised version of the final draft. Chair, I’d like to add to our statement. And we’d also, that Sudan has also aligned itself with our statement. Thank you very much.

Thank you for your statement, Russian Federation. Is there any other delegation that wishes to take the floor? Islamic Republic of Iran, please.

Thank you. Mr. Chair, firstly, I would like to extend my gratitude to you and your team for the efforts put into developing the final draft of the APR. I would like to align my delegation with the LMG statement delivered just now by Russia. Furthermore, I have the honor to offer the following remarks in my national capacity. While the final draft report is currently being reviewed in my capital, as an initial remark that I can offer, there is a strong expectation and necessity for a balanced and factual document. Now, please allow me to highlight some key points without which achieving consensus will be challenging. In the section on threats, our concerns about the threats identified by our delegation are conspicuously absent. Similarly, paragraphs 16 and 17, addressing the responsible use of ICT capabilities and emerging technologies, fail to address our apprehensions regarding refraining from unilateral coercive measures. Regarding norms, rules, and principles, the crucial issue of developing new norms, as stated in paragraph 23a, has been completely disregarded. This fundamental position, shared by like-minded countries, is almost entirely omitted from the second progress report. Abandoning this aspect undermines the group’s commitment to norm development and also the preparation of ICT concepts terminology. In the section on international law, the vital prospect of formulating legally binding obligations needs to be recognized. Only a weak mention in paragraph 32 does not align with our viewpoint. Additionally, paragraph 34 refers to state practice and the incorporation of national views on the application of international law. This should be deleted. With regard to confidence-building measures, our proposal for the temporary establishment of a directory of points of contacts has not been reflected. Furthermore, in paragraph 35c, our viewpoint on impartial and non-discriminatory information exchange has been overlooked. In the section on capacity building, our recommendations for creating a new capacity building mechanism under the United Nations have been disregarded. Instead, the focus solely revolves around enhancing coordination among existing mechanisms, which cannot fully be supported from our side. Moreover, paragraph 43a, which relates to preparing a survey to identify countries’ needs regarding gender equality in the field of ICT security, has not been removed. In contrast, paragraph 43b has been significantly weakened compared to the previous version, and the sentence about preparing an initial list of countries’ required capabilities, that is our proposal, has been deleted from paragraph 43g. Turning to institutional dialogue, the proposal put forth against the POA is weakly mentioned in paragraph 52b. However, in the more crucial and executive paragraphs concerning recommended actions, there is no mention of the said proposal, and the focus remains solely on the POA. It is essential to find a balance and consider mentioning the aforementioned proposal alongside the POA in paragraph 58. Moreover, paragraph 57, which refers to the involvement of other stakeholders in the future mechanism, does not align with the consensus. Additionally, paragraph 55a, b, and d do not acknowledge our suggestions regarding the international, transparent, fair, non-politicized, and non-discriminatory nature of the future mechanism. Lastly, paragraph 56 has not reflected the need to pay attention to a step-by-step negotiation approach. I must emphasize that our agreement to the consensus should not be taken for granted. Reaching consensus requires careful consideration of red lines, and therefore the text must undergo revision once again. I thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you.

Thank you, Islamic Republic of Iran, for your statement. I give the floor now to Australia, to be followed by China. Australia, please.

Thank you very much, Chair. Your efforts in drawing up this document, and also for listening to us all very closely this week, have been a difficult task, and we can see that you are working very, very hard. Australia wants this document to reflect not only our conversations over the last two days but also over the last two years. And this morning, you asked us to look at this document holistically, not to focus on particular trees at the expense of the forest. And with my apologies, I am going to very blatantly plagiarize your metaphor. Chair, colleagues, the forest that we cannot ignore is made up of our framework of responsible state behavior. Our trees are our law, our norms, our confidence-building measures, and our capacity-building efforts that have been recommended and agreed upon by consensus over many years. And we collectively want to add to this forest. That is our mandate. Our work here is to expand this forest by planting seeds and saplings. These are the proposals and the ideas that have been put forward over the past year. And nurturing these, and nurturing the seeds and the saplings that have the potential to grow into mature trees and to add to our forest. Like several others who have spoken this morning, Australia also scattered several seeds over the past year. We submitted several new proposals to this group to take forward. And we can see that many of these seeds have not found fertile ground. We will continue to work with this group to see if there is a way that our proposals and other proposals can be put forward in the future. But we can accept that for now, they’re not referenced in this report because they have not yet garnered consensus. In this report, we cannot ignore the forest. We can’t ignore the existing framework and focus only on the new proposals. We have agreed by consensus several times that these efforts should happen in parallel and concurrently. That is, we should be focusing not only on what we can do to add to our forest but also on implementing that forest. There are many new references in this draft to a possible way to add to this consensus by advancing the framework of responsible state behavior through exploring new legally binding obligations. And this has been supported by a small group of states. But there are also several deletions of references which nurture our existing forest and our existing framework. Australia is willing to acknowledge that there is a possible path forward with some of these new proposals, but we need to nurture the forest we already have at the same time. To do that, we have some proposals to add that we think will balance out the difference between and bring a holistic view to both the new proposals for taking our forest forward and also to making sure that we continue to nurture what we have. So, turning to specific text, in paragraph 23B, we would like to add a phrase so that it would say, “States underlined the importance of implementing norms F, G, and H for the protection of critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure.” And then the paragraph will continue. At 23C, we would add, “States continued to emphasize that to implement norm I, cooperation and assistance could be strengthened to ensure the integrity of the supply chain,” etc. At 23F, we would add, “States stress the need for further focused discussions on implementing the rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs.” And we would suggest that paragraph 23A flows better here, and we would add that to the end of paragraph 23F and move it down. We would also suggest that these references to specific norms add a footnote that footnotes either the GGE report from 2015, the OEWG report from 2021, or the GGE report from 2021. We are open to which one you want to choose, just to make sure that everyone is aware of exactly what we are talking about when we are talking about these norms. We also have a further proposed small change that we hope is more technical in nature, and this is at paragraph 30A in the international law chapter. We propose to rephrase this section to, “States reaffirmed the principles of state sovereignty and sovereign equality and the international legal obligations that flow from them.” This is because the word norms in the original text here is used in the context of this OEWG slightly differently from the way that it is often used in international law more generally. Here in our open-ended working group, we have already agreed on 11 voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behavior, and we often use the shorthand norms to describe these recommendations. What flows from sovereignty is not voluntary and it is not non-binding. What flows from sovereignty are legally binding obligations upon all states. As such, we would like to make that clear in this document at paragraph 30A, where we are not talking about voluntary expectations but about legal obligations when we talk about sovereignty. Finally, Chair, Australia also supports the proposed change to paragraph 56 made by France. We align with the statement delivered by Canada on behalf of the cross-regional group of confidence builders, and we align with the statement delivered by Estonia on international law. I do not envy your task, Chair, but I wish you a green thumb as we continue into the afternoon. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Australia, for your statement and also for your forest metaphor. We are not a land of forests in Singapore, but I do know that if we don’t have a consensus outcome, we will all be lost in the forest, and it may take some time for us to come out of it. And that’s what we are trying to do—to not get lost in the forest, come out of it, and hopefully have a consensus outcome that we can all own collectively. But thank you for your statement. I give the floor now to China, to be followed by the United States. China, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the last few days, I have been following the standard of a good student by abiding by their time limit. Therefore, if I go beyond the time limit, I seek your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I would like to thank you and your team again for your efforts in promoting consensus in our group. The day before yesterday, Mr. Chairman mentioned that we want to achieve a balance. That does not mean balance among different parts or sections of the document. It is also to find a balance in a document as a whole. China concurs with what you have said on this point. However, to be frank, the final draft is far from achieving balance. Balance is a delicate relationship among the major concerns of all parties. Especially, we should be dynamic in making changes in line with the development of the situation. In 2021, the GGE report mentions supply chain integrity and IHL. Actually, we have reached a balanced solution on such major issues. Last year, in our APR, the balance has been maintained. At first, China showed a great extent of good faith and accepted some wording on good practices. That is, such as exchanges of good practices at bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels on supply chain risk management. However, some developments that happened later, I believe you have all observed. The disruption to the supply chain and decoupling, building walls, such phenomena are rampant and they are on the increase. If I can make an inappropriate metaphor, if in ChatGPT we put the agreed wording on supply chain integrity, I believe it will not produce what we have in front of us. Therefore, I would like to say that the wording that we would like to see deleted has lost its original meaning. This has thus disrupted the balance we have achieved previously about supply chain and the IHL. Therefore, China strongly suggests that we delete this sentence. If some countries are against this, then we will delete all wording with regards to supply chain and those about IHL. I repeat again, that is everything about supply chain, as opposed to just 23C, so that we will go back to where we started, to ground zero. I believe that nobody would be in favor of what I have just suggested. Therefore, in order to show our flexibility, I would like to suggest that in 23C, before supply chain, we add transparent, objective, and impartial. This is the agreed language we have achieved previously about supply chain. Second, when it comes to norms and the international law sections, these sections are out of balance as well. This has been a long-standing issue, but this report has not dealt with this issue appropriately. For example, in paragraph 33A under international law, in our statement, China has proposed its deletion. If some countries would like to see it kept in the document, China then would request some additional wording added under norms accordingly. Therefore, I would like to suggest you revisit the mandate of the OEWG. Then we can move on to paragraphs 24 and 33. I believe in that case, you will discover that we are entirely out of balance when it comes to international law and norms. Therefore, it is our hope that the above-mentioned issues can be appropriately handled in the remaining one and a half days so that we can produce a consensual report. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, China, for your statement. I give the floor now to the United States, please.

Thank you, Chair. First of all, I want to reiterate my thanks to you and your team for your work on this year’s APR. We support your efforts to achieve consensus. We recognize the difficulty in finding a text that will make everyone happy. That considered, we want to be transparent and open regarding the remaining concerns we have. Unlike the previous speaker, we are here to find compromises, not take-it-or-leave-it proposals, and we are not interested in holding unrelated proposals hostage to reach consensus. Turning to our specific concerns on the text, we cannot support the current language of paragraph 56 regarding the necessity for states to agree by consensus on the establishment of a future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue. Although I believe we all share in the objective of seeking consensus, and will continue to strive to do so, the GA does not require consensus, and thus the language insisting a future mechanism be created by consensus is too prescriptive. The OEWG and most recent GGE processes are examples of processes not created by consensus, but generating substantial consensus progress on these issues. As such, we support maintaining language, as in Rev. 1, about the importance of consensus, as suggested by France, or we can consider alternative language about the need for states to strive for consensus. Additionally, we remain disappointed and would find it very difficult to accept the current sections of text given the significant revisions away from a focus on implementation of existing norms. As a kind reminder, the vast majority of our discussions have focused on this. Our efforts should seek to reaffirm the framework for responsible state behavior, not undermine it. It is disingenuous to overemphasize the focus of this body on the minority position that we need new norms at this time, and as I mentioned yesterday, if we are going to consider any proposal that is gaining traction, we would expect to see many more proposals in this document that have been otherwise ignored or belittled at the objection of a few states. In addition, we see a substantial muddying of waters with the addition of the possibility of additional legal obligations in the norms section and new references to norms in the law section. These revisions undermine our work and the strength of the framework itself. To that end, we support edits to the international law section proposed by Estonia on behalf of a group of states, as well as Australia’s edits to the law and norms sections. Finally, in the threat section, we note the new placement of the phrase “data security” that could be interpreted as elevating the issue, a phrase that is not well understood, to the same level of use of ICTs in the context of international peace and security, which is at the heart of our mandate. We request the deletion of that phrase. Thank you again, Chair. The U.S. delegation looks forward to continuing to work toward achieving consensus.

Thank you, United States, for your statement. Ghana, to be followed by the Syrian Arab Republic. Ghana, please.

Mr. Chair, thank you for giving me the floor. Since this is the first time Ghana is taking the floor, we would like to thank you and your entire team for putting together a comprehensive APR for the consideration of member states. We acknowledge that this is no small feat, and so we commend your leadership and commitment in steering the affairs of the OEWG. Mr. Chair, Ghana joins its voice to those of other states who welcome the language of embracing the need to have a high level of participation of female delegates and ensure gender perspectives in its discussions, as outlined in paragraph 7 of the document. We continue to welcome the inclusion of this text in the document and its eventual adoption. My delegation also supports calls for the inclusion of energy in paragraph 12 as part of the list of critical information infrastructure proposed by member states, and we believe that the designation and protection of key CRIs is an important component of cybersecurity development. Mr. Chair, Ghana would like to propose that the previous text in paragraph 21 of the first APR calling for the participation of relevant experts to be invited by the OEWG chair to have focused discussions on developments in new technologies such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence in order to exchange views and build knowledge on its potential impact be considered and maintained in the revised APR. This is because an increasing reliance on cloud technology false neutral, as outlined in the first APR, could increase vulnerabilities and expand attack vectors. Ghana continues to recognize that the increasing use of technology, specifically artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, blockchain technology, among others, continues to pose risks to international security despite the significant benefits they offer. Some of these include ransomware, online fraud, among many others. On existing threats, Mr. Chair, Ghana is pleased that the APR has been expanded to reflect the salient existing and emerging threats and the various forms in which they take. However, Ghana would have liked to see a text considering the possibility of a threat repository, namely because this will provide the benefits of member states, including enhanced situational awareness, which will allow member states to gain an understanding of the evolving threat landscape by sharing data on the most recent attack vectors, malware strains, and techniques utilized by cyber criminals. It will also aid in early warning and rapid response and cybersecurity capacity building. Ghana recognizes the need to establish a global POC directory and supports the nomination of national points of contact. However, Ghana recommends that this nomination is done at technical, policy, and diplomatic levels due to the differences in capacities. Further discussions on the development of such a repository and related capacity building initiatives at the OEWG are therefore very important. Regarding section D on international law, Ghana endorses the proposal to hold workshops, training courses, and exchanges on best practices at international, inter-regional, and sub-regional levels. We also acknowledge the valuable contributions regional organizations can make by sharing their knowledge and experience in this field. To conclude, Mr. Chair, Ghana acknowledges that the OEWG is a progressive engagement, and we assure you of our flexibility and support in reaching a consensus outcome. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Ghana, for your statement. Syrian Arab Republic, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’d like to first start by thanking you and expressing my appreciation for the work you’ve done in preparing the revised draft report. I thank your team and the Secretariat for the work they’ve done as well. The revised draft report has been sent to the capital, and I would like to make the following preliminary remarks. My delegation would like to associate itself with the statement delivered by the representative of the Russian Federation on behalf of like-minded states, and we make the following observations. First, the text has an undeniable attempt to make some improvements; however, at the same time, it did include some setbacks in certain aspects, which requires it to undergo further work to achieve a general balance in a manner that would reflect the major concerns and priorities of states in an objective and balanced manner. Second, my delegation stresses the need to arrive at a balanced and objective APR through a consensus, seeing as this report will define the main features of the international community’s future work in information security and ICT security, keeping in mind that we are halfway down the road in our mandate. Therefore, we stress that for delegations to feel ownership over the process and for us to maintain the comprehensive and effective nature of this process, we must arrive at a document that clearly and in a balanced way reflects the entire spectrum of basic views and considerations expressed by member states, especially those pertaining to the priorities of action needed in the upcoming stage and the general direction of this work. Here we find it unacceptable to simply focus on the inclinations of a group of states while disregarding the positions of another group of states in a manner that may give the inaccurate impression that a joint consensus has been arrived at between the states on the priorities that must be pursued. The delegations of the working group have clearly reflected the existence of divergent and sometimes contradictory views, especially on the means of the application of the criteria of the responsible behavior of states and the program of work for such responsible behavior. These discussions also showed that a group of countries is stressing the need to develop new criteria that might be binding to guarantee effective implementation. However, it is regrettable that the revised draft did not reflect this properly and is still missing an indication of the importance of developing new criteria. Moreover, the text continues to focus on the discussion over how to apply international law on cyberspace. It considers that arriving at mechanisms on the application of international law is the best way to deal with the challenges of using ICT in the context of international security, despite the fact that a certain group of states does not agree with this direction and believe that the text must maintain mention of the possibility of developing a legal instrument that has been proposed and that is on the table to develop a concept of a United Nations Convention on Data Security that has been submitted by the Russian Federation and which has been endorsed by a group of states, including Syria. Moreover, the draft continues to prioritize the program of work for responsible behavior and presents it as a new platform to continue the dialogue on information security, and this does not accurately reflect the different evaluations and positions on this program and is not in line with the mandate of the working group, which is required to discuss all initiatives and options in this context. In closing, my delegation believes that the text in its current form does not have the requirements and elements of consensus, and we believe that a consensus document requires some important changes that would add more balance and more accuracy and would reflect the main concerns and priorities of states. And in order to achieve this, I assure you of my delegation’s readiness to positively and constructively engage in discussions in a manner that would serve our joint objectives to arrive at real solutions to the current challenges in the field of ICT security and away from any other consideration. I thank you.

Thank you, Syrian Arab Republic. Kazakhstan, please.

Thank you for giving the floor. First of all, we express our gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, as well as to your team for the prompt presentation of the updated report. Our delegation considers the updated report as quickly as possible, and we can already say that our proposal on paragraph 12 has not been accepted. In this presented form, special spheres are rapidly marked. In this regard, in order to find consensus, we kindly ask you to exclude the reminder about humanitarian organizations and other important areas, such as the financial sector and electronic public services. Also, given the rapid development of technology, we consider it is right to mention AI. This technology could potentially have implications for the safe use of ICT. In this regard, we suggest you take into account the security of integration in new technologies, including AI. Thank you again, Chair, for your work, and we express our readiness for further work to reach a consensus.

Thank you, Kazakhstan. Republic of Korea, please.

Thank you, Chair. The Republic of Korea would like to express its sincere thanks to you, your team, and the Secretariat for preparing RAF2. Even though we see some room for further enhancement from our perspectives, my delegation views the RAF2 as meaningful progress towards a consensual outcome. Not all of the points raised by my delegation were fully incorporated into the RAF2. However, mindful of your request, as Chair, for flexibility for a consensual outcome, we’d like to offer our views on just some of the key issues. To begin with, on existing and potential threats, as my delegation delivered during previous substantive sessions and intersessional meetings, we consider cryptocurrency theft, in particular where it impacts international peace and security, a matter of grave concern. We have expressed concern over cryptocurrency theft cases that often finance internationally illegal activities, and several delegations have also expressed their concerns on this matter. Unfortunately, our proposal to include this reference to cryptocurrency theft has not been reflected in RAF2. So with your indulgence, I’d just like to propose once again to include this particular phrase in the text. Now with the RAF2 format, we’d like to propose to add this reference in the last sentence of paragraph 15, which would read, “as states also highlighted the risk posed by malicious software such as ransomware, as well as wiper malware and Trojans, and techniques such as cryptocurrency theft, phishing, and distributed denial-of-service attacks.” Chair, we believe that raising awareness of and helping member states address potential threats in ICT is one of the important roles that this body is expected to play. And we hope that this year’s APR should be able to capture this important issue, namely cryptocurrency theft, so that the international community can be vigilant and effectively address this particular issue. On the norms and rules, we would like to support the proposal made by Australia. We think that this section should also make a reference to the 11 norms of the Group of Governmental Experts Reports, which is a result of the consensus and deserves to be mentioned in the APR. In this vein, we also would like to suggest retaining the mention of norm FGH, which can be applied in paragraph 23B. On international law, in paragraph 30A, we also like to support the modification suggested by Australia. Again, I think this modification gives more legal clarity to this paragraph. On confidence-building measures, the Republic of Korea aligns itself with the statement made by Canada on behalf of the cross-regional group to advance confidence-building measures and supports the suggestion for retaining the sentence with reference to international peace and security in paragraph 1 of the NXA. We also would like to reiterate our support for the chair’s efforts to establish the global POC directory, and thus, I would like to see the adoption of the NXA, as mentioned in paragraph 39 of the APR. With that, I would like to express my sincere thanks to you and your team for your efforts, and we would be willing to participate in the deliberation in the coming days with a mind of flexibility and a spirit of cooperation. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Republic of Korea. Switzerland, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, thank you for all the efforts of you and your team producing a REF2 version of the report with the aspiration to help us find consensus. We think you have given us a good basis to do that. The draft is not perfect; there are parts we like, elements that are missing, and others we do not like. However, we agree with you that this report cannot contain only the elements that are important to us. Nevertheless, we would like to propose a few amendments that are important from our point of view. On the norms section, in paragraph 23A, we would like to request the correct citation of General Assembly resolution 76-19, preambular paragraph 10. Since this is a literal quotation, the quotation mark is required from “voluntary non-binding norm” onwards. Finally, the quote should end after “additional norms could be developed over time.” This is because the rest of the sentence does not refer to rules, norms, or principles, and the section on norms is not the right place to talk about additional legally binding norms. The right section to do that is the section on international law. Now, on the international law section, as the UN Charter is a key legal framework applicable in cyberspace, Switzerland welcomes the reaffirmation that international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable. What is still missing is the specification that the UN Charter applies in its entirety to cyberspace. On paragraph 30A, we support the proposal made by Australia. In section B of paragraph 30, we would like to slightly amend the text to state that Chapter 6 and Article 33 of the UN Charter are listed as a whole. The proposal reads as follows, I quote, “reaffirmed Articles 2, 3 of the Charter that states all member states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and new and Article 33 and Chapter 6 and so on. The rest of the paragraph,” end of quote. With regard to paragraph 32, we support the proposal made by Estonia. On paragraph 35, Switzerland suggests not using the term “different legal systems” in paragraph 35. After all, there is only one international law that applies to all states. A more appropriate term would therefore be “national context.” The proposed text reads as follows: “The open-ended working group chair is also requested to convene a dedicated inter-sessional meeting on how international law applies in the use of ICTs. In this context, the open-ended working group chair could,” and then delete “taking into account different legal systems,” and continue with “due consideration given to equitable geographical representation and national contexts,” and then the rest of the paragraph stays as it is. On the Program of Action, we would like to support the proposals made by France for that section. And on the NXA, on the point of contact network, we support the proposals made by the cross-regional group of states to advance CBMs in paragraph 1. In addition, we still have a problem with paragraph 4. The new wording in paragraph 4 gives the wrong impression that the point of contact network will have a function that is complemented by the work of CERTs and CSIRTs. CERTs and CSIRTs are involved in the technical operational day-to-day business. That is not the purpose of the point of contact network. Its main purposes are listed in paragraph 5. In our view, the point of contact network will complement the work of CERTs and CSIRTs in cases of ICT incidents with possible implications for international peace and security. And we think we should be very clear about their different functions. I therefore would like to see the following changes to the text of paragraph 4: “The POC directory will take into account and be complemented,” delete “by,” and then “complement,” as it has been in ref 1, “the work of computer emergency response teams and computer security incident response teams networks,” and then add “but not cover their functions.” Thank you, Mr. Chair.

You’re welcome! If you have any text that needs proofreading, please go ahead and share it. I’ll be happy to help.

Thank you, Chairman. We support the statement made by Russia on behalf of a group of countries with similar views. Although the current version of the APR is being reviewed back in my capital, I have a preliminary observation for you. I wish to share that there are strong expectations and, indeed, a need for a balanced and factual document. To that end, changes are required to the text, without which it will be very difficult to reach consensus. We firmly insist on the deletion of the reference to potential conflicts, which can be found in paragraph 23b, because the current wording could lead to erroneous interpretations about the potential automatic application of international law or international humanitarian law in the field of ICTs. This is a position which does not enjoy consensus. We reiterate that the Group of Governmental Experts’ conclusions were not negotiated by all Member States and that my delegation has, on a consistent and reiterated basis, expressed its very serious concerns and reservations with regard thereto. Thank you.

Thank you, Cuba. Vietnam, please.

Mr. Chair, the delegation of Vietnam would like to extend our sincere appreciation to you, Mr. Chair, and your team for your leadership and hard work throughout the course of the session. Your able leadership has contributed excessively to a productive discussion and the maintenance of the consensual spirit within the group. We wish to acknowledge the efforts put forth in preparing the current APR draft. It is evident that the draft report reflects a new attempt to consolidate the diverse views, preferences, and positions of all delegations. We commend the dedication to preserving overall balance, which has provided a strong basis for us to reach consensus. Mr. Chair, this delegation is pleased to witness positive elements and a forward-looking vision in the current APR draft. We once again would like to put on record our support for the addition of several paragraphs referring to significant matters, namely the role of capacity building in the overall section, the potential threat of new and emerging technologies in Section B, the reaffirmation of the implementation of norms of states’ responsible behaviors, and the role of consensus as a principle in the establishment and operation of any future regular institutional dialogues. We also would like to express our support for the Chair’s plan to organize multiple inter-sessional meetings dedicated to different topics, such as threats, norms and principles, international laws, capacity building, and regular institutional dialogue. Regarding Section D on international law, we support the suggestion of Australia on paragraph 30A, whereby replacing the phrase “international norms and principles that flow from sovereignties” with “international obligations that flow from sovereignties.” As we recall, in the last three days, many delegations have taken the floor to mention mostly the non-intervention obligation. We indeed were not entirely happy with the current APR draft as proposals on artificial intelligence, information, and data exchange in the POC networks were not considered and reflected in the text. However, in the spirit of flexibility, this delegation will defer its objection to the future session of the Working Group and support the current draft as proposed by you, Mr. Chair. We look forward to the early operationalization of the POC directories as a concrete outcome of this Working Group for the common good at the global level as we deserve. I thank you for your attention, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Vietnam, for your statement. Austria, please.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and like others, please accept my appreciation for the work carried out by you and your team in compiling the REV2. I think it’s a step forward and to lead us to the lush forest that we have, but I think there might be some weeding out of smaller issues to do. On the section on rules, norms, and principles, paragraph 23a, similar to the US and Switzerland, we are concerned about the reference to additional binding obligations in this paragraph. We are worried that the current wording obfuscates the distinction between voluntary and non-binding norms on the one hand, and binding obligations under international law on the other hand. The Swiss proposal we heard on this paragraph could help allay those worries. On paragraph 23b, we support the Republic of Korea, Australia, and others when it comes to the importance of reinserting a mention of norms f, g, and h. We are in the section on rules, norms, and principles, so it’s apt to us that this paragraph reflects the norms we’re referring to. On the international law section in Austria, Mr. Chair, we have a saying that four lawyers have five different legal opinions, so I’ll refrain from adding my own and just voice my support for other proposals. On paragraph 30a, we support the proposal made by Australia to be clearer on the language. On paragraph 30b, when it comes to the mention of Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, we can support Switzerland. Paragraph 32, we can support Estonia on its proposal, which reflects the discussions we had in a more precise way. And finally, on paragraph 35, we support the proposal made by Switzerland to include national context to give the paragraph a correct framing. Coming to regular institutional dialogue, Mr. Chair, on paragraph 56, this current formulation has been flagged by my capital as being problematic. The reason for that is that the current formulation would mean that a body mandated by the General Assembly would prescribe a mode of establishment that doesn’t correspond to the General Assembly’s rules of procedure, which in our view is not appropriate. This refers to the establishment of a body by consensus. France and the U.S. have made proposals on how to tweak this and make it more acceptable, and we could go along with those. I thank you.

Thank you, Austria. Colombia, please, to be followed.

Thank you, Chair. We add our voice to the statement made by Mexico on behalf of a group of countries from Latin America about capacity building, and the statement made by Canada on behalf of an inter-regional group of countries on confidence building, and to the statement made by Estonia on behalf of a group of countries about international law. In our national capacity now, Chairman, we would also like to express our thanks to you for your work and all of your efforts, as well as those by your team, and for presenting the revised version of the text. As the distinguished delegate from Vietnam said very eloquently, your leadership has allowed us to have a fruitful conversation and to make progress on the necessary dialogue on a topic which is so important to peace and international security. We reiterate our support for your leadership and our wish to contribute towards achieving consensus and the adoption of the second annual report during this session. That being said, we’d like to make the following brief remarks. On the section about existing potential threats, we would have preferred to stick to the reference that was in the previous version of the draft, which mentioned quantum computing and artificial intelligence. These are topics which were discussed during the year by multiple stakeholders and delegations. Additionally, we hope that in future sessions you would consider the repository of threats proposal made by Kenya, including the possibility of having participation by civil society therein. Turning to the section on rules, norms, and principles, we thank you that in 23b you have included the reference to the possibility of supporting developing countries in identifying their critical infrastructure. Turning to international law, as we’ve already said, we add our voice to the intervention made by Estonia. Thank you, Chairman, for taking account of the proposals made by the working group on international law. We’d also like to highlight that a number of delegations, including our own Colombia, have stated their support for Germany’s proposal to include a reference to human rights in this section. Therefore, we thank you for reconsidering that inclusion. Chairman, when it comes to capacity building, we recognize and acknowledge that, and thank you for including recommendations towards that cross-cutting goal, as well as references to the efforts made to build capacities from a gender perspective. Turning to the section on confidence-building measures, my delegation thinks that the approval of the directory on points of contact will be an important contribution to promoting peace and international security, will increase transparency, predictability, and provide a basis for the implementation of future measures. Section on regular international institutional dialogue, paragraph 56, just like France, we preferred the language from the previous version of the draft. This is the section on regular institutional dialogue. Finally, Chair, we wish to maintain the dialogue which allows us to move towards progress to ensure that states are responsible in their use of ICTs and to find shared understandings which allow us to tackle the challenges we face in cyber security in a cooperation-based way. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Colombia. Pakistan to be followed by New Zealand. Pakistan, please.

Thank you, Chair. Let me commend the hard work done by you and your team in compiling the final draft of the second APR. Indeed, it would have remained a daunting task to incorporate the views of all member states in such a balanced and coherent manner. Chair, the draft is still under consideration in my capital. Therefore, I am delivering the following preliminary remarks. Turning to the final draft, Pakistan welcomes the formulation of language under threats, capacity building, CBMs, and regular institutional dialogue sections. However, we believe that the sections pertaining to norms and international law may be made more balanced. Keeping this in mind, Pakistan is recommending two amendments and proposes the deletion of the phrase “if appropriate” in the last line of paragraph 23a and in the first line of paragraph 32. Moreover, Pakistan would like to seek more clarity about the formulation of language in line 2 of paragraph 14 concerning the use of the words “processes and systems.” Pakistan also supports the Republic of Korea’s proposal for the addition of a reference to cryptocurrency, Kazakhstan’s proposal concerning the addition of a reference to the financial sector, and Australia’s proposal pertaining to the reformulation of the language of paragraph 38. Chair, in the end, we look forward to the consensus adoption of the APR tomorrow, and for this, I assure you the full support of my country. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Pakistan. New Zealand, to be followed by Croatia.

Thank you, Chair, and kia ora everyone. We have listened carefully to the statements during this and earlier sessions, with particular attention to pragmatic suggestions put forward that try to bring us closer to consensus. So, in view of this, we will not reiterate points made earlier but confirm that we support the suggested text by the cross-regional group in the statement delivered by Canada to paragraph 1 of Appendix A. With this clarifying link to the OEWG mandate, we confirm our support for the introduction of the POC directory. The proposal by France to clarify that we will strive towards reaching consensus on the future regular institutional dialogue is a pragmatic one that reflects the principle of consensus that we’re working towards while acknowledging the workings of the UN General Assembly, and we therefore support this proposed amendment. We support the amendments to paragraph 30b proposed by Estonia on behalf of Australia, Colombia, El Salvador, and Uruguay, as well as Estonia’s amendments to paragraph 32, which we think is an important reflection of the discussions that we have had. We support the suggested amendments made by Australia to paragraph 23 and think this approach to the norms section is a helpful bridge between different points of emphasis. We cannot accept the deletion of “as appropriate,” which is previously agreed consensus language, and we also support Australia’s suggestions around paragraph 30a regarding the legal obligations that flow from sovereignty, and the clarification by Switzerland on national contexts in paragraph 35. Finally, we confirm we can also support the Republic of Korea’s proposal to include cryptocurrency theft with possible implications for international peace and security in the threat section, and also the statement made by Chile on behalf of a group of countries on the cross-cutting nature of capacity building. Thank you.

Thank you, New Zealand. Croatia, to be followed by Nicaragua.

Thank you, Chair, and also many thanks to your whole team for dedicated work and REV2. We said on Monday that it’s going to be almost a mission impossible to accommodate all requests from Member States and still have a well-balanced text, but we believe that we are on a good path and with some fine-tuning we could reach an agreement tomorrow. Croatia aligns itself with the intervention of the European Union and in national capacity would like to express our gratitude for reflecting discussions in the last three days and including some proposals that have gained broad support, such as reflecting gender perspective, especially in the area of capacity building, and when addressing ICT threats, which is actually in line with the global UN policies. We welcome adding the energy sector among other sectors in the threat section and mentioning here also the Internet of Things and DDoS. We are very grateful for more emphasis on capacity building, especially in FARA 5, as well as mentioning the useful and invaluable participation and contribution by the multistakeholder community throughout the text. One of the proposals that also gained broad support was adding in its entirety in FARA 28, since cyberspace is part of our rules-based international order where we, the people, play the key role, and rules that are valid in the physical realm are also valid in the ICT domain. Therefore, same as Switzerland, we would like to mention in FARA 28 that the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety is applicable and essential to maintaining peace, security, and stability of and in the use of the ICT. Croatia would also like to support interventions by France and the U.S. on FARA 56, where we also prefer previous language, and believe that progress that was achieved in the last year should be reflected in FARA 58. We can also support the proposal of the cross-regional group of states on Annex A, FARA 1, and adding a reference on international peace and security, as well as proposals from Estonia and the group of states on international law, and Australia on FARA 23 and 38. Finally, we will also welcome a dedicated discussion on proposals mentioned in the text, such as the previous text, such as Kenyan on a threat repository or Indian on a global cybersecurity cooperation portal. And for tomorrow, we can be both equally happy or equally unhappy, but we would prefer the first one. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Croatia. Nicaragua, to be followed by Sudan. Nicaragua, please.

Thank you very much, Chairman. We back the statement made by Russia on behalf of a group of countries. We thank you for the draft report presented. It is still under review in our capital. On a preliminary basis, we wish to acknowledge the improvements made to the text. Nonetheless, a number of key adjustments are needed to achieve consensus. Because of limited time, my delegation will simply request the inclusion of two significant elements to our delegation. As stated previously, we wish for there to be mention of a potential UN Convention on the Security of Information. This has been backed by Belarus, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Venezuela, and others, and presented as an official document at the 77th session of the General Assembly. Equally, we reiterate our request as per the mandate of this working group and in the resolution, and supported furthermore by the consensus of all member states in resolution 76/19 of the General Assembly, for the priority task of continuing to develop norms to be included, given that thus far the document remains, to a large extent, focused on the rules and norms and principles applicable regarding responsible behaviour of member states in terms of ICT. We support the statement by Cuba on 23b. We reiterate our support and wish to achieve a consensus-based, balanced document. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Nicaragua. Sudan, please.

Thank you, Chair, and thank you and your team for the efforts that you’ve made. I’d also like to thank you for your flexibility in taking into account all the guidance. My delegation, with our support to Russia and the like-minded group, would like to make the following comments in our national capacity. The group has, of course, tried to improve this text, but we are far from striking a balance because some aspects have seen a backslide, and we risk stepping backwards. What we want to see is justice and balance in the text. We hope that we’ll be able to have a text or a document that takes all views into account, particularly given that information security is ever-changing. We must take into account the priorities of countries as well as differences in levels of development. We can’t just focus on developed states because that only increases the divide. In terms of the norms, we can see that this document doesn’t mention the development of new norms, and we are prioritizing the position of some countries. In terms of the applicability of international law in cyberspace, well, there has been a discussion of this topic and indeed on a convention on international information security. However, this text gives a mandate to the group, and so we then need to question this approach. We think, Chair, that this version is far from enjoying the consensus that we’re hoping for. My country is committed to achieving this goal that we’ve set for ourselves through examining the different proposals and reviewing the wording. Perhaps we don’t have enough time this time, but that’ll be for next time. Thank you very much once again for your patience. Thank you.

Thank you, Sudan. Venezuela, to be followed by Japan.

Good afternoon. First and foremost, I wish to express my government’s conviction, my country’s conviction, and appreciation for the huge efforts made by the Chairman and the entire Secretariat thus far. You have demonstrated great patience and prudence in your work. We express our thanks. Secondly, we support the statements made by the Russian Federation and a number of other countries. In its entirety, we also express our support for the additional elements that Cuba requested. In this regard, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela wishes to express its concern because the more we assess the nature of international law, the more we realize there are gaps between what exists and what is required in such an innovative space as cyberspace. On the one hand, we have these gaps, and on the other hand, we have an insistence that all norms are already in place, all the rules we need are already in place. And that causes significant concern because reality shows us it’s not true. Those gaps need to be filled, and that’s not happening. We emphatically support an assessment of 30A, where it says sovereign equality and international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty. This is innovative wording for such a report, but in our judgment, it remains ambiguous. Either there is a clear establishment of what this means, what principles that flow from sovereignty are, or it needs to be deleted. As it is now, it creates more ambiguity than clarity, as more than one delegation has already indicated. I don’t wish to drag this on much longer, but the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela wishes to clearly state that we agree that we have to see the complete picture and try to strike an agreement to approve this report. But both consensus and approval are two sides of the same coin. For there to be consensus, there must be balance, and because we cannot yet see that balance, it’s going to be very difficult to achieve consensus. There’s a metaphor about not being able to see the wood for the trees, and I think it’s very applicable here. We shouldn’t get off the trees and bring in new fauna and flora and change things around; then we’re basically looking at a new tree, sorry, a new forest, and that’s perhaps our concern.

Thank you very much, Venezuela, for your statement. Japan, to be followed by Brazil. Japan, please.

Mr. Chair, our delegation would like to express our appreciation to you and your team’s efforts to come up with REV2. Our delegation is of the view that REV2 represents a genuine effort to bridge the different views that have been expressed during the week and believes this draft report is a sound basis for us to reach consensus. As our delegation stated earlier, this annual progress report should reflect the current status of the discussion. From this perspective, Japan would like to make just a few comments on issues that we believe are important. In section C, Rules, Norms, and Principles, on paragraph 23, we support the amendments proposed by Australia. In the international law section, on paragraph 32, we support Estonia. Regarding confidence-building measures in Annex A, we support Canada. And regarding regular institutional dialogue on paragraphs 56 and 58, we support the proposal made by France. Also, in section B, Existing and Potential Threats, on paragraph 15, we support suggestions made by the Republic of Korea to include cryptocurrency theft, as we consider this is an urgent security challenge we need to address. Japan would like to continue to work with other delegations constructively to reach consensus on this annual progress report. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Japan. Brazil to be followed by the Netherlands.

Mr. Chair, Brazil aligns itself with the statements read by Chile in the name of several Latin countries and by Canada in the name of a cross-regional group on CBMs. We take the floor in our national capacity to support this carefully crafted draft APR. Brazil shares the disappointment mentioned by Kenya and several others on the deletion or toning down of different passages. This is therefore far from being the perfect report, but we appreciate your efforts in such a short time in working on language through these 29 pages and trying to find balance among many different views. We praise the streamlined, balanced compromise on the most contentious issues. Perhaps at this time, it is useful to stress once again that given our circumstances, perfect must not be the enemy of good, as mentioned by Costa Rica this morning, and good here means arriving at a common ground that allows us to move forward in this process. My delegation feels we are back to Monday when delegations provided several detailed suggestions. We should be going in the opposite direction towards our next cycle of broad, open discussions on all the proposals on the table. Brazil does echo your appeal for flexibility from all delegations in order to have this APR approved. I thank you.

Thank you very much indeed, Brazil. I’ve lost track of the day of the week. Yeah, it does feel a bit like Monday, but we need to get to Friday. But thank you very much for your comments and also your appeal, which I endorse. Netherlands to be followed by Mexico. Netherlands, please.

Thank you, Chair, and I believe it is Thursday, but I’m also not so sure. Thank you, Chair. We thank you for all your hard work that you and your team have put into drafting and reviewing the APR. We know that reconciling diverging views is not an easy task. The Netherlands finds it of great importance that the APR reflects the discussions we’ve had in this Open-Ended Working Group in our joint efforts to make progress, as the APR will form the basis of our future work. I would therefore like to comment on some of the proposals that have been put forward and that we believe could help bridge the gaps that are of most importance to us. First, we support the proposals put forward by France under the regular institutional dialogue section. Second, we support the intervention by Estonia on behalf of Australia, Colombia, El Salvador, and Uruguay on international law, as well as Estonia’s text proposal in paragraph 32. We support the statements delivered by Australia. We support the text proposal on the POC network by Canada on behalf of a cross-regional group. We support the text amendments on international law as proposed by Switzerland, as well as the Swiss text that clarifies how the POC network relates to CERT to CERT work. And we agree with the US on concerns about data security. In addition, the draft could be further improved. We propose the following amendments: Under threats, in paragraph 10, change “express concern” to “noted.” And then to the end of the second sentence, add, first of all, a comma, and then “in a manner inconsistent with states’ obligations under international law.” The Netherlands looks forward to achieving consensus. Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you, Netherlands. Mexico to be followed by Uruguay.

Mr. President, Chairman, Mexico acknowledges the work of the Presidency and your team in drawing up the draft of the second APR and echoes the statements made by Chile and Canada on behalf of groups of states. Generally speaking, we think that the text presented has value and see it as the basis for future deliberations. In particular, we are grateful that throughout the document there is a recommendation for deliberations to continue on the mandated topics for this group as the next steps. This understanding that we are in the midst of a process and it won’t be until the group’s final reports that we will need to reflect agreements which provide continuity. We note that although some considerations on Section G have been deleted, the necessary minimum has been retained for an adequate and viable mechanism so we can move forward towards a regular institutional dialogue and implementation of a rules framework. For Mexico, we would have preferred the document to contain references of a more robust nature in issues such as the application of international humanitarian law, the application of human rights, and the malicious use of new technologies, among others, the repository of threats, for example. Nonetheless, Mexico will continue to insist and dialogue with other delegations during future sessions on the need to include these aforementioned elements in the final report when it comes to be adopted by this group. On issues of trust building, Mexico thinks that the text strikes the right balance relating to peaceful and responsible behavior in cyberspace and the key role of regional and sub-regional bodies for its development and implementation. Chairman, as I said at the beginning, Mexico values the progress achieved in consolidating this document which, although it still has room for improvement, remains the basis for convergence. We would call on everyone to move towards adoption this week. Thank you.

Thank you, Mexico. Uruguay, please.

Thank you very much, Chairman. We thank you for your efforts and extend our thanks to your team also in the new draft of the APR, which we appreciate and acknowledge. I’d like to start—this is consistent with what has always been our national position since the beginning of this working group and in previous working groups—by reaffirming our wish to achieve a consensus-based document that is balanced and takes account of members’ proposals. We also agree with the division presented by a number of delegations whereby this is not the final document yet. We appreciate the statements made by a number of countries, including Estonia on international law, Chile on capacity building, and also Canada regarding trust-building measures. Chairman, in the potential threats section, we agree that we need to go deeper into the risks associated with ransomware attacks, which have a disruptive impact on economies and societies in member states. Therefore, we regret that the proposal made by Costa Rica has not been retained in the text. We would also have wished for references to artificial intelligence and computing to be included as raised by the distinguished delegate for Colombia. In section C on rules, norms, and principles, in section 23b, Uruguay supports the inclusion of the importance of protecting critical information infrastructure, and we decisively support what was mentioned regarding the necessary support for developing countries in order to strengthen these infrastructures. In section E on trust-building and confidence-building measures, we would add our voice to the statement made by Canada. Additionally, we think that including paragraph 42 is very important because it increases transparency among member states and builds mutual confidence. In section F on capacity building, in addition to the points already made by Chile, we would like to highlight that in section 43b, south-south and triangular, as well as sub-regional cooperation, is a complement to north-south cooperation, not a substitute. In section A on the POC directory, we would underscore the importance of there being no duplication with CSIRTs, but rather this mechanism promotes greater interaction and cooperation among states in the communication and exchange of information in the light of potential incidents relating to the ICTs. We would also highlight the voluntary participation nature of states in the directory, which should take account of the different regional and national realities. In section A, we welcome paragraph 13c and 13d, which say that courses and simulations will be run. Finally, on differentiation among points of contact at the diplomatic and technical level within the framework of the initial list of global voluntary measures to build confidence and trust, we would propose that paragraph 13c delete the word “policy” and leave the sentence saying simply “technical and diplomatic levels,” as was in the text from the outset. Thank you.

Thank you, Uruguay. I give the floor now to Argentina, which I believe is making a statement on behalf of a group. Please proceed.

Thank you very much, Chairman. I’m not making a statement by a group but in my national capacity. Chairman, Argentina supports the statement made by Chile on behalf of a group of states. We’d like to thank you for the revised version of the draft APR and acknowledge your efforts and those of your entire team in attempting to bring together the different visions expressed by all delegates. We know that this is a major challenge and that you are taking the lead. For Argentina, it’s very important to have an APR this year that is substantive and takes account of the fact that we have achieved certain tangible results such as the global direction of POCs and which also guides us into our future work next year. We think that it’s important to keep this process alive and kicking. We thank you for the place that you found in the section on capacity building for a robust statement that looks forward towards action and also takes account of the reality of developing countries and includes the need for moving to close the digital gap so that everyone can participate in an effective way in safe, open, and interoperable cyberspace. In this context, Argentina thanks the inclusion in paragraph five, that’s the overview section, wherein there’s mention of creating capacity as a way of building mutual confidence in and of itself and that a cross-cutting approach for the work of the group as a whole. We align ourselves with the intervention made by Canada on behalf of a group of countries relating to the mutual confidence-building sections and points of contact. Furthermore, on threats, Argentina would have liked to see an inclusion of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. These are topics which have been debated throughout the year and on which members from all regions of the world have expressed their opinion. We also support the statement made by Kenya and its proposal for the directory of threats. We think that that should be considered in future meetings. Finally, Chairman, we share the vision that everyone should contribute towards achieving a consensus tomorrow. You can count on Argentina to continue working in that regard. Thank you.

Thank you, Argentina. United Kingdom, to be followed by El Salvador. UK, please.

Thank you, Chair. We are grateful for your efforts to reflect the breadth of our discussions over the past year. We recognize Kenya’s effort to help us achieve consensus in accepting more limited reference to their proposal to increase exchanges on threats. We took a similar approach last year to our own proposal, supported by over 25 states and stakeholders, to reference the cybersecurity capacity maturity model in our annual progress report. And we recognize the call from Chile on behalf of a group of states for flexibility in support of finding consensus. In this spirit, I’ll make only a few suggestions. Regarding paragraph 16 on malicious use of ICT tools, following discussions with several states, we proposed to remove the list of ICT tools to avoid ambiguity and differences in referring to specific commercial ICT products. As such, we proposed that paragraph 16 could read: States further expressed concern at the irresponsible and potentially malicious use, including by states, of available ICT capabilities. States also expressed concern at the use of commercially available ICT tools by malicious actors. On international law, we endorsed a proposal by Estonia on behalf of a cross-regional group of states to include in paragraph 30b specific mentions of Chapter 6 and Article 33.2 of the UN Charter and the edit to paragraph 32 delivered in the national capacity. We support the proposals of Switzerland to amend paragraph 35 to include a reference to national context and the proposals by Australia to both the norms and international law sections. We could not support proposals to remove, if appropriate, in paragraphs 23a and 32, that is agreed consensus language. We endorsed the suggestions by France and others to rephrase paragraph 56 to describe efforts to strive for consensus. We will approach our discussions on regular institutional dialogue in this spirit, but we agree with others that we should not predetermine the decisions of the General Assembly or prejudge the modalities of a future mechanism. Finally, we’ve supported your efforts to bring us to consensus on the points of contact directory, and we hope to achieve that this week. For the purposes of clarity, we support Canada’s proposal on behalf of the cross-regional group of confidence builders to reflect the remit of our working group in paragraph 1 of Annex A, and we support Switzerland and Uruguay’s proposals in paragraph 4 to avoid duplicating functions with existing networks. Thank you.

Thank you, UK. El Salvador, to be followed by Fiji.

Thank you very much, Chairman. You can count on El Salvador’s commitment to the group, your team, and yourself. We support the statement made by Chile on behalf of a group of states regarding the creation of capacities and by Estonia on behalf of a group of states on international law. Chairman, in my national capacity, El Salvador is ready to support the current version of the document. But we understand that it is a delicate balance of different positions. It is not perfect, but we think that it is a basis that we could accept. Just like other delegations who spoke before me, we would have liked to see a specific mention of the challenges posed by artificial intelligence and quantum computing in the section on emerging technologies, particularly because, as many other countries have said, we have been looking into potential threats in the group’s informal and formal sessions. However, Chairman, we recognize that this is work which will continue into the future sessions of the group and that we will continue to delve into it as these technologies affect our security and international peace. We hope, Chairman, that in future reports our concerns can be reflected. Thank you.

Thank you very much, El Salvador. Fiji, to be followed by Canada. Fiji, please.

Bulovinaka Chair, Bulovinaka Chair and colleagues, Chair, Fiji extends our sincere appreciation to you for your leadership in navigating us through these choppy waters. Our heartfelt thanks also go to the Secretariat for their meticulous efforts in providing support for the finalization of our draft report. Chair, I use the term “our” because we are all steadfast in our commitment that we must advance our work through this report. Fiji already sees substantive value coming out of our report, and we hope for its adoption by tomorrow. Chair, we have intently listened to various delegations both within and outside of this room. We also hear your call for us to review our report holistically, and as you have put it and as mentioned by other delegations, we cannot miss the forest for the trees. And we thank Australia for eloquently unpacking that in the context of this group. It is from that perspective that we take the floor today. Chair, with regards to Section B in Paragraph 5, we echo other delegations, including Chile on behalf of a number of states, in support for the insertion of Paragraph 5 regarding the cross-cutting nature of capacity building. With regards to Section C, specifically Paragraphs 23B and Paragraph 25, we welcome with gratitude and thank all Member States for the inclusion of support to developing states and small states in the identification of national critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. And this is, as I mentioned earlier, spotlighted in Paragraph 23B and in the recommended next steps in Paragraph 25. We also support the proposal by Australia regarding Paragraph 23. With regards to international law, we support the proposal delivered by Estonia on behalf of a group of states. For Paragraph 28, Chair, the UN Charter is the compass which we are using to navigate global pressing matters. Therefore, Fiji, like other delegations such as Switzerland and Croatia, would like to propose that we include specific language to state that the UN Charter is applicable in its entirety in this Paragraph 28. Chair, we are of the view that this amendment will strengthen the report. With regards to Paragraph 30A, we support the language proposed by Australia and which has been supported by delegations such as Switzerland, Austria, and Vietnam. With regards to Section E, Chair, we support the statement delivered by Canada on behalf of a group of countries, which includes Fiji, regarding the amendment to Annex A of the final draft. We understand the value of this amendment because we’re in the process of setting up our national CERT. And as outlined in Paragraph 4 of the final draft, there should not be a duplication of the role of this point of contact and the CERT and CSIRTs. We note that this has also been raised by our first and other CERT entities and other delegations in the room. In conclusion, Chair, Fiji fully stands by you, and our hope is that this group and this report serve as a unifying force, much like the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, bringing together our collective aspirations and advancing our common goal to make progress and to reach a consensus document by tomorrow. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Fiji. Canada, to be followed by Poland.

Mr. Chair, as the land of many forests, we are grateful to you for the difficult task you have undertaken to try and guide us on the right path through the mature trees, saplings, and seeds not yet sprouting. We are confident that no matter what the outcome of this week’s meeting, the OEWG under your direction will not be lost but will continue to forge strong paths through the forest over the coming years. Canada supports the changes proposed by France, Estonia on behalf of a group of states, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Chile, Austria, Australia, and the UK. We can also support Ghana and others on the inclusion of AI and quantum in our intersessional discussions, and the Republic of Korea’s proposal on cryptocurrency theft. I’d like to particularly highlight the point that has been made on Para 56. While Canada strongly supports the goal of reaching consensus on both the establishment of a future mechanism and its decision-making, we are concerned that the OEWG is overstepping its mandate. Any future mechanism, no matter what its ultimate form, will be taken by the UN General Assembly First Committee. While Canada is committed to striving for consensus, it is not for this body to prejudge the rights of states to vote in the First Committee. I’d also like to express my disappointment that a delegation has proposed to hold hostage IHL, an important body of existing international law that, at its core, is concerned with the protection of civilians and ensuring the conduct of parties to an armed conflict is not unlimited and thus is directly tied to the work of this body. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Canada. Poland, to be followed by Ireland. Poland, please. Thank you, Chair.

Poland, exactly as the whole group of 27 EU countries, wants to thank you and your team for continuous efforts to achieve a final consensus. I can speak for Poland, but I believe that all 27 states of the EU will not cease from our efforts and work to have a final success here. As one delegation stated, consensus cannot be achieved at the expense of vital interests of a group of like-minded countries. Many times we hear the word balance called as a justification for various countries’ or small groups of countries’ positions. It seems to have various definitions, the word balance, so I am not going to use it here. I’d rather express Polish feelings and the feelings of many countries speaking before me that the final language of the APR should at its best reflect the actual state of discussions, work, and documents we have had not only this week but also since we have started this process two years ago. When it comes to specific text, Poland supports proposals offered today by France and several other countries on para 56 and 58 on regular institutional dialogue. Estonia, on behalf of a group of like-minded countries, on para 30B, 33, 32 on institutional law. Australia and several countries on para 30A on international law. Canada, on behalf of the group of like-minded countries, on para 1 of annex A on the POC directory. And Switzerland and Uruguay on para 4, therefore, there. And also Ghana and some other countries asking for inclusion of the AI. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Poland. Ireland, to be followed by Czechia.

Chair, I wish to align with the statements by the European Union earlier today. Chair, I want to thank you and your team for your work on the new version of the text. I’m not as skilled as my colleagues in Australia, in particular, on extending the forest metaphor to a full and coherent intervention, but I will say that you have shown significant skill in pruning and taking care of the text to advance it to this point. I also want to pay tribute to our colleagues from Kenya who started us off this morning with a very tangible demonstration of the spirit of consensus, a spirit which has unfortunately not been evident in all interventions this afternoon. We also support your comments, Chair, that the Kenya proposal has started an important discussion which we look forward to continuing at future meetings. Chair, we welcome the progress made in the current draft on the retention of language on the gender perspective and the reference to international humanitarian law. On international humanitarian law, we share the concerns expressed by Canada just a few moments ago. There are, of course, elements which we would have liked to have seen retained in this draft, which did not make it, such as a dedicated session on new and emerging technologies, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and additional language on ransomware. The inclusion of these elements would have recognized the level of concern around these issues voiced in this group throughout the year. That said, I understand, and we understand, the task that you have in advancing this text and appreciate your judgment on how best to move towards consensus. There are a few issues, however, which we feel need to be reconsidered. Chair, we wish to support the Canadian proposal on behalf of the cross-regional group on the point of contact directory. The point of contact directory is a very tangible development and one which we welcome. On international law, we wish to support the Estonian proposal on behalf of a group of states. In paragraph 23A, we support the proposal to delete the language referring to the possibility of future elaboration of additional binding obligations. This section of the APR is concerned with norms, and in our view, it would not be appropriate to address binding obligations in this section. In paragraph 32, we propose making it clear that only a small number of states made these points. We also feel that two references to additional binding obligations are excessive and duplicative. We would suggest deleting the first reference accordingly. On regular institutional dialogue, we support the proposal of France for paragraph 56 as a practical solution to advance the text. On paragraph 58, we share France’s surprise at the new wording. There has been strong progress in consideration of the Program of Action (POA) this year. The vote of the UN General Assembly, the Secretary-General’s report, and the regional consultations, which are a priority for Ireland. We look to ensure that the POA is elaborated with the greatest possible inputs and regional ownership. However, the current draft seems to offer a contrary perspective and can be interpreted as a step back. And this is far from the case. There has been real and tangible progress, which we feel should be reflected in the final report. Chair, as we look forward to the next day or so, we look forward to working with your team to achieve consensus and wish you all the very best. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Ireland. I do feel like I need an Irish coffee at this point. We’ll get to that on Friday, hopefully. Czechia, to be followed by South Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We can offer you Czech beer if you don’t mind tomorrow evening. I would like to align with the statement of the European Union made earlier today. I would like to appreciate your effort in preparing a new version of our annual progress report. I acknowledge that it’s not easy work, and I think that we are moving in the right direction, but we are not quite there yet. In previous days, the Czech Republic has had a couple of comments and commendations, many of them concerning the strengthening of text on human rights in several places in the document. I regret that the new version of the text doesn’t reflect these suggestions in any way, but we are willing to accept this as a reality on the condition that other countries also make concessions on their positions. However, there are a couple of points which are essential for us at this moment and which have already been mentioned and supported by many countries. I would like to strongly support the proposal presented by France concerning the Program of Action (POA), especially those relating to paragraphs 56 and 58. It was supported by many countries, and this is really essential for us. As a member of the CBMs group, the Czech Republic fully aligns with the statement of Canada concerning the POC, specifically the textual change in paragraph 1 in Annex A. We fully support proposals concerning international law presented by Estonia and Switzerland, and we fully support proposals of Australia concerning the norms of responsible state behavior. I would also like to strongly support the proposal of Ghana concerning emerging technologies for artificial intelligence and quantum computing, as well as the support from El Salvador and other countries. I would like to react to some of today’s interventions and emphasize that international humanitarian law affords civilian and protected objects, such as hospitals and humanitarian organizations, protection in the context of armed conflict. In our discussion, we should avoid trying to connect it with unrelated issues such as agreed language on threats and norms. Additionally, I would like to react to some interventions and point out that the implementation of norms of responsible state behavior and capacity building are very important areas for us. In this context, I highly appreciate that there is a consensus with many countries in various parts of the world that this is really essential, and we have been working on it together. So, I’m sure we should fully reflect it in the text. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Czechia. South Africa, to be followed by Israel. South Africa, please.

Thank you, Chairperson. My delegation has been listening attentively to the various and numerous interventions that are being made by distinguished delegations. However, we believe at this point we are speaking past each other. For example, my delegation believes that your textual proposal in paragraph 27 was sufficiently balanced, requesting further discussion on rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior, without precluding the development of new norms. Thus, the proposed Chair’s text, while not explicitly in line with any specific delegation’s preference, was not exclusionary. Secondly, we observe that the same approach by the Chair has been made in paragraph 58, calling for engagement on regular institutional dialogue, including the Program of Action (POA), while not precluding the possibility of other mechanisms for institutional dialogue. Again, the final text was not exclusionary. This was the spirit with which my delegation was ready to accept your final draft and engage at this late stage of our deliberations. My delegation did not expect to try to track and react to preferences, though not vital interests, we believe, of the various textual proposals by each delegation. My delegation has found some proposals challenging and which merely reflect the interests of specific delegations, not in line with the spirit of consensus. We will do well to remind ourselves that consensus must be achieved in the OEWG to continue to progress in this working group. Like Brazil and like El Salvador, we believe that the final draft has been carefully crafted and balanced. We appreciate also the gracious approach of Kenya in foregoing a proposal that enjoyed momentum and support throughout the deliberations of the fourth substantive session in the spirit of consensus. A proposal which my delegation was happy to have reflected in the report and engaging on in this process. We should use the example and show the same amount of flexibility, and like Brazil, we appeal for this from delegations in order to consolidate the gains made thus far and move forward with a firm footing in the next years ahead. Thank you.

Thank you very much, South Africa, for your statement and also for your reminder that what we are trying to do here is find a balance, to find a consensus, and not search for perfection. This will require a demonstration of flexibility on the part of everyone in this room. So I appreciate very much the spirit of your statement, South Africa. Let’s move on with the remaining speakers. I have five of them on the list, and I’d like to listen to everyone who wishes to say anything at this point. So, Israel followed by Greece.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Echoing many delegations, we also wish to thank you and your dedicated team for the hard work you’ve all invested and for your tireless efforts to compile a text we could hopefully adopt tomorrow by consensus. My delegation can assure you we’ve been doing all the efforts to work together with other delegations, as you encourage us to do, and try to solve some of the standing issues that we have with the text in front of us. In the spirit of productivity, we will present briefly our remaining concerns, and we made efforts to mention only the most essential ones. On Para 16, we support the UK proposal on this para and the suggested text changes. Para 19, an issue we have seen in the context of threats, we would like to repeat that voluntary norms, international law, and CBMs cannot all be categorized as obligations. Voluntary norms, by their very definition and nature, are not obligatory. CBMs in the context of the open-ended working group are also voluntary. We therefore suggest, again, tweaking of the text that would differentiate between voluntary norms and CBMs on the one hand, and obligations under international law on the other. On Paragraph 23, this para deals with the role of the private sector. We wish to state we believe that technology itself is neutral and should not be described as malicious. Therefore, we suggest rephrasing the para that it would read after the word “supply chain” and “preventing the proliferation of ICT and techniques to be used in a malicious way, including through the use of harmful hidden functions.” Para 30d, with regard to the reference made to the principle of non-intervention, we suggested aligning the text with the language previously used during the open-ended working group and deleting the words “directly and indirectly,” which in our view create in the context of cyberspace more questions than clarity. In our view, the APR should refrain from introducing interpretive elements to the enumerated principles. On Para 32, we have a simple suggestion in order to make this para better reflect the discussions we held through the open-ended framework, the open-ended working framework on this issue. We suggest the following text: “States discussed the need to consider whether any gaps exist in how existing international law applies in the use of ICTs in order to consider the need to further develop additionally legally binding obligations.” In addition, we wish to support the statement made by Canada on behalf of the CBM builder group. And finally, Mr. Chair, on the issue of the POA, we hold that it is essential that all decisions on and in the framework of a POA or any other future institutional dialogue be made based on the principle of consensus, applied both to the negotiation process leading to the creation of the POA as well as to its decision-making process. We believe many can agree that cybersecurity issues could affect the fundamental national security interests of states. It is our request that this essential and widely observed principle be maintained and safeguarded. We can support the suggestion made by the delegations of France and the U.S. to revert back to the REV1 language on this issue, and we wish additionally to suggest the following amendment to improve the text of Paragraph 36. As it would say, “States recognize the importance of a consensus regarding both the establishment of a future mechanism itself as well as the decision-making process of the mechanism.” Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Israel, for your statement. Greece, to be followed by Portugal.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. Greece fully aligns with the statements made by the EU. Greece also supports the statements made by Australia. Actually, the forest analogy that has become fashionable among delegations struck a nerve considering the current wildfires in Greece. Our metaphorical forest is the cultivation of years of common work and has resulted in a consensus-based, multi-layered framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, with international law as its foundation, not a small feat. And we must all strive to protect and nurture our metaphorical forest with the same commitment we portray when striving to protect our natural environment. Greece also supports the statements made by Estonia on international law and by France on regular institutional dialogue. We would like also to propose a revision to the draft report that will provide further clarity to the text. In paragraph 58 of the section on regular institutional dialogue, it is not clear, in our view, which report of the Secretary-General we are referencing. So we thus propose the text to be updated so that it explicitly illustrates that we are referencing the Secretary-General’s report pursuant to resolution 7737 adopted by the General Assembly on a Program of Action to advance responsible state behavior in the use of information and communication technologies in the context of international security. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Greece. Portugal, to be followed by Ecuador.

Mr. Chair, we have heard this week several delegates complaining repeatedly that your APR drafts were unbalanced because they did not allocate enough space to their views and proposals. However, those delegates should not interpret as oblivion the silence, for the sake of consensus, of many other Member States about those of their text proposals which have not been included in the drafts. I would therefore like to kindly remind those delegates of only four proposals that have not made it to the revised drafts in spite of their importance and of their very wide acceptance inside and outside of this room. One, the reaffirmation that the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Covenants are applicable in cyberspace. Two, the recognition that States, in compliance with the law of State responsibility, have a right to attribute State-sponsored malicious cyber activity and that doing so contributes to upholding the UN framework and increasing understanding and awareness. Three, the reaffirmation that essential services and critical infrastructure should be always off-limits to malicious cyber activity. Four, the recognition of the essential role of all stakeholders, including the tech platforms, to every pillar of the framework, namely in identifying and sharing threats, in protecting critical infrastructure, in reviewing implementation and accountability, and in spearheading capacity building. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Portugal, for your statement. Ecuador, to be followed by Slovakia.

Thank you very much, Chairman. I’ll keep this brief. Ecuador reiterates, or backs rather, the statement made by Chile on behalf of a group of Latin American countries. My delegation acknowledges and thanks you for all of your efforts and those of your team to bring forward a REV2 to the document which, as many delegations have said today, may still have a couple of points needing improvement, including a few delicate ones. It also contains proposals such as Kenya’s on the directory of threats and the mention of an approach based on people and protection of human rights. However, we think that the current version, as has already been said by the delegation of El Salvador, strikes a delicate balance, so that tomorrow we can approve the document. Ecuador is firmly in favour of dialogue and therefore calls on everyone to show flexibility and a constructive spirit, which is exactly what we need in this body, so that tomorrow at the end of this long session we can strike a second substantive consensus-based document which takes account of the progress in the deliberations under our mandate and which leaves open a window to continue building in a positive way in future sessions. You can count on our delegation for that.

Thank you very much, Ecuador, for your statement. Slovakia, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. While aligning with the statement made by the European Union earlier, we would like to appreciate your efforts to put together this revised draft of the Annual Progress Report, which surely was far from being a simple task. We believe that the Annual Progress Report should reflect the discussions we have had over the course of the past 12 months, during which we have seen progress on certain key topics named in the report. In order for the Annual Progress Report to reflect these discussions, we would like to express our support for several proposals already made by other delegations. In this connection, Slovakia would like to express our support for the statement by Estonia on behalf of a group of countries on the international law section. Additionally, we would like to add our voice to the statement made by France in regard to the regular institutional dialogue, especially concerning the Program of Action, namely paragraphs 56 and 58. Furthermore, we would like to support the Australian view and propose additions into the section on norms. Finally, we would like to support a statement made by Canada on behalf of the cross-regional group of countries in connection to the POC directory. Mr. Chair, as requested, we are considering this document that you have prepared from a holistic perspective. As such, we believe that these aforementioned proposals will help with making the Annual Progress Report a more accurate reflection of the discussions we have had thus far. Thank you.

Thank you, Slovakia. Mauritius, please, you have the floor.

Chair, Mauritius wishes to express its appreciation for the work your team has been doing during this week in order to come up with a revised draft. Our delegation wishes to reiterate its support for this revised version. We also support the proposals for the Directory of Threats and to work further on challenges related to ransomware, AI, and quantum computing under Section B. We also welcome the suggestions of supporting countries and small states in paragraph 25. We believe that this will be largely helpful to small states and supporting countries. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mauritius. Egypt, you have the floor, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, let me express our appreciation to you, Mr. Chair, and also recognition of your efforts and your team to maintain the delicate balance throughout this text. And we took note with appreciation of the progress made in some sections. However, we believe that some concrete language was taken out and other proposals were not reflected. In particular, on the capacity building section, we commend the retention of the concrete proposals under this section. And although our comments were not taken on board on the issue of streamlining the reproduction notion of the capacity building principles adopted previously by the 2021 OEWG. Speaking on section G on the rigor and institutional dialogue, we took note with appreciation that one of our proposals was taken on board, reflected in the last sentence of paragraph 58. However, we believe that the recommended next steps include new language that prejudges our discussions here on the group of the different aspects of the Program of Action. Hence, it requires further amendments to correctly reflect the discussions of this group over the past year. And here we are speaking on paragraph 56. Moreover, let me add the following observations as a very quick reaction to what we have heard and seen over the past few days within the OEWG. As highlighted by you, Mr. Chair, and echoed by some delegations, there are clear challenges to elaborate a consensual annual report. And here we are repeating again an annual report, not a final one. Hence, achieving consensus requires compromises, collective efforts, and political will by all delegations, as well as avoiding repeating the same national positions while the same delegations would be undermining other delegations’ positions or proposals. We believe that we all agree in principle that this report should factually reflect the proceedings of the OEWG over the past year, as well as represent a roadmap for our future discussion of this group. In this context and in the spirit of consistency, all delegations should reconsider the notion of indicating some factual references to specific proposals as a national red line. In this vein, we believe that those factual references of the OEWG proceedings should not again represent a red line to delegations, taking into consideration that member states would decide which proposal to elaborate and which others would require additional discussions in the future. In conclusion, we hope that we can fine-tune this text based on consensual language as well as balanced factual edits, with the aim of achieving consensus, hopefully and of course by tomorrow, to push forward the work of this OEWG. And in this context, we echo the sentiments of the statements delivered by Brazil, El Salvador, and South Africa. And I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Egypt. I have two more speakers who have asked for the floor. I’m happy to spend the rest of the evening, and I mean that seriously. I will, after hearing all the speakers, share my views on how we move forward from here. But at this point, I’d like to hear the two speakers, and then I’ll make some comments. Saudi Arabia, to be followed by Jordan.

Mr. Chairman, seeing as this is the first time that our delegation speaks, we would like to express our gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, and to your team for the extensive efforts that you have made to develop this second draft in record time. The delegation of Saudi Arabia would like to make the following comments on the revised draft APR. Our delegation supports all the efforts aimed at improving states’ cyber capacities. With regard to capacity building, we welcome the recommendations in it, specifically what was mentioned in paragraph 46, which encourages further cooperation and coordination between the different initiatives and capacity building programs at the regional and international levels, and we would like to commend the practical steps that were mentioned here. And here we would like to note that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia this year has carried out a cybersecurity training in cooperation with the United Nations agency specializing in ICT. Forty states took part in this training, and several experts in cybersecurity as well. This was done at the sidelines of the International Informatics Society Summit. This aimed to enhance international efforts and joint work in cybersecurity. I take this opportunity to note that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia created a nonprofit organization based in the city of Riyadh named the Establishment of the International Forum for Cybersecurity, and it aims to contribute towards enhancing cybersecurity at the international level and enhancing international cooperation as well as socioeconomic development in this field. It also aims to establish correspondence between the different international efforts in cybersecurity and to support these efforts. We support what was mentioned in the draft report in terms of CBMs, and with regards to paragraph 37A, we hope that the directory of points of contact would be an important resource to improve cooperation between states. And we support listing the issue of capacity building in all CBM measures, and we believe that capacity building in itself is a CBM. In closing, Mr. Chair, we reiterate our appreciation for your efforts, and we hope that we all work effectively to arrive at a document that everyone is happy with. I thank you, sir.

Thank you, Saudi Arabia. Jordan, please, you have the floor.

Mr. Chair, thank you and the Secretariat for your work on the current text. With regards to section B, paragraph 5, we support the statement made by Chile on behalf of a number of states regarding the cross-cutting nature of capacity building. With regards to section C, we welcome the inclusion of the text “support states in the identification of critical infrastructures.” And with regards to international law, we support the request that the Chair convene a dedicated inter-sessional meeting on how international law applies in the use of ICTs, as this inter-sessional meeting will help bridge the gap between different opinions. With regards to future regular institutional dialogue, we support the statement delivered by Canada on behalf of a cross-regional group, which includes Jordan. And with regards to Annex A, we support the Switzerland statement and the necessity to differentiate between the function of POCs and the CSIRTs. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Jordan. I don’t have any other speakers who have asked for the floor. We are almost close to six on the eve of Thursday, and we still have some work to do ahead of us. I want to share with you some impressions as well as my views on how we can move forward. First, I’ve listened very carefully to all the views that have been expressed, and I believe I’ve given everyone a chance to express their views. I have listened carefully, taken careful note, and I hope that each one of you has also listened to each other. That was a very generous usage of metaphors. Thank you for that. But beyond the metaphors, I sense that there is a genuine willingness and commitment to search for an outcome and to search for a consensus document by the end of the week, which is tomorrow. So I think I want to thank all of you who have spoken because I think each one of you, as you put forward your views, you also indicated your readiness to work and reach an outcome. And I think that is encouraging. Second, as you put forward your proposals and suggestions, there was definitely an element of a restating of positions, a restating of preferences, and a restating of ideas. And I hope that each one of you has listened to that and come to the realization that there has been, even today, a restating of positions and preferences. And as each one of you spoke and put forward your ideas, it immediately came to mind who might have an opposite view, because that’s visible to me from the podium. For every idea I’ve heard, I could think of a few delegations that had a different, if not opposite, view to your ideas that you put forward with great sincerity and commitment. So to be candid, there is some degree of cancellation, if you like, for everything that you love and would like to see. There is also an opposite view, which doesn’t like very much what you have put forward and doesn’t like very much a reference or a deletion as you might want to have it. So this too, I hope, is a realization that has occurred to you. So while each one of you has the legitimate right to put forward your views, others also have the legitimate right to take an opposite view. So it then puts all of us in a predicament, especially the chair, to decide whose ideas and proposals should be included or excluded. And that is precisely what we are trying to do, searching for consensus and a balanced document. I said this morning that this is a fragile document. And the fragility of that document, in my view, is apparent to me at this point in this week of deliberations because there is a list of new additions or restating of proposals and requests and preferences. And there is also, for each of these proposals, a counter or opposite view. This has not been an interactive debate, so you were very kind and polite. You didn’t immediately say, “I object to every single idea that had been mentioned.” But it’s apparent to you, I’m sure, but it’s also visible to me from the podium that for every valid suggestion, there is a valid opposite point of view. So this fragility of the document we have is something that we need to recognize. But I was encouraged in hearing from almost all of you that you have seen some improvement in this draft that I circulated last night. I’m also encouraged by the fact that many of you said that it goes in the right direction. But it is also clear that fragile as the document is, it is not yet over the finishing line. So there is a need for some closing of the gap to potentially take this document across the finishing line. And in order to get across the finishing line, I think we need to look at solutions that are minimal or minimalist, that go in the direction of fine-tuning, as our friend from Jamaica put it this morning. So we need to look at the least number of fixes and fine-tuning that will be needed to achieve balance and achieve consensus. And that’s what I think we need to do at this stage of the week. If we take the path of seeking to achieve perfection and a comprehensive enumeration of every single issue and point of position or words or phrases that have been uttered over the last 12 months, then we will not be able to get consensus in the remaining time that we have. So what we need to do to close the gap is to look for solutions that will be minimal, that don’t require restructuring the draft that is before us, the revised draft that looks at a few fixes and fine-tuning that will allow us to achieve consensus. The other thing that I want to say is that we need to have a sense of where the final landing zone might be as early as this evening, because tomorrow morning and afternoon we have the whole day, but I anticipate that delegations would also require to consult capitals and seek final approval. So it is important that we continue our work this evening, and so what I would like to suggest is that we adjourn the meeting now, but we come back here at 7 p.m. and I’d like to, in the interim, undertake some informal consultations and then give you a further update when we resume the meeting at 7 p.m. in this room. So we have about an hour. I think we should utilize every single avenue that’s possible to achieve consensus and achieve an outcome. And as Chair, I’m guided by the mandate of this working group. The mandate of this working group requires that we submit an annual progress report. So if there is no annual progress report, then I would not be fulfilling the mandate of this working group. And if there is no annual progress report, we will demonstrate or we will raise questions about the ability of this mechanism to deliver results. And what is the benefit of making such a demonstration? Demonstrating that we are incapable of producing a consensus outcome. And it seems ironic that if we are not able to produce a consensus outcome now, we are already debating a future mechanism that we think will deliver outcomes. Because if we can’t deliver outcomes now, I’m not sure that provides any foundation for us to deliver outcomes in the future. And outcomes have to be delivered in a step-by-step and incremental manner. So my role as Chair is to fulfill the mandate, and the mandate requires that we submit annual progress reports and that we act on a consensus basis. And I am determined to do everything that’s possible in the remaining hours to try and get there. But I think each one of you should also contemplate the consequences of failure, the consequences of not having consensus, and the consequences of not having an outcome. And the consequences of such a scenario are not remote. In fact, the consequences of not having an outcome happen quite regularly at the United Nations. And for each meeting that ends without an outcome, there are consequences. And each one of you needs to reflect on that as well. And what does it mean for this process? What does it mean for you individually as delegations? And what does it mean for us collectively as a working group to be in a situation where we are not able to produce an outcome tomorrow? So those are some observations I wanted to share. So I’d like to adjourn the meeting now and resume at 7 p.m. to allow me to undertake some informal consultations and then to give you a further sense of how we can proceed with our work for the rest of the time we have. The meeting is adjourned, and we resume at 7 in this very meeting room. I thank you for your attention.