Session 9-10 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

Good afternoon, distinguished delegates. The tenth and final meeting of the ninth substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of ICTs is now called to order. We’ll continue our discussions under agenda item five on the topic of regular institutional dialogue. We’ll continue with the speakers list. We have a list of 30 speakers as of now, and of course, after we finish this item, we need to go on to other matters under our agenda, and then we can wrap up. So I hope that the remaining time available to us this afternoon will be sufficient for the 30 speakers, plus also time to deal with the additional agenda item of other matters. And so I’d like to once again appeal to all of you to do two things. First, I seek your cooperation in being very succinct and brief. Secondly, I also encourage and invite you to react and respond to the other ideas and proposals that have been made so far today in these discussions, so that we can begin to have a sense of the room and also begin to have a real conversation. So if you’ve come prepared with statements with your own positions, do also reflect on responding to the comments and ideas that have been put forward, and of course, do also be very brief. And with those comments, I give the floor now to Guatemala, to be followed by El Salvador.

Thank you, Chairman. Guatemala is grateful for the efforts and the work done by the Chair to present the elements of the regular institutional dialogue. We recognize this as an essential part of discussions that have been held over the last few years. For my country, the establishment of a future permanent mechanism that would guarantee a fluid transition that we could continue to build based on the outcomes of the work of the OEWG is of great importance. Furthermore, we underscore the need to avoid duplicated efforts in this task. We trust that this mechanism will be able to practically and effectively coordinate the norms and rules of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. For this reason, we believe that there are important elements that should be borne in mind, such as inter-sectoral cooperation. It is necessary to foster cooperation and dialogue between interested stakeholders, such as the government, private sector, the academic world, and civil society, to ensure the collaborative development of initiatives. This includes local and international initiatives to come forward with global responses, the development of policies and regulations that should be inclusive and able to streamline responses in technological progress and facing emerging threats, such as threats to cyberspace, as well as concerns on data privacy. They should focus on promoting innovation and best practices that make it possible to standardize ICT norms to guarantee interoperability and the quality of strategies. They should identify digital divides to improve capacity building proposals with collaborative efforts focused on training programs that are in accordance with the needs of each party. We should also focus on resilience with shared efforts for resilient technological frameworks. Chair, my country recognizes that much remains to be built here, and we believe it’s very important for all discussions to include all delegations. Therefore, we join the request of a group of countries which would prefer that the thematic clusters don’t exceed a strictly necessary amount. For my country, development and capacity building are particularly important to build a future mechanism and a safe and resilient cyberspace. Thank you.

Thank you, Guatemala. El Salvador, please, to be followed by the Netherlands.

Thank you, Chair. We will present a summarized version of this statement pertaining to the questions that you have given us and in line with our session on the 26th of November related to the modalities for the participation of other interested parties. We have put forward a proposal for this. For us, the meaningful participation of other interested parties in ICTs is already well known by the majority of Member States. We also identify this participation as an opportunity for capacity building and the development of technical capacity at the national level. We are aware that these participation modalities in intergovernmental United Nations processes have been a divisive topic. Therefore, we suggest conceptualizing this not only as a substantive topic but rather as a procedural topic. For us, substantive topics should be focused on the founding elements of the next permanent mechanism. For this reason, we believe that the participation modalities should focus on the concept of consensus as set out in subparagraph 17 in the Chair’s note. But it should also bear in mind other decision-making mechanisms that are used by General Assembly subsidiary bodies in the sphere of international security that provide viable alternatives. We recognize the inherent limitations in certain mechanisms such as the Committee on Cybercrime, which was established for a finite time. Therefore, we hope that we can have useful discussions with all stakeholders. With regard to the clusters, thematic groups, we believe that there should be four of these on threats, international law, norms, rules and principles merged with confidence-building measures and capacity building. We suggest that these groups have a decision-making process that is similar to the current one, bearing in mind that they shouldn’t last for more than five days. We should also bear in mind possible rotation among the groups. This should try to reduce the additional work burden for small delegations in New York, bearing in mind that this new mechanism will be set up within the other existing mechanisms. We are open to listening to the suggestions from others, and in this sense, we would like to thank France, Canada, and Chile for putting forward the proposals that we will be looking at closely. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, El Salvador, for your contribution. Netherlands, to be followed by South Africa.

Thank you, Chair. Aligning ourselves with the European Union, I’d like to make a few additional points. Our third APR marks the significant progress made in shaping a future Open-Ended Action-Oriented Permanent Mechanism. As a supporter of the Program of Action initiative, the Netherlands strongly values the common elements for a future mechanism identified in Annex C, and is fully committed to the OEWG’s efforts to shape the future single-track mechanism on the basis of consensus. In the same vein, we welcome the adoption by consensus of the single resolution tabled by Singapore in the First Committee this fall. Chair, I will try to be brief and focus on a few specific aspects of the future mechanism. On the thematic working groups, the Netherlands believes that having cross-cutting and policy goal-oriented thematic working groups would allow the future mechanism to address specific cyber challenges and help identify the capacities required to do so. With regard to the sequencing of meetings, we would propose to convene twice a year. That would be traveling here to be here physically twice a year. At the first instance, the dedicated thematic groups could meet consecutively back-to-back for one or two-day meetings each. And then at the second instance, we could repeat these back-to-back meetings of the thematic working groups, followed by a five-day regular plenary session. I believe this would allow us to keep momentum, not limited to being here once a year, where maybe most of the attention goes to negotiating an outcome document and doesn’t allow delegations to socialize the idea and consult more informally, but would still take into account the resource constraints involved in traveling here each time. I just wanted to echo also the point made by Brazil on the importance of geographical representation, both in terms of participation of member states as well as stakeholders. Chair, let me zoom in on capacity building, as the Netherlands believes that capacity building should really cut across the mandate of the new mechanism. And we therefore propose that capacity building and international cooperation aimed at advancing the implementation of the framework could be facilitated through a virtuous cycle comprising of the following steps. And here I will summarize my statement and just mention the four steps. First, sharing of expertise and best practices. Second, self-identifying needs using existing tools and the norms checklist that we’re developing. Third, matching needs and resources, also making use of the UN Global High-Level Roundtable on cyber capacity building, as well as the initiative for a portal. And fourth, a feedback loop. That these first three steps would equip states in considering gaps and what further development of the framework would be necessary. Chair, on stakeholder modalities, we echo delegations before us highlighting their unique expertise and their relevance to our work. So I won’t go further into that. But we really do believe that having a sort of integrated policy-oriented and cross-cutting nature of this mechanism would really warrant contributions of stakeholders on specific areas of expertise. And we could be more focused in that sense, I think, in the new process. On the modalities for accreditation, we would be supportive of something similar to the ad hoc committee modalities, while at the same time really reaffirming the essence of our mechanism being a single-track state-led permanent mechanism. And I think this is also something that we’ve been trying in Annex C of the third APR. Chair, as always, the Netherlands stands ready to work with you and other delegations to safely land this airplane, despite the inevitable turbulence. And finally, just adding to our distinguished colleague from Uganda, I would kind of wish all the members of your team and the Secretariat a very successful career going forward. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Netherlands. South Africa, to be followed by Thailand.

Thank you, Chair. Taking the opportunity of South Africa’s last statement at this ninth session of the OEWG, my delegation would like to thank you, Chair, your team, and the Secretariat for their tireless efforts and unwavering dedication to the successful completion of this process. Turning to the issue of the future permanent mechanism on ICT security under the First Committee of the GA, South Africa welcomes the opportunity to engage on this matter under the common understanding outlined in the guiding principles contained in the elements for the open-ended, action-oriented permanent mechanism on ICT in the context of international security. We would like to see a smooth and seamless transition from the current OEWG to the permanent mechanism, and in this regard, we support the proposed timelines for the first organizational and substantive sessions to be held no later than March and June 2026, respectively. We support the proposal by Brazil on dedicating the February session to discussing the future permanent mechanism. We agree that the permanent mechanism is an intergovernmental process. Our delegation found the interaction with stakeholders from the private sector, civil society, and academia in the intersessional session meetings of the OEWG beneficial in the development of our own thoughts. It would be ideal for these kinds of interactions to continue under the permanent mechanism. We remain open to how we can facilitate a consensus approach in this regard. It would be prudent for the permanent mechanism to include engagements in a format that can be accepted by all member states. In this vein, to ensure that formal recommendations and decisions remain the prerogative of member states, we propose that all decisions be adopted in the annual plenary meetings of member states. We believe that member states do not need to be overburdened by too many meetings in the permanent mechanism. There would be a need for permanent thematic groups to discuss matters like threats, the implementation of norms, and their further development. Thematic groups could also consider the implementation of the CBMs adopted in this OEWG and the voluntary checklist for the implementation of voluntary norms. A permanent thematic group on international law and the possibility of developing legally binding obligations could also be considered. As correctly pointed out by a number of member states, capacity building is a cross-cutting issue, and as such, all thematic groups could also focus on required capacities. We are of the view that some thematic groups could operate on an ad hoc basis, perhaps in response to new developments in the ICT sphere. Our delegation takes note of the presentations by France and Canada and will study them. As I conclude, Chair, we have had rich discussions in this OEWG on the various segments of the agreed framework. The future permanent mechanism provides a platform for these discussions to continue in an open, inclusive, and sustainable manner. We therefore encourage all to remain committed to building the consensus necessary for the establishment of the future permanent mechanism. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, South Africa. Thailand, to be followed by Cuba.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. Thailand supports the establishment of a permanent mechanism that will allow for the continuation of dialogue among states on cybersecurity, and serve as a confidence-building measure, particularly during this challenging period for international stability and security. The future mechanism should be action-oriented, focusing on capacity building to equip states, in particular developing states, to have necessary capabilities and resources to implement norms of responsible state behavior and international law applicable to cyberspace, as well as effectively prevent and respond to current and emerging threats. We recognize the value of establishing dedicated thematic groups to facilitate in-depth dialogue on specific topics. Given the dynamic nature of the cybersecurity landscape, we believe that it is important to embrace flexibility in the organization of these groups, allowing for adjustments in response to evolving needs and circumstances. Currently, we recommend prioritizing dedicated thematic groups on the issues of existing and potential threats, with an emphasis on emerging technologies and international law, which is an issue that urgently requires common understanding. The dedicated thematic group on existing and potential threats should include risk assessment arising from new emerging technologies, such as AI and quantum computing. The group can also discuss the possibility of establishing a future platform for information sharing on existing and potential threats, and best practices on incident mitigation measures. The dedicated thematic group on international law is another crucial one for developing our common understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace, in particular on the interpretation of thresholds, with the help of scenario-based discussion and legal experts to build capacity and promote convergence of views in this area. Mr. Chair, Thailand supports the participation of multistakeholders, NGOs, and academia in the future permanent mechanism, while also emphasizing the importance of reaching a consensus between states on the modalities of their participation. The expertise of these stakeholders will be instrumental to more effectively addressing cybersecurity challenges. Thailand places high significance on inclusiveness, transparency, and the promotion of human rights, which should be reflected in the development of this new framework. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much. Thailand, Cuba, to be followed by Côte d’Ivoire.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We welcome the fact that this year the work of the Working Group and the First Committee has been valued. We welcome the efforts made by all of the delegates to work on the design and establishment of a future regular institutional dialogue as the only forum to address security in the use of ICTs that would preserve the intergovernmental nature with the participation of all states and consensus as what is used for decision-making. We would like to add that if there were a consensus for establishing thematic groups, we would be in favor of keeping the topics currently under the mandate of this current group so that certain interests aren’t placed above others or mixed or to avoid duplication of discussions that are already held. The proposal to establish new thematic groups combining topics within one group as well as convening additional inter-sessional meetings should be decided by member states. We agree with those member states that have advocated for a future regular institutional dialogue that would promote capacity building for states, particularly in developing countries. This on the basis of practical cooperation and international assistance measures, including technology transfer and the transfer of knowledge towards developing countries. Through capacity building measures, we should ensure the inclusive and non-discriminatory participation of all states in accessing information and the ICTs in order to reduce the digital divide and improve states’ responses to emerging threats and to contribute to sustainable development. We are not in favor of the funding mechanisms for future training mechanisms being subject to international financing schemes that would limit the access to funds. Training initiatives should also not be limited to activities to establish just a common understanding on how international law is applied and how to apply norms of responsible state behavior. As we noted in our final statement following the adoption of the third annual progress report on the language of paragraph 9 of annex C on a future regular dialogue, we believe that the mandate of that mechanism should have a focus on legally binding guidance, but focusing just on voluntary norms of state behavior would be to deadlock the status quo while overlooking other matters on the agenda of the OEWG. The very voluntary nature of these norms is the first limitation on their implementation and therefore the initiatives to ensure verification with compliance thereto. No voluntary norm can substitute the value of an international legally binding instrument, which we believe is the only truly effective way to establish the responsible behavior of states in the use of ICTs in the context of international security. A law that encourages all states to use cyberspace for peaceful purposes will always benefit countries when they address the emerging threats in this sphere. Chair, on the participation of stakeholders in the future regular institutional dialogue, we are in favor of keeping the current OEWG modalities, which are a compromise following a long process of forming agreement here. Finally, we reiterate Cuba’s commitment to building necessary consensuses within the OEWG, including on the design of a future mechanism which will provide an opportunity for discussions on ICTs and their use. It falls to this OEWG to decide on the future.

Thank you very much, Cuba. Côte d’Ivoire to be followed by Indonesia. Microphone, please, for Côte d’Ivoire. Madam, could you start again?

Okay, so Côte d’Ivoire welcomes that there’s unanimity regarding the particular elements of the Regular Institutional Dialogue Permanent Mechanism adopted in the third progress report. My country, right from the outset, has supported the establishment of such a mechanism to enable the OEWG to, pursuant to that, guarantee an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable cyberspace. This is a decisive step forward. It gives a visible shape to this instrument and is a reason for hope at a time when we’re starting the last annual cycle of the mandate of the OEWG. My delegation would like to reiterate its unfailing position in favor of establishing a future mechanism without delay. This, nonetheless, would just be the implementation of a common commitment of all member states. It would embody an extraordinary achievement in terms of our efforts in terms of stability and predictability. Strictly upholding the timescale that we have agreed upon is crucial. So my delegation is committed to multi-party, collaborative, and inclusive functioning of the future Regular Institutional Dialogue Mechanism. My delegation thus supports the broadest possible participation of stakeholders and other interested parties based on the principle of a voice and not a vote. Establishing context for consultation and regular discussion with multilateral, regional organizations and also civil society, the private sector, academia, and the technical ICT community is crucial. Enabling them to attend all meetings planned for the future mechanism must be facilitated, especially those for which their skills and experience are needed. This aim of having broad participation should help to define flexible conditions. These can draw from tried and tested examples from other existing processes within the United Nations. Furthermore, the future mechanism is based on the cumulative and changing responsible behavior of states. So for this reason, it thinks that establishing thematic groups must correspond to the traditional areas of skills that are in the consensus-based elements. The states could think about establishing additional thematic groups based on their relevance and on the context whilst promoting criteria of being streamlined and effective. Based on continuity, the future Regular Institutional Dialogue Mechanism should seek to extend the implementation of all initiatives that we have managed to agree upon as part of the mandate of this working group. This aim in particular should encompass all cross-cutting efforts in the area of capacity building that we’ve realized as we have carried out our work in the OEWG. Thank you very much indeed.

Thank you very much, Côte d’Ivoire. Indonesia, to be followed by North Macedonia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Indonesia welcomes the shared views from the Member States on the establishment of a single-track, state-led, and inclusive future permanent mechanism. Indonesia has closely followed the discussion during the informal Town Hall meeting on the RID last week, as well as the proposals by Member States today. We have taken note of the various perspectives on modalities for the participation of other interested parties and stakeholders, suggestions for thematic groups, and the need to balance inclusivity and efficiency in the mechanism structure. Mr. Chair, regarding the structure of the future permanent mechanism, Indonesia notes the proposal for the five-year cycle consisting of the two biennial cycles followed by one-year review cycles, the substantive plenary sessions, dedicated thematic groups, dedicated international meetings, and a review conference. Considering the resource-intensive nature of this structure, Indonesia is open to further discuss the best modalities to be employed for the future mechanism. We recognize the importance of providing adequate support to ensure in-person participation of delegations in New York while remaining flexible in exploring hybrid participation. In principle, we would support any arrangements that could enable broader engagement by policymakers and technical officials, especially from delegations with limited resources. Indonesia also supports the establishment of dedicated thematic groups as a targeted approach to address priority issues in ICT security. Therefore, Indonesia recommends maintaining some of the important thematic pillars of the current OEWG, for example, capacity building, the rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior, as well as the CBMs. Indonesia also views the importance of engaging other interested parties and stakeholders to enrich the dialogue on ICT security. Therefore, to ensure consensus on this issue, Indonesia is ready to engage in further discussions with distinguished delegates on the modalities of stakeholders’ participation, consolidating or streamlining the thematic group proposals, and also the other elements necessary for a robust and efficient future permanent mechanism. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Indonesia. North Macedonia, to be followed by Argentina.

Chair, esteemed delegates, we would like to thank the delegations of France and Canada for their insightful and engaging presentations, which enrich our discussions. North Macedonia aligns itself with the EU statement delivered in this agenda item. In our national capacity, we would like to make the following remarks. Chair, significant progress has been made in recent years on the UN Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace, providing a solid foundation for future actions. The framework equips us with the tools necessary to advance collective efforts in ensuring peace, stability, and cooperation in the digital domain. As highlighted in recent discussions, including those related to the Program of Action, as a prospective permanent mechanism, it should serve as a platform for building resilience, enhancing international cooperation, and ensuring the effective implementation of agreed norms and principles. Importantly, the POA must address the needs of states and identify potential gaps in the framework, turning those insights into actionable advancements. The POA should encourage meaningful contributions from stakeholders, including academia, civil society, and the private sector, while retaining the primary decision-making role of states. To this end, it is important to employ modalities that prevent any single state from having ultimate authority over stakeholder participation. Instead, the POA should follow principles established in the OEWG, offering stakeholders a fair platform to express their perspectives, a voice. The inclusion of these actors is inevitable for tackling complex cyber challenges and enhancing the mechanism’s overall effectiveness through a more integrated engagement process. Dedicated thematic groups addressing key priorities, such as building cyber resilience, enhancing cooperation, and fostering stability in cyberspace. These groups should provide actionable recommendations and fit into plenary discussions, creating a continuous cycle of improvement and responsiveness to emerging threats. Facilitating tailored capacity-building initiatives to bridge gaps in resources and expertise, particularly for smaller states like us. By identifying specific needs and matching them with resources and mechanisms, we can ensure effective support where it is most needed. Designing the mechanism to be adaptable to the evolving cyber threat landscape, while ensuring inclusivity for all UN member states, provisions for remote participation, and streamlined processes will enhance accessibility and minimize burdens on delegations. As outlined in the third annual progress report, dedicated working groups should conduct targeted discussions, facilitate capacity-building efforts, and provide plenary sessions with updates and actionable recommendations. This group should address overarching goals, such as building cyber resilience, increasing cooperation, and ensuring stability in cyberspace. This work should align with the key objectives in complementarity with annual plenary discussions. North Macedonia remains committed to engaging inclusively in these discussions and contributing to the development of a mechanism that reflects the shared aspirations of the international community. And Chair, since it’s already confirmed by the Secretariat that today is Friday, we would like to convey our deepest appreciation to them, to you, Chair, and the delegations for their dedication and contribution throughout these five days. I thank you.

Thank you very much, North Macedonia, for your word of thanks and for your statement. Argentina, to be followed by New Zealand, please.

Thank you very much, Chairman. We’d like to begin by thanking France, Canada, and Chile for their presentations, which provide valuable ideas for our debates. For the interest of time, my delegation would like to set out four points that we believe are essential under this agenda item. Firstly, the number of specialized groups and the financial costs. Two, topics to be addressed by the groups. Three, working modalities of the groups. Four, establishing a sponsorship program for the participation of small delegations. And five, stakeholder participation. Before we begin to elaborate on each of these points, we would like to support Brazil’s suggestion, supported by Egypt, South Africa, and eight other delegations, that due to the short time that we have before the July session, where the group will have a titanic task of approving by consensus the mandate of the future mechanism, the next February session should be dedicated exclusively or rather mostly to the discussion of the format of the next permanent mechanism. Since this is a convened space forum, my delegation is concerned that we will not have enough time in July to reach an agreement and therefore guarantee a single track and a smooth transition that is so desired by all. Likewise, it’s worth bearing in mind that if the modalities do not satisfy all once they are established, we will not have the opportunity to make adjustments in our first review. We will only have the opportunity to review at our first review conference in 2030. Now on, we believe our discussion should be interactive in which all delegations are able to take the floor more than once to react to proposals by other groups, by other states. I’ll now move on to the modalities. On the number of specialized groups and the number of days and the initiatives presented as well as their financial implications. On this topic, my delegation would like to ask the UNODA Secretariat through the good offices of the chair to prepare a report on the budget implications of the specialized groups and other initiatives and proposals that have been put forward by delegations with a view to the establishment of the mechanism. This report should include a breakdown of the costs associated with each cost, including but not limited to the cost of simultaneous interpretation streaming, the cost associated with using a virtual platform for eventual remote participation, etc. It would also be useful to have a report on the number of UNODA offices that would make up the Secretariat so that the Secretariat can carry out its work not only for the organization of meetings and to support the chair, but also to operationalize and maintain the proposals submitted by different delegations, such as the proposal to create repositories, information exchange platforms, a capacity building portal to coordinate cyber security issues of a directory of points of contact. We should also look at the cost associated with the creation of repositories, clearinghouse platforms, and other proposals and the possibility of these initiatives being financed through a voluntary contribution fund administered by UNODA. My delegation is sure that having a study of the financial costs prepared by the Secretariat for our meeting in February would be extremely useful to order and shed light on the possibilities of implementing all of the initiatives presented. This would allow us to prioritize our financial capacities, while a study of this nature will be extremely enlightening in understanding all the proposals that have been presented and that many delegations like mine will be operationalized by the next permanent mechanism. On the number of working groups, we’re flexible, but we hope that the structure that is finally adopted will have the least budgetary impact, but also ensure the effectiveness of our work, which is increasingly critical in international security. On the topics to be addressed in the groups, we believe it’s crucial that the issue of capacity building be addressed by a specialized group dedicated exclusively to this topic, such as was mentioned by Guatemala and other countries. For my delegation, capacity building is the basis on which discussions on the rest of the topics of any cyber security mechanism are built. Incorporating capacity building as one single item within other working groups focused on other topics would dilute and divert attention from this key topic. This could limit their scope and diminish the issue of capacity building, affecting their comprehensive and cross-cutting approach. On international law now, my delegation believes that the current working group has proven to be very efficient in achieving the progressive development of international law in this area. Since the first exercise of the GGE, an increasing number of countries have developed their national position, and this was thanks to the momentum and discussions carried out within that group. That’s why we believe, like the delegation of Thailand and other delegations, that international law should be addressed by a specialized group that could also address matters related to the 11 standards of responsible behavior and confidence-building measures. We believe that the participation of legal and technical experts in the meetings of the permanent mechanism is fundamental. However, given that this forum will operate under the orbit of the First Committee, that is a part of the architecture of international security and therefore intrinsically political in nature, we believe that the leadership of the discussions must be diplomatic. Finally, on substantive matters, we believe that they should focus on the future and current threats. On modalities, we have reservations about the effectiveness and financial implications of hybrid meetings. Hybrid meetings have been very useful for bilateral meetings or small group meetings, but at the UN level, it’s well known that many of the initiatives and proposals do not emerge from discussions in the room, but rather from conversations between delegates in the corridors and during breaks. We are also concerned by the inclusive participation of those delegations that have large time differences with New York and that do not have delegations large enough to participate in person. As we’ve previously noted, we believe it would be very useful to have a report from the Secretariat on the financial costs associated with holding hybrid meetings. Turning now to the decision-making mechanism of the working groups, for my delegation, it’s very important to ensure transparency and inclusiveness in the preparation of the reports that those groups will submit to the conference. The modalities for the preparation of cluster reports should ensure that all delegations can see their views reflected. We support the Mexican proposal to explore a flexible decision-making mechanism ensuring inclusiveness. On the formal or informal nature of the working groups, we would like to ask the Secretariat about the logistical implications of meetings being either formal or informal, for instance, whether streaming services, UNTV, or informal meetings are possible in informal formats and whether the same modalities apply to informal meetings such as interpretation services. We are flexible on the possibility of holding meetings at other UN duty stations. We particularly think that the discussions on international law and rules of state behavior would be particularly enriched by the presence of experts in Geneva. On the sponsorship program, as in previous sessions of the group, a significant number of delegations expressed their support for the next permanent mechanism, having a sponsorship program administered by the UNODA Secretariat and funded by voluntary contributions from states. My delegation would like to reiterate the importance of a future mechanism, having a sponsorship program, which has proven to be useful in other forums that address issues on the international security agenda, such as, just to give a few examples, the sponsorship program of the Arms Trade Treaty and certain conventional weapons. Finally, on the participation of interested parties, for my delegation, it’s fundamental to have more substantive participation of interested parties in the future mechanism, particularly in meetings on existing and potential threats and capacity building. In this sense, we support the Canadian proposal that interested parties could speak by making non-politicized statements. It’s very important that in the February meeting we look in depth at how we can guarantee the substantive participation of the many interested parties, bearing in mind their unquestionable contribution to discussions. Thank you.

Thank you, Argentina. New Zealand, followed by Chile.

Thank you, Chair. I’ll try and react to some of the proposals that have been made this morning, at the same time as addressing the themes of your useful guiding questions. So, firstly, on stakeholder participation, it’s essential to underscore the value that relevant stakeholders would bring to a future permanent mechanism. This point has been made many times during the week, and given this value, the key question for us to consider is how best to integrate stakeholders into our future mechanism. While this mechanism will be state-led, and there’s no debate on this central point, we would do ourselves a disservice if we do not find a way to ensure we have stakeholder participation and perspectives integrated into our process. As others have noted throughout the week, our current modalities are not ideal in this regard, as we are consistently seeing relevant stakeholders vetoed from participating in sessions. Now, fortunately, we do not have to reinvent the wheel entirely; we can draw from recent and relevant precedents, such as the ad hoc committee that negotiated the UN Convention Against Cyber Crime, where stakeholder participation proved very valuable throughout that process. That’s not to say that we would need to copy those modalities outright, but it can provide us a baseline to work from, which we could adapt to our own context. In this context, we would commend Chile and Canada for their very detailed proposal, which we very much welcome and support. We would encourage states to study this proposal, as we will be doing, and engage constructively with it as we consider how best to use the expertise of stakeholders in our future mechanism. Chair, regarding your questions related to dedicated thematic groups, first of all, we want to thank France for its presentation, which provides us a very concrete proposal to focus our discussions as we consider the structure of a future mechanism. We believe that having three thematic groups could be practical to balance a manageable workload and comprehensive discussions. While we need to study further, we are generally supportive of the concept of cross-cutting thematic groups as proposed by France, and as an initial reaction to the proposal, it seems to us that these groups do build on the platform of the OEWG, and they would allow us to apply all the current pillars within those specific themes. So, it has the advantage of maintaining continuity while also further enriching our discussions with practical action-oriented contexts. We really do appreciate the useful example that France gave in relation to ransomware, which we thought well highlights this important point. Chair, in relation to your questions addressing resource limitations, as a general point, the future mechanism should be inclusive to ensure participation by all governments, no matter their size or resources. As a smaller country with long distances to travel, as is the case with all of our Pacific family, we are conscious of the need to ensure the future mechanism is not burdensome. We’re very open to discussing options of how best to achieve this, but we are optimistic that it would be possible to develop manageable modalities to realize this concept of thematic groups as articulated in France’s presentation. We think the Netherlands’ suggestion on meeting frequency in person twice per year would have merit, and while we’re open to the idea of virtual or hybrid meetings, we are conscious that hybrid engagement is not always equivalent to participation in person, especially in a Pacific time zone. We do need to ensure an inclusive process where all states can participate on an equal footing, and Argentina has just made some good points about the value of being able to engage in the margins of meetings that you would otherwise miss out on engaging virtually. Finally, we would also support further discussion for regular institutional dialogue at the next session, either in having the entire session dedicated to it, as others have suggested, or at least starting our discussions with RID so that we do not need to rush at the end of the week. The three-minute countdown clock is quite stress-inducing. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, New Zealand. I didn’t realize that New Zealanders were susceptible to being stressed. You’re such a nation of very happy and zen people. But yes, it is indeed quite a pleasure to be working under time constraints, but that’s how we have organized our work all this while, and we need to reflect on how we can manage the session in February better. Let’s go to the next speaker, Chile, to be followed by the United Kingdom.

Thank you very much, Chairman. On the regular institutional dialogue and bearing in mind the relevance of this topic, since it sets out the immediate future of the framework for discussions of the conduct of states in cyberspace, we believe that the discussions of this group, as discussed by many delegations, should focus on how the current pillars could be incorporated, transitioning in the most effective way possible. Without a doubt, your questions will be helpful here. Bearing in mind the views of delegations on the issue of the modalities of participation of interested parties, and bearing in mind the structural role that they play and will play to ensure the success of our role, together with Canada, we will be undertaking this joint work in involving them in the annual progress reports in order to propose modalities in a state-led process. I won’t give the answer, but I would like to appeal to states to be able to send us their proposals by 2025 to ensure that our proposals can be inclusive and constructive. We are grateful to Japan, and also to Mexico and El Salvador, on the procedural nature. We agree with what was said by Uganda on the need and usefulness of having some type of draft structure on the permanent mechanism and the thematic groups and how they progress and how they feed into the overarching process itself. We need to ensure that we have a proactive response approach here, and also assistance from the secretariat. We need to look at how we can best respect the aims that are brought together within this forum. We, therefore, support what was mentioned by Argentina, and we hope that the secretariat can shed light on the procedural implications of formal and informal as well as hybrid meetings. In this context, we would like to thank all delegations that have made specific efforts to make proposals both here and also in regional initiatives. We know that there are many efforts being made currently that address various matters. My delegation reiterates its willingness to cooperate by assessing all of these on their merits. On the thematic groups, we believe it’s crucial to have an approximation based on action and on a case-by-case basis to ensure that we can address the existing and potential threats practically, as was already mentioned by Thailand and Argentina. Now, on the perhaps more urgent and critical matter of security of ICTs, that’s perhaps a more urgent topic. Now, on Egypt, we value their suggestion on how to value international law. Like Thailand, we believe that this discussion should have a space to mature. Therefore, the suggestion to perhaps look at other mechanisms such as – I’d like to also thank France for their action-oriented proposal and also their cross-cutting and synergistic approach. Now, on the thematic groups and the risk of avoiding too much work for small delegations, we believe that one possibility might be to consolidate various topics within a limited number of groups with a synergistic approach. We also value a realistic option that would enable delegations to be able to cover all thematic groups easily. We could look at the rotation between groups and also bearing in mind the capacity of different delegations. For instance, my delegation, which is only two countries, this was explained by the Netherlands. On capacity building, we agree with what was stated by other delegations that this should be based on a permanent nature and be politically neutral. We support greater geographic representation, and this could also consider various interested parties. We agree with Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, and others that we believe that CBMs are cross-cutting. We think that this should be specifically addressed, and we should specifically address that these are large-scale threats, particularly bearing in mind the regional and sub-regional impact. As was noted in the joint statement of a group from Latin America, including Chile, for CBMs, we will be working to come up with a specific proposal by next February, bearing in mind both those proposals that have already been made. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Chile. United Kingdom, to be followed by Portugal.

Thank you, Chair. We recall that Annex C of the third APR recommends that the future mechanism should facilitate discussions in an integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting way. Annex C further states in paragraph 10 that international cooperation and assistance also cut across cybersecurity issues. We see these two characteristics as a good foundation for the dedicated thematic groups. Dedicated thematic groups should provide a platform to deepen discussions of national and international cybersecurity priorities, to share best practices, and to deepen our understanding of how the binding and non-binding elements of the framework have effect. Inter-sessional meetings and a global capacity-building roundtable would also help to support this vision. At the informal Town Hall meeting, we proposed that dedicated thematic groups could consider cyber-threat information sharing and mitigation, similar to Singapore’s proposal, cyber-incident response, and cyber-strategy development and implementation as three non-exhaustive ideas benefiting from deeper discussion. We noted France’s proposal at the Town Hall and this morning for three groups on resilience, cooperation, and stability. We see the merits of these broad categories, which might allow us to consider the more detailed topics we have heard from some delegations, including my own, within such headings. And those agenda topics under these three overarching headings could be agreed upon by the plenary. Chair, a cross-cutting approach to dedicated thematic working groups would not prevent us from discussing thematic issues in the context of the pillars of the agreed framework. For example, if we had a thematic group addressing stability, as France has suggested, sessions could allow states to discuss when cyber-attacks violate international law. This would allow us to move beyond discussing abstract principles and focus future discussions on how international law constrains state conduct in the real world. The UK was pleased to have the opportunity to do this using realistic scenarios at the UNIDIR workshop on international law last year. In terms of frequency, as a general principle, we should aim for the total number of meeting days throughout the year to be no more under the future mechanism than under the current OEWG. We agree with Iran that holding all thematic working groups sequentially within a single week could be beneficial. Turning to the matter of stakeholder modalities, we begin by thanking Canada and Chile for advancing our thinking in this area. The UK feels as strongly about this matter now as we did in 2021. We believe the continued use of the veto is not in line with the spirit of the modalities agreed upon, whereby all states are encouraged to utilize the non-objection mechanism judiciously, bearing in mind the spirit of inclusivity. All states should decide collectively on which stakeholders are accredited to participate in our work, as was the precedent set by negotiations on the UN Convention on Cybercrime. The UK also supports Brazil’s suggestion for more time for RID in February. Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you very much, United Kingdom. I’m very happy to note that there are some emerging elements and that you can agree also with proposals put forward by other delegations, including the Islamic Republic of Iran. That’s a good sign, UK. Portugal to be followed by Malaysia.

Mr. Chairman, Portugal aligns with your statement but would like to add some very brief comments on the future of our regular institutional dialogue, which we have agreed should be focused on the implementation of the consensually agreed normative framework of state-responsible behavior in cyberspace. Our future dialogue on the implementation of the normative framework is thus meant to contribute decisively to upgrade national cyber capabilities across divides, by mobilizing all interested parties, including tech industry companies, and to enable us to move on to a formal system of mutual accountability that will level up all Member States’ contributions to peace and security in the digital space, so that all of them can peacefully and securely benefit from the digital transition. Thanks to your chairmanship and to extensive engagements by cross-regional groups of Member States in response to your encouragement, the current OEWG has been able to add further layers of understanding on how some of the main elements of the normative framework apply in cyberspace, and I hope that it will continue to do so in its remaining time. The current OEWG has also been able to launch basic tools of communication, such as the Global POC Directory, and to make substantial progress towards harmonizing our language and to set up repositories of best practices in capacity building and incident management. Finally, the current OEWG has been able to show to all of us how we can smoothly move from the traditional pillar-based dialogue to a more action-oriented discussion, structured around priority policy areas and based on a cross-pillar model. These are all crucial achievements towards a desirable future, voluntary, universal system of periodic compliance reporting, which would involve all of us in monitoring and assisting one another to achieve a higher degree of accountability in ensuring security on the digital transition. The seamless transition between the current OEWG and the future permanent mechanism of regular institutional dialogue is therefore practically guaranteed, as it was clear during this week. And I would therefore like, on behalf of my government, to once again extol, Mr. Chairman, your superior diplomatic talents and engagement. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Portugal, for your contribution. Malaysia to be followed by Australia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. As has been widely recognized, it is imperative that we ensure a seamless transition from the present OEWG to the future permanent mechanism on ICT security, building on Annex C to the third APR. We appreciate the presentations by Canada, Chile, and France earlier today, which we will carefully study. In terms of the dedicated thematic groups, Malaysia believes that a thematic group on the protection of critical infrastructure merits consideration. This would allow Member States to address sector-specific threats in detail, deepening our collective understanding of the evolving threat landscape and the operationalization of the framework of responsible State behavior. The thematic working groups should also keep each other abreast of their respective work streams with a view to identifying cross-cutting or related issues which the plenary sessions may then take stock of. This would apply, for instance, to the interplay between international law and voluntary norms, which, as noted earlier this week, may be examined in a more integrated manner. The plenary sessions should also be able to make improvements to the scope and structure of the thematic working groups as may be necessary. The flexibility and adaptability of the mechanism will be key features in enabling its fitness for purpose in response to emerging threats and challenges. Further, it is important for the future mechanism to facilitate the effective participation of States at different levels of development and cyber capacity. We should capitalize on the hard-won deliverables of this OEWG, including the Global POC Directory, optimizing its role within the new mechanism. As to stakeholder participation, we agree with the spirit of the Chair’s guiding question on creative ideas which may yield elements acceptable to all. Prolonged debate on stakeholder accreditation under the permanent mechanism would detract from substantive efforts. My delegation looks forward to potential bridging proposals in this regard, allowing us to leverage the expertise of non-governmental stakeholders whilst maintaining the intergovernmental and State-led nature of the process. It may be helpful to draw on the experience of this OEWG, in which we have benefited during inter-sessional meetings from panel discussions featuring experts judiciously selected by the Chair from a roster reflecting diverse perspectives on various ICT security issues. In the limited time remaining under the current OEWG’s mandate, my delegation would also support a greater focus on the subject of regular institutional dialogue to maximize progress towards consensus on the permanent mechanism. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Malaysia, for your contribution. Australia, to be followed by Ireland.

Thank you, Chair. Australia welcomes the affirmation in our APR that the single-track, action-oriented permanent mechanism must have the implementation of our framework at its core and that our achievements to date will be carried into the Program of Action. We are pleased by the progress made, especially in Annex C, though we do heed your warnings of the work still to come. Let me assure you that Australia will run alongside you for the remainder of our marathon. We thank France for their presentation. Australia supports the proposal of three thematic groups. Keeping thematic groups limited in number will not overburden delegations while still allowing space and time to dig into key issues. We think the suggested groups have merit and will study in further detail. On the issue of timing of meetings, Australia is of the view that we should aim to keep our discussions across both thematic groups and plenary sessions to a similar commitment as to what we have in our current OEWG. We support the proposal for remote participation to allow for greater participation of a broader set of stakeholders, and we echo New Zealand’s remarks from our Pacific family’s perspective. Australia strongly supports thematic groups that will tackle policy issues that we have heard raised repeatedly over the years of our OEWG. Issues such as the protection of critical infrastructure face all of us, and we believe that a space to explore this in a cross-cutting manner will enhance and build upon the discussions that we’ve been able to have in the plenary format. We have heard a number of delegations reference a dedicated group on international law. We understand the desire to go deeper on international law, which we share and have repeatedly reaffirmed. However, Australia does not view a dedicated group on international law as the most effective way to advance our discussions. Australia fears that such a dedicated thematic group would silo these essential discussions. We’ve heard repeatedly the benefit of scenario-based discussions to delegations because of the ability to use these discussions to delve into how binding international law applies to practical life-like scenarios and concrete policy challenges, including new and emerging technologies threats. To that end, we think that the ability of dedicated thematic groups, such as the one on protection of critical infrastructure, to convene international law consultation sessions would be a more valuable way to advance these discussions and allow for integrated discussions on how international law fits with other elements of our framework. The plenary session would then complement this work, considering each aspect of our framework at a strategic level, identifying trends and considering issues, including the application of binding international law in their totality. Chair, you have heard from me a number of times this week on the importance of stakeholders to our discussion at the UN. Australia thanks Canada and Chile for their presentation and paper, and we add our strong support for improved modalities for stakeholder participation alongside the EU, Japan, Singapore, Mexico, El Salvador, the Netherlands, Côte d’Ivoire, Argentina, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, among others. We do not think that the existing format allows us to see the benefits stakeholders can add. We cannot hope to take concrete steps forward on issues like capacity building without the voice of stakeholders. We also add our support to the reiteration that we do not under any circumstances wish to give stakeholders decision-making power. This is the exclusive preserve of states. Finally, we also echo suggestions by Brazil to allocate more time to this topic or at least start our sessions with regular institutional dialogue. Chair, Australia has a long flight home, and my delegation certainly hopes that our plane has all of its parts. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Australia. You’re welcome to stop in Singapore on the way home. We have quite a lot of spare parts if you need them. Hopefully, you won’t. Thank you very much, Australia, for your contribution. Ireland to be followed by Switzerland.

Thank you, Chair. To begin, Ireland aligns with the statement delivered by the European Union, and I’d like to proceed now with some additional remarks in my national capacity. Chair, as we approach the end of the mandate of the Open-Ended Working Group, the establishment of a single-track, permanent future mechanism under the UN auspices that is inclusive, action-oriented, and based on the UN normative framework must be our priority. As we make efforts to find a formulation of what that should look like, we would stress that a balanced approach should reflect the relative support of the proposals that have been tabled, as a reflection on the realistic potential of those proposals to solve the very real problems that we all share, no matter the political perspective. Ireland’s position as a strong supporter and proponent of the Program of Action approach to the future mechanism is well known. We further welcome the modalities agreed in the third APR as a good foundation on which to build. I will now outline how Ireland sees we can build on this foundation. Chair, yesterday we heard about the challenges states are facing in cyber capacity building. We must therefore ensure that the future mechanism is ambitious but does not overburden already stretched delegations. This links to your question on a realistic number of thematic groups. Having considered our own capacity and having heard the concerns of many other delegations, we believe five thematic groups is too many. We also need to evolve our approach to cybersecurity at the UN. We cannot continue to discuss issues under rubrics that are no longer reflective of the cross-cutting nature of our contemporary concerns. Ireland’s perspective is that three thematic groups would offer an opportunity for in-depth thematic discussions and allow for more effective examination of cross-cutting issues. It is important that the topics chosen for these groups capture the cross-cutting nature of our discussions in this forum and that their titles reflect the enduring concerns of states. We believe that thematic groups must be demand-driven and must focus on response to threats, international cooperation and coordination, and building capacity for universal application and participation. The framing of topics of resilience, cooperation, and stability most succinctly encapsulate this demand. Specific proposals as to how we could integrate technical discussions on international law within the future mechanism with those three thematic groups were discussed in our international law statement on Wednesday. That statement is available on the UN OEWG website, and we encourage delegations to consider the proposals made. Chair, you have asked us to reflect on the value of stakeholders. We believe non-state stakeholders are particularly well-placed to enhance situational awareness and to also input their learnings and insights into this process. Their input is particularly valuable on threats where they enhance our understanding of cybersecurity challenges related to critical infrastructure, new and emerging technologies such as quantum and artificial intelligence. Ireland welcomed the initiative to include non-state stakeholders, including from the private sector, in the intersessional discussions in May. The interactive format of these discussions was the essential element of its unique value. The high-quality exchanges and active engagement of member states with non-state stakeholders in this active presentational format demonstrated the value of more active participation of stakeholders in the future mechanism on the basis of a voice but not a vote. We believe that this can be reflected in the approach to the thematic groups. To surmise, Chair, we support the approach of the Future Permanent Mechanism proposal that has been introduced by France this morning on behalf of the cross-regional group represented by the Program of Action. This proposal offers the right balance of issues, reduces the burden on states. We believe the modalities proposed allow for both focused results-driven discussions and succinctly facilitate discussion on cross-cutting issues. We support a state-driven approach while allowing for meaningful participation of stakeholder voices. And reflecting on the discussions this week, we feel it can appropriately absorb and effectively operationalize capacity building initiatives proposed by this group. But mostly, Chair, we think it reflects the ambition of the vast majority of our delegations, capturing their demands for a Future Permanent Mechanism that is fit for purpose. From what we have heard this week, we believe it is the most viable and pragmatic proposal for a future mechanism that can work and evolve for all of us. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Ireland. Switzerland, to be followed by Israel.

Thank you, Chair, and thank you for your guiding questions, and thanks to France and Canada for their presentations. We see a lot of value in the approach presented by France. We support holding discussions across pillars in the thematic working groups, with active participation of cybersecurity experts and legal experts. We think the proposed thematic groups deserve merit and will study the proposal further. We particularly like the image of the aircraft, and that international law sits in the cockpit, and who knows, we might even apply for the position of pilot or co-pilot. It will come as no surprise that for Switzerland, the topic of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, will also be a priority for the future permanent mechanism. The future mechanism must enable us to engage in in-depth discussions on the specific application of international law, and to make progress, moving on from general statements to finding common understanding on its application. Such discussions could take place in thematic working groups, as proposed by France. Ireland’s proposed technical meetings provide an opportunity for structured discussions on specific international law issues, expert briefings, scenario-based discussions, and the delivery of capacity building objectives. This proposal also merits consideration. Alternatively, or in addition to, a subgroup could be created. This group could be a standing committee that is asked by the plenary or a thematic working group to discuss and analyze a specific topic of international law in detail, and to report back at the next meeting. This could be done, for example, on the basis of a report or working paper. This proposal goes a little bit in the direction of the one that our esteemed colleague from Egypt made earlier on, but we think it would be more practice-oriented and not a theoretical discussion if it would work on specific mandates of the thematic working groups or the plenary. Mr. Chair, we are of the view that meetings of the future mechanism should also be held in locations other than New York. This could be particularly useful and valuable for the work of the dedicated thematic groups and dedicated stakeholder consultations. Such working group meetings could be convened at other places where the UN has offices, for example, in Nairobi or Geneva or other places. We would like to thank Argentina for having proposed Geneva as one possible venue for meetings. Geneva is home to a vibrant ecosystem in the field of cybersecurity, digitalization, and development cooperation. In addition to actors such as the ITU, UNIDIR, the International Computing Center, CERN, and the ICRC, numerous non-governmental actors are based in Geneva. In addition, UNIDIR is working on a concept for the Geneva Cyber Week, which will take place for the first time in the week of the aforementioned Global Conference on Cyber Capacity Building in May 2025, and annually thereafter. Organizing a meeting in Nairobi, for example, on the other hand, would also allow participants to familiarize themselves with the realities on the ground, especially regarding the need for capacity building and helping to gather communities and stakeholders engaged in cyber capacity building and development cooperation. Holding meetings in Nairobi or Geneva and other places will make it possible to benefit from the useful resources and the knowledge of a multitude of actors for the work of the future mechanism, and would also provide for better geographical participation, which is one of the ambitions we have identified for the future mechanism. The concern of the sequencing of resources has been raised, and rightly so. However, we think that there are ways to address these concerns. We are aware that not all states have permanent representations in these locations. Voluntary support programs and the organization of such meetings in a hybrid format would help to remedy this situation. And depending on the topic being discussed in a thematic working group, it is not always necessary for the same persons to attend all the meetings of the various working groups. For example, if the discussion is about protecting critical infrastructure, it might make more sense to have representatives from national cybersecurity centers in the room than, let’s say, diplomats. Mr. Chair, for this session, one state alone objected to the participation of 12 stakeholders, among them GFCE and FIRST. These are two organizations that are active in the field of capacity building, among other things, and provide valuable support to many countries. A single state should not be able to veto the participation of stakeholders, even without stating reasons. This is not in line with the inclusive and democratic spirit of this open-ended working group or the future mechanism. We accept that states may exercise their sovereign right to refuse the accreditation of one or more actors. However, this should be reasonably justified with the final decision on participation being left to all states. Finally, we support Brazil’s proposal to allocate more time for the discussion of the RID in our February session. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Switzerland. Israel, to be followed by Germany.

Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor. We wish to join this very constructive and very important conversation and share our positions on the topic of regular institutional dialogue. We hold the position that it’s important to establish a permanent, inclusive, and transparent global discussion mechanism on matters pertaining to the security of ICTs. The question of what would be the exact mechanism of such a regular institutional dialogue is directly related to its possible mandate, modalities, and scope. Israel is of the view that for the sake of inclusiveness and effectiveness of such a dialogue, the framework for such a dialogue on ICT security should be on a voluntary and non-legally binding basis. Any other form of framework carries the risk of alienating and driving away some of the relevant actors. In this context, Israel also believes that cybersecurity and cyber resilience are key elements of a state’s national security. It is essential that any future framework will be consensus-based. Mr. Chair, in our view, the chosen institutional dialogue should be a single track and avoid duplications or fragmentations, and it should optimize the use of resources and maintain a practical and focused process. Like many other member states, we also anticipate that we might encounter some difficulties equally distributing and fully engaging with parallel and multiple processes. In the same way, we advocate minimizing the number of thematic working groups and trying to hold them in a hybrid manner, allowing size, distance, and/or resource-challenged delegations to participate online. We wish to thank France for the very thoughtful presentation today on the future mechanism structure and modalities. In this regard, Israel also believes that there are several potential advantages in creating two or maybe three dedicated thematic groups based on cross-cutting challenges or problems. Through these issues, we can continue to elaborate and discuss or use the five pillars and issues pertaining to the work—to the framework we have created in our previous work of the current Open-Ended Working Group, the former one, and the GGE. Using rotating agenda items in the yearly cycle of the new mechanism can be one way to address the concerns of creating an excessive work burden as flagged by some member states. We found the Netherlands’ suggestions on the frequency and scheduling of the thematic group meetings to be very useful. We have noted the Canadian presentation on the participation of relevant stakeholders in our future mechanism and wish to thank Canada and Chile for their initiative and ideas. We will further learn from them and consider the suggestions as they presented to us. We are also open to considering suggestions by a few member states to adopt the multistakeholder modalities that guided the ad hoc cybercrime treaty negotiations. They have proved to be very practical and useful. In addition, Chair, we have persistently made clear that it is imperative in our view that all decisions on substantial matters in the new mechanism be taken based on the principle of consensus. This principle should apply both to the negotiation processes itself leading to the creation of the mechanism as well as to the decision-making process within the future mechanism. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, Israel continues to support the creation of a state-led, single-track, practical, inclusive, and permanent UN mechanism, and we are ready to continue our constructive engagement aiming to find the needed consensus on all matters vis-à-vis the modalities, structure, scope, and function of the future mechanism. Lastly, we support Brazil’s suggestion to consider allocating more time in our February session to the issue of RID, as it truly looks like we need the extra time. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Israel. Germany to be followed by Italy.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. Germany aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and wishes to deliver the following remarks in our national capacity, and I’m presenting an abbreviated version of my remarks. The long speakers list definitely shows that we need all the time we can get to dive deeper into the details and achieve consensus by July, and we therefore support Canada’s and Brazil’s call for more time on RID discussions in February, for example, by inverting the order of the agenda items and starting with RID and ending with threats, just as a suggestion. In the third annual progress report, member states have agreed, by consensus, on elements for the future mechanism, in particular on central guiding principles, functions and scope, the structure, modalities, and decision-making. We must now use these elements to construct a permanent inclusive mechanism for cyberspace discussions here at the UN that is ready for takeoff in 2026. Let me turn to working groups first. Germany believes that cross-cutting dedicated thematic working groups structured around shared policy issues would give member states’ diplomats the best value for the time they invest by coming here. By applying the tools of threat analysis, norms, international law, confidence building, including the POC directory, and capacity building in each working group, the mechanism would mirror how many of our governments actually tackle cyber policy challenges and how we at home identify gaps in our own national framework, that is, not in silos but in an integrated applied way, like Malaysia highlighted using the example of protecting critical national infrastructure. Germany also welcomes the presentation of France earlier that contained groups structured around desired outcomes of resilience, cooperation, and stability. Such working groups would organically generate actionable recommendations for the more strategic and complementary plenary sessions and thereby help all states in implementing and developing the cumulative and evolving framework in a cooperative way. And this would also inform a virtuous cycle of capacity building, as briefly touched upon by the Netherlands. Let me briefly turn to your guiding questions, Chair. First, on the workload, the future mechanism will be open to all states. In practice, this inclusivity must be guaranteed by not overburdening delegations from small and developing countries or countries with fewer resources. Therefore, Germany believes that the modalities of the future mechanism must not create more work than is currently the case. And we could support both a model of sequencing of two or three travel blocks per year, as suggested by France and the Netherlands. But we also caution against a single session with back-to-back meetings of plenary sessions and a working group session in order to have about at least six months in between the two sessions to give our national systems time to digest and also act upon the actionable recommendations generated in the working groups. As regards the numbers, we believe that three dedicated thematic working groups with two annual meetings of each group are a good start. Parallel meetings must be avoided. And in our view, this would not preclude the possibility that our work in the three initial working groups reveals the need for additional or adjusted dedicated thematic working groups, which could then be set up by the review conference, following the agreed-upon principle of consensus. Second, on the modalities, to further ease the resource burden, modalities should provide for the opportunity of hybrid participation, while Germany will also further study the questions on hybrid modalities raised by Argentina and New Zealand. Hybrid participation could also help foster a more geographically diverse participation of stakeholders from academia, civil society, and the business community, a necessity that many delegations highlighted today. This brings me to my third point on stakeholder modalities. Under each agenda item this week, states pointed to the vital role of non-governmental actors. And to us, it made it clear we cannot discuss cyberspace without acknowledging the role academia, civil society, or the business community plays in it. And without recognizing that states rely on multistakeholder cooperation when implementing capacity-building programs. At the same time, I would like to reaffirm that Germany fully supports the principle of a voice, not a vote, leaving all decision-making power to member states. Therefore, Germany supports the ongoing and inclusive work undertaken by Canada and Chile on developing detailed modalities for inclusive stakeholder participation. Chair, I conclude. I would like to once again thank you and your team for your commitment to building consensus and in keeping up with education-related analogies. Germany listened to the many views on RID elaborated at the session, and we will now take them back to Berlin for a detailed study session until February in the hope of scoring a good final grade in July 2025. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Germany. We all hope to graduate from this process into a higher education of postgraduate studies, beginning with the Future Permanent Mechanism. United States, to be followed by Colombia.

Thank you, Chair. The 2024 APR represents a significant development, particularly on the topic of the regular institutional dialogue. That report is an important starting point for our work this year to define a clear and definitive path for the single-track, permanent, action-oriented, and flexible mechanism within the framework at its core. The United States has been a consistent and active participant in UN cyber discussions since the first GGE on ICTs, and we agree with the Russian Federation that we have achieved results using the current format. Our view is that the POA should retain what works well in the OEWG, such as this plenary-style format. But we need to build on this. The new mechanism should also allow for more in-depth discussion via the cross-cutting working groups on specific policy challenges, such as defending critical infrastructure and responding to requests for assistance that leverage all aspects of the framework. These sorts of focused conversations can illuminate how the framework principles work in practice and align better with how cybersecurity experts frame the challenges states face in cyberspace. We can all agree that the issues we are facing in cyberspace and the solutions to those challenges cut across the framework’s pillars. While the existing format has been valuable in raising awareness of the content and purpose of norms, law, and CBMs, we struggle to see how to develop in-depth practical outcomes if we are restricted to that format. We have an opportunity with the thematic groups to take a big step forward in strengthening cyber resilience. We do not view proposals to combine a few elements of the pillars into a single working group, such as voluntary norms and binding international law, as a productive way forward. Such a scoping would cause confusion and would not lead to a more practical, issue-focused conversation. Separately, as we expressed at the recent town hall, we recognize that delegations are stretched thin, and it is critical to achieving inclusive participation that the new permanent mechanism not be overly burdensome. We are keen to discuss whether virtual sessions, written submissions, and other ideas can ease participation of states while maintaining our momentum. On the topic of stakeholders, the OEWG must resolve this year the process of including stakeholders in the permanent mechanism. We have heard nearly all states echo concerns that our current modalities do not allow for meaningful, inclusive, and in-depth stakeholder participation. The current modalities that allow a single state to veto potentially key stakeholders is not tenable and must be improved. We thank Canada and Chile for their proposal in this regard. Given the significant role of non-governmental entities in cybersecurity, threat analysis, public-private collaboration, and technical innovation, their participation will be essential to the mechanism’s success. Our starting point for their involvement should be the UN gold standard for stakeholder modalities. Chair, we share your ambition for a final OEWG report that paves the way for a seamless transition to the new permanent mechanism and stand ready to work with you and others on this goal. To that end, we agree with Egypt, Brazil, Canada, and other states that have stressed the need to allocate more time to this discussion through intersessionals and by starting rather than finishing with RID during our formal sessions. Finally, Chair, the visa issue was mentioned. The United States reiterates its commitment to the host country obligations and refers all such matters to the host country committee. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you. United States, Colombia, to be followed by China.

Thank you, Chair. We’d like to begin by thanking the delegations of France, Canada, and Chile for their presentations, and we support the possibility of assessing at the February session this agenda item not being discussed on the last day, as has been mentioned by many delegations. In order to contribute to the discussions on a future action-oriented permanent mechanism, we would like to highlight the following on thematic groups. As we have mentioned throughout this session, Colombia believes it would be helpful for this permanent mechanism to include the following permanent thematic groups: one on existing and potential threats, one in charge of addressing everything related to the application of international law to cyberspace as well as rules, norms, and principles, and a thematic group on capacity building. Bearing in mind that capacity building is a long-term progressive commitment that, in addition to international peace and security, helps to make progress on legal, technical, and political matters, we believe that it’s an enabler for practical action and think that CBMs could be addressed in a cross-cutting manner throughout the working groups. This has been done successfully in various other processes, as mentioned by Mexico and Egypt, where there are other groups with two technical groups which ensure that both perspectives can be addressed to ensure that parallel regimes are established. Colombia was one of the main proponents of the importance of the future mechanism being action-oriented, inclusive, and flexible. We believe that these principles could be implemented by including the annual thematic, practical, and policy-oriented topics within each group in line with the matters that are prioritized in light of the prevailing situation of ICT use and security. We could also integrate the implementation and follow-up of measures and recommendations adopted at the OEWG, such as the points of contact and the global CBMs list. These are aspects where there’s already agreement, where we can make progress together on their implementation. They should enable multiple interested parties participating in an advisory nature. We should also look at a sponsorship system, as was mentioned by Argentina, and look at the possibility of the venues for intersessional meetings, and the thematic groups could be rotational in nature and be carried out in the different regions of the world. I’d like to note that this last idea that my delegation is echoing was suggested at a side event yesterday held by Canada and Chile, where we were able to have a transparent, open dialogue among states and parties interested in a future mechanism. To conclude, I’d like to say that over these weeks we’ve listened to many important ideas and creative proposals. Therefore, it now falls to us to practice flexibility, seek agreements, and advance on understandings and practical commitments that lay the foundations for a comprehensive, action-oriented, and cross-cutting mechanism. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Colombia. China, to be followed by the Republic of Korea.

Thank you, Chair. At present, the ICT security process of the United Nations has entered a critical transitional juncture. How to promote discussions of the future mechanism and reach more consensus has become the key to determining the long-term development of the ICT security process. China wishes to propose the following. First, we must put unity first. After years of discussion, the establishment of a single-track permanent mechanism for ICT security in the UN with universal participation has become the common call of the international community. China supports discussions within the framework of the OEWG on the proposals of all countries on an equal footing, on the basis of which differences can be narrowed and consensus can be forged. China notes with appreciation that this year, the First Committee of the GA adopted by consensus a single resolution on information security, which has accumulated favorable conditions for reaching consensus on the future mechanism within the OEWG. We should continue to uphold the spirit of solidarity and cooperation, maintain the current international system, promote agreement on the future mechanism within the framework of the working group, and achieve a smooth transition between the working group and the future mechanism. Second, the rules of procedure of the First Committee should be used as a principle. China has noted that some countries have requested that reference be made to the relevant practices of the Third Committee and the Ad Hoc Committee on the Convention Against Cybercrime. The ICT security process of the UN originated from the First Committee and should naturally follow the rules of procedures of the First Committee. Decisions on any issue, whether substantive or procedural, should be made by consensus. Otherwise, they will give rise to disputes and divisions and disrupt the normal atmosphere of work and cooperation. Third, the future mechanism should holistically promote the five pillars of the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace in a comprehensive and balanced manner, namely existing and potential threats, norms of responsible state behavior, international law, CBMs, and capacity building. China opposes any distortion, reconstruction, and destruction of the framework or rewriting of the consensus, as well as the unilateral promotion of certain pillars while blocking discussions on other topics. China proposes that the thematic groups discuss all five topics without leaving any topic out. At the same time, regarding the modalities of the thematic groups, considering the differences in human resources among countries and to maximize efficiency and avoid adding unnecessary burdens, it is proposed that the meetings of the thematic groups be held back-to-back with the annual substantive sessions. In addition, on the premise of ensuring a comprehensive and balanced approach, China is open to the idea of holding thematic group discussions based on a rotational mechanism. China has noticed that Russia, France, Brazil, and Canada have made specific proposals and we are willing to study these proposals. China is ready to continue to participate in the discussions constructively and to work with other countries to promote agreement on the future mechanism under the framework of the working group so as to achieve a seamless transition between the working group and the future mechanism and to jointly maintain the unity and coherence of the ICT security process of the United Nations. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, China. Republic of Korea, to be followed by Czechia.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. We welcome the adoption of Annex C in the 3rd APR. This represents a significant milestone toward the establishment of a single-track, action-oriented, and permanent mechanism. As reaffirmed during last week’s Town Hall meeting, with the OEWG’s deadline approaching, it is essential to make as many decisions as possible now. As the Chair aptly noted, we must avoid kicking the can down the road. For the next future mechanism, we emphasize the importance of minimizing time and financial burdens on States while ensuring active and in-depth discussions. We propose two ways to achieve this. First, as also suggested by others, we suggest operating thematic groups in a hybrid format. The choice to stay up all night should be a feasible option as an alternative to enduring 15-hour flights and adjusting to jet lag. Regardless of its effectiveness, exploring the possibility itself at this moment holds significant value as the future mechanism should be an open, inclusive, transparent, sustainable, and flexible process. To achieve this, we agree with Argentina on the need for a budget calculation. Second, we appreciate France’s proposal as it provides a clearer concept for structuring our future mechanism. Building on this suggestion, we propose an additional renewal of the program of work at the end of the first biannual cycle of the plenary session, given that the review session occurs only every five years. This approach would enable the thematic groups to conduct timely discussions that reflect the rapidly evolving nature of cyberspace while allowing sufficient time for deep deliberation. Also, as a proponent of the multistakeholder participation, we appreciate the presentation made by Canada, also on behalf of Chile. The presentation provides the group with productive ideas as to how we should set up the modalities of multistakeholder participation in the future. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Republic of Korea. Czechia to be followed by Pakistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. Czechia aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and would like to make a few additional remarks in its national capacity. Since many of the key issues for Czechia have already been addressed, I will focus on just a few points. First, we appreciate the presentation delivered by France, which provides a good basis for our discussions. We believe that the in-depth discussion on a future permanent mechanism within the OEWG has helped to shape the Programme of Action proposal in a way that responds to the concerns raised here previously. Therefore, Czechia considers the Programme of Action to be the ideal proposal for a future institutional framework, one that can continue the work of the current OEWG when its mandate ends next year, while also offering a more action-oriented and cross-cutting approach to international cooperation on cybersecurity. From Czechia’s perspective, as a relatively small country, we are pleased to see a broad consensus that the future mechanism should not impose a greater burden on individual delegations than the current OEWG. We therefore welcome, for example, the idea of having a limited number of thematic groups that would meet twice a year, not in parallel, and that the meetings of these thematic groups could be held in hybrid format. Additionally, we are open to discussing whether these thematic groups could be held in locations other than New York. While the pros and cons need to be carefully weighed, Czechia is open to this discussion. If holding the meetings in another city would ensure a higher participation of states, especially from regions that find it difficult to send cyber experts from capitals to often very distant New York, we believe it is worth the consideration. Another key issue for us are the modalities for multistakeholder participation in the future permanent mechanism. We appreciate the work that Canada and Chile have done in this regard. Czechia believes it is essential that non-state stakeholders can participate on a voice-not-a-vote basis in the future mechanism. In this context, both the proposal made by El Salvador during last week’s virtual town hall meeting to adopt an accreditation process for multistakeholder participation in the future permanent mechanism, similar to that used in the Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime, and the Canadian proposal presented today are worth considering for the future mechanism to enhance transparency and make the expertise of stakeholders available to the future mechanism. To conclude, Czechia also supports the Brazilian proposal to allocate more time for discussion on regular institutional dialogue next time. Thank you.

Thank you. Czechia. Pakistan, to be followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Thank you. Thank you, Chair, for your steering of the Working Group. Mr. Chair, Pakistan maintains a consistent and clear position on the topic of regular institutional dialogue, and we have been iterating the importance of three key principles in this respect, which are inclusivity, consensus-driven decision-making, multistakeholder participation, global collaboration, and sustainability. We believe that the success of the process depends upon equal and all-inclusive participation of all member states. We also believe that the future institutional dialogue must include in its mandate the topics that we have been discussing in all clusters, which are capacity building, norms building, and discussion on the application of international law in cyberspace. In this respect, we can have working groups as per requirement. Permit mechanisms must be built on a sustainable foundation and developed through a consensual process. We advocate for a collaborative and all-inclusive approach ensuring effectiveness and long-term sustainability. However, we recognize that due to the diverse nature of the global internet and private entities playing a major role, participation of stakeholders in the process has great value. In order to devise – advise states on different issues, we believe that the process of accreditation of stakeholders should be more transparent, fair, equitable, and inclusive, and we see potential for enriching our deliberations in the future permanent mechanism. I would like to renew Pakistan’s support for this intergovernmental process for safe, secure, and stable cyberspace for all, and we look forward to constructive exchange of views on regular institutional dialogue in more detail in more dedicated settings. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Pakistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, to be followed by Sierra Leone.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Sir, for me, it’s the first time to take the floor, so I first and foremost would like to congratulate you and your team for your work since the start of the Working Group. The DRC delegation welcomes your leadership as you head up the work of this ninth session. Despite the current complex geopolitical situation, we are delighted to note that our Working Group has made significant progress. The consensus adoption of the third APR also shows the desire of member states to place the UN at the heart of our dialogue on ICT security. Sir, in an environment where we’re seeing an increasing use of ICTs by both state and non-state actors in times of armed conflict, we’re concerned by the effective implementation and respect of rules and principles under international law and international humanitarian law. The respect for these rules is absolutely critical in terms of guiding the responsible behavior of states. Threats to cybersecurity are no longer limited to isolated incidents and non-identifiable ones. Sometimes they are part of a deliberate strategy conducted by states who are exploiting cyberspace for political purposes, often to meddle into the domestic affairs of other states and to upset their stability. Given this, my delegation underscores the importance and even the urgency of regulating this space, not only between states, but also with public and private stakeholders to establish a collective multilateral order to preserve international peace and security. The DRC, unfortunately, is confronted with this scourge that has serious consequences. But reliable information reports that these attacks primarily come from our immediate neighbors with a supposed active support of some state actors in malicious activities in cyberspace that target our institutions and threaten societal peace. For example, identity theft affecting famous people and Congolese citizens through disinformation and smear campaigns in sensitive areas such as North Kivu, including Goma, Beni, Butembo, Kimbuma, and Kanyaboyonga. Disruptions to national and regional security with repeated attempts to compromise civil air transport in the DRC that has been eradicated thanks to the vigilant work of our experts and the support of some humanitarian organizations. This is a challenge for the international community. This reflects a worrisome politicization of the use of cyberspace. This is a major challenge, not just for the DRC, but for the entire international community. We should underscore that the Democratic Republic of Congo has considerable mining reserves that are crucial for developing digital global industries. This potential that we have should encourage sincere and mutually beneficial international cooperation. However, we continue to be subject to hostilities, armed attacks, and brutal acts perpetrated by armed groups supported by external forces. This compromises stability in the east of our country. These violations should be strongly condemned and should prompt the international community to act to restore peace and to encourage ethical and responsible use of cyberspace. The commitment of the DRC and calling for international action. Under that rubric, given these challenges, the DRC has published a law of number 23 on the digital code. This is a legal instrument to govern the use of cyberspace and to clamp down on malicious behavior. We’re continuing to strengthen our digital infrastructure in order to respond effectively to challenges posed by international cyberspace crime. In this context, we would call for building technical capacity of the experts and member states, particularly those from developing countries, to better prepare for addressing new digital threats and to reduce the digital divide, increase international cooperation to enable developing countries to make the most of technological advances and to have the necessary resources in terms of knowledge sharing and information in order to effectively coordinate joint responses to cyber attacks and to coordinate the way in which technology such as AI can be used to prevent and to have automated responses to decrease trends in an increase in cyber threats. It would be good if awareness could be raised about the global repertoire of points of contact to have regular training courses on cybersecurity and to promote data protection protocols. Furthermore, we should have ongoing work of this working group until a legally binding instrument is drafted and this would harmonize things at the national and international level. The DRC reaffirms once again its support for the implementation of international law in cyberspace and supports ongoing dialogue within the working group within indeed the OEWG. We remain convinced that a safe, regulated, inclusive cyberspace is something that we can achieve if we have sincere and determined international cooperation. I would like to conclude my statement by thanking the United Nations and all those partners that have made it possible for my delegation to attend this ninth session. Thank you very much indeed.

Thank you very much, Democratic Republic of the Congo, for your statement and also for your participation in this process. I give the floor now to Sierra Leone, to be followed by Vietnam.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, the rapid evolution of ICTs brings significant challenges, particularly for developing countries like Sierra Leone, which face this challenge of limited resources, capacity gaps, and heightened vulnerabilities. We believe that the establishment of a future permanent mechanism for ICT security at the United Nations, following the conclusion of the OEWG, is a necessary step to continue the discussions and address these challenges and ensure an inclusive, equitable, and effective global dialogue on ICT security. Sierra Leone supports the development of this mechanism under the United Nations and emphasizes that the process must remain a state-led initiative, providing a dedicated and accountable platform for governments to engage in meaningful dialogue and collaboration on ICT security in the context of international security. It is essential for the future permanent mechanism to be open to all member states, ensuring that the perspectives of smaller states and developing countries are fully represented. Sierra Leone recognizes that smaller delegations face significant challenges in attending thematic group meetings and other deliberations due to financial constraints. To address this, Sierra Leone supports the allocation of funding and capacity building resources to enable the effective participation of smaller states. Such support would enhance diversity, foster meaningful engagement, and ensure no state is left behind in the global dialogue. My delegation supports the proposal by Egypt for the permanent mechanism to adopt a technical and legal framework modeled on the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This structure provides a balanced and practical example of how a UN mechanism can effectively integrate technical expertise and legal principles while fostering collaboration among member states. We further underscore the importance of integrating regional perspectives and engaging multistakeholder groups. Regional organizations such as the African Union are essential partners in addressing ICT security challenges in a context-specific manner. Similarly, the inclusion of stakeholders such as the private sector, civil society, academia, and technical experts will enrich the mechanism by bringing diverse expertise and innovative solutions. Mr. Chair, for Sierra Leone and developing states, which are disproportionately vulnerable to ICT-related threats, the mechanism offers an opportunity to bridge these gaps by fostering capacity building, information sharing, and enhanced cooperation tailored to the needs of developing states. Sierra Leone reiterates its strong commitment to this process and stands ready to work collaboratively with all stakeholders to build an inclusive, secure, and sustainable ICT environment for all. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Sierra Leone. Vietnam, to be followed by the Philippines.

Mr. Chair, this delegation would like to express our full support for the elements for an Open-Ended Action-Oriented Permanent Mechanism on IC Securities in the context of international securities as contained in Annex C in the third APR. With regard to the modalities of the future mechanism, our delegation would like to thank France and Canada for their proposals and will study them further in the coming months. For now, our delegation would like to see improvements in the proposals on the following issues. First, the scope of the discussion in the future mechanism should encompass all elements in the cyber-civilian ecosystem, including emerging technologies, undersea cables, or even satellites. In this regard, the mechanism should also invite and enable the meaningful participation of pertinent specialized agencies such as ITU or UNOSA. Second, the number of meetings should be minimal so that a plenary should take place only once a year in the second half and one dedicated inter-sessional meeting on prioritized topics in the first half. To facilitate the participation of experts in the dedicated meetings, we believe that other UN Headquarters in Geneva, Vienna, or Nairobi or elsewhere should be utilized to host such meetings. Also, hybrid meetings must be limited and really exceptional as countries in Asia-Pacific are in clearly disadvantaged positions due to time zone differences. Mr. Chair, this delegation has the view that the future mechanism by any modality should be mindful of the cost of participation to member states, as many countries do not have a dedicated agency for cyber diplomacy and good cybersecurity experts are busy and also in high demand for meetings at regional levels. Indeed, ASEAN already has six different sectoral bodies to discuss cybersecurity policy annually, and this reality constrains our capacity to assemble a good inter-agency team to attend UN meetings. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Vietnam. Philippines to be followed by Uruguay.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Philippines reiterates its support for a future permanent mechanism that is single-track, state-led, and action-oriented, which caters to the collective but at the same time addresses the specific needs of member states. The Philippines agrees with the Chair that, as with all beginnings, time will be needed for the mechanism to be fully established and smoothly running, which is why the Philippines supports the proposal to begin with a limited number of thematic groups. This will enable a solid start and meaningful discussions and ensure that effective and efficient processes are cascaded to other thematic groups or processes as the mechanism expands and evolves through both time and in response to the evolving cyber-threat landscape. There are still many facets of the mechanism which have yet to be determined. The Philippines wishes to give particular emphasis on the importance of stakeholders’ inputs. Despite varying views on how stakeholders will play a role in the mechanism, there is a common recognition that stakeholders will have a unique and invaluable contribution through their resources and expertise, which cannot be downplayed. It is up to the member states to collectively determine how meaningful stakeholder participation may be achieved in a manner that reaps the most benefits and at the same time is acceptable to all. Canada and Chile have provided an excellent starting point with their concrete recommendations on how to operationalize this setup. The Philippines looks forward to further refinements to the proposal based on collective comments and feedback. We also see the possibility of other member states, even those with alternative or differing views, putting forth their own ideas of how to maximize stakeholders’ invaluable contributions in a manner or procedure which is workable for the whole body. As the Chair has previously stated, trust is an essential component that will bring all elements together and ensure success. A steady and solid start will ensure full inclusivity, which will allow trust to permeate the process. It is necessary to ensure that the views of all member states have been considered to ensure everyone’s support, guaranteeing the success and sustainability of the mechanism. Thus, as we move closer to the finalization and institutionalization of the mechanism, the Philippines agrees with the proposal that this body consider discussions and RID be held at the start of succeeding meetings, as structure and modality will be the vehicle to move the process forward. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you so much, Philippines, for your statement and also for your suggestions. Distinguished delegates, we have two more speakers who are on the list, Uruguay and Latvia, and then after that, I intend to make some comments to wrap up this cluster on regular institutional dialogue, and then we can go on to the remaining agenda item, which is other matters. So let’s listen to the last two speakers, Uruguay to be followed by Latvia. Same place.

Chairman, we’re grateful for the presentations made by several delegations, including Chile, Canada, and France. On the topic of the regular institutional framework, I’d like to recall the proposal made by my delegation on the holding of a substantive session entirely dedicated to the discussion of this pillar. We think that we should discuss when we believe that 2025 will be key in the decisions that we need to take for the future framework. As many delegations have commented, one of the most important topics of this session we are discussing with a time limit of three minutes, which is particularly impressive given the number of people who want to take the floor. As a country of the Global South, for Uruguay, capacity building should be the central focus of the future permanent mechanism. Therefore, we support the proposal made by Argentina, Guatemala, and many others to have a thematic group dedicated to this topic, but with a mechanism that makes it able to ensure the effective capacity building that is neutral and permanent, as was commented by the distinguished representative of Chile. Chairman, discussing how many groups to have shouldn’t be the focus of our debate. We should rather focus on what is what we need, bearing in mind that we have limited resources and also limited time. The duplication of activities and repetitive tasks don’t lead us to effective operations. The future permanent mechanism should have assessment mechanisms into its own work to provide effective and efficient solutions to the threats that the global community is facing. In our case, we propose there should be a constant developing dialogue of institution, international law, and the emerging threats as well as capacity building. As Australia said, we think that looking at practical cases has helped significantly. Therefore, this modality should be contemplated. Finally, the participation of civil society, academia, and the private sector is relevant and helpful in ICTs. These sectors, they are the most dynamic and innovative in the world, should speak up clearly and effectively. We need their contribution to be able to define the most efficient action that the international community can implement. Therefore, we welcome the proposal made by Mexico for a multistakeholder panel. As was mentioned by Malaysia, we believe it’s important to ensure the inclusion of experts that can provide advice and technical recommendations focused on forging towards addressing the malicious use of ICTs. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Uruguay, Latvia, you have the floor, please.

Thank you, Chair. I will not repeat the position of the Latvian delegation because it was eloquently presented by the representative of the European Union. However, what I wanted to intervene, Chair, is that, listening to this conversation today, I think we have a lot of convergence in the room. Knowing that there is a desire to continue this conversation during the February session, may I ask you to consider developing a proposal related to a blueprint of the future process? Perhaps organizing another town hall consultation in between and presenting that prior to the February meeting, so that we could organize our conversation on the topic based on your proposal. Hopefully, at the end of the February meeting, we could even endorse it, leaving for the July meeting issues with much more political sensitivity than just the organization of our future work. Thank you, Chair, and good luck.

Thank you very much, Latvia. I should add that my good friend from Latvia, we know each other for more than 20 to 25 years. We served together in Geneva many decades ago, but thank you very much for that intervention, Latvia. I think your specific suggestion is something I was also mulling about as you were speaking, so thank you very much for that. So let me take this opportunity, and I think it was just as well that we finished with that remark from Latvia. It helps to sort of bring things together. Let me start by saying that this has been a very, very good discussion. In some ways, it’s just as well that we are ending our week with this topic, because there’s a lot of commonalities, a lot of convergence, a lot of very good ideas, very creative proposals have been put forward. The discussion has been underpinned from where I sit, I sense this, has been underpinned by a willingness to have a dialogue, because in a sense you are having this discussion between yourself. I simply was here listening to your conversation between yourselves. The tone was very positive, the tone was very constructive, and I’m therefore very grateful to everyone who has spoken today for bringing your ideas and your very constructive proposals and your open-mindedness to this dialogue. It was also very heartening to see delegations which had not previously spoken jumping into this discussion, because this has to be our process. This future mechanism belongs to all of us, and everyone needs to shape this so that we can all collectively call this our very own special process that we had a role in building together. Now, in the course of the dialogue or discussion, there was also some elements or some sense of attachment to very closely held ideas, and there was a sense that perhaps we shouldn’t change what has worked. It’s true, I think what has worked has brought us thus far, but we also need to realize that we are making a transition to something that is no longer of a limited duration, because this open-ended working group was for a period of five years and prior to that for a period of two years. So in some ways the open-ended working group was an ad hoc arrangement, to use a word that you all have been referring to, ad hoc. But we are no longer going to be ad hoc but permanent, and therefore we need to think carefully about how we can learn from our experience and do things differently. Do things differently not for the sake of being different, but building on our experience in this process. And so I want to say that in terms of the structure, I think there is a fair degree of convergence. No one wants too many meetings, but at the same time your desire to speak at length is insatiable. So how are you going to square this? And of course you may not have been happy that I had to put a timer, which was stress-inducing, as one of you put it. But if you don’t want to have more meetings and you have a lot to say and everything to be done in a span of a week, which is basically two sessions of three hours, well, you know, something has to give. So, well, no one wants too many meetings. Different suggestions have been made, two meetings per year, and how we sequence the different meetings, and then the need to make it inclusive given the fact that delegations have to travel to make sure that we don’t travel too often back and forth because it’s a huge constraint, resource constraint. The point about budgets was also raised, but budget for the UN, but also budget for national delegations. Each one of you would have to spend money. Of course, the hybrid option is there, but the hybrid option is in some ways a quick fix for informal consultations. But if we end up systematically disadvantaging certain time zones, then I think it may not be as inclusive as the new group should be. But I sense that there’s a lot of common ground in terms of how we can organize, structure, and sequence the meetings. The discussions on dedicated thematic groups and the number of dedicated thematic groups elicited a lot of comments. I think one of you said it’s not the number of the groups, but what we want the groups to do. I think that’s a fair point. We need to think very deeply about this. There’s no magic number. If you say that you have three meetings, then the question arises, each thematic group, does it meet for one day or two days? If it’s two days, three dedicated thematic groups mean six days, but you have five days in a week. But then how do you squeeze that into a work program over a five-day week? Or do you have two dedicated thematic groups as was also suggested by Egypt using the COPUOS model? So this will require further discussions. But I also want to point out that in our annual progress report, we have the substantive plenary sessions. And then the dedicated thematic groups. And don’t forget there’s the dedicated intersessional meeting as an option in the structure that the chair can convene. We didn’t discuss that because we don’t need to decide anything about dedicated intersessional meetings. But the chair of the future mechanism can convene dedicated intersessional meetings in consultation with states. So that is also a flexibility instrument to convene additional very focused discussions in a working group style or a standing committee style to look at issues X, Y, and Z, for example. But that’s for the future chair to decide. Let me put it this differently. The discussion between pillar versus thematic is not incompatible. Because some of the discussion was that the pillars are what has worked for the OEWG. We should not change it. And then on the other hand, there were many of you who were saying that thematic group, because in the annual progress report we said that the thematic groups would be a mechanism to have integrated discussions. But the two are not incompatible. So the first point I want to make about the pillar approach is that the pillar or the pillars are the foundation of the cumulative and evolving framework. The pillars have given us the framework and the pillars will be there as a foundation for us to go to the next step. If you look at the substantive plenary sessions and imagine how that will look like in 2026, you’re going to end up having to organize the work around certain items and topics over a week. You cannot start by saying, I’m going to make an integrated cross-cutting general statement. You need to say, well, in my statement I want to address issues A, B, and C. So are you going to have a general debate for a whole week where every delegation will address 10 issues? Or are you going to slice that substantive plenary sessions into certain topics? So my point is that a pillar approach may well be useful in organizing the plenary sessions because it gives everyone an opportunity to make your very considered views, whether on the threat landscape or the evolving norms and your expectations for capacity building, etc. But that does not mean we should not have these thematic discussions. And there was that debate earlier in July when we agreed on this NXE that we need some interconnected discussions. And this is an important point I want all of you to take note. If we are having an integrated discussion, it does not mean we are destroying the pillars. It does not mean we are denying the different pillars of the framework. So it’s not incompatible. So I think keep that in mind. So you may have a nervousness that by moving to integrated discussions we are abandoning the pillar, and therefore we are abandoning issues of importance to my delegation. And therefore I don’t want thematic discussions because it could mean that the pillars are going to be destroyed. Whereas in reality, the two are not incompatible. It is essential to take both approaches. You may need to organize the substantive plenary sessions in terms of certain specific issues in a vertical way. But also you want a horizontal discussion where you want to give countries the opportunity to come and talk about certain thematic issues. It could be about talking about critical infrastructure, for example, or setting up their national institutions. Because when we talk about capacity building, capacity building for what? Capacity building applies across the board. Is it capacity building to train your personnel or to build national cyber institutions or to draft national legislations? So there is certainly a cross-cutting thematic element. So my point to you is don’t be nervous about having a thematic discussion. Don’t be nervous about having an integrated discussion. Because having such a discussion can help countries make a difference to their situation on the ground. So keep that in mind. A lot of countries are going to need help on a range of issues. So we need to take that policy-oriented and action-oriented approach. But that doesn’t mean we are abandoning or destroying the pillar-based approach. The pillar-based approach essentially is a way of organizing our discussions. And the cumulative and evolving framework are essentially the pillars. And the threats, international law, norms, CBMs, and capacity building are very much part of the normative framework that we have adopted. And also very much forms a part of all our outcome documents. So let’s keep an open mind. And then I wanted to say that it’s also important to look at the two-year biennial cycle as perhaps a two-year program of work. So if we have two or three dedicated thematic groups, not every thematic group needs to meet at every in-person meeting. I think some of you said that there could be a rotation, and I think we need to explore that. It may be useful to be thinking in terms of a two-year program of work. 24 months under one chair, and then it rotates to another chair. And at the end of two years, yes, you certainly have the option to make some adjustments. But after two biennial cycles, four years, you have a review cycle. And then you also need to think of the very first meeting of the future permanent mechanism. The dedicated thematic groups report to the substantive plenary session. But then you can’t start the new permanent mechanism with dedicated thematic groups. You need to start with a substantive plenary, because the plenary will then give guidance and establish these certain groups. And then you have this interactive loop. So there is a question of sequence. There’s a question of rotation. There’s a question of number of meetings. There’s a question of spacing it so that it doesn’t clash with other processes. Then there’s also the point about rotating it between venues. I think quite a number of you mentioned that. So there are a lot of possibilities. And so what I intend to do is as follows. I will put together a discussion paper. And yes, it’s also my intention to make this paper available to you well before the next substantive session in February. And I think it will also be useful to have an informal town hall meeting before the substantive session in February in order to hear reactions. Now, let’s keep in mind that we did have an informal town hall meeting. That was my way of giving all of you additional time so that we didn’t have to come here and feel the pressure to say everything that needed to be said. So the informal town hall was useful as a preliminary way of understanding each other’s positions, but it also gave us additional time. So let’s give ourselves that additional time prior to the February session. So I will prepare a discussion paper, I will circulate it before the February meeting, and I intend to convene a town hall meeting. And then the question is, do we need more time here in the February session to discuss the regular institutional dialogue? Now, some of you said perhaps we just spend the entire week discussing that, but we also have many other things to do. I think we need to take a step forward on a range of issues. So I am open to inverting the program of work, as some of you have suggested, so we can start with regular institutional dialogue. Is there any objection to that, inverting the program of work? So we are not destroying the program of work, we are not destroying the agenda, we are not destroying the mandate, so don’t get nervous. It’s exactly the same, we are just reversing the order. But I know what will happen. You will spend two days discussing regular institutional dialogue, and then you will say you don’t have enough time for capacity building, and then we’ll be rushing it. And then there might be proposals to reverse it back, but I’m at your disposal. So is there any violent objection to reversing the program of work? Doesn’t seem like it. So let’s be practical. And for those of you who need to consult your capitals, tell your capitals to relax as well. Because these are mechanical things, we are not subverting the substance of the process, it’s just organizing our work. Netherlands, I’m not going to give you the floor now. You press the button, but I will take note, but I’ll come back to it at a later stage, because I don’t want to open a discussion on Friday evening, but I’ll hear you at the end, if you bear with me. So that’s one option for the February session, going into the regular institutional dialogue. Now for the other points, for the modalities. Again, I have said this before, we need to take a step forward on everything, across the board. Now, some of you have said the existing modalities are perfect. Some of you have said it’s not perfect at all, not good at all, and that we need to aim for the gold standard. So there is a divergence and a diversity of views. But what seems clear to me is that as we design the modalities for the future mechanism, we need to find a way that can enhance the participation of stakeholders. Bearing in mind that this is a single-track, state-led, intergovernmental process where governments make the decisions. I mean, all that is very clear. The participation of stakeholders is not a new thing at the United Nations. There are different modalities, but across the board, the question of stakeholder participation is not important. I mean, it’s very important, it’s not new, that’s what I meant to say. And therefore, in this context of ICT security, we need to also recognize the value they can add in terms of partnerships, capacity building, contribution to the work that we do. So let’s keep that in mind. Again, let’s take a pragmatic view. I think the key issue has to do with accreditation procedures. Now, the current modalities have essentially a veto mechanism. It gives everyone, it has 193 vetoes. So the first question is, do we need a veto mechanism for the future process? And if there is a veto mechanism for stakeholder participation, do you have an override mechanism? And if you don’t have an override mechanism, do you have some kind of screening mechanism? These are questions for you to address. But in any case, all of us, it seems to me, agree that we need to make the process inclusive in terms of stakeholder participation. We need to make the process more transparent, the accreditation process. I think that seems to be a common element. And I also want to say that, and some of you have said this, and some of you have suggested this or implied it, we need to imagine perhaps an arrangement of variable geometry where we can look at stakeholder participation and engagement in the different spaces of the future permanent mechanism. Because there’s a substantive plenary session, there is the dedicated thematic groups, there’s the dedicated intersessional meeting. And do the modalities need to be identical for all of them? Or can we take a differentiated and creative approach to the different tracks as a way of finding creative solutions? So here, too, I will give some thought and put some points down on a piece of paper to have a further discussion when we meet in February for this particular issue, which is also an important issue that we need to resolve. We have to resolve this issue. There’s no other way of doing it. Because these are issues, if we do not resolve, could imperil the future permanent mechanism on day one, and that is not a good way to start the future permanent mechanism. And then finally, were there any other modalities? I haven’t heard anyone identifying any particular other modality that needs to be settled, but we still have time. When we come back in February, we can look at all of that together on the basis of the points that I will put on a piece of paper for further discussion. Now then, I also want to sort of, having wrapped up, so to speak, this cluster on regular institutional dialogue, I want to also recap the week. I want to recap the week because I think this week has been very productive and in fact I would say very positive. So I want all of you to leave with a sense that there has been a fair amount of commonality and that there is very clear elements of convergence and we need to put everything together and see it on paper, of course. So the few general points I want to make across the different topics is that first, we need to make decisions in July. So we do not have the option of kicking the can down the road. We need to be very concrete in the actions that we decide and we need to be ambitious and that means across the range of issues, we can’t be ambitious on one issue and not the other. So I’d like each one of you to go back and think about your own positions because you would like to be ambitious on issues of interest to you but on other issues, you might be happy with the status quo. But if everyone thinks that way, we’ll end up with the lowest common denominator or worse, we will not be able to have any good outcome that will allow for a seamless transition. And that, I think, is the key point. The more elements we agree on and the more clear and concrete we are, the greater the chance of a smooth and seamless transition. The more ambiguous we are, the more we fudge the solutions or the more we kick the can down the road, you are going to have the problem, not me. You will have a problem because the new process will get stuck on the organizational session in March and you will probably end up spending the whole session and then say that we have no time to discuss the modalities and kick it down to June and then you might, in June at the substantive session, still be discussing modalities and kick it down to 2027. I’m not exaggerating because that’s exactly what happened in this process. So things have a way of repeating themselves at the UN, so I am not being alarmist. I’m just pointing out to you the consequences if you do not reach agreement on a range of issues and certainly with regard to regular institutional dialogue. I think for the third annual progress report, I think we need to be ambitious across the board. I think we have the norms checklist on the table. I think it’s important that we take a step forward. We have had some suggestions and ideas for new norms. I think we need to take a step forward on that, on capacity building. We have discussed that earlier this morning, portal, voluntary fund, and of course on regular institutional dialogue as well. We just had a very productive discussion. So overall, I would say that it’s been a fantastic week, a good start. I think we are getting closer to graduation, to July, and as Germany said, we need to get this degree. You need to graduate and I need to get out of this airplane so that you can take your next long-haul flight to your destination with a new pilot. Now, is there any burning comments? Argentina, it’s 5:45. We have another agenda item. Can you be very brief, please? Netherlands, do you need to speak again? I’ll give the two of you a chance. Argentina, please.

Yes, my delegation apologizes for taking the floor again. We would like to thank the Chair for agreeing to provide an intersessional document before February, but as my delegation said, we would be very grateful if this report could add a chapter on the financial implications, on the financial costs of the future permanent mechanism for my delegation. This is an instruction from Buenos Aires, and it’s very important. Thank you.

Thank you, Argentina. Could you elaborate on what financial implications you want us to assess?

All of the financial implications that were set out in the declaration made by my country, but I can share them with the Chair. Thank you.

Argentina, thank you very much. I’m afraid I still do not understand what exactly the financial implications are that will be needed or that you expect me or the Secretariat to provide. The Secretariat can provide a program budget implication analysis based on proposals as agreed by governments. Right now, we have no agreement, and therefore, how do we assess the budget when we have not yet made a decision? So the process will be that when we reach an agreement in July, I’m sure we will, and exactly what we agree on in terms of the number of meetings, because are we going to agree on two meetings or three meetings or three thematic groups or five thematic groups or no thematic groups, that will make an impact on the budget. So it is only at that stage that we would be able to make an assessment of the budget. So that would have to be done by the Secretariat. As the Chair, I am not capable of providing a financial analysis. I was not elected to provide a financial analysis. I’m not an accountant or a budget specialist. I cannot really assess the budget implications, especially when decisions are not even made. Now, if your concern is budget implications for your own country in terms of how many meetings you need to attend, that I am not sure I can also provide that. So perhaps I’m not understanding you. Argentina, would you like to come back?

Yes, we would like to understand the financial costs of the mechanism, bearing in mind if we have, whether we have 10, 15, or 5 meetings per year and approximate analysis. We don’t need the detail, but I do think that it would be very important to be able to assess this as an input, to be able to understand for all delegations what sort of format we want to have. That firstly, and secondly, what we asked for was a study by the Secretariat. It would be good for the Secretariat to carry out a study, and this could go together with the report of the Chair.

Thank you, Argentina. I mean, what you’re requesting has to be done by the Fifth Committee. So, I am not in a position to provide a financial analysis in January. So, if you’re asking me how much a week’s meeting would cost, I won’t know, because that has to be answered by the Secretariat. Yeah, so Argentina, I am not able to provide that financial analysis. I’ll be candid with you, because I can promise you to do this exercise, but I do not want to give an inaccurate indication of what the financial analysis might be. But what might be useful is perhaps for you to engage in a discussion with the Secretariat informally, so that you can get a sense. One week of meeting on the OEWG, say in July, how much did it cost? If that is material for countries as part of their decision, then I think you can have that conversation with not just UNODA, but through your respective missions, you can ask them to have a conversation with the Under-Secretary-General for Conference Services, and also with the Chair of the Fifth Committee. But the Secretariat may also ask what would be the arrangements for that particular week, what additional audiovisual facilities might be needed. So, there are a range of variables as well. So, I just wanted to say that I will not be able to provide a financial analysis. Yes, Argentina.

Yes, apologies for taking the floor so many times. I promise this will be the last time that we will ask for the floor. We already mentioned this in our statement, but it would also be very useful to know how much a Zoom platform might cost to be able to hold virtual meetings, as was suggested by some delegations. That would be very useful because of the suggestion to hold virtual meetings. My delegation doesn’t believe that would be very helpful. Thank you. The virtual meetings wouldn’t be very helpful.

Thank you very much, Argentina. I think the Secretariat can informally provide you and other interested delegations with estimates for such meetings held in person for, say, a period of a week, as well as a cost for some of these virtual meetings informally. But I wanted to say that as Chair, I will not be in a position to do that, because I do not have that information, and I’m also not sure how I can obtain that information in terms of what the cost will be. So can I leave that with you to engage informally with the Secretariat, Arjit Sinha? Is that a satisfactory course of action for you? Are you pleased with the solution? Okay. I’m sorry that I cannot give you a more definite answer than that, because I’m very clear in my mind that the financial implications of the future permanent mechanism will depend on many things. First, in terms of the cost of the meetings here. Second, as to whether that cost is additional to the budget of the United Nations. It could cost, say, $10,000, but the Secretariat might say we can do it within existing resources. But they may also say I need extra budget. If the meeting is $10,000, they might say I might need $5,000 more, or they might say, well, they’ll need $10,000 more, or they might say they need $100,000 more. So that is something from a budget point of view that goes into the Fifth Committee, and there’s a very formal process for that. And I do not want to, as the Chair of this process, give my own estimates of financial implications, because then, firstly, there’s a good chance that I’ll be wrong, because I’m not a financial person, and I wasn’t elected to form this financial responsibility or role. But what I can do, and I will do my best, is to provide the sequencing of meetings so that delegations are very clear in terms of what the options are, and we are not having a certain number of meetings beyond what delegations consider acceptable. So we are not going to be having too many meetings. I think that was a clear message from every delegation. Well, I think I would also invite, and I think the Secretary has suggested, that a good way to start would also be to look at the program budget implication produced by the Secretariat for this working group. So when this was formed in October 2020, there was a certain budget assessment done. I think your mission in New York and your Fifth Committee representative would be able to furnish you with the details. And as I said, if you wish to approach the Secretariat informally, they’ll be happy to give some indication and estimates. Thank you very much. Are there any other comments? Netherlands? All right, thank you very much, Netherlands. We’ll now go to other items. Is there any delegation that wishes to take the floor? Australia, please.

Thank you, Chair. Australia is pleased to provide an end-of-session gender accounting update as per our usual practice. It is late in the day after a very busy week of discussions, so I will be brief. Chair, we are pleased to report that we have achieved significant participation by women in our rich discussions throughout this session. Our discussions on CBMs had the highest level of representation, with women delivering 60% of interventions. We also had women participating as panellists and moderators in side events held in the margins of our plenary discussions over the course of the week, and we’re thrilled to have women share their ideas and outlook during yesterday’s side event on gender perspectives on cyber capacity building at the OEWG and beyond. Overall, this week 52% of interventions were delivered by women, a remarkable achievement. We have come a long way. Back when we started our discussions in 2021, only 37% of interventions were made by women. To have such an increase is a testament to all of us, and we look forward to continuing this strong momentum as we move into the final sessions of the OEWG. As my final statement, allow me to thank you for your leadership and your personal passion and commitment to this issue in particular. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Australia. Let me take this opportunity to thank not just your delegation, but all the partner delegations that have supported, facilitated, and funded the participation of the Women in Cyber Fellows Program, which has made a significant difference to this process. Not only do we see more women participating in this process, but they have also made an active, very positive, and constructive contribution to this process, thereby making this process a truly more inclusive one. This is an issue that is very important to me personally, and also, I believe, to all of us in this room. So thank you very much. Let’s give all the women representatives in this room a round of applause for their work. Thank you very much. As we close the session, I do not have any concluding remarks to make. I think I have said enough. You probably have had enough of me for this week, but I just wanted to thank you all once again for your very active participation, and I look forward to continuing the discussion when we meet again in February. It’s important that we prepare for the February session in a thorough way so that we come to the February session no longer in the mood or mode of a general debate to read statements. We have to come here in the mood of finding solutions and finding the middle ground, because that will be the second last session before we get to the July session. So I wish you all a good flight back home, and my thanks to all of you. This has been a fantastic week, and I think all of you deserve a round of applause. Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.