Session 8-6 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

Good morning, Distinguished Delegates. The 6th meeting of the 8th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs is now called to order. Distinguished Delegates, we will now continue our discussion under agenda item 5. Under the program of work, we are to begin a second round of consideration of the 3rd Annual Progress Report. In this regard, please allow me to make some opening remarks before I open the floor. First of all, I sent out a letter yesterday evening, and I apologize that the letter and the document that came with that letter took a little longer than I had anticipated. In that letter, I had attached the final draft of the 3rd Annual Progress Report, together with the relevant annexes. So, it is my intention this morning to give you some of my thoughts on the 3rd Annual Progress Report final draft that circulated yesterday evening. I know that delegations are probably still in the process of internal coordination and consultations, possibly within groups as well. I understand that. But I also want to convene this meeting so that I could give you some of my thoughts and reflections and also hear preliminary reactions from delegations in a position to offer them. Then we’ll spend the rest of the day going through a second round of consideration of the drafting of the 3rd Annual Progress Report. The first thing I want to say is that the last few days have been very, very intense for all of us. It has been probably the most intense negotiations we have had in this working group since we began our work in June 2021. There were so many speakers, delegations taking the floor to put forward very concrete proposals, ideas, and suggestions. That was very gratifying because it is a sign of increased engagement. It is a sign of deep commitment to this process and to the success of this process. It is a sign of ownership, a sign of collective ownership that this process belongs to everyone, belongs to no one delegation, no one group of delegations, but it belongs to every single delegation. And that, Distinguished Delegates, is the true spirit of multilateralism and the true spirit of the United Nations. So that was very gratifying. But nevertheless, it was very intense and probably the most intense it has been over the last four years. That made it very challenging for me as the chair to prepare the revised version of the 3rd Annual Progress Report. That’s the reason why it took longer than I had anticipated, because I had to agonize over some of the changes, the additions, the deletions, the modifications, the adjustments that I had to make. The Annual Progress Report final draft, I think the changes are self-explanatory in many ways. So I do not intend to explain them section by section or paragraph by paragraph. That would take too long. And I do not also, in explaining it, omit any particular issue and thereby create the impression that I did not attach importance to this or that issue. So I would leave the Annual Progress Report as contained in the final draft version dated 10 July to each one of you to reflect and look at it very carefully. But I want to address the section on regular institutional dialogue in the Annual Progress Report, which is the section that has been the most challenging for us collectively and also for me as the chair to find a pathway forward. In this regard, I think we have a historic and unique opportunity to shape a future permanent mechanism that will build on all the work that has been done and take the process forward. The good news is that all of us agree that it is to be a single-track, state-led, permanent mechanism. It seems to me that all of us also want to make a seamless transition to the new permanent mechanism. So in other words, single-track and seamless transition. Because we can have a single track, but if you don’t have a seamless transition to the new mechanism, there is the risk of discontinuity and disruption to the work that we have done and the framework that we have built over the last 25 years. Now, the good news is that we all agree that it should be single-track. If the future permanent mechanism is to be single-track, how do we get to a single track? Please ask yourself this question. If we want to make a transition to a single-track future permanent mechanism, we need a single set of elements on regular institutional dialogue. So, single-track future permanent mechanism implies logically that we need a single set of elements. Where do we produce this single set of elements? That’s a fair question. Here, too, the good news is that all of you agree that the single set of elements should be discussed and produced within the OEWG. So, that is also an element of convergence already, and that’s significant. Then, the next question is what exactly constitutes the single set of elements we need to make the seamless transition to a single-track process? That exactly is the conundrum. Because within this working group, and even beyond this working group, in the first committee, the debate on a future permanent mechanism has gone on for many years, and there are different visions, different descriptions, different elements of what should constitute a future permanent mechanism. But if we want a single-track, and if we agree that we want to work on those elements in the Open-Ended Working Group, then we need to reach consensus. That is precisely why the annex on the future permanent mechanism, Annex C, particularly paragraph 9 in Annex C, is lengthy. It is lengthy precisely because it is an attempt to bridge different positions, different visions, different desires, different preferences, to create a future permanent mechanism. As we create this future permanent mechanism, it is really important that we give everyone a sense of ownership. So, paragraph 9 is lengthy also because it is an attempt to give everyone a sense of ownership. If I had taken, for example, the different proposals submitted by different delegations or different groups of delegations, it would have been a much shorter paragraph. It would have been a much shorter paragraph with fewer commas and semicolons, but it would have been seen to be reflecting the views of one or one group of states. That will not create a sense of ownership, which is needed to create a sense of convergence, which is needed to create consensus. So, I wanted to explain why some of the paragraphs, not just in Annex C, but also in the Annual Progress Report, the final draft itself, may be lengthy or may be inelegant. Well, the first reason is that English is not my mother tongue. So, I’m still on a learning journey. I’ve yet to master the intricacies of this beautiful language. But the second reason is that it is an attempt to bridge differences. It is an attempt to give everyone a sense of ownership. Now, over the last few days, I think many of you have shown signals of genuine flexibility. So, I want to express my gratitude for that, because in this process where positions are quite entrenched, I have seen signals of flexibility from all sides. But of course, each side thinks that others are not as flexible. But I can tell you, I see constructive engagement and flexibility from all sides, and I want to express my gratitude for that. My clear sense after a few days of intense discussion is that there is a pathway to have consensus. But it is the narrowest of pathways we have ever had in this process. It’s really narrow, with deep cliffs on both sides, but there is a way to cross the divide. Precisely because the path forward is the narrowest, we also need the maximum demonstration of flexibility from everyone. So, I want to express my gratitude for that. The APR, the final draft, plus the annexes, Annex C in particular, is a reflection of the very fragile balance of different elements. My appeal to delegations is that please look beyond the sentences, please look beyond the paragraphs, please look beyond the sections, please look at the document in its entirety, please look at the woods and not the trees, and look at the overall balance, and look at how this balance, if adopted this week, would allow everyone to take this narrow path forward. I also want to say that giving everyone a sense of ownership is part of building trust. We often say that the OEWG is in itself a confidence-building measure, and it’s important that we build that trust by giving everyone a sense of ownership. No single idea is superior to another idea. Every proposal, textual suggestion made, has its merit. I’ve done my best to look at all of them, and to see how we can put them together. In the process, it may look like a patchwork, but if it brings everyone together, if it allows us to move forward, then that in itself can be quite valuable. I also think that this final draft progress report keeps the door open for all your positions, so that the discussions can continue, will continue next year, and possibly beyond into the future permanent mechanism. I also want to say that creating the future permanent mechanism is fundamentally about creating a sense of ownership, a sense of trust. You can have the most beautiful mandate, you can have the most elegantly drafted paragraph and mandate, but if there’s a lack of political will, and if there is a lack of trust, the mechanism will not be able to function smoothly. But if there is political will, and a sufficient level of trust, then the future mechanism, in spite of the inelegant drafting of the annual progress report, can make concrete progress. As you reflect on this annual progress report, look back at the process over the last few years, and look back at the distance we have traveled collectively. I think that was a message that Under-Secretary-General Izumi Nakamitsu mentioned on the very first day. So, my friends, the document that is before you is what it is. I don’t intend to go on trying to persuade you, because you have a sovereign right to look at it. You understand the broader political and geopolitical context in which this working group operates. You understand very well, I believe, the risks of discontinuity, the risk and uncertainty that will be created if we are not able to agree on a substantial set of elements for the future permanent mechanism. I think all of you understand the risks very well. But if we are serious about making the transition to a single-track future permanent mechanism, that transition must begin this week. It must begin tomorrow as we leave and conclude our work. So, a very strong commitment to the future permanent mechanism and conclude our work. So, a very strong signal of collective commitment to make that transition to a future permanent mechanism will be positive, not only for our work for next year, but also will have positive reverberations in the first committee. This, in turn, will set up the future permanent mechanism for success. If, on the other hand, we are unable to get to where we need to go or take a step forward, the uncertainty will increase, the risk of a double-track approach increases, the risk of disrupting a seamless transition increases, there will be some erosion of trust as well, and all of these in a very, very challenging geopolitical context. The last thing I want to say in terms of procedure is that we are now Thursday. We have one day left. So, my intention is to spend the rest of the day listening to reactions and feedback on the final draft. Given that tomorrow is the last day, it is my intention to circulate the final draft as a conference room paper by this evening. This will allow delegations to send it back to capitals for final instructions, to take decisions, sovereign decisions, as may be required. So, it is important that I give everyone that opportunity to send back a conference room paper, which will be made available this evening. Tomorrow morning, it is my intention to begin the meeting by putting forward that conference room paper up for adoption. Tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. when we meet. I think there was a sense that we should do our best to conclude the work on Friday. So, it is my intention to put the conference room paper for adoption tomorrow morning. So, that, my friends, is the timeline. We still have a day this morning and this afternoon. I will listen very carefully to your feedback. If we can make some improvements that will allow us to make the collective step forward, you need to persuade each other as well, because it may be very tempting to add, delete, subtract. But it is important that we do not upset the apple cart. This reminds me of the game called Jenga, where you stack the different blocks vertically. Often, the most innocuous element right in the middle of the block, when you pull it out, leads to the collapse of the entire tower. So, what may seem innocuous as a minor piece in the architecture or in the draft may disrupt the balance and require additions or further deletions. So, if you are thinking of further additions, your addition may require even more additions to create that balance. Likewise, subtractions could require further subtractions or further additions. So, we may enter the domain of algebraic equations, and I am not a mathematician at all. So, I just want to make that point. But, as always, I am at your service. This is not my project or my outcome. This is your project. This is going to be your outcome. So, this morning, I will continue to listen very carefully. If you have any advice, I need your advice. If you have any suggestions, please say so. But, I also want to say that, as we enter this final process, I am absolutely committed to a transparent, open, inclusive process. I will also invite all delegations to express their views publicly, because it’s important to me that we have an open, inclusive process. So, if you have any questions, invite all delegations to express their views publicly, because it’s important that each one of you understand what others are saying. If you like something, say so, and share it with everyone. If you don’t like something, say so, and explain why. So, that too is part of the process of creating a sense of ownership, creating a sense of trust, creating a sense of confidence, and building convergence and consensus. So, my friends, those are some of the opening remarks I wanted to make. With that, the floor is open. I will now sit back and relax and listen to you. I’ll be all ears, and so will the members of my team. The floor is open. Qatar, I see you’re asking for the floor. Please. Thank you.

Mr. President, I would like to thank you for your chairmanship of this working group. We reiterate our confidence in your full leadership to achieve the results, the goals that we have set ourselves, and we’d like to thank the Secretariat for this second draft of the report. It’s an important step forward as we approach the end of the work of this working group. I’d like to refer to Part B with regard to existing and emerging threats, potential threats. We’ve said in the past that these security threats should be discussed, particularly in the light of digital developments. We think that this is an important step to bring points of view together with regard to what these existing and potential threats are, and which keep changing day by day. Therefore, we need to benefit from this forum, not just to discuss existing and potential threats, but to see the most appropriate ways that we can confront them with regard to the initiatives that we’ve been discussing. That is also mentioned in the recommendations in points 29 and 30. Chair, with regard to the norms and rules for responsible behaviour, we see that the list of non-binding rules would make it possible to have a discussion and move from theory to practice, and we hope to see discussions there continue, because this is really the cornerstone of the permanent mechanism and of the progress that’s been made up until now. We also agree with 31K. We think that these rules, if they are developed, do not mean that current rules will not be implemented. That’s also something that we can discuss during negotiations. Then 31C, we agree with what’s been said with regard to the protection of vital infrastructure, particularly through national measures, but also the link with F and J, which refer to the role of the private sector, particularly G, in order to protect the supply chain. With regard to confidence-building measures, we believe that the contact points, as was announced last month, is a good result, and we encourage other states to participate in this network, in particular to implement the Program of Action. We also agree with 42A. We think that confidence-building measures are essential to strengthen this confidence between member states. This, we feel, has a direct link to other things that have been mentioned with regard to responsible behavior of states in the digital sphere. In point F, there’s also the proposal with regard to national views, particularly the technical ICT terms, and that we need to arrive at definitions. With regard to capacity-building, we are very grateful for the round table that was held on the 10th of May, because that was a high-level forum to share national, regional, and international experience with regard to digital experience, and we feel that those kinds of meetings should be held on a regular basis in the future, as mentioned there in that paragraph. We also – 51. We also welcome the international platform. We think that those kinds of proposals are good ones, and it should be possible to merge together these initiatives. Then 50B. Well, there won’t be one solution that fits all, because the capacity of countries varies to a significant extent. That has to be taken into account and tried to bridge the digital divide between states. This third draft reflects the progress that has been made up until now, and we need to continue to bring about greater convergence, working in earnest. My country, Qatar, will continue to share its best practices and will do everything possible to ensure that we achieve the goals. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Qatar, for your contribution. The floor is open. I’m not adjourning the meeting, so I’m sitting here until someone speaks. So if you want an early coffee break, you’re not going to have one. Republic of Korea, please.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. Before moving on to the details, we commend the efforts of the Chair and the team who worked late into the night to prepare the second revision of the APR. We sincerely hope that everyone leaves New York with a copy of an APR approved by the group with consensus. Regarding the threat section, the Republic of Korea would like to propose a small but integral change in paragraph 20. Amending “the financing of malicious ICT activity” in the last sentence to “financing of malicious activities.” Funds illegally obtained through cryptocurrency theft have been reported to be used to support terrorist activities and nuclear and WMD development, among others. We believe that it is crucial that the APR illustrates the link between the cause, the cryptocurrency theft, and the effect, the impact on international peace and security. That is why we are proposing to make the link more inclusive to accurately portray reality. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Republic of Korea. El Salvador, to be followed by Uruguay.

Chair, the delegation of El Salvador would like to thank you for your efforts in producing the final draft. We are very happy to see many of the suggestions that we made during all of the formal sessions and informal sessions of the group reflected in this latest version. Also, we’d like to reiterate our commitment that this report should be able to be adopted by consensus as mandated by Resolution 240. There are elements that we could further work on. In paragraph 17, for example, we would prefer a reference to humanitarian organizations rather than aid organizations in order to be coherent with other United Nations fora. My delegation is aware that we have a year of work before us to continue to work on common understanding in all areas of the mandate. Therefore, in a constructive spirit, we are prepared to adopt the Chair’s report in its current format, and we hope that other delegations will be able to join us. Thank you very much, Chair, for all of your efforts and your team and the Secretariat.

Thank you very much, El Salvador, for your comments and support. Uruguay, to be followed by Iraq.

Thank you very much, Chair. Well, firstly, we’d like to thank your efforts to provide us with a new revised version of the Annual Progress Report. We very much appreciate that many of our proposals have been included in the new draft, although others we note have been left aside. That being said, and at this stage in the week, we feel that all delegations need to make a big effort to achieve the consensus that we all long for. A couple of specific things. In paragraph 7, we see that demand-driven was added with regard to capacity building. We think that the previous wording was more adequate because it doesn’t limit capacity building to demand. In the same paragraph, we’re happy to see the effort to recognize the digital divide, which is a reality in an international context. With regard to existing and potential threats, we are happy to see the reference to ransomware in paragraph 20. Chair, with regard to institutional dialogue, that section, we’re happy to see the importance of a single mechanism for the future as part of a permanent framework. And we’re happy to see the inclusion of paragraph 57, which mentions the initiatives of the Roundtable on Capacity Building as relevant input for the future. Here, we support the inclusion of paragraphs 58 and 59. Each of them refers to the importance of what’s been done and the need to discuss the future permanent mechanism within this working group. In that regard, we’d like to suggest that we use the next intersessional period to dedicate that fully to studying this issue, with the advantage of not having too much on the agenda. And if the plenary thinks it would be appropriate, we could perhaps include these proposals in the recommendations under this section of the annual progress report. We think that an exclusive one-week session on the permanent mechanism would give us the opportunity to go further into detail with regard to what’s proposed in Annex C, which we think is an excellent basis. The hybrid format is what we would suggest so that our technicians, experts in capital, can also take part. We also agree with paragraph 10 of that annex, and we also reaffirm that the generation of capacity building should play an essential role in the future permanent mechanism. Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you very much, Uruguay, for those suggestions and for your comments and contribution. I see that you are suggesting a dedicated inter-sessional meeting for the next session devoted to the question of regular institutional dialogue. I take note of that, but I would also welcome comments and reactions from others. I give the floor now to Iraq, to be followed by Senegal.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I switch to Arabic. Mr. Chair, at the outset, we would like to thank you and all those who have contributed to working on this draft APR, which was distributed yesterday, and the amendments therein. To make the work of this team a success through having objective discussions that are productive in order to benefit the expertise of different member states to reach effective steps to deal with cyber threats, we are working on showing necessary flexibility to reach an outcome document that has consensus, maintains state sovereignty, and is built on trust and exchange of expertise to have a safe cyberspace. So we have the following comments to make on the draft APR. With regards to the overview, we support what came in paragraph 10 regarding the promotion of narrowing the gender digital divide and promoting the equal participation of women in decision-making processes related to ICT security. We seek to promote this through an initiative that we have launched regarding Women in Cyber Fellows. We also support capacity building for women in paragraph 25 to protect them from the adverse use of technology. We have started working on programs to raise awareness among women as part of a national program. We also support paragraph 9 regarding the role of regional organizations and the cross-regional cooperation initiatives and their role in increasing cooperation and trust building. Regarding existing and potential threats, and geopolitical challenges in ICT security, we welcome paragraph 13. Iraq has suffered many challenges in this field. The current geopolitical environment is a major challenge, and there are increased concerns regarding the malicious use by non-government factors of this ICT. Malicious ICT activities affect international peace and security, including interference in political and electoral processes and the targeting of the CII. We have also noted that terrorist groups are using non-commercially available technology. Using ICT in conflicts and malicious activities by non-governmental actors, including terrorists and criminal groups, is an increasing concern for us. The increase in malicious ICT use, which targets many sectors, has very adverse effects, and the exploitation of vulnerabilities in ICT products and the use of hidden strengths in ICT is a serious threat to international peace and security. However, we do not support the use of this principle to affect the state’s abilities to access the latest ICT to protect state infrastructure and to use it to protect citizens by law enforcement parties and its import by stakeholders who are working with the state to protect state security. Therefore, we propose adding some text between 20 and 21 that supports unconditional access to technology by states, especially developing countries. As for next steps in this paragraph, we propose in paragraph 29 adding capacity building in AI and its threats and the ability to take advantage of it in creating a safe cyber environment that enables states, individuals, and institutions to achieve their safe technological ambitions. As for rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior, we see that paragraph A and I in paragraph 31 talk about very similar concepts, and therefore we propose merging them. As for 31A, while we support keeping the road open as in General Assembly Resolution 75-40 regarding setting new rules and principles because cyberspace is constantly developing and there are new risks and challenges that appear all the time, such as those related to quantum computing and artificial intelligence, we emphasize the need to urgently begin the voluntary application of the current norms and to provide effective partnerships to help developing countries promote security and stability on the international level. As for international law and voluntary norms, indeed, we emphasize paragraph 35, and we see that adherence to international law and the non-binding voluntary norms of the responsible behavior of states are integrated and enforce each other. States must implement these frameworks to enhance trust and cooperation in ICT, and we emphasize the principle of respecting state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. We also support paragraph 36C regarding the implementation of the UN Charter regarding refraining from the use of or the threat of use of force against the integrity, unity, and political independence of other states. As for confidence-building measures in section E, we thank the chair for approving our previous initiatives and contributions in paragraphs 42A and B. We also want to clarify that we are a member of the confidence-building initiative that was approved by the Regional Arab Center and the International Humanitarian Dialogue Organization, HD, to strengthen trust and information exchange and capacity. Therefore, we suggest inviting you to benefit from this initiative to set up similar initiatives for all states and to adopt the initiative as one of the initiatives in Annex B and paragraph 43 related to next steps. As for capacity building, capacity building is very important because it increases the flexibility of states and ICT resilience. State capacity building supports responsible behavior in using ICT and contributes to developing a safe and stable environment for ICT with a transnational nature. Therefore, the priorities must be defined based on how this country affects international peace and security and the risks that the state faces. Therefore, we propose having these priorities listed in 48G and 52 for next steps. We express the importance of using unified mechanisms and sustainable methods to protect all states from ICT malicious activities.

Thank you very much, Iraq, for your participation and contribution. Senegal, to be followed by Egypt.

Thank you very much, Chair. This is the first time that I’m taking the floor during this session, so let me begin by welcoming the results the group has achieved under your leadership since the beginning of this process. And I thank all the delegations present as well. At the beginning of this session, my delegation would like to call upon all parties to show the same constructive spirit in order to achieve real milestone results in our group. We want to share our views, Chair, on some of the issues that were discussed. Turning to section B on threats, we welcome the commitment shown with regard to this document, which focuses on points of interest for all of the delegations. However, in the recent draft, we have concerns about paragraph 17. There’s a reference to international aid organizations and international organizations instead of humanitarian organizations, and that’s of concern for us. This limits the concerns expressed. The term humanitarian organizations is a coherent one, and this is language that’s used in many fora, including in the Security Council. The language about these humanitarian organizations should not be limited to the provision of aid. This can be interpreted restrictively as the provision of goods. We’re also concerned about the application of international law, the adoption of a new legally binding instrument. The issue of that has not yet been resolved. We think there’s a need to continue discussions in order to avoid misunderstandings and to ensure better understanding of how international law could apply to the cyber realm. Now, paragraph 38a, we also want to reflect the fact that discussions on international law included many declarations on international humanitarian law. We are convinced that these discussions, which allow for a better understanding of everyone’s views, need to be duly taken into consideration. Thus, my delegation, along with a number of other delegations that have spoken before, propose the following in the point of paragraph 38. This makes reference to the decisions that were made during the 7th, the 8th, and today’s decision, as well as in the intersessional work of the working group, and we welcome the participation of a growing number of states in this work. Senegal also had the immense honor to present the working document during the last session on the application of international law, which reflected how the relevant principles of international law, including necessity, inter alia, apply to the cyber world. So in order to preserve the application of international law, we need to take a comprehensive view of IHL to the cyber world. And finally, the last concern of my delegation is that my delegation notes that many references were made to regional views, to regional viewpoints that we see throughout the text. For Senegal, the regional positions are important, but we echo the common African position, which was adopted in February of 2024 and was expressed in the previous session. This reflects Africa’s view on a number of principles, and I won’t go into it here. In particular, I would like to stress the proposal about the application of IHL to cyber activities. Discussions were held about this, and we very much would like to integrate these proposals into the final document. Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you very much, Senegal, for your contribution. Egypt, please.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairperson, and I renew thanks to you and, through you, to your team for the very diligent effort to be able to share a revised draft late last night. As you may imagine, Egypt, like many other delegations, is not yet in a position to provide comments and observations on the draft. However, by means of contributing to the transition to a more interactive mode that you encouraged delegations to adopt, I wanted to take the floor to register Egypt’s support for the comment by Uruguay about according an advanced priority for the discussion about the regular institutional dialogue, including through the possibility of dedicated inter-sessional work. We look forward to listening to the feedback from other delegations on this because this is an issue that we also accord great importance to. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Egypt, for your comments and also for reacting to the suggestion that was made. It’s quite clear that next year we will have to deal with a lot of issues, unfinished issues, remaining issues, outstanding issues, contentious issues, and the institutional dialogue piece of the puzzle is going to be very important so that we make that transition to a new mechanism. So it’s entirely possible to have a separate session on regular institutional dialogue to continue the discussions. In fact, this year, or this past cycle, we had two separate dedicated inter-sessional meetings on regular institutional dialogue, which allowed us to really have a good understanding of the different issues and dynamics. So I’m open. I’m at the disposal of members. So if you would like more meetings specific to RID, then that can be done. But this is something that all of you must agree, that it’s important to have that extra time for regular institutional dialogue. So I look forward to hearing views from others as well. Philippines, please.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. This is my first time to speak for this eighth subsequent session. Allow me to share my delegation’s appreciation to Singapore for your work and your team’s work to produce this well-balanced and carefully written final draft APR for the third APR. I’m taking the floor to also react to the proposal of Uruguay, now also seconded by Egypt, to have a dedicated intersessional work. From our delegation, our concern is on the timing. I think between now and the ninth substantive session, we have the high-level week and then the First Committee work, which begins in September and then October and continues through November. We have a very short window before the ninth substantive session. So in this regard, perhaps we can also explore the possibility of adjusting the program of work for the ninth substantive session to carve out a longer period of time to discuss our permanent future mechanism. Because I think it will be not very easy to carve out an intersessional session between now and our next substantive session in the first week of December. But again, our delegation is in the hands of the Chair, and also if this is something that the entire room is prepared to engage in, as suggested by Uruguay, we can also have this in a hybrid format so we can have more support from capital. That’s it from my delegation. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Philippines. Very well noted, your comments. Thank you for that. Brazil, you have the floor, please. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I’d particularly like to thank you and your team for your very hard work in getting this new revision out. We believe that it is an extremely good basis for our work, and it is bringing us extremely close to consensus. We very much support the inclusion of quantum computing in the threat section, for instance, and many other additions. We have only a few very specific edits to suggest, which we’ll make right now. So, we have some similar concerns as the ones presented by the delegation of Senegal regarding paragraph 17. We very much appreciate the language that you have included from resolution 2730, but at the same time, we are worried about losing the reference to humanitarian organizations, as aid organizations don’t quite fully cover their work. While we understand that there hasn’t been a consensus in the room so far on how we refer to international humanitarian law, we believe that this paragraph goes beyond that. It’s talking about the impact of cyber threats on humanitarian organizations’ work without getting into the issue of international humanitarian law. So, we would like to revert to the wording of humanitarian organizations, if possible. On paragraph 21, we very much thank you and other delegations that we have worked with for your flexibility in introducing changes. We believe that this new wording makes some very good progress. We would only request the deletion of one word, “irresponsible.” We believe that the addition of “illegitimate” covers and is more clear in terms of meaning than “irresponsible” would be. And finally, on the issue of regular institutional dialogue, which I believe will be the center of our debates, we believe that your NXC strikes a very good balance in moving us forward, but also leaving room for further deliberation on the issues that still need to be fleshed out. We very much appreciate the paragraph that recognizes the centrality of capacity building to the future mechanism and also believe that there is a very good balance, both in reflecting the different views presented in the room on the issue of additional legally binding obligations and on the modalities for our work. We very much support the proposal put forward by Uruguay and supported by Egypt to focus our future deliberations on regular institutional dialogue. We support having more intersessionals on this issue. We also take note of the concern presented by the delegation of the Philippines on the heavy schedule that we have here at the United Nations until our next formal session. So, we also support the proposal to focus more of our next formal session on RID. But also, at least from our point of view, focusing the intersessional work on this doesn’t really – it’s not just about the intersessional between now and the next substantive session, but intersessional work throughout the next year. So, if the next few – next three months will be very busy in terms of UN meetings, hopefully we can focus more of the intersessional work throughout between December and next July on this issue. While we very much understand the importance of having us all here in the room to discuss these issues, I think when it comes to RID specifically, the great experts are our colleagues posted to New York, and I say that as a capital-based expert. But also, I think the experience of the recent town halls in a hybrid format was very successful and could be a good way forward in terms of allowing us to have more discussions on this issue while being mindful that not all capital-based delegates can come to New York that often. So, these are just some preliminary remarks. Once again, thank you very much to you and your team for the excellent work on this new draft, and we look forward to continuing working with you. Thank you.

Thank you very much, President, for your comments and your suggestions. Very well noted with regard to a possible additional session to talk about RID. Saudi Arabia, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We appreciate the efforts for developing this final draft of the third APR for the OEWG, which paves the way to conduct meaningful discussions and to achieve progress regarding priority issues that are being discussed as part of the work of the OEWG. We want to refer to the importance of these topics, particularly the issue of capacity building, and we commend the high-level meeting that was convened in May this year regarding this topic. We also emphasize our support for RDI, which is related to ICT security, and we commend the progress that has been achieved so far. We also support that the permanent mechanism related to ICT security should be a platform of a practical nature and that it should have one path that is established after the end of the work of the current OEWG after 2025 as part of the First Committee. And as for the tasks and scope of this permanent mechanism, we see that it is important to build upon the discussions that have happened during the work of the OEWG. We also support enriching the discussions by expanding the scope of participation, and we see the added value of the participation of different relevant stakeholders, including companies and non-profit organizations, academic institutions, international and regional organizations, particularly because taking on the different perspectives of different stakeholders will lead to taking decisions based on studies and analysis and would also allow us to be proactive rather than reactive to cyber activities. We also commend the proposed mechanism, especially the establishment of the sub-teams. These will have a central role in enhancing efforts and to achieve progress on different topics that will be discussed as part of the permanent mechanism. We also want to reiterate the importance of establishing any sub-teams through consensus as necessary. And we also see that these high-level meetings should be convened annually in order to enhance the work of the mechanism and to guarantee the achievement of tangible outcomes and that these sessions should be conducted for all the sub-teams as decided by the OEWG. As for the pace or frequency of these meetings for the RDI, we think there should be two intersessional meetings a year in order to continue in this interactive discussion and also to achieve progress regarding the main components of our work. We also support the permanent mechanism structure regarding having a conference to review the permanent mechanism and the importance of the role this will have to ensure that the permanent mechanism is achieving progress as expected. We recommend the need of identifying the details of this conference, such as the outcomes and outputs and governance, in order to ensure achieving its objectives as required. We also see that a prep committee should be established in order to look into the preparatory work for this conference. And because there will be a lot of work done by a lot of specialized teams that will be set up, we want to emphasize the importance of fostering a flexible mechanism that allows these teams to have intersessional dedicated meetings without waiting for the entire OEWG to meet so that we can have continuous progress. In conclusion, we support the consensus approach as the main way to participate. And this is a main principle for the permanent mechanism. And we commit to cooperating effectively to achieve progress in this. We would also like to reiterate the importance of working regionally in order to accelerate a consensus and facilitate it. And we see that this approach will enable us to become familiar with all different views and would help us to collectively set the different positions. And this will have a positive impact on achieving progress in this area. Mr. Chair, we reiterate our support for the efforts of the OEWG and towards finding a permanent mechanism on ICT security at the General Assembly to contribute in achieving progress that is effective and continuous. We are also committed to supporting these efforts to increasing this interaction and cooperation between the states to establish a safe cyberspace that allows for the prosperity of all. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Saudi Arabia, for your contribution. Germany, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor, and thanks to you and your team for all your hard work in preparing the draft APR, which is now in front of us and which will hopefully guide us towards consensus over the next two days. Please allow me to focus on a chapter that is, in Germany’s view, almost perfect and that may not receive much attention going forward as I see our discussion will be focusing on other more difficult chapters of the APR. I’d like to briefly focus on the CBM chapter. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for taking on board many of the good suggestions that have been circulated in the room. In Germany’s view, the most important elements are summarized in PARA 44 with the focus on operationalizing the global POC directory. Thank you for linking this with the future permanent mechanism, as this will be one of the future pillars of action of that permanent mechanism. Germany has a drafting suggestion to make on PARA 47 on the standardized templates. Germany has voiced its reservations on developing these templates before and would like to suggest the following language in PARA 47: We urge states to optimize communications to the global POC directory, including insert by considering the delete through development of standardized templates, and at the end of the sentence delete no later than the end of May 2025 so that the sentence would finish with template. There’s a further minor drafting suggestion to make for the Annex CBM number 7 exchange of information where the off needs to be deleted in order to bring that CBM in line with the action-oriented way that we’ve agreed to in order to formulate the CBMs. So just read exchange information. This is the end of my brief remarks just on that chapter, and Germany will come back on other chapters going forward. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Germany, first of all for describing at least the chapter on CBMs as a perfect one. You know, in Singapore we never get that kind of feedback, because in Singapore our parents always tell us we must do better. So I wish I had gone to a German school. Secondly, your comments are well noted. I will take them back and will reflect on them. So, France, at this point I think some of you need coffee. You have either been overcome with such great joy that you are not able to speak, or you have been overcome with such shyness, or you are still recovering from a late evening yesterday. So let’s have a coffee break. We’ll come back here at 12 noon.

Good afternoon, Distinguished Delegates. I resume the meeting of the 8th substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group. I see many coffee cups in the room. That’s a good sign. I also have the sense that there are a lot of informal conversations going on, which is entirely understandable. And I’m also very encouraged by the many positive and informal feedback that has been transmitted to me and my team. But it’s my intention to give the floor to delegations in the remaining time we have before we adjourn for lunch, to continue to hear preliminary initial reactions, comments, and suggestions to the Chair. I give the floor now to Greece.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor and for the work of you and your team in providing us with a REV2 APR. Please allow us to put forward a number of suggestions that we believe will provide more coherence to the text and better reflect our discussion so far. First of all, with regard to norms in paragraph 31K, the draft APR references the conclusion that norm implementation and norm development are not mutually exclusive. This, however, is not reflected in their recommendations. Therefore, we propose the following revision of paragraph 34, and I quote, “to continue discussions on the implementation of existing norms as well as on possible additional norms of responsible state behavior.” With regard to the international law section, in paragraph 36B2, there is a reference to cases of applicability of international humanitarian law, yet in paragraph 36A, IHL is not among the list of topics discussed. Therefore, we propose the inclusion of IHL to the list of topics discussed as well. Finally, with regard to the section on regular institutional dialogue, we strongly believe that the text should include an explicit reference to the Program of Action, considering the extended discussions on this mechanism and the broad state support for this particular proposal. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Greece, for your contribution and for your comments and suggestions. Switzerland, to be followed by Pakistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving us the floor, and I hope you could also enjoy a cup of coffee, that you also are energized to bring us through these discussions and lead us to a consensus report. Thank you very much, Chair. Switzerland would like to thank you for your team and the work you’ve already done this week and for the final draft of the Annual Progress Report. After initial review, we believe that the text brings us closer to a consensus, but that we are not quite there yet. The text contains elements that are problematic for us. On the other hand, key points that are important to Switzerland have not been included. In your latest letter, you have expressed your hope to see flexibility from all delegations so that a consensus can be reached by tomorrow. Switzerland supports this request, and we would like to show flexibility. However, flexibility is a term that should allow for movement in both directions. We have seen this movement in certain areas, however not in every section, which is why we cannot fully support the draft as it is now. Let me make some remarks on the following sections. With regard to the chapter on threats, paragraph 14, we would like to retain in paragraph 14 consensus formulations from the second APR by again naming the sectors healthcare, maritime, energy sector, and aviation that have now been deleted. The naming of these sectors does not contradict the statement that it is each state’s prerogative to determine which infrastructures it designates as critical. With paragraph 17, we generally welcome changes to it. However, as others like El Salvador, Brazil, or Senegal have said, we are concerned that by referring to international aid organizations instead of humanitarian organizations, this wording now limits the concerns expressed in this paragraph and this too narrow set of organizations. The term is consistent with UN language in other UN fora where humanitarian organizations are commonly referred to, including at the UN Security Council. The work of humanitarian organizations not only includes the provision of aid, which could be read narrowly as bringing goods. In paragraph 23, security by design was deleted. Switzerland advocates to keep this in the report as it is also used in this sense in other UN documents. With regards to the chapter on rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior, we can support the adoptions in this chapter in principle. However, in paragraph 33, we would like also to mention resources other than just the checklist for further discussions, such as those mentioned in paragraph 31Ai. With regard to the chapter on international law, however, we must state that this chapter does not represent progress made over the past year and is in fact more than incomplete. In this respect, it feels to our delegation more like a report lacking the progress it carries in its title. We just cannot support this chapter in its current form. This is particularly true that given the majority of states have expressed their views on how international humanitarian law applies during armed conflicts to ICT activities. A detailed cross-regional working paper has been submitted. A second from different groups of states with specific language has been put forward, and this has been referenced countless times. We are surprised that the report cannot even reflect that IHL discussions took place. We are also aware that there are different positions on this aspect, but this is also the case for additionally legally binding obligations, and these are mentioned in the report. There is therefore no reason not to mention that discussions on IHL took place at all. We would have very much hoped for a way to reflect in a better way these rich discussions and to include a clear statement for the protection of civilians and civilian objects during armed conflicts from the harmful effects of ICT activities. As a compromise and show of utmost flexibility, we can support the very minimal and factual proposal by Senegal supported by many others with regard to paragraph 38A and would add after international law, quote, including international humanitarian law, end quote. We do not support a deletion of references to scenario-based exercises. We therefore ask to restore it in its entirety in new paragraph 42, old paragraph 41, on scenario-based exercises, which was an accurate summary of discussions throughout the year and the views of states. As throughout the last year, especially in March and May, many states expressed support for scenario-based exercises as valuable elements in capacity building and developing common understandings on international law. This is consistent with the OEWG mandate and should therefore be reflected. We also support calls by a number of states to act back regional in paragraphs 38C and 40. The work and contributions in regional and sub-regional statements are an important and very valued contribution to our discussions. In this regard, I would like to mention just as one example the African Union’s Common African Position, issued earlier this year on behalf of more than 50 UN member states. This was repeatedly recognized as a positive development in the March and May meetings. With regard to the chapter on confidence-building measures, we can support the changes on the POC directory and echo Germany’s comments. It’s an almost perfect chapter. In paragraph 42G, the regional organizations have been deleted and, as it appears, subsumed under parties. This does not correctly reflect the status of regional organizations. We would like to see them mentioned here again. In paragraph 47, we would like to add voluntary to standardized templates so that the wording is consistent with paragraph 42D. With regard to the chapter on capacity building, good news for you. We are satisfied with it as it is. With regard to the chapter on RID, we welcome the maturity of the changes made. However, in annex C, paragraph 15E, we unfortunately continue to see no flexibility for formal meetings of the future mechanisms in locations other than New York. We regret this and believe that it will be detrimental to the work of the future mechanism. We would therefore like to propose again that formal meetings of the thematic groups can also be convened at locations other than New York. Many thanks, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Switzerland, for your comments and also for your commitment to a consensus outcome. It’s very much appreciated. Pakistan to be followed by Mauritius.

The hard work done by you and your team in compiling the second draft of the third annual progress report is commendable. Indeed, it would have remained a daunting task for you and your team to incorporate the views of all member states in such a balanced manner. The draft is still under consideration in my capital; therefore, I am delivering the following preliminary remarks. Chair, I thank you for the addition of some of the Pakistan proposals in the second draft of the APR. Pakistan supports the formulation of language concerning the voluntary checklist of practical actions for the implementation of non-binding norms of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs. The language is in line with Pakistan’s position that the document should come under further discussions at the forthcoming OEWG sessions. However, Pakistan considers that the final draft of the APR may further be refined through some minor additions. We would like to propose the addition of a reference about disinformation and fake news in paragraph 18 of the APR. Pakistan maintains that the empowerment of ICTs to spread fake news and disinformation has great implications for regional and international stability and social harmony in certain countries. Pakistan positively takes note of the amendments in Annex C of the APR containing the elements for the open-ended, action-oriented permanent mechanism on ICT security in the context of international security as a state-led single-track permanent mechanism established under the auspices of the UN and making decisions through consensus. However, Pakistan also proposes the retention of all language in paragraph 9 of Annex C in RAB 1, that is, quote, “including the development of additional legally binding obligations as appropriate,” unquote. Considering the importance of Annex C, Pakistan believes that the document requires further in-depth discussions among the group. In this regard, Pakistan supports Brazil’s proposal for holding hybrid formal meetings to further discuss the structure, scope, mandate, and other aspects of the future mechanism. In case of any further comments, I will take the floor again. Chair, in the end, we look forward to the consensus adoption of the APR tomorrow. For this, I assure you of the full support and flexibility of my country. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Pakistan, for your comments and also for your support. Mauritius to be followed by Ecuador.

Good morning, Chair. Thank you for giving me the floor. We are grateful to you and your team for your unflinching determination throughout this demanding process and also for producing a revised draft report last night. Mauritius would like to make brief comments on Sections B, C, E, and G. On Section B, Existing and Potential Threats, paragraph 22, we support the inclusion of quantum computing, as stated by other delegations. We echo Qatar on Section C, Rules, Norms, and Principles of Responsible State Behaviour, in that this section should give more weight to the practical implementation of the norms, rather than on mere theoretical principles. This could act as a complementary element to Annex C. On Section E, Confidence Building Measures, paragraph 42F, we wish to reiterate that the development of national cyber lexicons could significantly facilitate the sharing of terms and terminologies on ICT threats. On Section G, we firmly believe regular institutional dialogue is crucial for this group, as it helps in handing over the necessary features to see how the future permanent mechanism could be established. We therefore suggest that separate intersessional sessions are conducted in that regard. Finally, we would like to underscore that we very much look forward to the adoption of the third APR by tomorrow 6 p.m. and finding consensus on the future permanent mechanism, at least by December this year. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Mauritius, for your statement. Did you say 6 p.m. tomorrow or 10 a.m.? I thought we had a consensus that we were going to adopt it at 10 a.m. Very good. Thank you very much, Mauritius, for your contribution. Ecuador, to be followed by Bangladesh.

Thank you very much, Chair. My delegation would like to thank you and your team for your enormous efforts in producing this second draft of the APR. I’d also like to thank the various delegations for their contributions that undoubtedly have helped us have a more substantive and orderly document. We think it reflects the observations and comments that were expressed during the first two days of work. And we understand the complexity involved in getting everyone to converge on a document that’s coherent for everyone. With regard to the proposal made by the delegation of Uruguay, Ecuador fully agrees with the need to continue to discuss the substantive elements of our future permanent mechanism. And we believe it’s appropriate to do this during inter-sessional periods. We understand the concerns that have been expressed by the delegation of the Philippines, which are indeed the concern of our teams in New York as well as in capitals. And particularly since we’re talking about reduced missions and teams, we would suggest that these inter-sessional meetings be held in a hybrid format in order to ensure greater coverage and ensure that teams and capitals can participate. Also, my delegation is flexible with regard to maintaining these sessions until we have the ninth session or even until the tenth session. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Ecuador, for your contribution. Bangladesh, to be followed by South Africa.

Mr. Chair, thank you very much for your extraordinary hard work in presenting the final draft of the third APR, as well as presenting us a sleepless night. We truly appreciate your efforts to reduce the length of the draft. On paragraph 14, my delegation proposed to include the financial sector alongside the healthcare, maritime, aviation, and energy sectors as critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. We insist on including the financial sector in the listing. Chair, while we appreciate that you have included the reference to the dark web in paragraph 21 as an existing and potential threat, which my delegation proposed to be included, we, however, regret that misinformation and disinformation have been excluded from the draft. The distinguished colleague from Pakistan also just mentioned it very eloquently. Indeed, the increasing weaponization of misinformation and disinformation driven by cutting-edge artificial intelligence technologies such as deepfakes poses a pressing threat. This threat jeopardizes societal harmony, democratic processes, and the very existence of humanity itself. We truly want to have the reference to this threat in the third APR. We trust your judgment on the appropriate language and placement of this crucial reference. Chair, on a lighter note, I know you hold CBMs very dearly, like many delegations including my own. I vividly recall that last year, when we were negotiating the second APR in the late evening, next door the negotiation on the political declaration on universal health coverage was taking place. And the distinguished peer of Thailand was hosting delicious Thai food for the delegation. When the enticing aroma of Thai delicacies reached our room, you announced that you would also host a lunch or dinner for the delegation if we adopt the third APR. I am wondering if you would reannounce your commitment, as it could serve as an additional confidence-building measure for delegations to adopt the third APR, which we all desperately aspire. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Bangladesh, for your contribution and also for your specific suggestions. I’ll give another look at that with regard to the textual proposals you have made. You’re also right in holding the Chair accountable to an offer of an invitation to lunch or a meal. But was it in the context of binding obligations, or was it a voluntary norm? I think I have to check the records again, but I can say that when the final progress report is adopted in July 2025, we will seriously look into making arrangements for the offer to be implemented and also perhaps further developed. And I will ask my team to work on the modalities. Hopefully, when this process comes to an end in July 2025, we will all have an opportunity to spend some time together in a more informal setting. But thank you very much, Bangladesh, for the reminder. South Africa, to be followed by Ghana.

Thank you, Chairperson. South Africa thanks you and your team for your outstanding efforts to produce a balanced and substantive final draft of the third APR. We have achieved consensus on previous APRs because of your valuable guidance and leadership. We believe that this approach has managed to build upon our work in each successive APR of this Working Group, and we hope to reach consensus on the basis of the current draft. This session is an opportunity to develop and adopt a basic framework for the future permanent mechanism within the United Nations. We would like to make a few comments on the current draft APR and will come back to this later. We welcome the amendment in paragraph 21 that states express concern that the ready availability of certain kinds of ICT hardware and software to state and non-state actors increases the opportunity for their illegitimate and potentially malicious use, and we support Brazil’s proposal to delete “responsible.” We appreciate the inclusion of Para 33 that clarifies that Annex A is a voluntary measure that states may further discuss and update. We can accept the recommendation in Para 34 that states, in consultation with other interested parties and stakeholders, continue discussions on possible additional norms of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs at the forthcoming sessions of the OEWG. We support the international law section as has been drafted and would like to retain the section as is. We thank you for the acknowledgment in Para 48 that states may implement CBMs according to their different national priorities and capacities. On the issue of capacity building, we support the retention of the assertion in Para 52 that the Global Cyber Security Cooperation Portal would subsequently support and facilitate the work of the Future Permanent Mechanism. We support Para 54 in which we have fleshed out the operation of the Voluntary Fund, particularly its support for developing countries. We believe that the July 2025 deadline for a report from the Secretariat is acceptable as we can discuss the matter further and include it in the final report of the OEWG and the Single Track Future Permanent Mechanism. The APR recommendation contained in Para 59, which allows for further discussion of stakeholder participation and thematic groups, is a balanced approach to some of the more difficult issues that we have faced in this OEWG. Chairperson, on Regular Institutional Dialogue, Section G, we believe that it would be important for this substantive session to agree on the basis on which to continue the discussion on Regular Institutional Dialogue. Specifically, Annex C entitled Elements for the Open-Ended Action-Oriented Permanent Mechanism on ICT Security in the context of international security. Therefore, we strongly support the recommendation in Para 58, and we believe that the future discussion on RID should proceed on this common understanding to avoid having this matter discussed outside of the OEWG, including the possibility of further resolutions at the first committee on this matter. With regards to Annex C, the current draft is an improvement, and I understand that India and Brazil also feel the same. With regard to the functions and scope of the Permanent Mechanism, we support the revised Paras 8 and 9 on the functions and scope of the future Permanent Mechanism, particularly the link to strengthen the capacity of all states and retention of the function to develop and implement capacity-building measures. In this regard, Para 10 further acknowledges the cross-cutting nature of capacity-building. Paras 11a to d are clearer on the intergovernmental nature of decision-making in the mechanism, while including the importance of engaging stakeholders in some form in the Permanent Mechanism. We also support Paras 16a and b on ensuring a seamless transition to the Permanent Mechanism. In terms of the proposal by Uruguay, while we support the idea of an informal session to discuss regular institutional dialogue, we believe that it could be reflected in the main parts of Section G. However, we will leave it to the discretion of the Chair on when and how to approach the intersessional. So at this stage, it might not be necessary for us to have a formal recommendation. Chairperson, we trust that Member States can join consensus on the current draft. I thank you.

Thank you very much, South Africa, for your comments and for your strong support for the draft third annual progress report. Ghana, to be followed by New Zealand.

Mr. Chair, my delegation would like to thank you and your team for working tirelessly to put together a draft that captures to a large extent the views of all member states, which we agree is no small feat. We welcome the inclusion of a reference to the need for states to determine for themselves what infrastructure is designated as critical in paragraph 14 of the new version of the APR, and we hope this text is retained in the final report. My delegation also supports the revised text in paragraph 22. We, however, suggest that the language on the benefits of AI is improved to incorporate benefits of strengthening cybersecurity measures and cyber resiliency, noting that this has been highlighted by many delegations in the first reading. My delegation also notices that the need for strengthening of security by design approaches throughout the lifecycle of new and emerging technologies has been taken out of the current revision of the document, and we would like to call for the reference to be reinstated. On confidence-building measures, my delegation is in support of the retention of the reference to a standardized template to increase clarity and timeliness of communication between states through the global POC directory in paragraph 42D, and believe this will be beneficial for states that are new to having POCs. In this regard, my delegation supports the retention of 42D in paragraph 47 and appreciates the extent to which the chair has framed these paragraphs to accommodate the proposals for having standardized protocols. On capacity building, Ghana appreciates the mention of South-South cooperation in section 50B as a complementary action to North-South cooperation. Ghana has especially prioritized South-South cooperation in its capacity-building activities through existing MOUs such as those signed with Rwanda and Mozambique and other states, and we see merit in having this issue retained in the text. On regular institutional dialogue, Mr. Chair, as proposed by Singapore, Vanuatu, and other delegations, my delegation would like to reiterate our call for all meetings, including interstitial meetings and the future permanent mechanism, to be held in a hybrid format to ensure maximum participation by member states. It will be appreciated if this is reflected in annex C of the annual progress report, which mentions the meetings of the future permanent mechanism. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Ghana, for your contribution and for your suggestions. New Zealand, to be followed by Mexico.

Kia ora everyone, and thank you, Chair, and to your team for the significant undertaking to produce the final draft of the third APR. In the threats section, we agree with El Salvador, Senegal, and others who have noted that for consistency with other UN documents, the term humanitarian organizations is a better formulation and should be reinstated. In the norms section, we continue to think that describing ICTs as having unique attributes is unhelpful and doesn’t accurately reflect our discussions at the OEWG, which are focused on responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs, not the ICTs themselves. We would therefore like to see this removed as, in our view, it doesn’t enjoy broad support. We note reference to several proposals for new norms but would emphasize that these proposals have not gained traction or had any significant discussion within the OEWG sessions and think that they should therefore be deleted. The possibility of new norms, if necessary, logically flows from the identification of gaps, if any, that are found when implementing the framework. We don’t think there’s been any discernible progress on this issue over the past 12 months, and we would then therefore be looking to adopt previous consensus language in this section. Turning to a brief comment on stakeholders. Like yesterday, we underscore the need for civil society to be included alongside industry, academia, and non-government organizations in any description or list of stakeholder groups. We’re also not sure what the term interested parties means alongside stakeholders and would welcome clarification on this terminology. To international law, we were disappointed that there is no mention of states engaging in scenario-based discussions on how international law, including international humanitarian law, applies to cyberspace. In our view, this has been one of the most significant developments over the past 12 months and therefore should be captured as a marker of our progress. Even if we are still progressing common understandings, the APR should reflect that these discussions have taken place. We also note and support the helpful drafting suggestions submitted by the cross-regional group on international law. On the POC directory, we suggest the POC directory could support rather than support and facilitate the taking forward of CBMs in paragraph 42b. This edit would recognize that the POC directory is not the only mechanism to progress CBMs, such as existing CERT to CERT cooperation. And similarly, we think the portal could support rather than support and facilitate the work of the future mechanism. We think these minor edits would better reflect feedback on the REV.1 draft yesterday. In paragraphs 50e and g, we agree it’s very important to avoid duplication of efforts but stress that this should not just be confined to across the UN system. To regular institutional dialogue and the elements paper, we appreciate the simplification of the text to describe the future permanent mechanism and suggest this should be consistent in the annex, including its title. And we also agreed with Brazil’s very practical suggestion of devoting more time in the next substantive session to discussing the permanent mechanism. We do, however, think there needs to be a factual reference to last year’s UN General Assembly resolution deciding to establish a Program of Action. We managed to address the Program of Action within the RID section in the second APR by consensus and look forward to doing the same in this year’s APR. Chair, we strongly agree with the principle of consensus, but we have heard several states distinguish between substantive and procedural elements when considering the future permanent mechanism. We are mindful that the permanent mechanism will be action-oriented and that we will need to carefully decide on modalities that will ensure the effective and efficient functioning of the mechanism. So for pragmatic reasons, we therefore suggest that the text and the annex could note the importance that states place on the principle of consensus and recommend states continue to discuss how this principle can be applied to the new mechanism. Regarding dedicated intersessional meetings and thematic groups, we think these groups could perhaps submit reports and recommendations to the plenary but may not themselves negotiate formal outcomes. And finally, we took note of the many states who have requested that the intersessional meetings and thematic groups in the new mechanism be conducted in hybrid format and fully support this. Thank you.

Thank you very much, New Zealand, for your contribution. Mexico, to be followed by Vanuatu.

Thank you, Chair. Before beginning our reactions to the revised document, we’d like to share some thoughts with regard to the interpretation services for this working group. Yesterday in the afternoon, we had to continue with some interventions only in English, although it was said that those that were to take the floor would need to make them in English and there wouldn’t be any major problems. We would like to recall that delegations here are also listening to interventions from other delegations. Some of our capitals are also following these meetings on the webcast, so we would like this to not set a precedent with regard to the use of one language when we’re talking about formal sessions of this working group. And that’s also something that we’ll need to take into account for the future permanent mechanism. The following are preliminary comments, and my capital is continuing to study the REV document. We believe that, in general, the changes to the APR are positive and they bring us towards the necessary areas of convergence for their adoption tomorrow, Friday. We’ve got some proposed changes for certain paragraphs as well as some comments in order to improve the convergence of the text. In section D on threats, in paragraph 17, some other delegations have said we are missing the reference to international humanitarian organizations, and there’s been a change for international aid organizations, and we feel that this change doesn’t cover everything. We don’t think it means the same, and the term international humanitarian organizations would enable us to capture OCHA and umbrella organizations of the United Nations, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross. We very much support what Senegal said in this regard. On paragraph 22, we welcome the explicit references to AI and quantum computing. In section C on norms and rules, we regret that the reference to regional and sub-regional organizations was removed in paragraph 33, and we would like for you to consider reintroducing that. We can be flexible with regard to statements reflecting that these organizations are not always a reflection of all countries in the region. In section D on international law, we regret that there’s very little reference to the protection of civilians, protection of infrastructure, and those few references have even been removed in this revised version, 37F and 37G of the previous version. It’s clear that the discussions that we’ve had with regard to the recognition of international humanitarian law in cyberspace is something that no one can deny, and that’s important for a number of delegations. And once again, it seems that we’re not including it in this text for the purposes of consensus. We also don’t understand why the reference to real scenarios with regard to the application of international law undertaken by academic and research institutions, that reference was deleted. It’s these examples which help us to better our understanding. With regard to institutional permanent mechanisms, we are happy to see that the details from the point of contacts have been included in paragraph 57. Following proposals of other delegations that took the floor before us, we would ask that in the section of recommended next steps, we include a reference to intersessional meetings, maintaining those, including in hybrid format, to make progress in negotiating aspects of the permanent mechanism for its adoption at the July session of the group in 2025. With regard to annex C, we are grateful to see that the content was reduced to concentrate on the convergences that were seen in the room. And we’d like to make two specific comments with regard to issues that should be changed. The first is the inclusion of the various interested parties, the stakeholders. We are grateful that they are mentioned with regard to the interested parties. That could have limited their participation. However, we would like to have greater clarity in the text which specifies that the stakeholders are covered in one way or another throughout the structure. The second point has to do with decision making of the future mechanism. We won’t repeat Mexico’s position on the distortion of consensus, but we do have to be clear that it seems strange to us that the majority of the elements of the mechanism, such as structure and scope, contain the word would, whereas decision making says will. How can we make a determination with regard to decision making when we don’t have that same determination with regard to the structure and the scope? We believe that paragraph 5 that you included is not sufficient and 17 will not be necessary for the moment. If there is an insistence on maintaining paragraph 17, we’d like the paragraph to be amended to align it with the previous paragraphs. And it would read in English – The future permanent mechanism would take all decisions on the basis of consensus. That would be our proposed change. But also, the options that we heard from the distinguished delegate of New Zealand just a moment ago with regard to how we refer to consensus could also be something that Mexico could support. That’s everything for the moment. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mexico, for your contribution and your comments on interpretation, as well noted. We’ll do our best to avoid situations like that. Vanuatu, to be followed by the European Union.

Mr. Chair, we can see the care and consideration that went into producing this final draft, and you and your team have our thanks for your efforts. We can see the logic and goal of consensus behind every addition, amendment, and deletion. Yes, we have sections where we would like to see different language; that is probably true of every delegation in this room, but this is a moment for compromise for all of us. We also welcome the suggestion by Uruguay to strengthen our focus on regular institutional dialogue in the next year. We would like to echo the comments made by the Philippines, and we would appreciate it if the discussions took place during the ninth substantial session, rather than at intersessional. But if the room collectively decides that an intersessional makes more sense, it should be in a hybrid format to allow us to engage. Ghana explained very eloquently how meetings going forward, including under the new permanent mechanism, should be held in such a format to allow developing states to fully take part. We fully support that point and would like to see it reflected in Annex C. I’m also grateful to see that Vanuatu’s suggestion to make sure that capacity building should be demand-driven has made it into Paragraph 7. This is an important point and will make our collective capacity building efforts more effective, sustainable, and purposeful. On Annex C, we would like to welcome the focus on capacity building in Paragraphs 9 and 10. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Vanuatu, for your contribution and also for your reminder to all of us that this is a moment of compromise. I think earlier in the week you mentioned that you are probably the delegation that has flown the longest distance with two transit stopovers and the investment in time and energy that you have taken. I think there are many, many delegations which have come from far and distant capitals, and I am really gratified that all of you are here wanting to reach an agreement and leave home with a document that you can all collectively own. It is that spirit that encourages me to work harder to find that equilibrium and balance that will allow us to take a step forward tomorrow. So thank you very much for your contribution, Vanuatu. I give the floor now to the European Union, to be followed by Nicaragua.

Dear Chair, Thank you very much for your work on the REF2 draft progress report of this year. We deeply appreciate your effort to capture the rich and intense discussions we had here over the last days, but moreover the discussions over the last year. The progress report shows the work that we have done and gives direction to further work for next year in view of the final OEWG report, including in view of a seamless transition to the future permanent mechanism and as well indicates our focus under such future program. We are grateful for the work you have done and indeed have seen your effort to bring views closer to each other, including by taking some of our proposals. We moreover compliment you personally on bringing the OEWG together around the parameters of the future permanent mechanism, and we are grateful for the progress we have made since last year towards a single permanent platform in the United Nations on the use of ICTs in the context of international security. In this light, the APR is important, and it is important to reflect our discussions correctly, focusing on the discussions and proposals that got traction and led to results and less on proposals that were brought to the table but did not get that traction. We see some room for improvement here. Particularly, we regret that the important and fruitful discussions on international law, particularly on IHL, the law of state responsibility, and international human rights law, are not adequately reflected in the RAF2, as if nothing happened. Moreover, we regret that the APR also does not fully reflect the discussions on norms, including by not recommending it but just taking note of the checklist and by focusing on the little discussions on further development of norms, including in the recommendations, while not reflecting the wish of the open-ended working group to foremost continue the exchange on the practical implementation of norms as a recommendation. Therefore, we suggest adding a recommendation on this to reflect this. This also counts for the progress made on the regular institutional dialogue. Considering the discussions and the broad support, we see the need to mention that progress on the Program of Action since last year in the APR. Mr. Chair, we welcome the regular institutional dialogue annex and would like to work with you and other delegations today to further clarify some elements in the regular institutional dialogue chapter as well as the annex, ensuring that the future permanent mechanism will have the right focus and structure, will work in a cycle of identification of gaps before diving into new obligations, and confirming that we will conduct our work on dedicated thematic groups, that stakeholders will be able to join in a meaningful way, and that capacity building efforts are targeted to matters of ICT security, as well as the cyber capacity building ecosystem is well-functioning without duplication and overlap in order to deliver upon its task. We want the regular institutional dialogue to be able to deliver upon its expectations, as also other delegations have stressed. In this context, we can also support the proposal made by Uruguay, supported by several other delegations, for an intersessional on the regular institutional dialogue to make further progress building on the strong foundation that we hope to agree upon this week. Further, let me take the opportunity to say that we support Senegal and other delegations on paragraph 17, as well as their suggestion for 38A. Mr. Chair, thank you once again for the progress made in the REF2. We are convinced that our work today can lead to further improvements that will allow us to better reflect the actual reality of our progress, as well as seal that progress in the APR, and for us tomorrow to make a big collective step forward towards a UN permanent program on the use of ICTs in the context of international security. Thank you very much, Chair. Thank you.

Thank you very much, European Union, for your contribution and your detailed statement. It is well noted. I’m looking at the time. I’m not sure if we’ll get some extra minutes from the interpreters. Let me check. I think we’ll have to adjourn. It’s 12:59, and I want to thank, first of all, the interpreters for giving me extra time over the last few days, so I won’t abuse their generosity and understanding. So we’ll break for lunch and continue this afternoon. But I just want to say that this afternoon I’ve got a list of speakers. I want to reiterate that at the end of the afternoon session, I will go back and reflect on what additional adjustments might be needed to bring us across to the finish line. These will not be restructuring the paper. These have to be calibrations, fine-tuning, tweaking, very small adjustments. And so this afternoon, I encourage all delegations to come focused on how you can support the text. What are the parts that you find perfect? Tell me that. I think we need to lift the mood in the room. And of course, your utmost demonstrations of flexibility are going to be very necessary for us to cross the finish line tomorrow. I reiterate it’s my intention to table a conference room paper, which is a formal UN document, this evening. That can then be transmitted to capitals for final instructions. Tomorrow morning, 10 a.m., it is my intention to put forward that conference room paper for adoption. And then we take it from there because the document will then be in your hands, and we’ll take it from there based on what happens tomorrow. I wish you a pleasant lunch. The meeting is adjourned. See you at 3 p.m.