Session 6-10 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

The tenth and final meeting of the sixth substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of ICT is now called to order. Distinguished Delegates, we will now continue the discussions under agenda item 5 on the topic of regular institutional dialogue. We began that initial list of speakers earlier just before we broke for lunch, and I am happy to report to you that the list has grown further since then, which I take as a good sign. It’s really good that we have a good number of speakers. Just before we broke for lunch, I think we heard some opening remarks from the Secretariat, but also from the EU, France, as well as the Islamic Republic of Iran. The representative of France said that we should start a substantive discussion. I just wanted to say that we have started this substantive discussion. In fact, we have been discussing this for the last two years. But what I think we need to do is change gears. We need to go deeper into the discussion and find common ground. And so it is in that spirit that I look at this list in a positive way, seeing that there are enough delegations wanting to make their views known. So let’s go through the list. I know it’s Friday afternoon, but Friday afternoons are the most productive afternoons at the United Nations. And so, in that true tradition of productive Friday afternoons, I want to give the floor first to Egypt, which I understand is speaking for a group, followed by Brazil. Egypt, please.

Thank you, Chair. Allow me, at the outset, to present this statement on behalf of the Arab Group. Chairman, the Arab Group supports the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) as an inclusive platform through which to discuss all subjects regarding security of and use of ICTs, including the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue, which will be established after the end of the Open-Ended Working Group’s mandate in 2025. And we must take into account the concerns of all states. The Arab Group supports the follow-up for the implementation of the norms and principles of responsible behavior by states, as well as consensus-based results. We must also continue to develop this framework, depending on what is needed in the future. We support the principles of the second APR for a future mechanism that would be inclusive, flexible, and comprehensive under the UN’s auspices, and that would take decisions on a consensus basis based on results already accomplished by the Open-Ended Working Group. We believe that the scope of application and the mandate of this group should include, first and foremost, capacity building for states in a regular manner to improve capacity for developing countries in terms of applying these norms. Secondly, we must note the gaps that exist in cybersecurity. Thirdly, we must adopt a normative framework that would have the possibility of being developed into legally binding norms. We think that we must have meetings with greater in-depth discussion, which are separated when it comes to the mandate, the scope of – the scope and the timelines for meetings, as well as modalities. And this will allow us to reach consensus on the essential foundations for this future mechanism. Finally, we must not prejudge our negotiations, and we must insist that all parties show the necessary political will to reach a balanced discussion. If not, this would have negative consequences on our work, as we have seen during the first committee during this 78th session. And we want to work with all parties to achieve the results that we want. The guiding question on this matter, we believe that the following three pillars of the scope and mandate of the future mechanism could be additional consensual elements of the future mechanism. One, implementing the existing agreed outcomes. The future mechanism should periodically assess the implementation of the agreed framework by member states through reviewing their voluntary national implementation reports. That would result in identifying the gaps and the diverse challenges faced by member states in their implementation of that framework, and to promote relevant actionable recommendations to respond to these challenges. Second, capacity building. It should provide concrete and sustained support for capacity building based on the recipient state’s needs and assessments in accordance with the capacity building principles contained in the second APR and outcome report of the former OEWG. That could guide and assist states in implementing the agreed framework. Third, developing the existing framework. Through identifying the gaps of the existing framework based on the periodic implementation of the agreed outcomes, and subsequently developing the existing framework of norms, rules, and principles, as well as legally binding obligations. With such a comprehensive mandate, there is no need for establishing multiple processes. Subsequently, we could ensure the continuity of discussions and the work done under the UN auspices, including the outstanding issues, notably the applicability of international law and other matters. Moreover, we believe that the future mechanism should build upon the agreed outcomes of the UN cybersecurity processes, including the current OEWG, and to coordinate and synergize, if not administer, the established cyber tools. For instance, the POC’s directory and all other proposals to be adopted by the OEWG to maintain their effective functioning and review, if needed. With regards to the meeting periodicity of the future mechanism, we share the viewpoint that it would convene the following. First, biannual meetings every two years. This would allow implementing the program of work adopted by the review conference and follow-up on the implementation of the agreed norms, rules, and principles by member states. Second, review conferences to be convened every six years that would focus on the following: examining and reviewing the implementation of the POA, identifying the main priorities for action in the following years, and consequently adopting the program of work for subsequent meetings. In addition to that, it would also consider whether additional norms, rules, and principles or binding obligations should be developed. Third, intersessional meetings or informal working groups. The future mechanism may decide by consensus to hold intersessional meetings or to establish informal working groups to focus on specific related issues, including on the applicability of international law. Finally, we look forward to further discussing all elements related to future regular institutional dialogue within the OEWG through dedicated sessions on the naming, mandate, scope, structure, and modalities of the future mechanism. And we express our readiness to engage with all interested parties on such discussions. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Egypt. Brazil, followed by the Russian Federation.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, comprised of India, Brazil, and South Africa. We thank the Secretariat for the informative briefing made at the end of the morning session and reiterate our appreciation, Chair, to you and your team for your efforts to advance the debate on the establishment of a regular institutional dialogue mechanism on international security related to the use of ICTs. Having, upon the conclusion of this Open-Ended Working Group, a permanent body within the United Nations dedicated to cybersecurity will allow countries to benefit from digital transformation while preventing threats to peace and security stemming from these technologies. As we stated in July’s session, in our view, a regular institutional dialogue mechanism must integrate all key aspects to a secure ICT environment, such as confidence building and capacity building, and also foster in-depth discussions on areas where common understandings have yet to be reached. The IBSA Forum fully supports the recommended next steps on future institutional dialogue outlined in paragraphs 54 to 58 of the Second Annual Progress Report, particularly that it be a single-track, state-led, permanent mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations, reporting to the First Committee of the General Assembly, and an open, inclusive, transparent, sustainable, and flexible process, so as to allow for it to nimbly adapt its work to new technological developments. We equally welcome its recognition of the work of the GGEs and OEWGs as its foundation. We highlight that decision-making should operate on the basis of consensus, while preventing the stagnation of the process, for instance, through a possible de facto veto power. Most importantly, the IBSA Forum would like to reiterate that any proposal on regular institutional dialogue should be considered within this Open-Ended Working Group, which has a General Assembly’s mandate to establish such a mechanism. The OEWG’s consensus decision-making process will ensure that whatever framework ends up being established will enjoy broad support. In order to further promote comprehensive common understandings, it is absolutely essential to maintain the unity of our discussions on international security related to ICTs, in a single-track reporting from this group to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. The delegations of the IBSA Dialogue Forum would like to underline our support for the OEWG process and our commitment to maintaining a single-track process that all UN Member States can contribute to. We caution against bypassing the Open-Ended Working Group through the tabling of competing proposals on regular institutional dialogue outside of this process, which would duplicate efforts and undermine the OEWG’s mandate, setting a concerning precedent for future UN-inclusive forums. In this regard, we urge all delegations to concentrate further deliberations on this issue within this Open-Ended Working Group. We must not shirk our collective responsibility to uphold multilateralism and prevent short- and long-term threats to international peace and security stemming from malicious ICT-related activities. The IBSA Forum remains committed to supporting you, Chair, in this endeavor. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Brazil. That was a crucial last paragraph. I’m glad that we heard you on that. Russian Federation, to be followed by the United Kingdom.

Mr. Chair, a year and a half are left before the conclusion of the OEWG mandate. Against this backdrop, defining the format that will succeed the group after 2025 has become increasingly relevant. The key task here is to develop a consensus decision on this topic. States may have different approaches to various aspects of international information security, but when it comes to a new negotiation mechanism and its parameters, we must develop a unified vision. The future platform should provide equal conditions for all participating states and must not be tailored to the interests of certain countries to the detriment of the interests of others. I am sure that no one would challenge such an approach. That is why it is fundamentally important that the issue of regular institutional dialogue be resolved within the Open-Ended Working Group in accordance with its mandate, which is enshrined in UNGA Resolution 75-240 and the consensus recommendations of the group’s report. We consider the aspiration of a number of states to push forward a decision that meets their interests through a simple majority in the General Assembly to be completely unacceptable. Negotiations in the First Committee have demonstrated that this approach is not shared by the majority of developing countries. As we have seen, the most offensive provisions on the launch of a Program of Action were excluded from the final draft resolution. We encourage the authors and supporters of this initiative to discuss it within the current group. Attempts by a number of delegations and international officials to present the POA as allegedly the only possible and already predetermined format for future dialogue on international information security are puzzling. Let us recall that other proposals on this aspect of the mandate have also been submitted to the Open-Ended Working Group. In particular, the concept paper of Belarus, the DPRK, Nicaragua, and Russia, which was reflected in the second annual Open-Ended Working Group report. Taking into account the dynamics of the negotiations, Russia would like to present on behalf of Belarus, Burundi, Cuba, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, the DPRK, Nicaragua, Russia, Syria, Sudan, and Eritrea, an updated concept paper on the future UN mechanism on security and the use of ICTs. We will transmit it to the chair of the group immediately after this statement, and we would request that this material be published on the Open-Ended Working Group’s website. We believe that the Open-Ended Working Group format has proved its efficiency and its relevance in practice. Since 2018, it has managed to gain the trust and support of a vast majority of countries, primarily developing countries. In this regard, we propose to preserve our common heritage by establishing a permanent decision-making Open-Ended Working Group after 2025. We consider it necessary to ensure continuity between the new body and its preceding groups. First and foremost, this relates to the principle of consensus in decision-making. There is no doubt that states will face difficulties in developing universal arrangements that meet the interests of all countries. However, practice has shown that this is possible and that this is the way to develop the most effective and result-oriented solutions. One recent example of this is the agreement reached in July 2023 on the establishment of a global intergovernmental point-of-contact directory for the exchange of information on computer attacks and incidents. The mandate of a permanent Open-Ended Working Group should focus on further promoting the creation of an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment and build on the mandate of the current OEWG. We see the development of legally binding rules, norms, and principles of responsible behavior of states as elements of a future universal treaty on international information security as a priority area of activities for the future mechanism. The focus is also on the applicability of international law in the use of ICTs, confidence-building measures, and mechanisms for practical cooperation between states. This also includes capacity-building in the digital environment. The development of a universal agreement on these aspects is aimed at preventing interstate conflicts in the global cyberspace and ensuring that they are peacefully resolved. On behalf of the co-sponsors, we would call on all participants in the Open-Ended Working Group to study the concept paper presented as food for thought. For our part, we are ready for a constructive exchange of views and consideration of useful comments and proposals in order to create a negotiating mechanism on international information security that meets the interests of all countries. Thank you for your attention.

Thank you, Russian Federation. United Kingdom, to be followed by Cuba.

Thank you, Chair. We welcome the decision by the UN General Assembly to adopt Resolution A/RES/78/16 that establishes a mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations upon the conclusion of the 2021-25 Open-Ended Working Group and no later than 2026. As the resolution affirms, it is important to build on the existing framework of responsible state behavior in addition to any further outcomes agreed by consensus under this OEWG. You asked us to consider additional common elements under this Program of Action. Paragraph 55d of the second annual progress report states that the future mechanism will be, and I quote, “an open, inclusive, transparent, sustainable, and flexible process.” My delegation would like to focus on how inclusivity could manifest under this future Program of Action mechanism and offer some ideas for additional common elements that could build on this objective of inclusivity with particular reference to stakeholders. Many states have already spoken of the importance of stakeholders in different contexts this week. Under existing and potential threats, Argentina noted that governments and stakeholders should work together to develop an understanding of risks in the context of critical national infrastructure. Costa Rica noted that stakeholder engagement is needed to understand the impact of cyber risks on vulnerable groups and women. Kenya noted the value of the participation of stakeholders in the context of promoting good practices by suppliers and vendors. Under capacity building, Saudi Arabia talked of the importance of private sector and NGO stakeholders. Many other states also spoke of the role of stakeholders, indicating very wide appreciation of the importance of stakeholders to our discussions. The United Kingdom agrees strongly with the importance of stakeholders to rich, informative, and meaningful discussions and implementation of cybersecurity. Collaboration with stakeholders is essential to deliver effective capacity building at the global scale that we need. In elaborating the inclusive dimension of this common element further, we propose that: 1. The future mechanism includes interactive dialogue with stakeholders on specific topics of interest to UN member states. 2. Stakeholders can attend and speak at meetings of the future mechanism and make written contributions to the secretariat. 3. The future mechanism should promote engagement with stakeholders from all regions. Of course, inclusive also applies to states. The future Program of Action should be open to all UN member states and observers, and decision-making should remain intergovernmental in nature. We should also continue to foster the participation of all states, and we are proud in this regard to contribute to this objective through the Women in Cyber Fellowship. Thank you.

Thank you, United Kingdom. Cuba, to be followed by Italy.

Chair, as we underscore the importance of preserving multilateralism and the leading role of the United Nations as the multilateral forum par excellence in addressing the concerns of its member states regarding the use of ICTs in the context of international security, we recognize that the OEWG has demonstrated its value as a unique space, a singular space, in which states can contribute to regular institutional dialogue on the subject. The second APR sketched out some of the areas of convergence that should be taken into account in principle for the establishment of a future mechanism for periodic institutional dialogue. Given these elements and on the basis of the experience of this OEWG, we support the concept note, the updated concept note presented by Russia, in which the mandate for the future mechanism is proposed, as well as other principles that should be based on the work and other organizational and procedural issues that have been referred to, for example, their structure and the work plan. We feel that this proposal can contribute to the practical implementation of the recommendations of the current Open-Ended Working Group and allow us to continue examining in a comprehensive way all of the necessary aspects that have been identified by states in order to move forward towards the achievement of an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful environment for ICTs. The current mandate of the OEWG includes examination of all national initiatives by states, and another of the proposals has been a Program of Action. We have had debates on this in previous sessions in the framework of this group. In these deliberations, our delegation formulated substantive considerations on the proposal, its scope, structure, principles, content, preparation, and modalities. We also included this in our national contribution to the Secretary-General’s report pursuant to Resolution 77-37 of the General Assembly of the United Nations. We reiterate that our delegation feels that the preservation of the intergovernmental character of the future mechanism for periodic institutional dialogue and consensus are essential as a method for decision-making, both regarding substantive questions and also organizational ones. We should avoid forced links of the future mechanism with initiatives of regional organizations that are not representative of all of the countries in these given regions and therefore cannot be considered interlocutors for these regions. With a view to contributing also to deliberations on how we conceive of the future periodic institutional dialogue mechanism, it should be noted that the voluntary norms for the conduct of states on the use of ICTs in the context of international security represent an intermediary step or a complementary pathway, but they cannot be a substitute for the adoption of an international legally binding instrument, which we consider is the only truly effective way of achieving responsible conduct by states in this area. The future periodic institutional dialogue mechanism therefore needs to be one that promotes capacity building in states, in particular in developing countries, on the basis of practical measures for international cooperation and for international assistance, and this should include technology transfer and knowledge transfer to developing countries. Measures or activities for capacity building should be oriented towards enabling universal, inclusive, and non-discriminatory access for all states to information and knowledge related to ICTs and towards closing the digital gap in order to perfect the response of states to threats that have been identified in this OEWG and to contribute to sustainable development, especially in developing countries. Initiatives in this direction cannot be limited to activities for the implementation of voluntary norms on the responsible conduct of states but should arrive at a common understanding on how international law applies. It is down to the OEWG to recommend courses of action that are most appropriate for the future on the basis of consensus reached by member states. We do not support the creation of parallel track duplicative mechanisms or substitutes for the group but ones that emerge from our group. Any discussion on any proposal or national initiative relating to the future mechanism for periodic institutional dialogue should occur within the framework of this Open-Ended Working Group in line with the mandate handed down to the group by Resolution 75-240. Chair, by way of conclusion, we thus reiterate that we are at your disposal to continue contributing to the deliberations, and we are fully committed to the purpose of building the necessary consensus. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Cuba. Italy, followed by the United States.

Chair, Italy aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and would like to offer the following remarks in its national capacity. First of all, let me congratulate you and ourselves for the tremendous results we have accomplished in this and in the previous OEWG. It is really heartening to see the number and the level of interventions and proposals that characterize the work of our group today. We were here in September 2019 when the first OEWG began. There has been incredible progress since then. At the beginning, we were generic, somehow self-restrained, and, at least in our case, much less knowledgeable. It is rewarding to see how remarks and suggestions have become more insightful, informed, and action-oriented. We interpreted this as a sign of the willingness of the membership to participate, cooperate, and achieve concrete results. This is the way we interpret the overwhelming support received by the resolution on the Program of Action, which, with its 161 votes in favor, is a clear indication that we want to move forward on regular institutional dialogue. Therefore, this is the time to take stock and prepare for the future of a different multilateral framework that builds on the results achieved by the OEWG. In fact, I want to be clear. Without the OEWG and the discussions we have been having over the last five years, this level of participation, awareness, and desire to reach a high level of cooperation would not have been reached. However, like in a family, children grow and change and, sooner or later, they must follow new paths that are more fit for the stage of their lives, while preserving their nature. That is why I agree with Fran’s intervention, especially when it says that the Program of Action should include discussions along the lines of the ones that are happening within the OEWG, as the membership has demonstrated its appreciation for it. The time ahead and the continued work within the OEWG will help us shape in a truly cross-regional spirit and in a very inclusive and participatory manner. Coming to your first question, having in mind the common elements identified by the second APR, there will be a need to work on the structure of the mechanism in a way that conjugates its permanent nature with the ambition to be flexible and action-oriented. Therefore, whether it should be more articulated and diversified than the current OEWG, also given the importance of capacity building for the proposal. Coming to your second question, like others, we would like to support Kenya’s proposal for a threat repository and for India’s global cyber security cooperation portal. And we will reserve to come to additional ideas in the near future. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Italy, for your statement. United States, followed by Mauritius.

Thank you, Chair. The GA vote on Resolution 7816 provides us with a clear mandate. 161 states voted to establish the Program of Action (POA) as an action-oriented, inclusive, and permanent future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue following the conclusion of the current OEWG. While this would be a new mechanism, the resolution affirms that it will be a continuation of the work of the GGEs and OEWGs in promoting peace, security, and stability in cyberspace over the last 20 years and build upon this robust consensus foundation. In my intervention today, I want to focus on the elements of future regular institutional dialogue that we agreed to by consensus in this year’s APR and how they must be incorporated into the POA. First, the future POA will adopt the inclusive model of the OEWG and is conceived as a forum to discuss existing and potential threats, support states’ capacities and efforts to implement and advance commitments to be guided by the framework, discuss and further develop, if appropriate, the framework, promote engagement and cooperation with relevant stakeholders, and periodically review progress and implementation and survey priorities for future work. Unlike past and current working groups, however, the future POA is envisioned to be a permanent institutional mechanism under the auspices of the UN. This will avoid repeated restarting of discussions on modalities of the sort that significantly delayed the start of substantive engagement in this OEWG, and it will afford the stability and continuity necessary to build effective supporting platforms and programs, including on capacity building, to enable greater framework implementation. In addition, the future POA will adopt an action-oriented and flexible approach to regular institutional dialogue with a focus on implementation of the consensus agreements. The OEWG process has built confidence and capacity for almost four years, and we believe member states will be ready upon the conclusion of this group’s mandate in 2025 to take forward and deepen our work on implementing and, as necessary, evolving the framework. We are charged with determining the scope, structure, content, and modalities of this permanent mechanism. In this context, we stress the resolution’s conclusion that the future POA be an action-oriented process with specific objectives building on previous outcomes and be inclusive, transparent, consensus-driven, and results-based. We appreciate the views provided already by many states on the structure, content, and modalities of the future mechanism, many of which overlap with our own views, and strongly encourage further thinking and sharing on these questions. In line with current work, the new POA must enable member states to share useful guidance on implementing the existing norms and CBMs, as well as any proposals for new norms or CBMs, deepen common understandings on how international law applies to state use of ICTs, and develop a mechanism for states to self-assess their capacity-building needs related to implementation of the framework and identify relevant capacity-building resources. As provided in Resolution 7816, the future POA should have the flexibility to further develop the framework, including consideration of new dynamics in the cyber-threat landscape, more common understanding of existing principles of responsible state behavior, identifying any gaps in common understandings of the norms and how existing international law applies in the use of ICTs, and, if appropriate, consider the need for additional volume of non-binding norms or additional legally binding obligations. As we have heard this week, there is an urgent need for capacity-building on international law to ensure all states are in a position to engage effectively in these discussions. We need to prioritize this work, including providing states the building blocks to produce their own national positions. We also take note of earlier comments from a few states that to hold other states responsible for their malicious activity in cyberspace, their capacity to detect those activities needs to be improved. To further build capacity and competence, we urge further scenario-based work beginning in this OEWG and continuing into the POA to solidify how existing international legal rules provide accountability. We also welcome ideas from states on how the POA can better further the goal of accountability. An advantage of the new mechanism’s flexible structure is that it will permit us to capitalize on the reinforcing and interdependent components of the framework. For example, we could consider whether new levels of progress could be achieved through an updated, more action-oriented framing of the discussion in terms of objectives or end states. We might identify resilience, particularly of critical infrastructure, as a desirable end state and focus on norms 13G, I, and J, as well as capacity building. To this end, we propose greater integration of industry stakeholders into the future POA. Several states have referenced baselining using industry standards in their capacity-building interventions. These comments reflect the fact that the expertise of private sector companies, whether in the West or elsewhere, is superior to that of many governments in the room. Member states might also determine that furthering international cooperation on significant cyber incidents should be a priority. In that case, we would be working to implement norms 13D and H and several CBMs, including the POC directory. Here, too, we note the important role of the private sector, particularly for states currently lacking in-house capabilities regarding incident response. And most states would agree that increasing international stability and security and preventing conflict is a worthy goal. Focusing on the implementation of norms 13A, B, C, F, and K, and the application of international law to cyberspace, we can make progress toward that objective. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, United States. Mauritius, to be followed by China.

Thank you. Good afternoon, Chair, good afternoon, colleagues. Chair, under this agenda item, allow me to briefly express the Republic of Mauritius’ views on a future mechanism for future regular institutional dialogue. Mauritius voted in support of resolution 77/37 on the creation of a Program of Action to continue the international discussions regarding the use of information and communications technologies in the context of international security. We believe that the POA could allow states to advance the practical work on implementing the UN framework of responsible behavior in cyberspace established by the GGE and the OEWG. Mauritius aligns itself with many other delegations and recognizes the following benefits of the POA. First, permanent structure and inclusivity. The POA could provide a permanent, inclusive, transparent, action-oriented, results-based, and consensus-driven structure to support all states in their efforts to implement the framework. It could encourage voluntary reporting by states on their national implementation efforts and help identify the needs and challenges they face. Second, flexibility. Many delegations have evoked during past substantive sessions that although support for the implementation of the existing framework is urgently required, new norms may also be developed over time if necessary. The POA, if adequately flexible, could allow states of all sizes and capacities to address emerging threats and further develop the normative framework on the basis of consensus if required. The POA could convoke regular meetings to update the framework as appropriate. Third, capacity building support. The POA could aim to provide support for tailored capacity building activities to address the needs and challenges identified by states in their efforts to implement the framework. In order to achieve this objective, the POA could seek to build on existing capacity building initiatives, including structures and platforms. Fourth and last, but not the least, multistakeholder engagement. The POA could enhance multistakeholder commitment that would allow for regular consultations with relevant stakeholders in all states, including the private sector, academia, and civil society, to consider and provide their valuable perspectives upon pertinent cyber issues. In conclusion, I would like to thank the EU delegation for hosting a roundtable discussion on Thursday to capture African priorities for the scope, structure, and way forward for the establishment of the POA. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you. Mauritius, China, to be followed by Thailand.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Regular Institutional Dialogue, or RID, is an issue vital to the UN’s information security process over the long run. China is of the view that, first, achieving consensus on the RID within the OEWG is the only option. China welcomes the important consensus achieved on the common elements deemed essential to this mechanism, as reflected in this year’s APR, which calls for a single-track, government-led, and consensus-based approach as key principles. This shows that the OEWG can deliver as a framework that allows for convergence towards the mechanism. For that reason, China will not support any attempts to establish the RID outside of the OEWG, as they can lead to divisions in the UN’s process on ICT security and can fuel geopolitical and bloc confrontation, to the detriment of all member states. China appreciates that the concept note submitted by the Russian Federation on the future mechanism of RID to the succession has already been done. We support the effort by Russia as well as the co-sponsors on this concept note. On a preliminary reading, this concept note contains a lot of positive elements, which can be included in a program towards the future mechanism of the RID. As for the structure and the features or functions of the RID, we believe that on one hand, it needs to preserve the UN ICT process. It has to build on the milestones achieved in the UN’s work in this regard during the past quarter century, while at the same time, it should be forward-looking. Therefore, we believe that the mandate for this mechanism of – for this RID can be a two-part process. We, on one hand, can have a look-back part, which focuses on enforcing the established norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, especially when it comes to updating and adapting action plans on capacity building on an ongoing basis. The second part of this mechanism should be a look-ahead part. This forward-looking part, in addition to the backward-looking part, can focus on developing new and updated norms on areas such as data security while working towards concluding legal instruments. China notes with appreciation that in some of the statements delivered prior to this, the delegates of the EU and the Russian Federation have many areas of convergence vis-a-vis China’s proposal. If in the end, we can agree on including such elements into this year’s APR as the new common elements for the future mechanism, that would be a welcome development. And third, for the RID, we believe that it should be a deliberative and decision-making tool. China envisages review conferences every five years as well as annual plenary meetings in two to three sessions a year. In each review cycle, the first three years can be devoted to substantive discussions to, among other things, adopt annual procedural reports as the main goal. Key issues of concern to a large number of member states as they arise can be decided by consensus. Year four of the review cycle can mark the beginning of the preparatory process of the review conference and to draft a rolling text of the chair. Year five is then devoted to substantive discussions on the text to distill or negotiate and agree on substantive consensus for defining a five-year work plan. Fourth, this RID should be member-state-led. At the same time, it should adopt the same methodology as the OEWG so that there can be broad participation from stakeholders. Mr. Chair, China is open to engaging with member states to hear all views and positions, to seek convergence and consensus, and to play an active role in achieving more substantive progress towards the mechanism. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much. Thank you very much, China. Thailand, to be followed by Canada.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. With regard to the section on RID, Thailand wishes to highlight the following. Thailand sees the merits of establishing a future mechanism that will allow us to continue our global dialogue pertaining to cybersecurity. We welcome the progress made on our discussion on RID, as set out in the second annual progress report of the OEWG, stating that a future mechanism for RID would be a single-track, state-led, permanent mechanism under the auspices of the UN, with an aim to continue the promotion of an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. Moreover, we are of the view that certain elements for the future mechanism should be further reiterated, particularly consensus and inclusivity. It is crucial for the future mechanism to operate on a consensus basis while embracing inclusivity to ensure that all views and perspectives, even when there is diversion, are acknowledged and taken into account. A multistakeholder approach should be encouraged where appropriate. Lastly, as many delegations mentioned on building on common elements and existing frameworks, we can strongly support the continued discussion on the scope, structure, content, and modality of the RID, including a possible Program of Action within the OEWG framework, as indicated in the second APR. We aspire to see the future mechanism playing a pivotal role in forging a universally accepted, common understanding on the application of existing international law and the application of the rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior in the use of ICT, promoting capacity building and international cooperation, and strengthening CBMs amongst states and relevant stakeholders. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Thailand. Canada, to be followed by Bangladesh.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. As this is my last statement for this session, allow me to thank you and your team for your excellent guidance of this body over the last week. My delegation has been struck by the significant number of substantive statements we have witnessed from so many delegations. We’ve also been impressed by the significant common ground within these statements. We’re pleased to see that this phenomenon is still somewhat reflected in this agenda item, notably the desire to negotiate the substance of a future mechanism within this OEWG. Mr. Chair, you asked how we can align different synergies and best develop a future mechanism for ICT security. For Canada, the answer is clear. With the vote of 161 member states and 67 co-sponsors from a diverse cross-regional group of countries, the resolution on the Program of Action has established the future mechanism. The UNGA was also clear that it wants the OEWG to develop the POA in this consensus-based body. We understand that we have a clear mandate from both the UNGA and from the UN Secretary-General to define the content and modalities of a POA. This is an important and substantive task and will require the commitment of all states to bring it to fruition over the coming year and a half. Many of the proposals put forward within the OEWG could therefore be developed to have synergies with the POA, most notably the POC directory, but also other proposals such as a threat directory, potential portal, or even new CBMs. We need to examine how to continue the development and implementation of such proposals so that they can transition seamlessly at the end of this OEWG and the beginning of the POA. However, continuing debate on whether the POA is the future mechanism or attempting to build duplicative measures is unconstructive. We find it puzzling that a small group of states remain convinced that advancing their interests overrides those of 161 states from all parts of the world. There’s no reason why all states should not be able to contribute constructively to building a consensus agreement on a POA that reflects the interests of all states in this body. There’s also no reason why all views cannot be reflected within a POA agreed within this body. Mr. Chair, there is no doubt that we’ve benefited greatly from discussions in the OEWG, including this very substantive session. We agree that these discussions must continue past this current OEWG, but we would argue that such conversations should continue in a similar format as part of the POA. A duplicative process is not needed. OEWG discussions as part of the POA offer space for growth as the POA creates opportunities for more. It can allow us to have a single permanent, inclusive, and action-oriented mechanism, one that has specific objectives and goes beyond conceptual discussions to further focus our efforts on concrete progress. Indeed, as I mentioned during our statement on capacity building, Canada sees the POA and particularly an action-oriented nature of the POA as a virtuous circle. I spoke yesterday about the links between the discussion of implementation of norms and the value of applying capacity building to address gaps that states identify in their ability to implement norms. But that circle goes further. It’s possible that focused norms implementation, discussion of international law, and focused dedicated capacity building will reveal additional gaps that cannot be addressed through implementation, confidence building, or capacity building. In this case, the circle moves and POA resolution creates space for consideration of further developing the framework for responsible behavior, including developing as appropriate new voluntary norms or additional legally binding measures if necessary. This circle would then begin again with further examination of implementation, a truly action-oriented process. We must now all build the substance and structures of this circle. Canada would welcome and indeed believes we are mandated, Mr. Chair, to use the next meetings to focus not on vague ideas of a future mechanism but focus on specific areas of the POA and begin to build convergence on the substance of our future Program of Action. We also hope that states will take the initiative to develop ideas that they can bring into this room to help build its substance. Canada was pleased to begin to do this by holding a standing-room-only, apologies for that, side event that looked at the role of stakeholders in the POA. We’re committed to continuing to work on this issue and in the hope of developing options to allow for genuine engagement between states and stakeholders while recognizing the specific and unique role that only states can play. Proposals that we hope to bring to this room to be built further collectively. We encourage all member states to engage with us in this work and we encourage them to share with us how they wish to be enabled to engage with stakeholders within the POA. This is ultimately, Mr. Chair, a very exciting time. We have the opportunity to shape a permanent mechanism that will serve all states as we confront a challenging and rapidly changing ICT environment. I hope this is a challenge that we will all take on with seriousness and with commitment to respecting the will of the UN General Assembly and building a tool that benefits us all. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Canada. Bangladesh to be followed by Malaysia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The second APR laid a valuable foundation for regular institutional dialogue on responsible state behavior in cyberspace through a list of common elements. Bangladesh’s position on regular institutional dialogue is very clear. We reaffirm that a future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue would be a single-track, state-led, permanent mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations. It must be an open, inclusive, transparent, sustainable, and flexible process which would be able to evolve in accordance with the state’s needs as well as in accordance with developments in the ICT environment. The foundation of the work of the future mechanism must be the consensus agreement on the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs from previous OEWG and GGE reports. We recognize the importance of the principle of consensus regarding both the establishment of the future mechanism itself as well as the decision-making process of the mechanism. And we highlight that all of these discussions related to the future mechanism should be discussed under the Open-Ended Working Group. In response to your guiding questions on additional elements, my delegation proposes two points that we believe should be included. One, the future mechanism must be action-oriented with a specific focus on capacity building. It should incorporate a reporting system on the implementation of agreed-upon actions to ensure accountability and transparency. Second, the mechanism must be inclusive and take proactive measures to facilitate the meaningful participation of smaller states and developing countries, ensuring that their views and perspectives are actively taken on board in its work. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Bangladesh. Malaysia, to be followed by Israel.

Mr. Chair, Malaysia welcomes the list of common elements for a future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue as a significant consensus outcome reflected in paragraph 55 of the Second Annual Progress Report of this OEWG. It is reassuring that Member States have agreed, in principle, inter alia, that a future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue, and I quote, would be a single-track state-led permanent mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations, reporting to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. This future mechanism, and I quote, would take as the foundation of its work a consensus agreement on the framework of responsible state behaviour in the use of ICTs from previous OEWG and GGE reports. In common with many delegations, Malaysia greatly values the substantive contributions of this OEWG as an inclusive multilateral platform building on past and existing efforts under UN auspices. Against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical tension and a prevailing trust deficit, the OEWG remains a critical confidence-building measure through which Member States are collectively able to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. As we move forward, maintaining a single-track approach as envisaged in the Second Annual Progress Report is imperative. From a substantive standpoint, we should ensure that multilateral discourse and action on ICT security evolve in an inclusive manner without fragmentation. Moreover, as has been repeatedly highlighted, the optimization of scarce resources, as well as the practical constraints on smaller delegations, particularly from developing countries, should be accorded due weightage in our deliberations. Member States have invested significant time and effort in the present OEWG and should have the opportunity to participate fully in any follow-up process on an equitable basis. Mr. Chair, even as we assess the content and modalities of a prospective mechanism for the post-2025 period, balanced consideration of issues under all pillars of this OEWG, which is now at the midpoint of its five-year mandate, remains essential. At the same time, we recognize the need for serious reflection on next steps and look forward to continued, focused discussions on regular institutional dialogue through the OEWG’s substantive sessions and dedicated inter-sessional meetings. Malaysia notes with keen interest proposals presented to date and will continue to engage actively with proponents thereof. We appreciate the felicitous framing of the Chair’s second guiding question, which asks how Member States can align different synergies, taking into account the latest developments on the Programme of Action, POA initiative, and other proposals. This is premised on a collaborative rather than a competitive pathway, and we commend the Chair for approaching the discussions in this manner. Objective, dispassionate consideration of relevant proposals will allow us to better understand the substantive issues at play and to identify areas of commonality which may be built upon in fleshing out the details of a future mechanism. It is heartening to note that delegations across the board have consistently emphasized the role of the OEWG in this regard. My delegation also recalls that, in accordance with paragraph 56 of the Second Annual Progress Report, Member States have “…recognized the importance of the principle of consensus regarding both the establishment of the future mechanism itself, as well as the decision-making processes of the mechanism.” Malaysia hopes that the spirit of constructive dialogue and engagement central to the progress already made by this OEWG will prevail and allow us to advance further.

Thank you very much, Malaysia. Israel, followed by Belgium.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. We wish to join this constructive conversation and share our positions on the topic of regular institutional dialogue, including our remarks on a future POA. Israel holds the position that it is important to continue conducting an inclusive and transparent global discussion on matters pertaining to security and ICTs and their use. The question of what should be the exact mechanism of such a regular institutional dialogue is directly related to its possible mandates, modalities, and characteristics. Israel is of the view that for the sake of inclusiveness and effectiveness of such a dialogue, the framework for such a dialogue on ICT security should be of a voluntary and non-legally binding nature. Any other type of framework carries the risk of alienating and driving away some of the relevant actors. In this context, Israel also believes that as cybersecurity and cyber resilience are key elements of states’ national security, it is essential that any future framework will be consensus-based. Mr. Chair, like many of our distinguished colleagues have stressed before us today, any chosen institutional dialogue should avoid duplications or fora fragmentations, and it should optimize the use of resources and maintain a practical and focused process. Like many other member states, we also anticipate that we might encounter some difficulties equally contributing and fully engaging with parallel and multiple processes. Mr. Chair, Israel voted in the UNGA last year in support of Resolution 77-37 on the creation of a Program of Action and has joined many states in supporting this year’s Resolution 78-404. Since the introduction of this idea during the 2019-2021 OEWG, Israel has been favorable to the creation of a POA on cybersecurity within a UN framework. According to our understanding, this initiative aims at creating an important, inclusive, and permanent venue for discussing cybersecurity issues. At its inception, the aim of this idea was to unite existing UN channels into one main forum. At this point, Israel still believes that there could be several potential advantages to the idea of creating a future POA, serving as a sole UN mechanism for discussing cybersecurity issues on a global level. We have persistently made clear that it is imperative all decisions on substantial matters in the new POA be taken based on the principle of consensus. This principle should apply both to the negotiation processes itself, leading to the creation of the POA, as well as to the decision-making process within the POA. As cybersecurity issues have the potential to affect all states’ fundamental national security interests, we wish to see it clearly stated as part of the POA’s modalities. It is our expectation that this essential and widely observed principle will be safeguarded in text and put into practice in the next phases of deliberations and during the creation of any future POA. With regard to some of the language and references made during the discussion over the creation of a future POA, Israel wishes to clarify and reiterate that while some states hold the view that further development of norms and implementation of existing norms could take place in parallel, our view is that it would be more effective to enhance the implementation of existing norms before embarking on the development of new ones. Before developing new norms in the context of the future POA, it would be more appropriate, in our view, to focus on those norms that currently exist to assess whether and how they are being understood and applied, ensuring that there exists a common language when referring to these norms. Once this is done, we as a community can begin to consider if there is a need to clarify, enhance, or even to reconsider the original norms. Only then, in our view, can we assess whether there exists a need for additional norms. Furthermore, as we and other states have said before, there is no consensus over the need to develop any additional legally binding obligations at this time, and this, in our view, should be stated in a clear way in the context of our discussions vis-a-vis any institutional dialogue or the suggested POA. This passing year has demonstrated again the heightened responsibility of governments to provide security and protect state interests from malign actors. We are skeptical that this can happen through the introduction of new and untried principles. Rather, it requires cautious application of time-proven principles, confidence-building measures, interstate cooperation, and capacity-building. Israel remains ready to share its know-how and vast experience, further develop bilateral and multilateral collaborations, and take other pragmatic steps to improve cybersecurity and cyber resilience across the globe. In conclusion, Israel continues to support the idea of the creation of a POA, but the way forward must base all decision-making processes on substantial matters in the process to and within the POA on the principle of consensus, and especially while discussing the modalities of such a POA. Going forward, in our opinion, it will be important for the POA to be also objective and neutral. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Israel. Belgium to be followed by Pakistan.

Mr. Chair, my country aligns with the statement delivered by the EU and wishes to stress the following elements in its national capacity. My delegation supports the envisaged vision of the POA that will be circulated by France. As indicated by the French delegation this morning, it will put forward a preliminary two-pillar structure of this permanent action-oriented and inclusive mechanism and proposes common elements for addition to the list agreed in the second APR. Belgium would like to suggest the inclusion of a victim-based approach under the proposed second pillar of the future mechanism dedicated to an action-oriented platform for implementation of the framework. As we stressed in the opening of our session, cyber attacks make human victims. People die in hospitals because of ransomware or cyber attacks. Cyber attacks cause human suffering. We therefore recommend the creation of a Committee on Victim Assistance as an action-oriented instrument. The Committee on Victim Assistance would, first, help states to better understand harm to victims and human suffering caused by cyber attacks. Second, exchange on best practices to mitigate them. Third, support and guide states in their national efforts to strengthen and advance victim assistance. The Committee on Victim Assistance would be composed of four to five states with a regional balance. They would be elected for a mandate of two years on a rotation basis. They would organize activities and report annually to the plenary meeting. We suggest adding this proposal to the list of initiatives mentioned under pillar two in the French working paper to come. Belgium is ready to organize a side event in the margin of the Open-Ended Working Group’s seventh substantial session to substantiate this proposal. In this context, we would like to refer as an example to the research and process launched by the Cyber Peace Institute to develop a standardized harm methodology, the strategic objective of which is to identify means to measure and assess the harm inflicted by cyber attacks to people. In this way, we could increase knowledge of the human cost and inform accountability and resilience efforts. Finally, Mr. Chair, in our work towards designing the modalities and content of the POA, this group should engage meaningfully with all stakeholders, including civil society and industry, and facilitate their participation in this group. An overwhelming number of states, for the second year in a row, expressed resolute support for the resolution on the POA to advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace in the UNGA. And here we wish to thank Mrs. Priceman for her excellent presentation this morning. Together, these states send a clear signal that the establishment of a permanent, inclusive, and action-oriented mechanism like the POA is the best means to materialize regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the UN. In line with the Open-Ended Working Group mandate and the recommendations contained in the second APR, we should use the opportunity of the dedicated inter-sessional meetings to make substantial progress on the scope, content, and structure of the POA, as well as its modalities, with a view to its establishment upon conclusion of the current Open-Ended Working Group no later than 2026. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Belgium. Pakistan, to be followed by the Netherlands.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Pakistan maintains a consistent and clear position on the topic of regular institutional dialogue. We believe that the key principles in the formulation of future platforms for discussions on the important topics relating to ICTs must include inclusivity, transparency, consensus-driven decision-making, multistakeholder participation, global collaboration, and sustainability. The future institutional dialogue must include in its mandate the topics of capacity building, norms building, and the application of international law in cyberspace, including discussions on the formulation of a legally binding instrument to regulate the behaviors of states in cyberspace. Furthermore, such dialogue should take place under the auspices of the UN. The existing OEWG is the most appropriate forum for all the discussions related to the TORs and mandate of any future platform, including the Program of Action. Any mechanism or structure created after the existing OEWG in 2025 must be built on a sustainable foundation and developed through a consensual process. In this regard, the existing OEWG provides an ideal platform for such discussions. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much Pakistan. Netherlands, followed by the Republic of Korea.

Thank you for giving me the floor, Chair. Aligning with the EU Statement, I would like to make a few further remarks in a national capacity. At the outset, Chair, allow me to express our appreciation to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs for its presentation on the ESG report just now. The Netherlands welcomes the progress made in the second APR, and particularly on identifying common elements for future regular institutional dialogue, as well as the agreement to dedicate more time to discuss proposals under this agenda item, including the Program of Action initiative. We also welcome Resolution 78404, in which the General Assembly decides to establish a permanent, inclusive, and action-oriented mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations. In our view, the resolution helps set a clear objective and timeline for the establishment of a single-track process after the conclusion of the current OEWG. Chair, the Netherlands continues to support the POA initiative as a permanent yet flexible platform to, 1. continue to build common understandings on the use of ICTs in the context of international security, like we’re having in the current OEWG, where the proposals of all states can be considered and developed on the basis of consensus; 2. advance the practical implementation of what we have already agreed; and 3. to benefit from the expertise of stakeholders. And I would note that, for the sake of time, this is a summarized version of our interest in that initiative. In practical terms, we believe the POA could facilitate the identification of states’ capacity needs through self-reporting, voluntary self-reporting, and the use of implementation checklists, enable the match of needs and resources in synergy with existing initiatives, and provide a platform for exchanging best practices. It could also provide a permanent home for initiatives we’re currently working on in the OEWG, such as the Global POC Directory and other forthcoming initiatives. Chair, in response to your question on possible further common elements of future regular institutional dialogue, we are keen to listen to the views of other delegations and find possible areas of convergence within this group. Please allow me to share some of my delegation’s initial views, building on the common elements we agreed in our second APR. Firstly, we propose that the future mechanism would seek to achieve further common understandings on responsible state behavior, and the Netherlands considers that such inclusive discussions are important to continue beyond the conclusion of our current process so that we can further build stability in cyberspace. Secondly, on the consensus foundation of a future mechanism, which was an element we included in last year’s report, we consider that the mechanism could aim to foster cooperation between states to advance the implementation of these consensus agreements, and we would also put forward action-oriented capacity building as part of this element, making reference to the principles for capacity building previously agreed. Thirdly, we would propose that future RID would provide a platform to exchange on existing and potential threats, since our discussions this week once again demonstrate the importance delegations place on this topic, including ours. Fourthly, we would like to highlight the role of stakeholders, not to make decisions that are reserved for states, but to consider how they can best fulfill their role in global cybersecurity and to capitalize on their expertise. Chair, let me conclude by once again reiterating the Netherlands’ commitment to finding further common ground on the objectives and functions of a future permanent mechanism. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Netherlands. I would encourage delegations, if you are able to do so, to see if you could present an abbreviated version of your statement. And I think the statements so far have been so rich, and as I try frantically to take notes, I find it difficult. So I think it would be good if all of you can submit your statements to the Secretariat to be put onto the website, or if you’re not comfortable with it being put on the website, you can share it with my team. In fact, almost this is like a submission exercise because we have had such rich statements. So you will not be disadvantaged if you present an abbreviated statement. So please, we will go on to the next speaker, Republic of Korea, followed by Indonesia. Thank you.

Thank you, Chair. My delegation commends the previous consensus work in developing the framework for responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs. It is therefore quite fortunate that we can build upon the previous progress that was made. At the same time, we can no longer delay the important task of establishing regular institutional dialogue for facilitating the implementation of the already established framework. It was in this context that my delegation co-sponsored the UNGA resolution on the Program of Action (POA) that decided to establish a mechanism under the auspices of the UN upon the conclusion of this working group. Now, to answer the guiding questions provided by the Chair, our delegation would like to highlight some of the elements of the future mechanism that we think are integral. While we hope that states can continue to discuss and exchange views on important topics like threats, norms, and international law, we believe that the future mechanism should also focus on supporting the states’ capacities to implement and advance their commitments guided by the framework, which will make the mechanism genuinely action-oriented. In addition, the future mechanism needs to be flexible enough to address the rapidly evolving nature of ICT technologies. We believe that the development of technology and our understanding of it will help clarify the needs of states, thus making the best use of this flexibility to efficiently address evolving circumstances. In order to facilitate the implementation of the norms and principles, which are voluntary and non-binding, my delegation highlights the importance of follow-up mechanisms, including the periodic review process. The proposed Program of Action and its follow-up mechanisms suit that purpose, implementing the framework and identifying further areas that require additional attention and assistance. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, the Republic of Korea supports the establishment of the Program of Action as the future forum for regular institutional dialogues, which are permanent, inclusive, practical, and action-oriented. We believe the POA will best serve this purpose by promoting an open, secure, and peaceful ICT environment, building on the agreed outcomes of previous OEWG and GGE reports. We look forward to discussions on this matter throughout the remaining sessions of this group. I thank you.

Thank you Republic of Korea. Indonesia, followed by Argentina.

Thank you, Chair. Indonesia reaffirms our commitment to the success of the OEWG process as a single track and consensus mechanism to address issues relating to the security of and in the use of ICT. As we surpass the halfway point of the OEWG, it is important for us to continue engaging constructively in developing cooperative measures to ensure a safe, secure, and stable cyberspace. We must build upon the consensus adoption of the second APR, which agreed to establish a point of contact directory that demonstrates the concrete outcome of the work of the OEWG. Therefore, it is imperative that we maintain the sanctity of the OEWG as an inclusive framework for managing cyber risk, fostering good governance, and regulatory practices within the cyberspace domain. Chair, with regards to the vision on the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue, allow me to highlight two points. First, we need to clarify the interaction between the OEWG and the Program of Action. We took note of the latest development on the POA. The resolution that was adopted provides a number of key indicators. We need to seek clarity on the timeline of the discussion ahead of the proposed conference in 2026. How do we ensure that the work and tangible outcomes of the OEWG feed into the POA? How do we ensure the smooth transition between the two processes? How do we also ensure that other existing proposals with respect to future mechanisms are considered in the meantime? Also, how do we ensure possible new emerging proposals are taken into account if warranted? To be able to address this, we must continue to identify potential gaps among different frameworks and seek to combine the possible convergences. There are commonalities on which we can focus, such as implementing consensual outcomes of the OEWG and focusing on boosting international cooperation and assistance, while continuing to elaborate between existing frameworks of norms, rules, and principles, legally binding obligations, as well as emerging norms and necessities to reflect the rapid development of the field. In addition, we must also ensure that the work of the OEWG will provide substantive input into the POA. These are the discussions that need to take place within the OEWG in order to ensure a smooth transition to the next future mechanism. Second, Chair, we need to ensure the maturity of the future process. Reflecting on paragraph 55 of the second APR, we have agreed to maintain an open, inclusive, transparent, sustainable, and flexible process. We share these elements as they would ensure the maturity of our process. We must maintain an environment that provides space for an open, transparent, and sustainable dialogue on this matter. However, one critical part is to ensure active participation of all in an inclusive manner. Therefore, Indonesia shares the view of many other delegations that we must continue to support stronger and more robust capacity building and CBM cooperation. We believe that the future process should have a mechanism that can foster stronger international cooperation and ensure effective implementation. This will assist countries in enhancing their cybersecurity capabilities and enable them to carry out meaningful participation as a building block of a resilient future process. Chair, finally, we continue to support the current OEWG towards its successful conclusion of work in 2025. We need to continue to reach common ground for the establishment of future mechanisms building upon the work of the OEWG. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Indonesia.

So, your pleasure, Chair. For 25 years now, under the auspices of the First Committee, the process of debate on the responsible conduct of states in cyberspace has been ongoing with the purpose of preventing conflicts between states that could endanger international peace and security. Next year, we will hit the midterm of the current mandate of the OEWG. And we should move towards defining the type of format that should be used following 2025 so that we have a regular and institutional sphere under the frame of the United Nations that will serve as a platform for dialogue and negotiation on issues that, so far, have fed into the acquis on security as regards the use of ICTs. To date, the topics of cybersecurity have been dealt with sequentially, firstly in a closed format in the GGE and then later in an open format in the Open-Ended Working Groups, OEWGs, both with time-limited mandates and subject to approval from the General Assembly. To date, there have been six groups of governmental experts and two OEWGs. Let us highlight that the last GGE was run in parallel to the first OEWG, duplicating the debating process on security and the use of ICTs. Chair, Argentina promotes the move towards a regular, open, inclusive, and transparent platform on regular continuity on security and the use of ICTs so that we do not depend on negotiation of specific resolutions for each mandate of work. The priority objective of the permanent platform included in the Program of Action should be focused on implementing the acquis that we have built up over the last 25 years. In this way, my delegation considers that discussions that tend toward developing this acquis should be promoted due to the changing nature of the international agenda on security and the use of ICTs. The permanent platform should be led by states, but it should also allow for the participation under appropriate modalities of various different stakeholders, including the private sector, academia, and civil society, amongst others. Building secure and resilient cyberspace should include the constructive cooperation of all stakeholders. Also, insofar as the future mechanism is action-oriented, capacity building is fundamental. And in this regard, as we indicated yesterday in the statement delivered on behalf of a group of Latin American countries, my delegation reaffirms that the future regular institutional dialogue, RID, cannot be sustainable and comprehensive if it does not have clear provisions on how to build and maintain capacity over the long term. Chair, Argentina believes that the structure, modalities, content, and reach of the regular mechanism included in the POA should be consensually arrived at by members of the OEWG within the work of the group rather than being developed outside it. This is the appropriate forum for discussing these topics and generating consensus. This debate itself is a confidence-building measure in and of itself and can also help us move towards real consensus on its constitution. Finally, my delegation believes that in addition to the elements identified in the Progressive Order 2023, we feel that the following items should also form the cornerstone of the permanent regular platform. On the one hand, a human rights-based approach reminds us that technological development should be put to the service of people rather than the other way around. On the other hand, recognition of the existence of the digital divide and the gender gap and also the fundamental role of capacity building within this framework, we believe that the digital transformation that is needed can help us close the gaps and will contribute to developing open, secure, and interoperable cyberspace for all. Argentina looks forward to the future open and transparent debate, and we look forward to seeking consensus together.

Thank you, Argentina. Mexico, followed by Colombia.

Thank you, Chair. Mexico considers it is important that we continue the exchange of points of view on the future regular institutional dialogue mechanism, RID, on cyber security under the framework of this working group. We are grateful for the presentation by the ODA this morning. In April last year, Mexico submitted its national contribution in accordance with resolution 77-37 of the General Assembly of the United Nations and has constructively participated in the inter-sessional meeting of May on the scope, structure, and content of the mechanism for RID. In this regard, we wish to highlight the following points. We believe that the mechanism for RID should lay the foundation for international cooperation in capacity building and strengthening capacity, as well as for the exchange of information, experience, and best practices linked to the prevention, management, and mitigation of cybernetic incidents in the context of international security. We feel that the structure and content of this mechanism could be aligned with a substantive analysis of the responsibilities that different stakeholders in this process would have, including priorities that are of a national character, such as the protection of critical infrastructure and appointing national points of contact, and also the modalities for participation of non-governmental entities independently of their consultative status. The efficacy of the mechanism’s work will largely depend on its ability to take decisions. In this regard, we reiterate our well-known position on the inadequate use of consensus. Historically, we have seen how insistence on consensus can lead to paralysis. It can actually become an obstacle to productive negotiations. The future mechanism should have a more dynamic decision-making focus that is also flexible and realistic in order to allow us to move forward with the critical matters. This would not only allow us to have the necessary momentum in our deliberations, but it would also ensure that decisions truly reflect the collective interests. It would also prevent them from finding individual positions as an obstacle. Chair, for Mexico, it is crucial in terms of implementation that we clearly include the periodicity in order to respond to the National Survey of Implementation as established in the recommendations of the final report of the OEWG for 2019-2021 on the implementation of resolution 70-237 of the GA of the United Nations. Finally, it would also be fundamental for Mexico that the negotiation of the RID mechanism actually consider the different levels of technological development and differential capacities given the regional threats and regional priorities. It is essential that these goals and actions are built on the basis of having a tangible and effective impact. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Mexico. Colombia to be followed by Latvia.

Mr. President, the OEWG’s plans for CSIRTs will be based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including maintaining international peace and security, international humanitarian law, and human rights. As regards foundational aspects, the mechanism will promote the use of ICTs for peaceful ends, prevent conflicts arising from the use of these technologies, procure peaceful settlement of disputes, reduce digital divides, create resilience in all societies and sectors, and maintain a human-centered approach. As regards its scope, it should support capacity building in a comprehensive and cross-cutting way in all thematic areas. It should be guided by the principles of capacity building included in the final report of 2021 of the OEWG. Creating a tool that will serve the purpose of guaranteeing sustainability in this regard will be a cooperative measure that is key and should be considered as part of the future mechanism. As its foundation, the implementation of the framework of responsible conduct of states in cyberspace will have sufficient flexibility to consider the development of additional norms as it feels necessary. It will also promote shared understanding of existing and potential threats as well as cooperative measures to deal with them. This mechanism shall incorporate the initial list of CBMs and will allow the creation of new ones, considering that these can help prevent conflicts, avoid mistaken perceptions, misunderstandings, and reduce tension. It will also permanently integrate the practical tools that are created within the OEWG, such as the global directory of points of contact. Also, while it is an action-oriented mechanism, it should also be built as a place for regular dialogue. Together with the collaboration of civil society, the private sector, academics, and the technical community, finally, the future mechanism for RID should be established after the OEWG in 2025 and not later than 2026. I thank you.

Thank you Colombia. Latvia, to be followed by Australia.

Mr. Chair, we fully align with the EU Statement. The following remarks are in our national capacity. Cybersecurity has been on the agenda of the UN for more than two decades now, and significant progress has been achieved within several GGEs and OEWGs. However, the cyber landscape is evolving constantly. As we have discussed this week, cyber threats and activities are not only increasing but also are getting more complex and sophisticated. It is still unclear how emerging and disruptive technologies, like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, will transform and affect cyberspace. We should not wait for the emerging challenges to fully materialize before we start to act. As it already is clear that existing and potential threats to cyberspace can only be addressed effectively, a more stable and secure ICT environment can be achieved if states cooperate and build confidence. For these reasons, we believe that it is high time to decide on the establishment of a permanent and at the same time inclusive, action-oriented, and state-led mechanism within the UN to address these challenges in a long-term manner. We believe that would serve everyone’s interests. Latvia, as a small country, would in particular be in favor of a single-tag approach which would enable effective use of limited resources. Rather than engaging in lengthy discussions every five years or so on the establishment of a temporary mechanism, all energy and resources should be focused on enhancing long-term cooperation and trust among states. As the resolution on the Program of Action (POA) received wide support from all regional groups and was approved by 161 states at this year’s General Assembly, it gives a strong mandate to continue in-depth discussions on the establishment of the POA. In our perspective, the scope of the POA would be matters related to the use of ICTs in the context of international security. The POA, as a permanent institutional mechanism, would advance the implementation and further development, if appropriate, of the framework for responsible state behavior. As well, the POA should focus on discussions to further clarify and deepen understandings as to how, and not if, the existing obligations of the UN Charter and international law apply in cyberspace. In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, the POA should support relevant capacity-building activities in accordance with needs identified by states. The POA should also entail genuine dialogue with the stakeholders because their knowledge and expertise are invaluable for substantive discussions and for informed decisions to be made, not least because the development of new technologies is driven by academia and the private sector. Mr. Chair, lastly, Latvia is fully committed to the continuation of inclusive and constructive discussions within the OEWG on the scope, content, and establishment of the POA. Thank you.

Thank you, Latvia. Australia, please.

Thank you, Chair. Australia very much welcomes the positive, focused, and constructive discussions taking place in the OEWG this week to progress discussions and reflect on implementing the commitments set out in our framework, both in this group and into the future. Australia has long been an advocate for the establishment of a permanent UN mechanism to advance responsible, regular institutional dialogue on responsible state behavior in cyberspace, a mechanism that is inclusive, transparent, democratic, and consensus-based. We stress, as we did as one of the 67 co-sponsors of the Resolution on a Programme of Action to Advance Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace at First Committee this year, that the OEWG should discuss and agree by consensus on the common elements for a future regular institutional dialogue. Australia was very proud to be among 161 member states who voted in support of this resolution, 78-16, in the General Assembly earlier this month. This resolution decided to establish a Programme of Action and also, very importantly, agreed that the scope, the structure, the content, and the modalities of any permanent mechanism should be based on the consensus outcomes here. As France said this morning and echoing many others, we now have a very clear, sequenced, and realistic timeline for establishing the mechanism for regular institutional dialogue. This resolution encourages us to discuss here in the OEWG how the POA will continue to support states, particularly through sustainable and tailored capacity building to implement the framework and our key. We think that a Programme of Action provides permanent stability and sustainability and facilitates the necessary discussions to deepen common understandings and make progress, and that it’s important to make this progress to advance peace and security in cyberspace in a permanent way, because the threats that we face evolve and the digital ecosystem itself also evolves. It allows us to continue the implementation of the actions in this open-ended working group, including things that we’ve established like the Point of Contacts Directory, our survey of national implementation, our agreed capacity building principles, and the many other things that we have done that are very substantive in this group. And we’re also cognizant that it is incredibly important that any permanent mechanism doesn’t compete with what has come before it. As was explained very eloquently by my colleague next door from Argentina, these discussions have a very, very long history in the UN, and the mode and structure of UN cyber discussions have developed very considerably since the first Group of Governmental Experts established in 2004 consisted of a small group of states behind closed doors to the ad hoc creation in 2018 of an OEWG, open to all 193 member states, and now to permanent, making this conversation and this mechanism permanent. We agree with France and with others that in addition to the common elements for a future mechanism, which we can agree, that we did agree in the second APR, we should consider focusing on new elements here and discussing and agreeing those by consensus to make sure that they are action-oriented and inclusive in nature. Particularly on the inclusivity, we think that bringing relevant experts together for inclusive dialogue is absolutely essential for the effectiveness and the practical action-oriented work of any future mechanism. And when we talk about inclusivity and the importance of multistakeholder participation, we’re really proposing to strengthen multilateralism so that states who are and who remain the decision-makers in this arena have the expertise and the information that they need, relevant and necessarily, to successfully undertake our work to promote peace and security in cyberspace. Because it’s clear that our success in this OEWG will be based upon the practical difference we can make on the ground to countries and the POA should continue with this focus. Australia looks forward to dedicated intersessional meetings on this issue to discuss in greater detail the common elements for a future permanent mechanism, including the Programme of Action. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Australia. Portugal, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Portugal aligns with the statement delivered by the EU and would like to add some remarks in our national capacity. In November 2022, after three years of extensive consultations by the co-sponsors of the initiative, 157 countries, that is 80% of the UN membership, voted to task the SG to submit a report on the modalities of a Program of Action to advance state accountability in cyberspace after the current OEWG ends in 2025. And just last month, 161 countries, 158 countries voted to welcome the report of the SG and to establish no later than 2026 this permanent, inclusive, and action-oriented mechanism as a permanent successor to the current OEWG. For Portugal, one of the first co-sponsors of the Program of Action initiative, this permanent mechanism is meant to enable us first to concentrate on effectively matching demand and supply of national capabilities from a long-term perspective by fully involving all member states on the same footing, as well as interested parties, including from civil society and industry. And secondly, it provides for the continuation of open-ended discussions among all UN member states in order to improve the application in cyberspace of existing international law and of the agreed voluntary norms that have been repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly. By improving the application of the normative framework, we mean not only monitoring of implementation, but also further codification of voluntary norms of behavior whenever it is politically viable, for example, on due diligence in cyberspace, as I mentioned earlier this week. The current OEWG has been able, thanks to your able chairmanship and extensive engagement by member states, to build constructively on the previous work about needs and means for wide state accountability, including on basic tools such as a global directory of points of contact and repositories of best practices in crucial areas, including capacity building, legal and institutional frameworks, and incident response. These are, in our view, useful preconditions for the effectiveness of the future permanent mechanism, consisting of one track with two pillars, thus avoiding a duplication of efforts that would be highly detrimental to our common goals and that would be especially problematic for small delegations. We therefore look forward to intersessional meetings dedicated to further discussing the features of the future Program of Action, including the recommendations that the SG made in his report. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Portugal. Denmark, please.

Mr. Chair, esteemed colleagues, I would like to commence by thanking you, Chair, for your diligent work throughout this week. Your job is not always easy; however, you make it look easy, and I entirely agree with our colleague from Uganda, who provided you an A+ yesterday. I think it’s well deserved. On that note, Denmark fully aligns itself with the EU statement previously delivered, so the following is in national capacity. As is well known to all, the OEWG has repeatedly called for a permanent UN mechanism on cyber issues in the context of international security. And with the UN General Assembly decision this year to establish a Program of Action (POA), we have delivered on the aforementioned call. It was not a narrow decision. The majority vote was, in fact, overwhelming. And I would especially like to applaud our French colleagues and other co-sponsors for their hard work put into this effort to the benefit of all. As a permanent institution dealing with cyber issues, the POA will, for the first time, enable us to focus our debates exclusively on substance rather than future processes. Essentially, what we will achieve is institutional stability. But at the same time, which is also stipulated clearly in the resolution, the POA will be established only by the end of the OEWG’s current mandate, and furthermore build upon key decisions and recommendations achieved by consensus within the current OEWG cycle and previous institutional arrangements. In other words, which is essential, the POA does not in any way represent a departure from or contradict the current OEWG format. We welcome discussions on the scope, structure, and content of the POA as a key element within the current OEWG cycle. In Denmark’s view, it’s crucial to arrive at a work program that is inclusive, reflecting the interest of the international cyber community as a whole. In our opinion, and in line with a host of countries, capacity building should be a cornerstone. Bridging the digital and technological divide is paramount in ensuring cyber resilience, equity, and the implementation of the framework as a whole. As is well known, a key tenet of the POA is its action-oriented ambition. To Denmark, it is of utmost importance that we accelerate the implementation of the established framework for responsible state behavior and the use of ICTs in the context of international security, bearing in mind the applicability of international law in cyberspace, including the Charter of the United Nations, which has continuously been agreed upon by states. When looking at the cyber landscape, however, we clearly have a long way to go in terms of compliance with international law and with regards to the implementation of the 11 voluntary non-binding norms. Clearly, not all states abide by the principles and live up to their responsibilities. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Denmark, for your statement. Ireland, to be followed by Romania. Ireland, please.

Thank you again, Chair. Firstly, as we draw to a close, I’d like to thank you for your skillful stewardship in facilitating the rich exchange of perspectives over the course of this week. I believe that we can now move toward next year’s sessions and the inter-sessional period with real momentum and some concrete proposals which we should productively build upon. For our part, Ireland aligns with the statement delivered by the European Union on regular institutional dialogue this morning, and I would now like to provide some additional remarks in my national capacity. Chair, the vote last week in the UN General Assembly for the Program of Action resolution delivered an important message. The resolution, co-sponsored by a cross-regional group of 67 states, was supported by 161 states, which affirmed their support for a permanent, inclusive, and action-oriented mechanism to consider and advance security in the use of ICTs. Ireland is proud to be an early supporter of the POA. We see the vote as a vindication of the iterative and inclusive approach that has been the hallmark of this initiative. For the session this week, you have asked us to focus on questions that might further elaborate on this future mechanism, building on General Assembly resolutions 78 and 77, and the common elements agreed by consensus in the 2023 Annual Progress Report. We welcome your questions and the opportunity to have this discussion at the OEWG this week. My delegation would like to take this time to focus primarily on the question of additional consensus elements that could be added to this list. We believe that this is the time to do so, building on the momentum from the second Annual Progress Report and the first committee resolution on the POA. Chair, Ireland maintains the long-held view that the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue must be an inclusive platform, and while it is state-led, it should provide a forum for comprehensive multistakeholder engagement. We join with those states this week that have expressed their regret that certain non-governmental entities were blocked from participating during this session. The scale of the issues we must collectively address in cyberspace, made all too clear in our substantive exchanges on threats on Monday, demands that all of the expertise and perspectives available to us are mobilized. This includes important voices from industry, academia, and civil society, with the objective of developing an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful cyberspace. It is only when all of the skills and perspectives are utilized, and when responsibility is shared, that we will make the progress that we believe is the collective objective of this OEWG. Chair, we believe that there is consensus on the need for the future mechanism to be action-oriented, a platform to implement the range of excellent ideas that have been raised here this week and which command the necessary support. I would note, in particular, as other delegations have throughout this week, the very promising and welcome initiatives proposed by Kenya and by India. As we reflect on our discussions, and most notably those exchanges on capacity building and international law, it is clear that there is much to be done. Encouragingly, there is an evident appetite from Member States to get to work to enhance our collective cybersecurity capacity, to continue our work to implement the agreed normative framework, and to get on with the work of closing digital gaps, including the digital gender gap. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Ireland. Romania, please.

Mr. Chair, distinguished colleagues, Romania fully aligns with the EU statement, and we would like to make the following remarks in national capacity. As I take the floor for the first time, Mr. Chair, I would like to use this opportunity to thank you for your leadership in steering our discussions and the work of the OEWG. We welcome today’s exchange that allows us to have a substantive discussion on moving forward on regular institutional dialogue. This is both timely and necessary. Romania welcomes the adoption by the UN General Assembly for the second consecutive year of the Resolution Program of Action to Advance Responsible State Behaviour in the Use of ICTs. In our view, the resolution reconfirms an overwhelming political support for the establishment of the POA as a permanent, action-oriented, inclusive, transparent, and results-based mechanism in line with the evolving framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. We now have a solid basis to begin this work. Resolution 7816 transparently sets a clear and realistic timeline and steps that should allow UN member states, collectively, to elaborate this mechanism in 2024 and 2025 within the OEWG, based on the consensus outcome therein, and ensure a seamless transition. We support working collectively in a cross-regional manner to design the POA as an action-oriented, transparent, and inclusive platform that provides for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and serves everyone’s interests. Capacity building to strengthen the implementation of the framework for responsible state behaviour and cyber-resilience and the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental players, are inherent to this approach. Romania has been a long-standing supporter of the establishment of the POA, and we look forward to continuous substantive discussions on this topic in 2024 at our substantive and dedicated inter-sessional meetings.

I thank you. Thank you very much, Romania. It’s my intention now to suspend the meeting briefly for 10 minutes because I have to be at the emergency special session of the General Assembly, which is taking place right now, and deliver a statement on behalf of my government. These are the hazards of electing a permanent representative as Chair of a working group, but I want to assure you that we will go through all the statements. We have obtained some additional time, so we can go beyond 6 o’clock if needed because we have about 17 speakers, and I want to be fair to everyone, and we will hear everyone. So, with your permission and indulgence, I would like to suspend for 10 minutes. The meeting is suspended.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will be concise. We would like to make the following points on future institutional dialogue. We underline the importance of maintaining a single-stack discussion on ICT security in the context of international security, avoiding duplication, resource dispersion, and effort dilution. Any future mechanism for future dialogue must be the outcome of inclusive discussions, bringing together all Member States. This will avert contentious principles that undermine the OEWG and prejudice its conclusions. There should be balance in dealing with the future proposals on future dialogue, especially since not all countries agree on the idea of the Program of Action (POA), and there hasn’t been any detailed discussion on the topic of and on the scope and the structure of this POA. Without a common understanding, it will be difficult to reach solutions that help build the consensus. The POA focuses primarily on rules and norms of responsible behavior, while the issue of ICT security is important and pervasive, and therefore it should be approached with more ambition and in a more inclusive and comprehensive manner. Billions actively use the internet. There is a growing reliance on these technologies in light of digital transformation. This affects an increasing number of people and governments. The mandate of the OEWG should be respected, and the OEWG is mandated to elaborate and discuss a future mechanism for a permanent future dialogue on cyberspace. We should exercise our collective and equal ownership in this context. The common elements of a future dialogue mechanism, as mentioned in the second APR, can help reach an adequate format for institutional dialogue, including the potential establishment of a permanent committee or conference as a permanent mechanism for international action on the security of and in the use of ICTs. The revised concept paper on the future mechanism just presented by Russia alongside other like-minded countries, including Syria, serves as a good starting point for this permanent mechanism that should be state-led and should be based on consensus and decision-making. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, we are ready to engage in constructive cooperation to maintain momentum in the work of the OEWG to serve our common objectives of reaching genuine solutions to address current challenges in the field of security of ICTs. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Syrian Arab Republic. Uruguay, to be followed by El Salvador.

Thank you very much, Chair. Uruguay has been an active participant in the work of this working group, and we attribute great value to the work carried out by Ambassador Gafoor and his team, and the important contribution of all states that has led to tangible and substantive progress in the area of cybersecurity. Let us cite, for example, the development of the point-of-contact directory and the exercise on skills mapping. The various substantive sessions were an excellent opportunity to explore strategic links and exchange information between participating states. We welcome the progress made under all pillars of resolution 75/240, and we encourage states to continue bringing their ideas to the table in a quest to make substantive progress towards a permanent framework for exchange on cybersecurity. Similarly, we believe that we should continue contributing to the application of concrete measures that benefit states in their attempt to tackle threats deriving from malicious use of ICTs. Therefore, we envisage a permanent multilateral framework that is open, inclusive, and action-focused. This framework should recognize and take account of the existing differences between states in terms of economic, technological, and know-how capacities. It should also promote a platform for cooperation and capacity building, especially in the countries that most need it. Chair, we are grateful for the intervention of the ODA where the reporting Secretary-General was presented. We agree with the proposals of the Secretary-General, especially on what was said about a robust segment in national security. This cybernetic issue should be subject to clear norms and standards. We also highlight what has been said about the digital divide and how this can be reduced through international cooperation, gender issues, and the need to ensure that the future institutionality is adapted to the evolution of a sector that changes very rapidly. We also note France’s proposal as regards inclusivity in the future permanent framework, and we agree on the need for actors from the private sector, academia, and civil society to be able to participate in the future mechanism. Chair, in an adverse and mistrustful context, we have a duty to develop an inclusive process that allows us to present a united front to the threats linked to malicious use of ICT frameworks and can bring – that we can bring is ideal so that we can equip it with content – the content that we need to achieve the objective, taking into account the urgency required for addressing cybersecurity for the well-being of our people. We have full trust in your leadership as you have stewarded thus far. Thank you for your attention.

Thank you very much, Uruguay, for your statement. El Salvador, to be followed by Chile.

Thank you, Chair. For El Salvador, the conversations on regular institutional dialogue are fundamental because, from our perspective, they will lay the foundations for a process that we envisage as being continuous and progressive, action-oriented, and supported by the United Nations. From our perspective, states have made considerable progress in reaffirming the framework and its evolution as regards the conduct of states when it comes to ICTs and their use. A permanent, regular platform, in our view, would provide the necessary framework to move directions forward in all the areas of the mandate of this group. El Salvador agrees that it is within this group that we should continue discussing and exchanging ideas in order to generate common understanding as to how we envisage the future. My country has for years advocated for the establishment of a Program of Action to move forward with the responsible conduct of states in the use of ICTs in the context of international security, and we are pleased to see this initiative taking shape. Nevertheless, we feel that it is important to continue building understanding within this group, which has shown that, through flexibility, it is possible to achieve convergence, even in politically complex times. We can reach common understandings that allow us to achieve our common goals. In this regard, we feel that it is pertinent to avoid duplication, not only because it leads to inequality in participation and additional challenges for developing countries, but because we believe that, even in our divergences, it is possible to find common ground. We wish to highlight the importance of dialogue. In light of this, we welcome recommendation 55 of the annual progress report, and one of the crucial areas is the permanent mechanism on a single track. In line with the other recommendations, Chair, my country will continue to participate constructively in the debates, including in the Program of Action over the coming session, both informals and informals. Thank you.

Thank you very much, El Salvador. Chile, to be followed by Japan.

Thank you, Chile. Thank you, Chair. I would like to thank you for your leadership and also the Secretariat for their support throughout the negotiation session. As regards the RID, as we’ve highlighted previously, Chile feels that it is essential that a future mechanism for RID helps to assist responsible conduct of states in ICTs in the context of international security. It should be inclusive and action-oriented in order to analyze existing and potential threats and support the capacities and efforts of states in terms of fulfilling and promoting those goals and promoting responsible conduct of states, including the implementation of voluntary non-binding norms and the application of international law to states’ use of ICTs, together with the development of measures aimed at confidence building and capacity building, including the active participation of non-governmental interested parties and stakeholders. We also feel that this process of the Program of Action is the best way of fulfilling those elements that we feel are essential for a multilateral discussion. Therefore, our country has since the beginning supported the initiatives of a Program of Action, including the resolutions of 2022 and 2023 on the subject. We understand that the Program of Action should maintain relevant support from some countries, and there is thus a responsibility to continue making progress on the future structure and functionality of appearing. We have observed the Program of Action is the natural evolution of this process of deliberations on ICTs in the context of international security. Nevertheless, and having said the above, Chile is available to continue working on this to help us achieve the consensus that is necessary to make progress and to give meaning to the work of this group.

Thank you, Chile. Japan, to be followed by Switzerland.

Mr. Chair, Japan is of the view that regular institutional dialogue should be an action-oriented permanent framework that could provide concrete support for the effective implementation of the framework for responsible state behavior. In that regard, we support as a co-sponsor the General Assembly resolution on the Program of Action, which was supported by 161 member states. This resolution decides to establish a mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations upon the conclusion of the current OEWG, and no later than 2026, that will be permanent, inclusive, and action-oriented. As we have discussed in the threats section, the threats in cyberspace never stop increasing. We need to establish this mechanism upon the conclusion of the current OEWG so that there would be no gap in the UN mechanism. For that, we should advance our discussion of this OEWG, including its dedicated sessions on the scope, structure, realistic timeline, content, and modalities of the Program of Action, taking into account the report of the Secretary-General, the views submitted by states therein, the regional consultations, as well as the dialogues with relevant stakeholders. Mr. Chair, it is important to create, under the POA, a virtuous cycle of implementation of the framework of responsible state behavior and capacity-building efforts, as the Canadian delegation stated. The POA should encourage voluntary reporting on national practices with regard to the implementation of norms of responsible state behavior. This would help to identify the gaps and the challenges faced by each member state in its implementation of norms of responsible state behavior. Singapore’s proposal for a checklist, as well as UNIDIR’s national implementation survey, would help this function. Once the gaps are identified, the POA should help fill in the gaps through coordinating and leveraging capacity-building programs conducted by various stakeholders. This kind of virtuous cycle, with the possible development of the normative framework itself, should be the main feature of an action-oriented POA. Mr. Chair, there are synergies between the POA and other proposals submitted to this OEWG. For example, Kenya’s proposal for a threat repository, India’s proposal for a global portal, the global POC directory, and Singapore’s proposal for a checklist could also contribute to the action-oriented nature of the POA, which could serve as an institutional envelope, as the French delegation has suggested. We would also like to reiterate that the POA should be inclusive, ensuring broad participation of member states and non-governmental stakeholders. We would also like to reiterate the importance of a multistakeholder approach. Finally, Mr. Chair, Japan would like to make utmost contributions to the discussion of the OEWG, including its dedicated sessions to discuss proposals on a regular institutional dialogue, including the POA, bearing in mind that the POA will serve as a hopeful format for the actual implementation of the agreed norms and principles of responsible state behavior. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Japan. Switzerland, to be followed by Sri Lanka.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. First, I would like to thank the Secretariat for the presentation on the Secretary-General’s report. Switzerland is pleased that the Programme of Action again has gained broad support with the adoption of Resolution 78-16. A large majority of 161 states voted in favor of the resolution and agreed to establish, upon the conclusion of the 2021-2025 Open-Ended Working Group, a permanent, inclusive, and action-oriented mechanism. The General Assembly has given us a clear mandate to do so. Switzerland believes that we should establish at the UN level the Programme of Action as a permanent, regular institutional dialogue aimed at supporting the implementation of the agreed framework for responsible behavior of states in cyberspace. The discussion yesterday and today about capacity building has shown that there is an urgent and great need for it. We agree with France that we do not start from scratch. Many elements are on the table. As part of these discussions, we can also consider Kenya’s proposal for a threat repository, India’s proposal for a global portal, as well as other proposals. As part of these discussions, we need to talk more in-depth about scope, structure, content, and modalities. Switzerland has presented some proposals in this context at previous meetings and in our submission to the report of the Secretary-General, for example, on annual meetings, technical working groups, review conferences, and decision-making. In the interest of time, I will not repeat them here. We are looking forward to discussing them in more depth at the next meetings of the Open-Ended Working Group. Mr. Chair, you asked what additional elements can be added to the list of consensus elements. Switzerland would like to underline the importance of inclusivity in this regard. This means, of course, that all states should be able to participate in the work of the POA. In addition, the POA should allow for meaningful and broad multistakeholder engagement. This is important as the multistakeholder community has a crucial role to play when it comes to supporting states’ efforts in implementing the framework, in particular, but not exclusively, in the field of capacity building. We support the elements that the UK delegation has mentioned in that regard. Among other things, stakeholders should be able to be present in the room and make statements and submit written proposals. Or to say it in your words, Mr. Chair, we have to bring in the stakeholder speak and have to see that as a win-win for us all. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Sri Lanka, to be followed by South Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman, as we navigate a landscape where information and communication technologies are indispensable to the functioning of our societies and economies, the OEWG ICT stands as a pivotal platform for international collaboration and policy development. We observe that the journey of the OEWG has been marked by continuous engagement and constructive proposals from Member States. Throughout the sessions, there has been a shared recognition of the importance of regular institutional dialogue in promoting responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs. The agreed-upon common elements for a future mechanism dedicated to regular institutional dialogue, such as being state-led, permanent, and under the United Nations umbrella, emphasize our commitment to fostering ongoing discussions. Sri Lanka observes that these elements act as key pillars that underscore the importance of an inclusive, transparent, and adaptive framework aligning with the principles of regular institutional dialogue and contributing to sustained collaboration on ICT-related matters within the United Nations context. Mr. Chairman, moving forward, the regular institutional dialogue emerges clearly as a pivotal platform for consensus building, particularly through the lens of public sector audit, inclusive of stakeholder engagement with regular institutional dialogue where it becomes instrumental in holding governments accountable for their commitments with a focus on enmissioning the government’s readiness for implementing agreed policies. Regional dialogue, Mr. Chairman, can significantly enhance accountability through constructive engagement, overcoming challenges such as bureaucratic procedures and delayed processes. To further enhance RID, we propose the integration of comprehensive strategies for implementation, strengthening inclusivity and consensus, and promoting integrated synergies for dialogue mechanisms. A unified document can clearly, I believe, articulate aligned strategies that can serve as a reference for all stakeholders, providing a comprehensive overview of the integrated approach. Mr. Chairman, in line with the theme of inclusivity, regional dialogue should adopt, we believe, a multifaceted approach. Initiatives must prioritize diverse representation, encompassing individuals from various backgrounds, cultures, and communities. Community forums and regional advisory councils can contribute, we say, to valuable insights, facilitating a holistic approach to decision-making. Recognizing linguistic diversity and ensuring accessibility are another essential component, as is active involvement of the youth and targeted outreach strategies for underrepresented groups. Sri Lanka advocates for the initiation of a comprehensive mapping project aimed at identifying and evaluating current cooperative initiatives. These projects are crucial, we believe, to operationalize the potential connections between the ICT threats, landscape, and existing initiatives. Through systematic monitoring, rigorous reporting, and thorough verification of the impacts, we can conduct impact assessments. This, in turn, will empower us to derive more effective solutions and identify common priorities that can guide our collective efforts in addressing challenges related to information and communications technology. Sri Lanka is of the view that interdisciplinary research collaboration, supported by international governance, will further enhance action agendas regionally and nationally. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the OEWG in the information and communication technology sector, through its commitment to regular institutional dialogue and the proposed enhancements to RID, stands, we believe, as a beacon for international collaboration in navigating the complexities of our digital age. Mr. Chairman, be assured of Sri Lanka’s support for this process. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Ambassador, for your statement. I give the floor now to South Africa, to be followed by Botswana.

Thank you, Chairperson. South Africa aligns with the statement delivered by Brazil on behalf of India, Brazil, and South Africa, my own country. South Africa would like to firstly express our full confidence in the Open-Ended Working Group process. This forum’s effectiveness has been typified by the adoption of successive Annual Progress Reports by consensus. On regular institutional dialogue, we would like to highlight that the second Annual Progress Report recommendations on this matter are aimed at elaborating common understandings on the most effective format for future regular institutional dialogue with the broad participation of States under the auspices of the United Nations. We should do our best to expand on these common understandings, which will assist in reaching the outcome we can all agree to on this matter at the end of this process. We are also pleased by the agreement in principle on common elements for regular institutional dialogue and the importance of the principle of consensus regarding both the establishment of the future mechanism as well as decision-making of the mechanism. Regarding the principle of regular institutional dialogue, South Africa reiterates the view that we should operate with inclusivity, transparency, sustainability, and in an objective-driven and results-based manner. Chairperson, consistent with the recommendations of the second Annual Progress Report, we believe that discussions in the OEWG should inform the basis of a Program of Action or any future institutional dialogue process. It should have the broadest possible support for it to be effective. We should use such a mechanism to address the concerns of developing countries as they build the ICT infrastructure and the needs of States that wish to update existing ICT infrastructure. South Africa believes that to ensure broad participation of all member States, we should avoid parallel processes on the issue of security of and in the use of ICTs and keep the discussion in a single open and inclusive track. It is also important that the integrity of the OEWG is preserved, and we should all guard against trying to address specific matters within the ambit of this working group through such specific resolutions or decisions that might prejudge any outcomes. The Open-Ended Working Group should be given every chance to succeed. Thank you.

Thank you, South Africa. Botswana, followed by Germany.

Thank you, Chair. Botswana welcomes the multi-state recognition for the need of regular institutional dialogue on security in the use of ICTs beyond the current OEWG. Botswana welcomes the adoption by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly of a resolution on the Cyber POA as a forum to broaden discussions that have been under the purview of the OEWG. The POA will enable states to further engage on existing and potential threats to support each other’s capacities and efforts to implement and advance commitments guided by the Framework for Responsible State Behavior. Botswana acknowledges the need for a future forum that is action-oriented and is a results-based process. It will be to Botswana’s delight if the POA is inclusive, where all states will participate and multistakeholder participation is guaranteed to enhance the discussions. It is essential that any proposed regular institutional dialogue has a multistakeholder approach and that without the inclusion of multistakeholders, regular institutional dialogue will be incomplete. The participation of stakeholders in issues dealing with security in cyberspace is anchored in our own national cybersecurity strategy, which emphasizes the need for all stakeholders to be involved in the cybersecurity of the country. The POA should prioritize capacity building for both member states and stakeholders and should play a key role in coordinating capacity building and providing for resource mobilization to enable the successful implementation of existing norms for all states. However, this should not be the only function of the POA, but it should facilitate efforts of existing mechanisms without duplicating efforts. Botswana further supports a POA that encourages gender mainstreaming in its language and the implementation of the existing norms by states and supports gender-sensitive capacity building. To ensure that the POA is working well, there is a need for the periodical review and monitoring of the progress made in the implementation of the POA as well as what the POA will be working on in the future. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Botswana. Germany, to be followed by Kenya.

Thank you, Chair. Please allow me to briefly respond to some of the statements that have been made during the session. First of all, it has been truly overwhelming this week to see the great interest in capacity building. With more than 60 speakers, this is easily the topic that generates by far the most attention and that mobilizes more states to speak out than any other issue on our agenda. We need to respond to that as we think about the focus of regular institutional dialogue. Cyber capacity building clearly needs to take center stage when we think about this. We have also heard repeated calls for a strengthened institutional role of the United Nations. Antigua echoed the interests of many states this morning when it said that the UN is to play a stronger role in providing access to cyber capacity building at the global level. The Program of Action (PUA) as an action-based mechanism will answer to both priorities. However, the PUA is not the only suggestion on our table. In spite of all the votes this proposal got in the General Assembly, there is the idea of a portal. And it was great to learn so much more about this concept from the excellent presentation that India gave us yesterday. The PUA will need a portal. It will need to be accessible online. And all the elements that were mentioned by India yesterday are elements that will have to play a key role in the future PUA. So how can we bring these initiatives together in a sensible way? To my delegation, this is a very realistic option. There is also the idea of a repository of cyber threats put forward by Kenya. And that merits closer consideration in view of implementing the future mechanism. There is also a clear need for more dialogue on recurring items. Germany agrees with Russia that this open-ended working group (OEWG) has proven to be a good forum. We need space to continue these discussions. The PUA is going to provide this space. It will be action-based, but it will also have annual meetings that will allow all of us to address those recurring issues like threats, international law, and development of norms that we want to discuss. At the same time, Germany would like to invite Russia and the group of states supporting Russia’s proposal to consider what it would mean to make this open-ended working group truly open-ended, turning it into a permanent mechanism as has just been proposed by Russia. As diplomats, we have the privilege of going through regular rotation. But just imagine for a second we didn’t. How many delegates in this room would want to stick to this open-ended working group till the end of their career? It’s just after six o’clock and the room has gotten empty. How much popularity would a truly permanent mechanism have? Has anyone consulted the chair and his team if they want to stick with this forever? These are important issues to consider when we think of establishing a permanent working group. It is also my sense that while we have excellent discussions here at this open-ended working group, these discussions are held in the spirit and with the expectation of delivering concrete results that translate into action. And this action is not here on First Avenue, it’s in Antigua and it’s in Djibouti and it’s in all those countries that have the ambition to meet basic cyber security needs. So in the spirit of the Russian proposal, I think the Russian proposal can easily be accommodated by the PUA in spirit as the PUA will be a forum for dialogue. But having a forum for dialogue like this open-ended working group is not enough. I think this is clear after all the statements and all the calls for action that we have had. In closing, allow me to say that in Germany’s view, the PUA is the only truly inclusive proposal on the table and that it answers to all expectations that have been expressed. It will promote capacity building, other action-oriented elements, and it will provide a forum for ongoing dialogue. It will also strengthen the UN’s institutional role. And all this in a truly open-source way as has been underlined by my French colleague. I share China’s optimism that convergence with the other proposals on our table is possible. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Germany. I give the floor now to Kenya, to be followed by Slovakia.

Thank you, Chair. The Open-Ended Working Group has continued to offer states an equitable and inclusive platform to meet and exchange views on security of and in the use of ICTs. Future institutional dialogue should, in the same vein as the OEWG, be designed in line with the principles of equitable, inclusive, and effective participation of states, and should build on what we have already done within the OEWG with the aim of bridging the digital divide. Care should be taken to ensure that there is unity of purpose and members’ efforts and energies are not fragmented in multiple processes running concurrently. Regular institutional dialogue should also factor in partnerships with various stakeholders, including regional and sub-regional organizations, who are critical in enhancing awareness and contextualized understanding within our regular institutional dialogues here in New York. I affirm Kenya’s continued constructive engagement to contribute to enhanced global efforts, legal framework norms that will promote a free, peaceful, and stable cyber domain, and at the same time cooperatively work to mitigate the existing and potential threats. I conclude by thanking you, Chair, your team, and all participants in yet another productive OEWG session. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Kenya. Slovakia, to be followed by Poland.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Slovakia aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier by the European Union, France, and other co-sponsors of the Program of Action. Nevertheless, Slovakia wishes to make its own contribution in the form of the following comments. Slovakia appreciates the pragmatic and action-oriented approach of the existing Open-Ended Working Group, as well as the joint efforts to ensure that acquis remains a cornerstone of global cyberspace and digital development. The General Assembly, for the second consecutive year, adopted resolution 7816 on the Program of Action to advance responsible state behavior on the use of ICT. While the resolution was adopted with 161 votes in favor, it’s equally important to mention that this, in many ways, key resolution was co-sponsored by a trans-regional group of 67 states. Without a doubt, and as repeatedly reiterated by a vast majority of states present here today, the ongoing Open-Ended Working Group offers a valuable platform to elaborate on the responsible use of ICT and enables a constructive exchange of views on the topic of regular institutional dialogue. The resolution from this November acknowledged this and relied on the Open-Ended Working Group to define the substance and modalities of the future mechanism. With regards to the guiding questions for this session, and having listened carefully to all interventions during these past five days, it’s clearly desirable to find common ground on the form of regular institutional dialogue that shall be action-oriented and results-based. One that will be inclusive, transparent, and consensus-driven while supporting states in their implementation of the normative framework to the largest possible extent. An example of the sought inclusiveness is the possible incorporation of several existing proposals, such as but not limited to Kenya’s proposal for the threat repository and the already agreed global POC directory. The participating states have made a big step forward in the UN First Committee since 2004. The UN processes on the peaceful use of information and communication technologies are in a stronger place thanks to the process. The focus should now turn to the implementation part. As a co-sponsor of the Program of Action, Slovakia believes that the POA is best suited to aid participating states in this endeavor. Finally, the overwhelming support of the UN member states for the recent resolution serves as a testament to the desire to establish the Program of Action under the auspices of the United Nations after the end of the current OEWG. As such, now is the time to begin substantive discussions on the topic and utilize the latter half of the OEWG mandate to operate this mechanism. Mr. Chair, we are not starting from scratch, but we are nowhere near the finish line either. Therefore, Slovakia appreciates the work carried out by your team and the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs and would like to offer our maximum support and cooperation moving forward. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Slovakia. Poland is the last speaker.

Thank you very much. I like being last because I read in the Bible this is a good thing to be the last here. But I also promise to you that I will be very concise and short. That’s why I’m not going to repeat a lot of good proposals that were made by a number of countries. They were mentioned also by my previous speakers, including recently by Germany, whose line of thinking I also share. Thank you, John. So what I want to say is that on Tuesday, when we discussed norms here, I said that rather than fueling discussions on how to expand the next sets of norms, we shall focus on implementations of what we have already agreed upon in the context of the United Nations. And I was also saying that to implement these norms, each and every country needs three elements: political will, the legal framework, and last but not least, resources and abilities as instruments of these norms’ implementation. So many countries, in fact, are lacking such instruments of implementation of norms. The whole purpose of this exercise that we are participating in here is that we should be increasing the level of safety and security in cyberspace for all of us and for each of us. To achieve this purpose, we have to work together and help each other. To make it possible, we need trust and we need to share our expertise, our resources, and our best practices. Therefore, we are focusing our efforts on CBMs and on capacity building. But to achieve sizable and lasting results, we need patience and determination. So eventually, we need to agree on a permanent platform to continue our efforts. Such a permanent platform must be inclusive and action-oriented. In July, on the last day of the negotiations of the annual progress report, when you proposed the draft, Chairman, I said that sadly, probably, ideals do not exist in the world. So we all need to agree on something which is compromised but the closest possible to the ideal compromise. And when it comes to the future permanent structure, the Program of Action as presented, as developed, and as accepted in the form of resolutions by a huge majority of states here is perhaps not ideal but is the best achievable project on which we shall focus our work in the time remaining for us within the framework of this existing open-ended working group. Finally, I want to share my optimism when it comes to the assessment of the works and the process of our group here. My spirit is growing when I witness and enjoy the increasing engagement of the bigger and bigger number of states coming from all different parts of the world and offering a whole range of concrete and sensible proposals and solutions. This is really something noticeable and many of us will discuss it during the coffee breaks. As a result, I’m convinced that with the efforts of all of us and under the skillful guidance of you, Chair, and your team, we have good chances to achieve, finally, within the remaining time of this working group, solid results. Solid results in the form of a well-prepared permanent Program of Action as the only sensible, long-lasting solution to deal with the threats that come from cyberspace for all of us, small and big, from this part or the other part of the world. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Poland, who was the last speaker. I’m very conscious of the time, so I’m not going to do a very lengthy reflection or summary, but I would echo the views expressed by many of you, that this discussion on regular institutional dialogue has been very, very substantive. I think our colleague from France this morning said that it’s time to start substantive discussions, or something to that effect. And I had said in the afternoon that we had started discussions, in fact, two years ago. But I sense a certain commitment, I sense a certain dedication, and I sense also signs of a potential pathway to convergence on this very important issue. It’s very clear that all of you are committed to discussing this within the OEWG. It’s also clear all of you are committed to working towards consensus. And that, I think, gives us a very good basis for our work at the next session, but also in the inter-sessional period. I don’t want to go into a lengthy, detailed summary, but what I would say is that we have, I think, a lifetime, or once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, to design the institutional architecture, the multilateral institutional architecture in the domain of ICT. And this must be something that builds on decades of work. So we have a responsibility to build on the foundations we have of previous GGEs, OEWG, previous resolutions, previous annual progress reports. And we need to take that in a seamless way into the future. And this discussion is not just about institutional discussions. How do you design an institution? It is fundamentally about preserving the framework of rules, norms, and principles, implementing the framework of rules, norms, and principles, and evolving the framework of rules, norms, and principles, and adding additional layers and guidance and understanding to the rules, norms, and principles. And therefore, the institutional architecture is closely related to the very substance of this process, which is ICT security. That makes it all the more important that we need to build consensus on the institutional arrangements because if we do not have a seamless transition or if we do not have a single track mechanism for the future, then I think we put at risk not just the risk of having parallel processes, which is an institutional problem, but we also put at risk all the work that has been done cumulatively over the last two decades. So I just wanted to underline the point, and my sense is that all of you understand that, which is why I sense a commitment to working towards consensus. I see many potential elements for convergence, and so it is my intention to see how we can further expand the common elements in the Second Annual Progress Report and build on it. So I’ll give some thought to preparing some additional elements for discussions in the form of a non-paper from a chair so that we continue the discussions, we go deeper into the scope, structure, and relationship between the OEWG and POA. But I would also say that a rose by any other name would smell just as sweet. So let’s not be fixated by what we are going to call this beloved sweet-smelling flower of ours. Let’s just focus on doing what needs to be done. Let’s focus on the common elements that bring us together, and I think there are many. Capacity building was an issue that also came up in the context of the institutional dialogue and future mechanism, because if you don’t have a future mechanism, then you don’t have the means through which to deliver, coordinate capacity building programs, and exchange information on capacity building programs. So like all the issues in the mandate of the working group, everything is related to everything else. But I think it is possible for us to make progress and make progress towards convergence. Some of you said one track with two pillars. Another person said one track with two parts. Some said implementation and development, norms development. But essentially and conceptually, I think there is potential for convergence. So that gives me a lot of hope and confidence that we can take another step forward gradually as we head towards the March session and then the July session. I think another point to keep in mind is that we are trying to create this in a way that itself creates and builds confidence, because the way we decide on a mechanism will itself be a test of the levels of trust and levels of confidence we have. And that’s why it’s important to do it within the OEWG. And there are other options to establish a mechanism, because if you go to the first committee, you can legislate it, you can happen it. But I’m not the chair of the first committee, so I’m not going to go there. But what I can do as chair of the OEWG is work with all of you to see how we can create this future mechanism and launch it in a way that will itself create and enhance levels of trust. Because as we conclude the work in 2025 and begin the transition to a new mechanism, that transition must be in the context of trust and a certain level of satisfaction that this belongs to all of us. And that will only come about if we find elements of convergence. As I said, there are other options to legislate and decree the birth of a new process. I have seen so many of them, and you would have seen some of them too in the first committee. Parallel processes being established for the same domain, it’s possible, absolutely possible. But the question is how can we avoid a scenario where we end up in a situation where confidence is eroded, the levels of trust that we have built over the last two years, but also before gets eroded by the act of creating a new mechanism. So the act of creating a new mechanism must itself enhance the trust, which is why I think it’s worthwhile for us to do our best to find common ground and build consensus. And I want to end with an optimistic note. I want to say that it’s achievable, it’s possible to reach a consensus agreement in the OEWG on a future mechanism. But that will require all of you to demonstrate flexibility. That will require all of us to focus on the elements that bring us together. And if there are elements that we can’t decide, let’s leave that aside for the moment and continue focusing on other elements, common elements. And if we grow the list of common elements, then that could also create more confidence and more flexibility, hopefully, for us to go towards almost designing all the elements of a future mechanism. So this has been a very good discussion. I want to thank all of you. For those who are staying here, even though it’s past 6:30, I’ve told the Secretariat you will get extra credit points. You get an A++. I don’t want to abuse your time, but I want to go through very quickly the remaining agenda items, which is any other matters, before I make some final concluding comments. So under any other matters, I understand Australia would like to take the floor. So Australia, you have the floor, please.

Thank you very much, Chair and colleagues. I do not want to stand between everyone and your weekends, but I would like to provide an additional reason to celebrate our work here this week. As many of you who’ve been around for a while know, my wonderful delegation behind me, and also our wonderful Secretariat, Catherine Priesman, pays very close attention at each of our sessions, not only to what we are talking about, but also to who is talking. The data shows that the international agreements that we make last longer and are better implemented when we have women at the negotiation table. And while gender diversity in First Committee discussions and forums does leave a lot of room for improvement, UNIDIR data shows that in First Committee debates, only 27% of speakers are women. We’ve done much, much better in our OEWG. From our first session in December 2021, when we had 37%, to our session in July, last July in 2023, where we increased it up to 48% of speakers in the session being women. But this week, I’m so excited because for the first time ever in this OEWG, we have had on each and every single agenda item and every pillar of our framework, over 50% of interventions made by women speakers. And this has gone to or above 60% on two of those, international law and capacity building. And of all the interventions made this week in our formal session over the last five days, women speakers made up 55% of all interventions. So congratulations. I hope everyone has time to celebrate this historic and momentous achievement and we all go forth and break more glass ceilings. Thank you, Chair. [APPLAUSE]

Thank you very much, Australia. No, I want to echo what you said, and I want to thank Australia and the group of countries who have made this possible through the Women in Cyber Fellows Program. And I think this week we have seen through the overwhelming number of speakers for every agenda item that the participation of women has been very, very active. And I also want to thank all the women representatives here. Thank you very much, and I think in that sense we should continue to do better, continue to work harder, because I think the role of women in peace and security and ICT security is absolutely important. So thank you for your work, and thank you, Australia, for being our auditor or conscience event on the issue of gender participation and mainstreaming in our process. So I’d like to now, there are no other speakers, move on to the last item in the program of work, which is concluding remarks from the Chair. And frankly, I don’t have much to add, but just to say that this week has been intense and, as one of you put it, overwhelming, but in a positive way because it shows that there are a lot of ideas and commonalities on the table. Second, as I said earlier, I’m beginning to see glimmers of convergence and commonalities across the different clusters, and I think this creates a certain momentum as we go into the March session. And as I also said earlier in the week, I’ll give some thought to organizing and sequencing our meetings such that when we come back in March for the substantive session, we should build on the discussion we’ve had at this session. We should see how we can concretize some of the points and proposals and ideas that have been put forward and then begin to see how we can put things together. And in that respect, I would also give some thought to see how I can contribute to the process by preparing non-papers where such a non-paper might facilitate a focused discussion in order for us to go further. I’ll also give some thought to preparing elements for further discussion for certain chapters and ideas for discussion for certain chapters, all with a view to building on the discussion we’ve had this week and taking small steps forward towards March, but also more importantly in July. I think it is really important that we, in July 2024, work towards another annual progress report, of course to be adopted by consensus. That is going to be the minimum expectation on the international community. We cannot take that for granted, so we have to work hard. But in that consensus third annual progress report, which I hope we will be able to adopt in July, we must make some small steps forward. And I think it’s important that small, concrete, pragmatic steps, not only do they build confidence, but they can also enable ambition by leading to other options and other possibilities subsequently. So we must continue the incremental step, and we must continue to put together some elements that we can agree on in July, because otherwise we will backload everything to the next cycle and then we will not be in a position to deal with the many, many issues we need to deal with. The other point that I wanted to make is that the dedicated session is in some ways an opportunity for us to go deeper, you know, because to bring in the experts and stakeholders. So it is my intention also to shortly send out a letter asking states to invite, to nominate, invite you to nominate experts that we can consider inviting for the dedicated sessions. Because the dedicated sessions, which are mandated, also require the participation of experts in an equitable, geographically equitable manner. And we don’t want experts from one region; we want experts from every part of the world. And therefore, I think it is good that we have nominations of experts, and you know I will send out a note shortly to this effect. We may not be able to invite every expert you nominate because then we may have 500 experts, for example, but at least we begin to have a list that we can use and tap to invite to our process from different regions who can then contribute to the process. So I think the dedicated session can also be very helpful. There are so many other things that I thought I could say, but I will not abuse your generosity and your patience. So I just want to end by saying I want to wish all of you a very, very happy holiday season. For those of you who celebrate Christmas or Orthodox Christmas or other religious festivals during this time, I wish you good health and all the best to your family. And those of you who have traveled from far, far away capitals, I wish you a good flight home. And once again, my gratitude to all of you for your hard work, for your dedication, and for your sense of collective commitment, which I think has been very palpable this week. And that gives me a lot of encouragement, a lot of energy, and a lot of optimism to remain committed to this process, to do whatever I can to take us to where we need to go in July 2025, which is to have a consensus report that will bring us seamlessly into the future with the spirit of consensus intact. So on that note, I wish you all happy holidays. I also thank the Secretariat for their patience and support and to members of my team. So the meeting is adjourned, and have a pleasant evening. Thank you.