Session 9-9 Transcript
(OEWG 2021-25)

Good morning, distinguished delegates. The ninth meeting of the ninth substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on ICT is now called to order. We will continue our discussions under agenda item five and focus on the topic of capacity building. We’ll continue with the list of speakers from yesterday’s meeting. I want to let you know that we have about 20 speakers who have signed up to speak on the topic of capacity building. If each of the speakers takes three minutes, we can finish the discussions on capacity building in one hour. If the speakers each take more than three minutes, then we will need much longer time. I would recommend that the speakers who are inscribed to speak on capacity building this morning do their best to make their interventions in three minutes so that we can get to the discussion on regular institutional dialogue. I know that you certainly would have longer and more thoughtful and very prepared statements, but I would strongly encourage you to focus on the key points that you wish to make, especially with regard to the questions that I had circulated in my letter on the 12th of November. To help you keep time, the screen will have a timer so that you can see how much time you have taken, and so can others who can see how much time each speaker is taking. Let’s be fair to everyone. I do not wish to cut off the microphone at three minutes. It’s not a good idea. The UN is a place for people to have a discussion and have a dialogue, but it’s also important that we be fair to each other, and I think the best way to be fair to each other is to make very succinct interventions on capacity building for this morning’s discussion. So we will now start with the first speaker, Vanuatu, to be followed by Malaysia.

Good morning, Mr. Chair, and good morning to all the delegates. One World Two fully aligns with the Pacific Islands Forum statement delivered by Tonga, and would like to add the following in our national capacity. One World Two established its national cybersecurity strategy in 2021. The strategy targets to deliver on six national priorities to strengthen national security by responding to cyber threats and issues in One World Two. The strategy priorities include cyber resilience, cybersecurity awareness, cyber capability and literacy, addressing cybercrime, international engagement, and cybersecurity standards and legal frameworks. Mr. Chair, as a small island developing state, our digital resilience depends heavily on accessible, inclusive, and needs-based capacity building measures. Capacity building programs should be tailored to the realities of CITs, including practical training for ICT professionals, CSIRTs, and public officials. The most successful capacity building initiatives are those built on long-term partnerships. It is our strong wish that the future permanent mechanism is designed with these principles in mind. Initiatives like the proposed global ICT security cooperation capacity building portal are very welcome and should ensure the tools, templates, and guidelines are user-friendly and aligned with our needs. However, as raised by other delegations, we would like to urge efficiency in how we spend our energy. We should ensure that any new portals we commit ourselves to do not replicate the excellent work done by the GFCE’s cyber build portal, the UNIDIR’s cyber policy portal, and others. This would serve two aims. Firstly, we would not spend already scarce resources on duplicating existing work. And secondly, as CITs, our ability to interact with many different initiatives will always be limited. Mr. Chair, Vanuatu also welcomes the recommendation for the establishment of a United Nations Voluntary Fund for ICT security capacity building. To ensure its effectiveness, it should adopt a needs-based approach, prioritizing the most vulnerable states, including CITs. It must maximize existing initiatives such as regional efforts and global initiatives by Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), GFCE, ITU, UNIDIR, and others. Chair, any discussion on capacity building should always be inclusive of our civil society, academic, and private sector colleagues. In closing, Vanuatu thanks the governments of France and Ireland for their funding support towards the participation of delegates in this OEWG and also thanks Australia for the funding support towards CITs at these sessions. We look forward to seeing continuity of these funding programs until the end of the process and into the future. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Vanuatu. Malaysia, to be followed by Iraq.

Mr. Chair, Malaysia welcomes the discussion on capacity building, a cross-cutting topic which is of central relevance to all pillars of this OEWG. In this connection, Malaysia believes it is helpful for states to organize themselves domestically through a risk-based approach in prioritizing their capacity building needs so as to ensure that the UN’s coordinating role is well suited to the national needs. This includes the identification of cybersecurity areas that need enhancement and the identification of required capacity, followed by identification of domestic agencies with mandates for coordination and implementation. This is important in ensuring capacity building initiatives are coordinated, inclusive, and sustainable, avoiding disintegration and redundant initiatives that do not bring about desirable benefits. In this regard, just like many other states, Malaysia recognizes enhancing capacity and capability building, awareness, and education as one of the pillars in our national cybersecurity strategy. Mr. Chair, cybersecurity incidents are inevitable, and the effectiveness of response and recovery will depend on the preparedness of people, technology, and processes in place to ensure minimal disruption. The level of preparedness and readiness relies on the capacity and capability that have been established. In this regard, Malaysia supports the comments from states on the importance of investment in developing the global cybersecurity workforce. For example, at the national level, there is a need to embed cybersecurity across academic courses under ICT and computer engineering programs. Investment in quality and established security certifications programs focused on technical areas of cybersecurity should also be increased. At the same time, capacity building in cybersecurity does not only entail developing a skilled workforce and enhancing cyber expertise, but also fostering a culture of cybersecurity awareness or cyber hygiene. For example, in education, cyber hygiene or cybersecurity-related modules should be introduced across non-ICT or non-engineering disciplines. Malaysia also shares the view of many member states on the invaluable contribution of industry and other stakeholders, given the nature and complexity of the cyber domain. Malaysia welcomes the proposal of a global cybersecurity cooperation portal, as well as a needs-based ICT security capacity building catalogue. We should continue discussion on this proposal, including potential linkage on how they may be integrated into the future permanent mechanism with a view to reaching global cyber resilience. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Malaysia. Excellent talk, great for keeping within exactly three minutes. Thank you very much, Malaysia. Iraq, to be followed by Canada.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. In the name of God. Mr. Chairman, we all know that today the world is facing an increasingly widespread phenomenon, and that is the malicious use by terrorist and criminal groups of resources, specifically ICTs, to further their ends. There are increasing numbers of cyber attacks targeting entire economies and businesses, putting in peril the national security of various countries. There is a pressing and urgent need to come up with tangible and effective initiatives which could help strengthen capacity so as to tackle the challenges we face and to achieve international peace and security. Mr. Chairman, the Delegation of Iraq would like to re-emphasize that cyber capacity building and the promotion of partnerships, as well as the role of knowledge in ICT security in that sphere, are some of the most important priorities of the OEWG. This is a vital and necessary component of our work that is necessary to bridge the enormous gap dividing developed and developing countries in the cyber security sphere. Iraq calls on all countries to build and strengthen international cooperation in this area. Our government, for its part, has managed to adopt a national strategy on cyber security. Currently, we’re working to adopt tangible and effective measures under its auspices. For example, promoting ongoing cooperation with stakeholders and international experts so as to start a study in the field to review and review periodically going forward the five dimensions of cyber security. Also, ensuring cyber security is incorporated into school teaching programs in Iraq to raise awareness about the risks, thereby reducing the threats and dangers. Cyber security is now a specialty in three Iraqi universities. Mr. Chairman, Iraq would like to express its gratitude to the various countries which put forward initiatives on capacity building. We believe it’s absolutely vital to continue short-term work under these initiatives. Therefore, Iraq would like to underline how much we appreciate Singapore’s efforts, as there are scholarships for those looking into cyber security, and we also want to thank our brother nation Kuwait, which spoke yesterday during the morning meeting about the establishment of a specialized platform working hand-in-hand with the portal under discussion, all being established to promote responsible state behavior. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The statement will be made available online.

I thank you. Thank you so much, Rahul, for your contribution and also for helping us all by keeping to time. It’s very much appreciated. Let’s continue this approach that so far all the speakers have taken, and I continue to urge everyone to do their very, very, very best to keep within the time limit. Canada to be followed by China.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. In light of the need to move urgently to our most important issue facing the body this year, namely RID, I will make only two capacity-related points now and will post Canada’s full, yet short, statement online. Canada remains committed to building international capacity to respond to ongoing and growing cyber threats, and the conciseness of my statement is in no way a reflection of the importance we place on capacity building. Canada notes that the capacity building mapping exercise captures many stakeholders providing capacity, yet vetoed from providing their expertise in this room, notably first, GFCE and private security industry. We must reform stakeholder modalities. Finally, capacity building cuts across all themes and all pillars of this body and must be discussed prominently in each of the thematic groups of a future Program of Action. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Excellent, top prize for Canada. I think you will get a marathon gold medal. Thank you very much, Canada. But your point is an important one. A succinct intervention does not mean we do not pay importance to this issue. And by asking you to be confined to three minutes, I’m not also taking the approach that this issue is not important. So please understand that as well. China to be followed by Japan.

Thank you, Chair. Chair, China always advocates for international cooperation and assistance in cyber security to promote fair, reasonable, and universal internet access and universal application of ICT to ensure equal share of digital dividend and to achieve common and sustainable global development. In response to the Chair’s guiding questions, China wishes to propose the following. First, the 2021 OEWG report reached a key consensus on the 10 principles of capacity building, providing a fundamental guideline for international cooperation. China calls on all states to take an open, fair, and non-discriminatory approach, adhere to non-interference, no preconditions, non-discrimination, sustainability, and transparency, and work to effectively help developing countries enhance their digital capacities, share digital opportunities, and collectively address risks and challenges. Second, regarding the global ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal, China believes it should strictly adhere to the principles of neutrality and objectivity, focus on capacity building, maintain its member-state-select nature, and avoid duplication with other similar websites. To prevent wasting resources, we firmly oppose any attempt to politicize the portal and any proposal that may undermine mutual trust among states and interfere with capacity building cooperation. Third, we welcome the adoption of the Global Digital Compact at the Summit of the Future this year as the first global success to promote global digital governance and cooperation. The compact marks also the UN’s active efforts to actively promote cyber capacity building. China stands ready to work with all parties to strengthen cooperation among states and UN agencies to jointly advance the implementation of the compact and global digital governance. Fourth, China appreciates the high-level global roundtable on ICT capacity building convened by the Chair in May this year, further raising awareness among states of the urgency and importance of ICT capacity building. China will continue to actively participate in future meetings under the framework of the Future Mechanism. All parties can reach consensus on specific issues such as the timing of the meetings. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, China, for your statement. Japan, to be followed by Singapore.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Japan believes that capacity building is essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting a free, fair, and secure cyberspace. The United Nations is well-positioned to collect and share information and experiences regarding existing capacity building efforts and to identify gaps, areas where capacity building is needed. Japan highly values the voluntary checklist, and it should be utilized effectively. In capacity building, involvement of non-state stakeholders such as businesses and academia is indispensable, and a multistakeholder approach should be pursued. Regarding multistakeholder participation, there may be room for improvement in the current system if we look at the rejected cases. For example, Japan highly values the contribution by FIRST with its members spread over Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania to the global CERT community. We are confident in the quality of their work and pleased to see that its annual meeting was held in Japan this year. We need a more open and more transparent process for utilizing such non-governmental expertise. Mr. Chair, in the context of capacity building, the starting point should be to clearly identify what is lacking in one’s own country and who to consult for assistance. To address such questions, the GCSCP proposed by India and the needs-based cyber capacity building catalog proposed by the Philippines would be practical tools. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Japan, for your contribution. Singapore to be followed by Kazakhstan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Apart from the many important capacity-building initiatives being already undertaken, and which continue to be implemented, Singapore continues to see a need for holistic cyber capacity building to support the development of national cybersecurity leaders across cyber policy, strategy, operations, technology, and diplomacy domains. In this regard, we are very encouraged by the strong interest and positive feedback from UN Member States for the UN-Singapore Cyber Fellowship. We thank you for your participation. We are glad to share that the sixth iteration of the fellowship will be taking place in May 2025, and the Secretariat will be sending out the call for applications soon. In response to the Chair’s question on the development and operationalization of the portal, Singapore believes that small and developing countries would benefit from a one-stop platform to access information resources that would help them develop cyber capabilities in a responsible manner. It would be useful for the portal to be, firstly, modular, to allow for various existing initiatives and functions to be included, and new ones added in the future in a fuss-free way, and secondly, allow for information to be hosted securely. As agreed in the second annual progress report, States requested for the UN Secretariat to update the Cyber Diplomacy e-learning course to strengthen the understanding of international cybersecurity discussions for diplomats. Singapore is pleased to fund the updated course. We trust that the course will provide a comprehensive introduction to cyber-related processes, outcomes, and agreements at the UN, and contribute to capacity-building efforts in support of a safer and more resilient cyberspace. We thank the Secretariat for briefing us on the updated course, and hope that all States will find opportunity to make full use of the learning materials available. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very, very much, Singapore, for your contribution. Kazakhstan to be followed by Indonesia.

Thank you. Capacity building is a cross-cutting pillar, and we recognize it as one of the CBMs that strengthen trust and cooperation among states in addressing global cyber challenges. Kazakhstan has made significant strides in enhancing its cyber capacity in recent years, focusing on public awareness, developing professional services, and fostering regional and international cooperation. As it was mentioned in guiding questions, what more can we do to support and facilitate capacity building? We believe that creating a comprehensive, dynamic, and member-driven cyber resource hub under the portal would be a key initiative. Such a hub will provide real-time, demand-driven support, facilitating collaborative problem-solving and knowledge exchange. This would enable states to respond more effectively to emerging threats. In terms of regional cooperation, conducting a comprehensive assessment to identify gaps and launching a regional training of trainers program could be valuable. Developing training curricula and materials would ensure long-term benefits. The proposal for a global capacity building portal presents a unique opportunity to transform international collaboration in ICT. To ensure its success, the portal must be a dynamic, neutral, and member-state-driven platform under UN auspices, incorporating cutting-edge technologies to enhance functionality and accessibility, such as AI. Needs-based ICT security capacity building catalogs should go beyond a static repository, evolving into a dynamic tool for decision-making and progress tracking. It could utilize advanced analytics and data visualization to highlight gaps, benchmark efforts, and connect states with appropriate support. Another key initiative could involve regional cyber competence centers to provide specific training, policy development, and technical support. In this context, we would like to highlight the work initiatives of Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship, as well as the Singapore Cyber Fellowship, as they play a crucial role in fostering cross-border knowledge and professional networking, which are essential elements for creating a globally connected cyber landscape. By aligning with international best practices, we aim to contribute meaningfully to global cyber efforts and create a cyber-resilient ecosystem. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, Kazakhstan. Indonesia, to be followed by Ethiopia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Indonesia reaffirms its view that capacity building, including the transfer of knowledge, skills, and technology, is essential to narrowing the digital divide between developed and developing countries. This contributes to creating an open, safe, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. Recognizing that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to capacity building, it is important to foster an environment where states can voluntarily assess their needs. This enables tailored capacity building efforts while encouraging dialogue among Member States and relevant stakeholders. To follow up on the mapping exercise conducted by the UN Secretariat earlier this year, Indonesia encouraged continued dialogue through the OEWG, or a dedicated platform, to facilitate communication and better identify technical capacity building needs, to provide guidance for designing capacity building programs tailored to those needs. Mr. Chair and distinguished delegates, regarding the proposal to develop a global cybersecurity cooperation portal as a need-based ICT capacity building catalogue, Indonesia supports the development of such a portal under the auspices of the UN. The portal should be a modular, one-stop-shop platform that facilitates coordination between states on ICT security issues. It should be practical, neutral, and free from political consideration while maintaining an accessible resource for states. In addition, the portal should include the following features. First, the capacity building dialogue itself, which is a directory of available programs and initiatives. Second, the event calendar that contains a centralized schedule of capacity building events and activities. And third, a document repository in the form of a library of resource guidelines and best practices. Mr. Chair, Indonesia is also of the view that the idea of additional funding mechanisms, including a UN voluntary trust fund for ICT security, could support the participation of representatives and experts from developing countries. A future permanent mechanism of ICT security could enhance coordination within existing development programs and funding mechanisms to maximize the impact and capacity building efforts and to avoid duplication with similar initiatives. Indonesia also welcomes the convening of the high-level global roundtable on ICT security capacity building on the 10th of May 2024, where the Indonesian delegation also participates in the dialogue. We believe that similar roundtables could promote discussion and commitments for action-oriented capacity programs. To that end, Indonesia suggests that the next high-level global roundtable is convened only after establishing an appropriate timeline, ensuring it follows the first substantive session of the future permanent mechanism to allow for prior deliberation. Finally, Mr. Chair, Indonesia emphasizes the importance of raising awareness among Member States and stakeholders about the principles of ICT security capacity building. Establishing a monitoring and evaluation system would ensure efforts are effective in strengthening ICT capabilities of states. Indonesia is confident that with inclusive dialogue, tailored initiatives, and robust mechanisms, we can collectively ensure a secure and resilient ICT environment for all. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you. Indonesia, Ethiopia, to be followed by Ireland.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, for giving me the floor. Allow me to share some of the efforts made by my government with regard to capacity building in the area of cyber security. As we all know, the world is rapidly changing with the fast development taking place in cyberspace. This development has brought enormous benefits, and at the same time, the technologies related to it have posed and presented challenges to our social, political, and economic activities. It is also defining not only the way of doing things but also the realm of national and international security. In Ethiopia, it has been quite some time now since we have envisioned being a fully digitalized country by 2025. We have started this journey some years back, and we are on track to attain this critical objective despite the various challenges we face in the field. We have undertaken important steps in building cyber security capacity. The establishment of the Information Network Security Administration, INSA, in the mid-2020s and the Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute some years ago are testament to the government’s commitment to enhance the development of the sector. These and other institutions are engaged in research and development with technological ownership in mind and with the national cyber policy and legal framework put in place as a guide. These institutions are working tirelessly in building the capacity of the country’s human resource, which is instrumental in achieving development in the field. As part of the country’s capacity building effort and as part of the commitment to build trusted, safe, and secure cyberspace, various institutions, including Information Network Security Administrations, are working together on scaling up secure national data exchange platforms and public key infrastructure. These institutions are trying to reach the general public, civic society, startups, higher education institutions, and others through public-private partnership schemes, awareness creation programs for the general public, regular capacity building programs on cyber security for government institutions, and other means of engagement. Talented young people from across the country have been given the opportunity to participate in a seasonal program for a specific period of time where they will be encouraged to develop their talents and interests. Upon graduation, they could contribute to the cyber security of the country. Ethiopia is also running public-private partnership programs in the areas of cyber security technology and infrastructural development, CERT and SOC services, and many others. Mr. Chairperson, we believe inclusive platforms such as the OEWG and other regional platforms are critical processes to reach consensus and strengthen collaboration in the field. In re-establishing and realizing this crucial objective, it is vital that input and outcomes of sub-regional and regional initiatives are taken on board in our deliberation. In attaining this critical task, building the capacity of developing countries, particularly the least developed countries and African countries, is therefore of paramount importance. This is also essential to further build confidence both at regional and global levels. Ethiopia therefore calls on the international community, particularly the United Nations, to enhance their support on capacity building programs on technical, legal, and other areas on the peaceful use and protecting wrongful access in cyberspace. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Ethiopia. Ireland to be followed by Switzerland.

Thank you, Chair, and good morning, colleagues. To begin, Ireland aligns with the statement delivered by the European Union, and I would like to proceed now with some additional remarks in my national capacity. Chair, ensuring that all states can harness the benefit of ICTs, while mitigating the risks involved through capacity building measures, is a priority for Ireland. Since the inception of the Open-Ended Working Group, states have engaged constructively on cyber capacity building. Ireland shares states’ views that cyber capacity building is vital for promoting a secure and stable cyberspace, including in the implementation of norms of responsible state behaviour. The scale of this engagement here today has shown the importance states attach to this topic. While there are areas within the Open-Ended Working Group where there remain substantial differences of opinion, the need to build resilience globally is universally supported. We are grateful to you, Chair, for the strong initiative and priority that you have afforded capacity building throughout our work at the UN, which is an area of focus and necessity for so many delegations, including through the Global Roundtable earlier this year. We must ensure that capacity building remains an indispensable priority for an action-oriented future mechanism. Ireland believes that supporting states to implement the UN Framework on Responsible State Behaviour should therefore be central to such a future mechanism. Ireland supports the action-oriented Programme of Action model proposed by the Cross-Regional Group to assist states in the implementation of the UN Framework, particularly around the application of international law and protection of critical infrastructure. Chair, in your guiding questions, you have asked how to make a UN voluntary fund for capacity building practical and effective. I would like to take this opportunity to recall Ireland’s support through UNODA to ensure the participation of a number of developing and small-island developing states in this week’s proceeding. Ireland’s co-funding of this project with France has assisted in ensuring regionally balanced representation, which is vital for our discussions. UNODA has organised a programme of seminars on topics relevant to the remit of the OEWG, and Ireland joined the International Law Panel to share our experience in developing a national position on the application of international law. Chair, we have heard how smaller delegations have faced challenges in coming to New York to sit at the table and join in these discussions. This has led to an absence of their perspectives and valuable voices in our discussion. We are therefore pleased to hear from participants of this programme of its value in enabling them to provide cross-regional and gender-balanced representation here, and thus enable contributions to the OEWG. Chair, you have asked for concrete examples of action-oriented capacity building, and in that respect, I would like to mention some forms of capacity building and examples. Firstly, I would like to mention EU Cybernet. As a member of EU Cybernet’s stakeholder community, Ireland supports the network’s efforts to build tailored, needs-based, and objective capacity building efforts. EU Cybernet also undertakes a mapping of EU-funded external capacity building initiatives. We see this as a prime example of how to coordinate efforts at a regional level to avoid duplication and maximise effective capacity building. Secondly, the third APR in July recognised the value of workshops, training courses, and conferences as capacity building tools. In this regard, I would like to reference the Talent Summer School and Cyber Diplomacy, which this year brought 54 participants from over 49 countries for a comprehensive training programme. A number of those participants are here today as part of national delegations. Finally, Ireland is encouraged by the success of needs-based, demand-driven capacity building efforts of the International Counter Ransomware Initiative, the mapping of capacity building needs and assets, and fostering of collaboration through the initiative’s expanding membership. To conclude, Chair, we look forward to learning from states’ experiences here today, as we did yesterday, building a collective picture of best practices in this Open-Ended Working Group and using that learning to inform an action-oriented capacity building component of the future mechanism. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Ireland. Switzerland to be followed by Saudi Arabia.

Thank you, Chair, and thank you for your guiding questions. In the interest of time, I will not address all of them. Switzerland is of the view that necessary platforms, fora, and corporations to build needed cyber capacity are well established and generally well working, as the mapping exercise shows. As the needs for specific capacity building might vary from member state to member state, or even regionally, it is difficult to identify channel gaps on a global scale. Focus should lay on strengthening the efforts of the existing initiatives and support their coordination and collaboration by inclusive efforts, such as the Global Conference on Cyber Capacity Building, which will be hosted in Geneva in May 2025. This conference is the follow-up conference to the conference that took place in Ghana in 2023. By bringing together key stakeholders from government, industry, civil society, and academia, the conference aims to drive actions in line with the ACRA call and to increase awareness and expand knowledge of existing good practices, tools, and methods, to generate new insights and out-of-the-box thinking, to bring together communities and stakeholders engaged in cyber capacity building and development cooperation, and to drive collective action on existing or new commitments, solutions, and plans. Leveraging existing capacity building initiatives and connecting them will support the mainstreaming of the agreed capacity building principles. With regards to the possible creation of a global ICT security corporation and capacity building portal, we suggest avoiding duplications with other efforts or initiatives in the field of capacity building. In our view, the main problem is not a lack of initiatives and programs. Hence, the UN could focus on harnessing the information readily available on existing portals, such as the GFCE Civil Portal or Unity Cyber Policy Portal. This may happen by providing a pointer to the respective portals or by cooperating with the respective portal provider. Equally, the creation of a possible UN Voluntary Trust Fund must not come at the expense of existing initiatives and funds. We are open to more discussions to further clarify the role and function of such a global capacity building portal and a voluntary trust fund, and how the risks mentioned could be avoided. We also thank UWAIT for the proposal for a norms implementation portal and will study it carefully. Finally, with regard to the question of when the next High-Level Roundtable on ICT Security Capacity Building should be convened, we would like to advise that this should happen at a point in time after the Global Conference on Cyber Capacity Building that I have mentioned before. This would allow the result of the conference to be presented and built upon in the next High-Level Roundtable. I thank you.

Thank you. Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, to be followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thank you, Chair. Chair, please allow me to address different aspects of our discussion in this fairly brief statement, which is going to be my first and last statement in this session. To begin with, we appreciate your efforts in facilitating the work of the Open-Ended Working Group on cyberspace in ICT and the safety using this. This allows us to undertake discussions so that we can achieve the progress on our common priorities that are being discussed within the work of the Open-Ended Working Group. We’d like to stress the importance of such topics, particularly the idea of confidence-building measures and capacity building. Those efforts are very effective in achieving progress on all other vital axes that we’re trying to discuss. With regard to the primary checklist of voluntary CBMs globally that are included in the third APR, we’d like to share with you some of the efforts of the Kingdom in this regard in brief, so that we take into account the limitations on time. With regard to CBM1 on adding national focal points for the POCs, we have already identified the parties in question on both technical and diplomatic levels. The Kingdom also welcomes the participation in discussions on initiatives on the activities of building capacity. The Kingdom also encourages such collective efforts based on mutual confidence that give the operational aspects of these measures. We hope that such efforts will contribute to promoting a safe cyberspace for all. The Kingdom, sir, continues to build confidence on the regional and international levels and supports an approach based on consensus, it being a primary way for participation and a primary principle of multilateral action. The Kingdom also believes in the importance of working regionally to expedite the consensus and facilitate it. We believe that such an approach will allow us to take into account the opinions of all states and would help us in deciding the decisions and to discuss issues on the international level, which will be positively reflected on our progress to cooperate on the international level. In this regard, the Kingdom provided a proposal to establish a council of prime ministers in the League of Arab States on cyber states. We hope that – we are glad to tell you that we will be meeting on the 21st of December in Riyadh, and this ministerial council will play an important role in setting forth strategies and priorities that could develop joint work in the field of cybersecurity. Mr. Chairman, because we seek to promote cooperation on the international level, the National Authority on Cybersecurity in the Kingdom organized the fourth iteration of cyber state in the city of Riyadh under the banner of promoting joint action in cyberspace so that we can promote international cooperation to address challenges in this field with the participation of international experts and decision-makers. We held the first summit to protect safety in cyber state, which we organized with the ITU and the United Nations Fund for Children, UNICEF, as well as some stakeholders from the private sector and academic circles in the world. With regard to capacity building in cyberspace, as you said, sir, capacity building is the best way to promote confidence building. To add to this the fact that capacity building can contribute to the applicability of international law in cyberspace, and so that we can share good practices, the Kingdom would like to shed light on some of the initiatives that we launched recently. The National Authority on Cybersecurity in the Kingdom launched an initiative on fellowships and grants for entrepreneurs in cyberspace that would allow researchers and pioneers to promote the outputs of research and other creative results. Such grants and scholarships would like to increase impact on the national and regional levels. The Kingdom, in conclusion, would like to stress that we support the work of the group and we support the idea of finding a permanent forum at this General Assembly for cybersecurity so that we can effectively achieve the progress. The Kingdom also supports the efforts to increase the productive cooperation among states and to find a safe cyberspace that would allow everybody to enjoy prosperity. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Saudi Arabia. Islamic Republic of Iran, to be followed by France.

Mr. Chair, observing the time limit, I’m delivering the shortened version of the statement. We take note of the efforts by Your Excellency as the Chair of the OEWG, particularly the initiative to hold a global roundtable on capacity building in the field of ICT security. Meanwhile, results from those roundtables should be projected through action-oriented and practical means. Turning to the guiding question, we have already expressed our comments concerning the mapping exercise to survey the landscape of capacity building programs and initiatives within and outside of the UN. We note that following its release, some countries have expressed concerns about the document, both in terms of its content and structure. The document appears unbalanced in favor of the force by certain countries and contains a confusing compilation of ideas or issues that are controversial and not related to the mandate of the OEWG. It suggests that the current version of the mapping exercise requires revision to be practical material in hand for further follow-up. On establishing a voluntary trust fund for security in the use of ICTs, we believe that its main goal should consist of financing specific capacity building programs for states. In this regard, we reiterate that capacity building should be a sustainable process, politically neutral, transparent, accountable, and without conditions. Moreover, states have agreed that capacity building should be undertaken with full respect for the principle of state sovereignty, be demand-driven, and correspond to the nationally identified needs and priorities. Any foreign work or initiatives in this regard should be guided by these principles. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Islamic Republic of Iran. France, to be followed by Brazil.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be delivering a shortened version of my statement. France supports the idea of a web portal to support the activities of the future regular institutional dialogue mechanism, as proposed in the cross-regional working paper published back in 2021. At the same time, we would like to make two points regarding this initiative. First and foremost, it’s important to take into account existing initiatives of the same kind, with a view to optimizing synergies and avoiding the risk of duplication. Second, this initiative must be part and parcel of our discussion on the regular institutional dialogue. Such a portal should be developed and incorporated into the future mechanism, so as to reinforce its primary functions, that is, international coordination and capacity building. Mr. Chairman, France strives to be a responsible cyber actor which also cooperates and stands in solidarity with others. Against this backdrop, we are working to improve the level of cyber security at the international level, and this through the establishment of regional centres for cyber capacity building. To this end, back in 2023, together with Slovenia and Montenegro, we launched the Western Balkans Cyber Capacity Centre. The centre has already organized 21 weeks of training in 2024 and is planning 30 further weeks in 2025. I’m pleased to announce that the centre will be officially inaugurated at the ministerial level next week. Regional centres enable recipient countries to be fully involved in the governance to meet the needs of partners, and this point is crucial. The future Program of Action needs to increase matchmaking between existing capacity building programmes and the needs at national and regional levels. For this purpose, the round table on capacity building format which you initiated, Mr. Chairman, could be a relevant space here at the UN for bringing together cyber security practitioners, both governmental and those from the multistakeholder community. I thank you.

Thank you very much, France, for your statement. Brazil, to be followed by Mozambique.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Brazil aligns itself with the statement made by Argentina on behalf of a number of Latin American countries and would like to add a few comments on its national capacity. Bridging the digital divide and building capacities in the field of ICT security is the foundation for all of us to reap the socio-economic benefits from digital transformation in a sustainable way. This is why capacity building has played a central role throughout the mandate of this Open-Ended Working Group and must be even more so in our future mechanism. We recognize the value of the variety of initiatives currently being promoted by many countries and stakeholders and have directly benefited from many of them. Having a greater UN involvement in implementation, however, would have two main benefits. One, it would centralize information in a UN portal, as proposed by India, making those initiatives much easier to find, which would allow them to increase their reach. It would also avoid duplication of efforts. The needs-based catalog proposed by the Philippines would complement it and offer guidance to donors so they develop initiatives that will have the maximum impact on the recipients. Two, having the UN as a partner in cyber capacity building would, responding to one of your guiding questions, greatly contribute to mainstreaming the capacity building principles. From our own experience as beneficiaries of many capacity building initiatives, those that have a multilateral organization that we integrate as one of its promoters have been much more demand-driven and much more collaborative in both their design and implementation. This is why we support the establishment of the voluntary fund mentioned in paragraph 54 of the third APR. The UN has already done great work on this issue through, for example, the UN Singapore Fellowship and the many UNIDIR trainings, and it will be able to do much more with greater resources. Given the rapidly evolving pace of digital technologies, developing and retaining enough qualified personnel is an ongoing challenge, and even more so from a gender, race, and disability-sensitive lens. Ensuring that women and persons belonging to other historically marginalized populations are duly qualified is essential to a more secure cyberspace, and that is the focus of our updated national cybersecurity strategy currently under development. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, the interconnected and transnational nature of cyberspace means that capacity building will continue to play a crucial role in our future mechanism. Our common goal of an open, secure, stable, peaceful cyberspace will require a significant reduction of the digital gap that still persists. I thank you.

Thank you very much. Brazil, Mozambique, to be followed by Kiribati.

Thank you, Chair. Mozambique will speak out for national capacity. The Mozambique delegation recognizes that capacity building is essential to promote the security and inclusivity of cyberspace. As a developing nation, Mozambique faces a significant challenge in safeguarding its ICT networks and critical infrastructures. Despite the challenge, Mozambique has taken important steps to address them. A key achievement is the approval of Mozambique’s cybersecurity policy and its implementation strategies. This framework aims to protect the public and private entities as well as critical infrastructures in cyberspace. The policy objectives prioritize building organizational capacity, enhancing human and technological resources, raising public awareness, and fostering research and innovation. Through partnerships with international cooperation agents, we have delivered training programs for government officials, IT professionals, and educators, contributing to the development of focal expertise in cybersecurity. To achieve these goals, Mozambique highlights the need for sustained efforts in technical training, capacity building, professional certifications, awareness campaigns, and the promotion of research and innovation. These initiatives are vital to equip society, academia, and both the public and private sectors with the tools needed to navigate and secure cyberspace effectively. In terms of legal frameworks, Mozambique is currently drafting legislation on cybersecurity, cybercrime, and data protection. Our chief participation in drafting the international convention against the use of ICT for cybercrime has greatly informed and enhanced our domestic legislative process by integrity, best practice, and international standards. Furthermore, Mozambique is grateful for the ongoing support of these partners, including the United States, Brazil, EU, and member states in areas such as capacity building, training, and active engagement in world forums. Their collaboration is helpful in building the skills and the resilience needed to tackle emerging cybersecurity challenges. The participation in human and global forums on cybersecurity is a powerful means of empowerment, ensuring that the issues specifically affecting women are addressed. In this regard, the Women in Cyber Fellows program has been instrumental. We would like to take this opportunity to highlight and express our gratitude to the GFCE and donors such as the United States for including Mozambique in this process, thereby strengthening our representation and contribution in this critical area. Mozambique reaffirms that the fulfillment of this goal requires institutional development and capacity building as well as international cooperation. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Mozambique. Kiribati, to be followed by India.

Chair, Kiribati is aligned with the joint statement delivered by Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Island Forum members and would like to provide the following remarks on our national capacity. Capacity building should be a cornerstone of our collective efforts to promote responsible state behavior in cyberspace and to foster a resilient global cyberspace that empowers and benefits the entire international community. As a small island developing state, Kiribati values establishing a sustainable and permanent capacity building mechanism that reflects the rapidly evolving ICT environment. We hope to see this embodied in the forthcoming permanent mechanism. We strongly value proposals for flexible, needs-driven capacity building programs that adapt to states’ evolving priorities while harmonizing with existing initiatives to maximize efficiency and avoid duplication. Moreover, Kiribati underscores the importance of integrating and coordinating with well-established regional and global cybersecurity entities, such as the Pacific Cybersecurity Operational Network and others, including cybersecurity training providers. Embedding such a collaborative mechanism within the forthcoming permanent mechanism will ensure that resources are utilized effectively, addressing states’ specific capacity needs while minimizing redundancy and irrelevance. Kiribati also strongly supports the establishment of a United Nations Voluntary Fund to foster a capacity building effort. For a small island developing state like ours, access to such funding is critical to addressing resource constraints and ensuring active participation in shaping the global cybersecurity landscape. We welcome the fund proposal to include developing countries, ensuring all states have an equal voice in shaping the global ICT security framework. In developing and organizing this voluntary fund, we encourage the UN Secretariat to prioritize inclusivity and accessibility. The fund structure must consider the unique challenges small and resource-constrained states face, streamlining eligibility and access processes. Additionally, we underscore the importance of mainstreaming ICT security capacity building principles into funds implementing while ensuring alignment with existing initiatives to maximize impact and prevent duplication. Furthermore, we support exploring diverse funding sources, including public, private, and philanthropic contributions, to ensure the sustainability of this initiative. We urge all members to ensure that this initiative prioritizes inclusivity and adaptability to meet the diverse needs of small and resource-constrained states by fostering a global cyberspace that is secure, resilient, and accessible to all. We can build a meaningful, inclusive, and sustainable framework for capacity building in this way. Kiribati looks forward to constructively engaging with fellow member states to achieve a consensus on these critical proposals and stands ready to support their operationalization.

Thank you, Governors. India, followed by Slovenia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The international community’s ability to prevent or mitigate the impact of malicious ICT activities depends on the capacity of each state to prepare and respond. Capacity building is the common thread that connects focus areas of the OEWG and plays an important enabling function in promoting common understanding on its important pillars, like applicability of international law, the implementation of existing norms, and developing inclusive, transparent, and action-oriented confidence-building measures. Mr. Chair, drawing from the list of your guiding questions on what criteria for development should a neutral platform have in practical terms, we believe that such a framework should be a one-stop comprehensive solution for all cybersecurity skills development needs of Member States, particularly for the developing countries. In this regard, developing specific training modules on crisis management post a cyber incident also merits focus. Such a practical capacity building framework under the aegis of the United Nations will certainly help harmonize and universalize all the existing capacity building initiatives and frameworks. In this context, Mr. Chair, the establishment and early operationalization of the Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal represents a transformative opportunity for the United Nations and its Member States for both enabling the collective cybersecurity efforts and taking a step forward towards concretizing the confidence-building measures. The larger vision of the portal we propose is envisaged as an integrated platform, providing a centralized resource for sharing of information, best practices, guidelines, legislations, surveys, catalogs, as well as the global POC directory. Its unique features, such as incident reporting, assistance mapping, and comprehensive access to key resources through different login credentials for government and private sector, would distinguish it from the existing platforms, thereby enabling it to serve as a vital tool in addressing the evolving challenges of the digital landscape, as well as allowing for direct communication between Member States. The said portal could also host a capacity building calendar, which could include information on relevant events happening across the world, including conferences, security deals, workshops, etc. It must be highlighted that the scope of this portal is open-ended and could be expanded depending on the new items that may warrant inclusion in the future. The common positions that countries have been publishing on international law and other matters of relevance is a welcome step, and we further propose that such national positions may also be hosted on the said portal, which will help avoid Members having to access multiple platforms or track several sources for getting authentic information. Likewise, hosting the positions of stakeholders could also be considered. Mr. Chair, India welcomes with appreciation the incorporation of a global ICT and capacity building portal through consensus in the third APR, which is to be anchored at the United Nations. This portal will be the first UN initiative to comprehensively cover all Member States, ensuring inclusive participation and collaboration. India remains committed to supporting this initiative, which we believe will be of great practical utility for all countries, particularly from the Global South. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much. India, Slovenia, to be followed by Israel.

Thank you, Chair. We align ourselves with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union and its member states and wish to offer the following remarks in our national capacity. Considering the time, Chair, I will be brief and submit our full intervention in writing. When it comes to capacity building, it is essential to consider the diverse needs of each member state as they face different challenges and vulnerabilities in their cyber security domain. Tailoring capacity building efforts to these differences is key to ensuring that member states have the tools and knowledge necessary to effectively combat cyber threats. Colleagues, this is also our guiding principle in regional capacity building efforts. As shared during previous OEWG sessions, Slovenia, together with France and in partnership with Montenegro, established the Western Balkans Cyber Capacity Center, or WB3C, in Podgorica last year. The distinguished colleagues from Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have already briefly touched on the center’s activities. Let me add that the WB3C addresses cyber vulnerabilities in the region by providing advanced training, fostering regional cooperation, and aligning cyber security efforts with those of European Union standards. To date, the center has trained almost 500 experts in its first year and a half of operation. By 2027, WB3C aims to have trained over 1,500 cyber professionals, police investigators, prosecutors, and other key stakeholders, ensuring that the region is prepared to counter evolving cyber threats. As a distinguished colleague from France mentioned just a few moments ago, we are pleased to announce that the official inauguration of the center will take place on Monday, 9th of December. This inauguration will bring it one step closer to obtaining the status of an international organization, at which point it will be open to collaboration with interested countries in its activities. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you. Slovenia, Israel, to be followed by Interpol as the last speaker.

Good morning and thank you, Chair. We will present in brief, for the sake of time, some main points of our national perspective on the topic of capacity building, and share some concrete examples. Cybersecurity is an urgent issue. Currently, the growth of risk far outpaces offensive capacities and capacity building. The global community needs to do more and to do it much faster. Developing countries are struggling to bridge the digital divide and they seek to leapfrog their digital economies and to do so securely. Capacity building can also serve as an important measure in building trust, as well as promoting a stable and resilient global cyberspace and facilitating continued human prosperity and progress in the information age. Israel’s capacity building efforts are aimed at improving global resilience on a politically neutral basis, thus adopting a constructive and cooperative approach while encouraging innovation. Israel continues to contribute to raise the cybersecurity of foreign markets by donating funds to the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank, assisting countries to build their strategies, methodologies, and establish their national cybersecurity mechanisms. Israel is actively sharing best practices with many countries and organizations who wish to build their own national cybersecurity capacities, and we are ready to collaborate with other states and organizations on this important matter. Under the CRI, the Counter-Ransomware Coalition, Israel is leading together with the UAE an initiative that includes the presentation of the Crystal Ball, an information-sharing platform that will allow the easy sharing of information between countries on cyberattacks. This is done with dozens of partners, including very fruitful cooperation with the private sector, and already serves as a tool to prevent attacks on the go. Israel’s experience has shown that cyber can also serve as a means to improve social mobility and economic growth. We have therefore continued to invest in capacity building programs to reach out to citizens living in the socioeconomic periphery, with inclusive training and educational programs aimed at underrepresented sectors, especially relevant for young girls and women. The cyber domain is not just of threats. It holds possibilities and opportunities. We are gladly sharing our experience in this field. Finally, Mr. Chair, however we tend to speak in the context of cyber capacity building about technology, it is indeed mostly people-driven, and it should be treated as such, starting from education at a young age and working rapidly to minimize any existing gaps. And we would also like to see the pillar of capacity building in the heart of any future UN cybersecurity mechanism. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. Israel, Interpol, please.

Thank you, Chair. On behalf of Interpol, I congratulate you, your team, and esteemed delegates for all the progress achieved thus far. Interpol welcomes the Third APR’s recognition of capacity building as a central and cross-cutting issue, as well as some of its concrete proposals. We would also like to express our sincere appreciation for the Chair’s high-level global roundtable on capacity building, and we look forward to contributing to future iterations. As an organization with 196 member countries, Interpol attaches great importance to capacity building. To bridge gaps in the capabilities of different states and enhance their capacity to collaboratively combat the transnational threat of cybercrime, Interpol works with its partners to provide tailored support to law enforcement. This support includes providing access to specialized training courses and e-learning resources, organizing tabletop exercises and digital security challenges, promoting knowledge exchange through webinars, publications, and expert group meetings, as well as offering access to specific tools and platforms. Chair, in response to your guiding question on examples of concrete capacity building initiatives, allow me to highlight in particular the case of the Interpol African Cybercrime Operations Desk, which is supported by the United Kingdom as an example of the positive outcomes that can be achieved thanks to needs-based and sustainable capacity building. Over the past years, the African desk has been developing regional law enforcement capabilities by combining access to cybercrime-related trainings, tools, and platforms with operational support and coordination. In fact, about two months ago, the desk coordinated 19 African countries in a major operation, which resulted in the arrest of over a thousand suspects and the dismantlement of hundreds of thousands of malicious infrastructures and networks, preventing future attacks. This example demonstrates how capacity building initiatives that are sustainable, needs-based, and action-oriented can produce tangible results and contribute to a safer world. Before concluding, since many states have emphasized the importance of awareness and resilience as a key area of focus for capacity building, being mindful of our limited time, I promise, Interpol would also like to very briefly comment on the topic of threats. Specifically, Interpol takes this opportunity to highlight two recent and ongoing sets of activities that aim to deepen understanding and raise awareness of cybercrime threats. First, over the past year, Interpol has produced a number of assessments and reports which offer detailed information on many of the emerging and potential threats identified in the APR. For example, Interpol has produced cyber threat assessment reports for the African region and for the Asia and South Pacific region, a report on the impact of AI-generated synthetic media for law enforcement, and a comparative assessment of existing interventions against ransomware alongside our partners from Australia. Many of these assessments are available in the public domain. Second, this week Interpol launched a global campaign called Think Twice, which focuses on raising public awareness about rising online threats like ransomware, phishing, and generative AI scams. We invite you all to join this campaign and help to amplify its reach. Chair, in closing, Interpol would like to thank you for your leadership throughout this ninth session, and we will continue to work with member states to promote an open, secure, and accessible cyberspace.

I thank you. Thank you very much, Interpol, for your statement, and my thanks to everyone for being very, very helpful and cooperative by observing my request to be very succinct and brief in their remarks. I think this has helped us to hear each other, but also keep within a reasonable period of time. We’ll shortly begin the discussions on regular institutional dialogue. I did make some comments yesterday on capacity building. Having heard the remaining speakers today, this morning, I can only say that our impressions and my own impressions are just reinforced in terms of how everyone looks at capacity building as being central, as being vital to everything that we are doing within the working group. Many of you have said it is cross-cutting in the sense that it connects the dots, it integrates everything, it brings together everything, and of course, many of you have also said that the discussions on capacity building are also in some ways an exercise in confidence building and the operationalization of very concrete capacity building initiatives is also a way to build trust, confidence, and build partnership between countries. That is a common point that brings all of us together. Now, that leads me to my next point, which is that if we believe that it is so central and cross-cutting and is even a confidence-building measure in itself, then it follows logically and also politically that it is important that in July we take some concrete steps forward with regard to capacity building, because if we affirm the importance of capacity building as being so central and connected to all other issues, and at the same time we don’t take a step forward or take some concrete decisions, then there is a disconnect in terms of what we are saying and what we are doing or not doing. That just makes the case for us to look very deeply on this issue and to see where we can build common ground and take some very, very concrete steps forward. That leads me to my third point, which is that we are starting from a good base because the discussions, not just this morning but over the last year, have shown that everyone is doing something for capacity building. Everyone is engaged in some kind of partnerships with other countries, South-South, North-South, East-West, of course partnership with stakeholders, other international organizations, institutions, NGOs, the whole range of it. A lot is happening. That is a good development for all of us. So in that sense, the glass is more than half full, because there is always room to make things better. But we can start from the point that we have a good basis to bring things further. And that goes to the question of the mapping report, which was one of the first questions in the list of questions. Some of you have said that the mapping report shows that a lot is being done, which is true. Some of you have also said that the mapping report was not entirely adequate because it doesn’t demonstrate everything or it doesn’t demonstrate the gaps. Some of you have said maybe we should do another mapping report. So look, all of these are valid points. As I was saying yesterday, we cannot aspire for a perfect mapping exercise and a mapping report or a landscape survey. We have one. On the basis of that, we have to see how we can make things better. I think related to this is a question of duplication. I think a lot of you have said that we should avoid duplication. I think that is also a common point. A lot of you have also said that we must leverage on existing initiatives. That’s also a common point. We must create synergies. I think that’s also a common point. I think all of these are also referenced in the third annual progress report that we want to optimize synergies and avoid duplication. Now in that sense, when we look at duplication, yes, we have to avoid it, but we also need to look at it from a broader perspective. Does creating a portal by itself lead to duplication with existing initiatives or could creating something at the UN, in fact, be helpful to avoid duplication? So that’s one point for reflection. And when we talk of duplication and gaps, we also need to think in a broad way. Yes, there are a range of institutions, programs, projects, partnerships, but do we really have a good sense of where the coverage is and the flows of programs and resources are? As I said, the glass is more than half full. Are we sure that some countries are not being left out by the different programs? We don’t know. So we may well need future mapping exercises to be done from time to time. But my point is that we can’t wait for more and more mapping reports before we do anything. We have to take the first step. First of many steps that need to be taken. We have to make a first step in July. That is my main message to you. Now in terms of what steps we take, I think the global ICT, security, cooperation and capacity building portal, I think there is very, very broad support. So I think we need to take a step forward with regard to making this portal a reality. Now, we will not be able to agree on every aspect of the portal because there’s no such thing as a perfect portal. There’s no such thing as a perfect future permanent mechanism because there’s no such thing as a perfect United Nations. And information is not going to flow perfectly either. But yesterday I was at a reception where one of the speakers said we should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. So we need to take some steps now in terms of making the portal a reality because there is, I sense, a strong expectation that the portal can be helpful in terms of playing a practical and neutral platform, provide information, repository for papers, events, important documents, but also bringing countries together. And if it’s done in a modular way, it can be built up incrementally such that we start with the essential functions and then we add on other stuff. So it is important that we take a step forward by defining clear parameters for the portal as part of our recommendations and decisions in July. And related to the portal is the needs-based capacity building catalog idea plus the proposal from Kuwait and others have also put forward other ideas. I think if we take an incremental step-by-step approach, then we can get started and other initiatives can be added into the portal as and when they are mature and we are ready to take further steps. The idea of the voluntary fund, again, I think many of you have talked about it. I think we did agree in the July annual progress report that we will work towards operationalizing it and reaching a consensus agreement. So it is important that we take a step forward on this. That means laying down some clear parameters for what the voluntary fund will do. Again, some of you have said that we should not duplicate. Yes, but again, we can take a step forward in a way that avoids duplication but also that is very specific and focused and I think a fund that can help to enhance participation of developing countries to broaden the voices and people involved in this process can be also one way of making the fund a reality. And that in turn is related to the idea of enlarging participation in the POC directory, bringing more people on board, this open-ended process leading to the future permanent mechanism. So inclusive participation is also very foundational and inclusive participation in a UN process carries a lot of importance because the UN is a place where all countries get together. And then there was a question of the global roundtable. I think many of you have said that it was a useful sort of platform to bring everyone together, including stakeholders. I think the role of stakeholders in capacity building, I think is very important. I think we should not underestimate that. And you will recall that the global roundtable did bring stakeholders into the process. I think we must build on that because I think if we are serious about capacity building, we need to work in partnership with stakeholders, not just the stakeholders who are in the room or who might be watching the proceedings, but we need to reach out to stakeholders who might not be involved. We need to encourage them, incentivize them to be part of this process. Otherwise, you know, it’s not just a question of getting additional resources and funding, but it’s also about creating, you know, very sustainable long-term partnerships for capacity building. So we need stakeholders, we need governments to be involved. So the global roundtable, a lot of you said, was useful. So that is another common point. Then the question arises, what’s the timing? I think my sense is that if we want to avoid duplication, we should not be competing or clashing with other events. So there is obviously another event being held in May 2025. So it’s possible for the global roundtable to be held in 2026. So that gives the future permanent mechanism some time to also look at the issue and provide additional guidance. But it’s important that if we are planning for the roundtable, we can’t send out a notice two months before and then expect people to turn up at a global roundtable. Because if you want high-level participation, you must make the dates public at a very early stage. There’s a lot of preparatory work by the Secretariat. And therefore, I think in July, it’s also important to give some sense of a clear direction in terms of our decision on the global roundtable. So friends, very, very good discussion, very useful discussion. And we will take it from here. And I think there are many common elements that hopefully can find convergence leading to consensus. So thank you very much for all of that. So we will now make the transition to the next agenda item. Well, it’s agenda item five, but the topic of regular institutional dialogue, the much-awaited topic, because there’s a lot of details that we need to do, a lot of work that needs to be done. And this is critical for ensuring a smooth and seamless transition, which we all agree is needed. So we need to dive deep into this issue. And I’d like to get us started with two presentations, one from France to be followed by Canada. So friends, I’ll let you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My delegation thanks you for the opportunity to share with the OEWG a presentation on concrete proposals and avenues of reflection for the future mechanism of regular institutional dialogue. This new presentation will extend and deepen our presentation of last March, this time by zooming in on the matter of dedicated thematic groups. Firstly, I would like to thank you and your team for the important work of Annex C on the elements of the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue. For five years now, France, alongside a trans-regional group of states, has been contributing to our work here through thinking about the Action Programme, the Programme of Action, the POA, to feed into discussions on the organisation of the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue. We are continuing to work together to reach consensus by July. Our aim is to continue the important negotiations to implement the framework of responsible behaviour on the part of states. But above all, we need to add on an action-oriented dimension by giving the UN a concrete role in promoting the resilience and security of cyberspace, particularly in terms of capacity building. France is making this presentation in its national capacity. This is a response to the request made in Annex 3 of the Third Annual Progress Report, which asks states to pursue their reflection in Paragraph 12b. We believe that it will contribute to a consensual approach and encourage reflection from all, particularly from states with different views, as this future mechanism obviously belongs to all states, the international community. Transparency. My colleague will now switch to English to present more thoroughly our proposal. This is quite an extraordinary step for a French delegation at the UN. Please see this as a confidence-building measure. Thank you. To set us off, we wanted to give a visual representation of the overall structure which was agreed last July in the Annex C and from which we intend to build upon. There are three main components that were agreed by consensus. First, the review conference, which will review the implementation of the framework, update it if necessary, and assess the effective functioning of the future POA to provide strategy guidance and direction. The plenary sessions will also carry out discussions in accordance with the functions and scope of the future mechanism and consider the work and recommendations of dedicated thematic groups. Next. This brings me to the dedicated thematic groups, which carry a more action-oriented approach through focused discussions and recommendations to the plenary sessions. Next. Let us zoom in on how we can ensure that the dedicated thematic groups are useful. In the Annex C, it indicates that dedicated thematic groups will conduct focused discussions and report to the substantive plenary sessions with updates and recommendations. So pursuant to this agreement in the third APR, we propose four key modalities. Next. To ensure… So these four modalities, we determine them by listening to all statements during last week’s informal town hall meeting as well as throughout this week. So the first priority of these groups is to ensure inclusivity in the discussions. The discussions will be open to all member states and to ensure a light footprint for delegations, a limited number of three groups could be created. These groups would meet twice per year to complement the single plenary session that was agreed upon. So one plenary session per year and two meetings of the groups. Remote participation should be possible and the meetings should never be held in parallel. In addition, holding these meetings in places different than New York could also be contemplated as to maximize participations from all regions. The second modality is to have an operational agenda that focuses the discussions or a program of work. These discussions would be focused on actionable recommendations to tackle common policy goals shared by all countries. Meetings will include briefings by experts such as the ones we had in May of this year during the intersessional meeting to set the conversations off. The program of work of the groups would focus on sharing challenges and best practices, in particular regarding to capacity building and through national voluntary reporting to identify gaps. Now the third modality or priority is to ensure the active participation of cybersecurity experts and legal experts from government and from the multistakeholder community alike as well as of regional organizations. By bringing these communities together, we generate added value and it has the potential to unlock complex discussions on certain issues. The fourth modality is the importance of information sharing to ensure that the permanent secretariat of the future POA can circulate information to all member states through an e-portal and the debriefing to the plenary on the group’s activities or sharing written submissions will ensure that all member states benefit from their actionable recommendations. So these four modalities, they share one simple goal, which is to reach a mechanism that allows for results so that when a delegation goes back to its capital after the meetings, it has actionable inputs useful to its national cyber ecosystem. So we wanted to give a dynamic view in time to look at the current and the future situation on one year. So this is a representation of one year of meetings of the current OEWG. So this is in terms of formal meetings, even though of course the activities can foster the work throughout the year. For example, such as through workshops based on the program of work of the dedicated groups to be agreed by all states. So we heard concerns about the burden to small delegations and developing states. So the future POA would meet for 10 days over a year in this scenario, which results in reducing the burden on states in terms of meeting time by 50%. Next. Now, if we zoom out to a full review cycle of the future POA on the five-year basis, we can see that over five years, there is a virtual cycle of continuous improvement that is created and it serves to identify and address possible gaps in the implementation of the framework, identify challenges and best practices. Next. Next. So we wanted now to turn our attention to pillars. So the pillar approach has its benefits, but as the discussions this week have shown, we should have the full picture if we want to tackle issues such as the protection of critical infrastructure. So next. For instance, at this stage, this image maybe looks like a bullet. Next. Or maybe a fish. Next. Or even a shark’s fin. So next. And next, please. There we go. It is only by considering the full picture that we can tackle issues, that we can effectively find solutions or fly the plane. In this regard, it has been agreed that the future mechanism in paragraph nine of Annex C will address issues through facilitating discussions of an integrated, policy-oriented and cross-cutting nature. Next. So this is not only a metaphor. Really, by considering pillars individually, we can have only incomplete solutions to very pressing issues. Next. So this is why France is proposing a set of three cross-cutting dedicated technical groups aimed at working on cross-cutting options. We put forward three main themes that encompass cyber challenges. So the first one is to build the resilience of cyber ecosystems and critical infrastructures. Second group, cooperate in the management of ICT-related incidents. And the third group, prevent conflict and increase stability in cyberspace. So these three mandates are action-oriented. They are also broad enough that within each group, a program of work decided by the plenary can cover any priority agreed upon. So we’d like to take a concrete example of how a meeting of the cross-cutting group would work. For instance, under cooperation, under the second group, against ransomware attacks. So states previously highlighted concern over the use of malicious software such as ransomware in the successive APRs by increasing number of malicious actors and increasing frequency, scale and severity of ransomware attacks that may have an impact on international peace and security. A policy-oriented approach would discuss this threat and states could engage in mutual understandings on how norms and international apply. For instance, in relation to due diligence. This is made possible through capacity building, of course, for national cyber ecosystems including the training of legal experts. And confidence building measures also play a key role. For instance, in the cooperation among international partners through the POC directory. Finally, the multistakeholder community, including from relevant service providers in the health sector or computer emergency response teams would also contribute to foster knowledge and trust. So all components of the framework must therefore be considered to foster cooperation against this threat or concrete policy challenges because using only one part creates incomplete solutions. So we would not want to fly back home on a plane missing one of its parts. Well, the same goes to security in cyberspace. Let me add two points on international law and existing initiatives. The discussion space for international law would be provided including through scenario-based scenarios looking at those concrete policy challenges in the program of work of the groups. And this cross-cutting approach enables not only one but actually three dedicated groups on international law while including legal experts in the conversation and giving all member states the relevant information through the regular debriefing of the activities of the group to the plenary. Moreover, existing and future initiatives can be discussed and personalized in the cross-cutting groups where they are most relevant. So for example, the global POC directory on cooperation or the victims-based approach proposed by Belgium could be explored as part of the resilience thematic group or transparency measures such as COAIT’s proposal yesterday for an online tool to enhance accountability on the implementation of the framework which fits into the discussion on increasing stability. So Mr. Chair, this presentation will be made available online. France is committed to getting the plane off the ground with everyone on board. We make this proposal in a constructive and open manner to go collectively in the next phase of our discussion by building on the existing pillars with a view towards enabling concrete action useful to boost capacities and to serve the objectives that are shared by the whole international community to build resilience, to increase cooperation, and to ensure stability. Thank you.

Thank you very much, France, for your statement. Well, thank you also for the confidence-building measure of speaking in English. Neither English nor French is my mother tongue, but I think every language is a vehicle to build confidence, and we very much appreciate your flexibility. Second, and very importantly, I note that you said right at the beginning that the future permanent mechanism belongs to all of us, and I really welcome that as a demonstration of your delegation’s commitment to design and build the future permanent mechanism in such a way that we can all make a smooth and seamless transition, and we can all proudly call our own. Now, I think you invoked the image of an airplane. I think that’s a very good metaphor for the work that we are doing. Ultimately, the thrusters or the engines on an aircraft are what bring it forward, and in our process, it’s the trust and confidence that we have been able to build so far, and to increase that trust will give the process more thrust to propel us forward. So the mechanics of designing the plane is one thing, of a process is one thing, but what will bring us forward, not only to ensure a smooth and seamless transition, but to propel us forward, is to create that level of trust and confidence between delegations. I think that has been the real value of the OEWG over the last few years, and I can already see that there are increasing levels of comfort and trust, and the fact that we were able to adopt a first committee resolution by consensus, a single resolution, is a demonstration of your commitment to this process and to continue building that trust. So I would invite all delegations to also take the same approach as you look at this issue of regular institutional dialogue. Regular institutional dialogue should not be and need not be a political or a geopolitical tussle. Let’s take a pragmatic approach. Let’s take an incremental step-by-step approach. Let’s build on the reservoir of trust that we have built so far, and let’s also recognize that we have made good progress. Annex on the elements for the future permanent mechanism gives us a good full framework. What we are now grappling with is the question of dedicated thematic groups, how it fits into the architecture. I think it was in that context that the French presentation was very useful. So I would like to thank France for that contribution, and let’s go on to Canada now. Canada, are you going to speak in English as well? Thank you.

I could go in both. Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the beginning of this week, you mentioned that we could not expect smooth sailing until July. Given the recent presentation, perhaps we should speak about smooth flying. Either way, we agree we should not postpone addressing hard issues. We regret that the time to discuss RID this week will be short, and I’m afraid I will need to use some of the minutes I saved in our previous statement to address this issue now. Canada would recommend that we review how we schedule this topic for the February meeting to ensure RID is perhaps not left for last. Before I turn to the Canada-Chile presentation on stakeholders, allow me to speak shortly on another topic identified for RID in the Annual Progress Report, that is the dedicated thematic groups. This week we again heard the shared objective of going beyond pillar-by-pillar discussions and address practical policy objectives. This is the goal of the dedicated thematic groups, including as France outlined just now. In terms of these groups, there are two common priority policy objectives we’ve heard from all regions and repetitively over the last few years. That is the protection of critical infrastructure, including addressing how the framework applies concretely to related threats, and second, assisting states where there is a cyber incident, including through focused capacity building. Taking critical infrastructure as an example, addressing threats to these systems requires understanding some of the technical aspects of threats, how norms apply concretely, areas of convergence on the applicability of international law, how to have the most value for targeted capacity building and confidence building. These discussions do not take place when siloed or isolated from each other. Experience-based discussions that cut across traditional pillars could also allow us to shift from the sometimes divisive discussions we have under each pillar. As we noted in our suggestion of a virtuous circle, by identifying gaps through cross-cutting discussion and then applying capacity building and checking again for gaps would allow for fact-based, not theoretical discussions on whether any new norms or other measures might be necessary. Now, Mr. Chair, let me turn to stakeholders. We need to work together to enhance the modalities for stakeholders. We need to avoid limiting the benefits that they can bring to our work. For context, just like we do not control the winds, the vast majority of states do not control or seek to control their industry and civil society. They have experience at the national level with public-private partnerships, and they know this is essential to find the best solutions. Most states understand that protecting themselves and their citizens from cyber threats requires collaboration with critical infrastructure operators and with cybersecurity firms and with broader civil society groups and academia. At the same time, no matter the level of partnership, all participants in such collaboration know for a fact that the government, and only the government, will take the final decision on matters of national and international security. We should together find a way to translate such national experience on the international stage and provide stakeholders with a meaningful voice, but not a vote. We have heard the overwhelming majority of states speak this week on the importance of engagement with stakeholders domestically and internationally, and the value of stakeholder engagement in a future mechanism. Canada and Chile are working with dozens of states and dozens of stakeholders, and are open to working with everyone in this room, to find a common path forward on this issue. I will now turn to my colleague, who will make a visual presentation on the non-paper we posted online late last week. Could we please have the visual presentation on the screen? Thank you. Next slide, please. Let me start with the obvious. As you can see, the non-paper reflects the APR of last summer by including the terms state-led discussions in its title. States, and only states, will take decisions on security matters. In over one year of consultations, Canada and Chile did not hear one voice proposing to give stakeholders a vote. Next slide, please. There have been more than 50 statements this week about the added value of stakeholder expertise in our work, including when it comes to capacity building. Next slide, please. Considering this consensus, we need to move to the question asked in the APR, in other words, how to enable the benefits of stakeholder contributions in the future mechanism. Next slide, please. You can see on the screen some of the types of stakeholder contributions that we heard are most beneficial to states. I’m going a little bit fast, but this is online, so you will have access to it afterwards. Next slide, please. The most difficult part of the how question concerns overcoming the vetoes that limit how much we can collectively benefit from stakeholder contributions. This week, again, showed the missed opportunities associated with the vetoing of stakeholders. I will be brief and only say that there are many concrete options to resolve this challenge, and we are happy to continue working on overcoming this obstacle. Next slide, please. What is clear is that member states want stakeholders in the room. They want them to have access to the microphone and to provide expert briefings and to be able to contribute papers on the website. It is also clear that we need to find ways to facilitate more diverse stakeholder participation, including in terms of geographical representation. How to do this? Allowing for remote participation with rotating timeframes is part of the solution. Continuing and potentially improving on sponsorships like the Women in Cyber Fellows program is another part of it. Next slide, please. Finally, what we have heard consistently is that there is a role for stakeholders in each format of our future mechanism, be it in review conferences, plenaries, or dedicated thematic groups. Next slide, please. Mr. Chair, it is true that smooth sailing or smooth flying to July is unlikely. Establishing a solid, single-track future mechanism is of critical importance. As you have noted throughout this week, status quo is not enough. We must move forward and resist appeals to simply copy-paste the format of this time-limited, if important, body. Mr. Chair, Christmas is coming, and I hope that the magic of the holidays inspires us to continue working on such progress in the new year. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Canada, for your presentation. Before we go further, can I invite Canada to go back to the slide on the accreditation modalities? Can I invite you to maybe explain it a bit further so delegations can also understand that particular slide? Are you comfortable doing that, Canada? Yes. Okay, all right.

Okay, so as we can see, an idea, a way forward could be to have an aide-mémoire circulated ahead of each substantive plenary session. The aide-mémoire would be circulated by the Secretariat in order to set out the process and deadlines related to applications for accreditation in the future mechanism or in a given plenary session, for example. There is then one of the options that we are contemplating and that has been mentioned as existing under the current mechanism, is the opportunity for a State to choose and try and oppose the participation of a given stakeholder, providing the rationale for such an opposition. The next step would be for the Secretariat to consolidate and compile a list of the applications for accreditation that have been opposed, alongside the names of the States that have opposed, as well as the related rationale for the oppositions. The next step would be for a decision on whether or not opposed stakeholders are accredited. This could take place, for example, and there are many options for this that we are happy to continue considering, either during the organization of work session of the next plenary or in the context of the General Assembly. The last step is a means to future-proof the process, given that this is going to be a permanent process. To the difference of the AHC modalities for stakeholder participation, there would be a need for renewed potential for application for the stakeholders. That’s what you see in bullet six here. Accredited applicants for one plenary session would remain accredited going forward for a period of, for example, five years. This is up for discussion. When I say that opportunities for applications should be renewed because it’s a future mechanism, what this entails is that if needed, then there would be renewed process like this, for example, once a year. So if there is a new stakeholder that comes in town, if you allow me the expression, they would have an opportunity to join the process even if they did not apply at the very beginning of the future mechanism. I hope that you consider this useful.

Thank you very much, Canada. Certainly very useful for me in understanding the process as you envisage it, and I take this opportunity to also thank Canada for this presentation. I know that this is an initiative undertaken by both Canada and Chile, and I want to thank both delegations for the initiative that they have taken. Equally important, I want to thank Canada for the very constructive manner in which you have made this presentation, and I would like to invite all delegations to take the same approach when we are discussing this issue. I will open the floor shortly, but before I do that, I wanted to point out to you that the section of the last annual progress report recommended next steps, paragraph 58 to 60, makes it very clear what we need to do this year. So there is no kicking the can down the road, so to speak. This is critical if we are to ensure a smooth and seamless transition to the future permanent mechanism. That’s the first point. Second, the resolution adopted in the First Committee and subsequently adopted in the General Assembly also reaffirmed elements in paragraph 58, 59, and 60 of the third annual progress report. So these are elements that we have all agreed, reaffirmed, and again reaffirmed and endorsed and formally adopted as part of the General Assembly resolution. We are to continue our discussions and submit recommendations in July on the modalities on the participation of other interested parties and stakeholders, and we need a clear recommendation on dedicated thematic groups, and that was the earlier presentation by France. Finally, other elements as required. That’s also a question I want to ask for our discussion today, and that’s part of the questions in the list of questions I circulated as part of my letter. Are there any other elements that you think are important? I’d like to hear all those answers or comments today. I’ll open the floor now. Please press the buttons if you wish to speak on this particular point, and we’ll see how many speakers would like to come in on these issues. Now, before I give the floor to the, as expected, long list of speakers—there’s no surprise on that—I want to remind you about the informal town hall meeting that we had prior to this formal session. That also gives us a good basis to continue the conversation here in the Open-Ended Working Group. Secondly, from the first day of this working group this week, I have been saying that standing still is not an option on any of the items on the agenda of this working group. Likewise, with regard to regular institutional dialogue, we have to take a step forward across the board. I’ve been saying that for every single issue: landscape, norms, international law, confidence-building measures, capacity building, and now regular institutional dialogue. We have to take a step forward, building on the common elements, building on the trust that we have built up, building on the First Committee resolutions that we have. I’d like, once again, to ask all of you to also be as concise as possible. We do have a long list of speakers, so be as concise as possible and get to the essential points. If possible, please also respond to the presentations you have heard from France and Canada. We have more than 30 speakers, almost 40, so there’s a hard stop because it’s Friday. I’ve been told. I’m not aware. Is that true it’s Friday? It’s been confirmed by the Secretariat, so it must be true. It’s Friday, I’m told. So there’s a hard stop, so please be very conscious of the time. Uganda to be followed by the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Chair. It’s my first time to take the floor, so I wish to congratulate you and your team for the excellent preparation for this session. Uganda aligns itself with the statement delivered by Nigeria on behalf of the African Union. Chair, in this marathon race, while our feet may be tired and sore, our spirits are high and our determination to get to the finish line is undeterred. Chair, my delegation would like to raise two points in regard to the future permanent mechanism. Chair, the first point is about the term of the chairmanship and the vice chairmanship. In your guiding principles, you have set the time at two years. But Chair, given the limited financial resources and human capacity of some of our states, that we face, it may be very difficult for us to be able to offer ourselves to chair this committee’s meeting. So our proposal is that, is it possible to have a flexible chairmanship for this permanent mechanism? Maybe for those who can afford two years it’s okay, but for some of the member states who may wish to opt to chair for only one year, it could be also a possibility. Because Chair, you may notice that without support from your capital or a dedicated team, it will be very difficult to offer good service as the chair of this session. And on a positive note, Chair, I want to highly recommend the young man on your team. I forget his name. He’s so full of energy. Even in his work, you know it means business. He reminds me so much of myself 30 plus years ago when I first joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I thought I would change the world, but here I am still trying. So I wish him all the luck in his future career. Chair, for Uganda, it will be very difficult to be able to offer to chair any of these committees, the thematic groups, or even the mechanism, because we can’t afford financially all the human resources required. Chair, the second issue we want to raise for my delegation, we are yet to understand how this future mechanism will actually work. We see it on paper, there will be thematic groups, they will do this, there will be this, the chair will do this, but how does it come together? How is the working relationship between the chair and then the vice chairperson of the other thematic groups? Do they report to the chair? Do they do what? So I think we need to have a blueprint, Chair, which will help us understand the responsibilities which come with being a chair of a thematic group or the chair of the permanent mechanism itself, so that the country which offers to chair any of these knows exactly what is expected of it. So I would wish that in the next session maybe there will be available a blueprint which can tell us if you are going to chair this thematic group you must do A, B, C, D, or for the permanent mechanism this is what is expected of you. So Chair, those are my two brief remarks from my delegation in the interest of time. Thank you so much and look forward to concluding a successful session and have time to go and see what New York offers. Thank you so much.

Thank you very much, Uganda. My sister, it’s good to see you again. Thank you for your comments. I want to say that you have raised a very important point. Leadership opportunities at the United Nations cannot be confined to countries with the resources, whether it’s human resources, financial resources, or institutional resources. And if we are really designing an inclusive process, it’s open to every member because the UN is about a community of nations that are sovereign and equal. That’s what the Charter says. And that just also means that all of you need to be very conscious about this point in terms of providing support, in terms of providing resources and assistance so as to empower countries which may not have as much capacity as your own country to be in positions where they can contribute as leaders of a process, as facilitators of a process, because we really want this process to belong to all states, as France said it right at the beginning. We want a process that belongs not just to a few countries with the resources and the deep technical knowledge of this ICT process over the last 25 years at the UN or the states that have access to all the technologies. So you’ve raised a valid point. How will it work, whether we will have a blueprint? Well, let’s say that at the end of July, as we put the different elements together, the modalities and the dedicated thematic groups and the timeline for the meetings for the rest of the future permanent mechanism, I think we will have greater clarity, but whether there can be a user guide to the future permanent mechanism, that’s a bit difficult for us to do because, in a sense, we can design the system, the new chairperson and the new mechanism must then evolve its own way forward. So that is why it’s important that we resolve as many issues now in this process rather than leave things to the next process. If we kick the can down the road, then there will not be a smooth and seamless transition, and that will be deeply, deeply disappointing but also deeply, deeply damaging because we will not be able to go as far as we need to go. And to come back to the metaphor of the aeroplane, we are already flying, by the way, and we need to land this aircraft in July 2025, and that’s a transit stop. The passengers are not getting out. And then we have to take off in a seamless way into the future permanent mechanism. So we don’t want a crash landing in July because if we are not able to land, we won’t be able to take off. So before we even take off to the future permanent mechanism, we need to land, refuel, have the clear road map, or as our sister from Uganda says, the blueprint, and then the plane takes off under the future permanent mechanism with a new pilot, if I may add. So let’s go on with the speakers list. Russian Federation to be followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Chairman, the Russian Federation welcomes the adoption at the First Committee of the 79th UNGA session, the Single Draft Resolution on International Information Security. The document, introduced by Singapore and supported by all member states, formalizes the agreement reached within the OEWG on the establishment of the permanent state-led consensus-based mechanism endowed with a mandate to develop legally binding norms on international information security. We’re hopeful that the draft resolution will be adopted by the GA at its December session. The decision to establish the successor format for the OEWG is an important milestone in negotiations on international information security. Nonetheless, we have yet to negotiate the remaining modalities of the future mechanism. It is absolutely vital for us to agree on this issue on a consensus basis, with all member states’ views being taken into account without exception. First and foremost, I’m referring to thematic discussions within the subgroups. We believe that continuity between the OEWG and the future mechanism is of particular importance. The allocation of topics among the subgroups should be in keeping with the pillars of the OEWG and the successor format: threats, rules of responsible state behavior, international law, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. Such an outline for our work has been proven effective within the OEWG. Across nearly all areas, we’ve seen concrete results achieved. These include the global intergovernmental POC directory, the checklist of practical actions for the implementation of voluntary norms of responsible behavior, inter alia. The global portal is at the final stage of development. We suggest that we stick to what we’ve already achieved and not reinvent the wheel. As for the so-called cross-cutting approach, we believe all of the components of the mandate are cross-cutting. Some states are attempting to pull out distinct topics. This has no added value. There have been proposals for discussing, for instance, critical information infrastructure or ransomware as standalone topics, and we believe this is splitting hairs. It’s unnecessary. These issues can and should be addressed within the aforementioned elements of the mandate. In our view, one of the promising areas of activity of the future mechanism is the establishment of a comprehensive international legal regime regulating the use of ICTs, which is something our delegation already stated when we spoke about norms and international law. We’d like to remind everyone that states should hold the reins when it comes to the successive format as enshrined in the very title of the future mechanism as well as the elements which we adopted by consensus. The current OEWG’s modalities for NGO participation, non-governmental actors’ participation, are more than enough. They are the fruit of lengthy negotiations and represent a balance, a compromise that has been struck. For example, we are deeply dissatisfied with the loophole which allows certain organizations which have nothing to do with international information security to attend meetings of the group, and this is an ECOSOC loophole. At the same time, the existing accreditation filter for businesses, NGOs, and academia is indisputably efficient. Structures involved in politicized propaganda are not permitted to attend the OEWG meetings. When it comes to the role of non-state actors in the negotiation process, we should adhere to the following principle: less politics between states, no politics for stakeholders. We cannot agree with what some delegations said. They advocated following in the footsteps of the Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime in terms of participation of businesses, NGOs, and academia. This is being portrayed as a gold standard, the practice of the AHC. But we’re talking about two completely different issues. Criminal justice, combating crimes committed using ICTs, that’s one thing. The national security of specific member states and international security, that’s a whole different story. Given that such negotiations are sensitive by definition, the role of non-state actors should be rather limited. The Russian Federation stands ready to work constructively on the development of a permanent negotiation mechanism with a view to ensuring open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environments. At the same time, we deem it unacceptable for the activities of the future mechanism to be undermined by dishonest practices of the US as regards visas. Washington continues to abuse its powers as the host country of UNHQ. The US is refusing to issue visas or delaying their issuance. This is affecting the head of the Russian delegation and its members. The US is deliberately preventing our experts from fully participating in OEWG meetings. Unless the United States stops this malicious practice, we’ll be compelled to call and achieve the relocation of meetings of this excessive format away from New York. But in conclusion, we’d like to emphasize that the Russian Federation is determined to find solutions to contentious issues. We believe this is achievable, and yet we are not seeking consensus just for the sake of consensus. I thank you.

Thank you, Russian Federation, Islamic Republic of Iran, to be followed by the European Union.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the floor. I will be quick as I have to reach the airplane, a real one. With regard to the remaining issues and related established permanent mechanism on the provided guiding questions, my delegation would like to briefly state the following points. The OEWG has already agreed to the overarching principle that the future permanent mechanism is a state-led process where the negotiation and discussions, and decision on the ICT security remain the prerogative of the States. With this understanding and with the view to the discussions to come, we underline the permanent mechanism must maintain the modalities of participation of the other interested parties as agreed upon for the current OEWG attached to your letter dated 22nd April 2022. We recall that those modalities have been the result of very complicated and lengthy discussion among the Member States, and the outcome has been based on the allocated balance that covers all overall concerns by Member States. Thus, we believe that attempts to reaffirm these modalities are not a productive move. In the same vein, the role of the non-governmental organization in the permanent mechanism should remain informal, consultative, and merely focus on technical matters. During the virtual town hall meeting last week, we heard proposals to apply similar modalities for participation of stakeholders as it was adopted for the ad hoc committee to elaborate the comprehensive international convention on countering cyber crimes. We believe that the modalities were applicable only within the context of the ad hoc committee. The issues in hand and the structural differences between the two formats should be taken into account. As its name suggests, the ad hoc committee to elaborate the comprehensive international convention was an ad hoc committee with a temporary working period. It had specific objectives and a limited working schedule. In addition, its works and stakeholders participating in it focused on legal issues, which logically have a different nature and sensitivity level from issues related to the information security agenda. Regarding the issues in which stakeholders can intervene, the OEWG has already emphasized that capacity building is fundamental for developing the resources, skills, policies, and institutions which are necessary to increase resilience and ICT security of states. Moving forward, stakeholders, upon request by Member States, could provide their technical expertise for capacity building purposes with the view of establishing such resilience. Attempts to engage the non-governmental stakeholders in roles with the controversial nature of political implications could lead to fragmentation and disagreements and divide between our governments. Addressing the issue of establishing dedicated thematic groups, Iran believes that the number of these thematic groups should remain limited. A limited number of dedicated thematic groups will allow small delegations to participate and contribute to the discussion in a meaningful way and on an equal footing while reducing the administrative workload. Member States, based on the consensus, may consider rotational arrangements for convening meetings for each subject during the two-year biennial cycle or creating temporary subgroups to consider emerging issues. Having said that, I do take note of presentations by distinguished delegations of Canada and France. We will study the ideas presented regarding the timing of the meetings in the presentation by the French. Also, I would like to, as an initial reaction, add that holding meetings related to this mechanism at different time windows throughout a year makes it difficult for the delegations from capitals to actively participate. Thus, we are of the idea to hold all thematic group discussions within a specified single time window, whether it is one week or two weeks. In closing, allow me to reiterate that while we believe that priorities of different countries should be considered in a balanced way, we are of the opinion that vague language and formulations such as proposed dedicated groups on the cross-cutting approach to ICT security are quite general and would duplicate discussion on the pillars of the mandate of the mechanism. Such general language is contrary to the idea of creating thematic groups that are supposed to work on a specific topic with a limited and defined scope. I would like to refer to language reflected in paragraph 9 of Annex C regarding the functions of the future mechanism, which stipulates that the future mechanism will further consider the development of additional legally binding obligations. This subject should be given priority in detailing the working structure of the future mechanism, including its possible dedicated thematic groups. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Islamic Republic of Iran, for your statement. European Union, to be followed by Japan.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The candidate countries, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia, and the EFTA country, Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as San Marino, align themselves with this statement. Chair, let me start by thanking you for convening a town hall meeting last week on this topic. As you mentioned in your opening remarks last Monday, a constructive approach by all is necessary to reach consensus on a single-track process that is focused on practical results to make a difference. We must work diligently to find the solutions needed to ensure that the future permanent mechanism not only starts seamlessly but also begins with a strong and successful foundation. In order to make practical progress in our cooperation to implement the framework and tackle cyber threats, the future permanent mechanism should adopt an approach focused on our objectives and common challenges, such as building resilience to protect our critical infrastructure or increasing cross-border cooperation for incident response. To this end, we agreed in the third annual progress report that dedicated working groups should conduct focused discussions, enable needs-based capacity building, and feed the substantive plenary sessions with updates and recommendations. In our view, the thematic groups could focus on actionable recommendations and on free and compassionate objectives related to ICT security, building cyber resilience, increasing cooperation, and ensuring stability in cyberspace. They should function in complementarity with annual discussions in plenary, as we have in the open-ended working group. They would apply to these main objectives the toolbox of norms, international law, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. Thus, the working groups would generate input on the framework to the plenary discussions, which would retain the decision-making power. The group should be inclusive and open to all UN member states, should offer the possibility for remote participation, and should not be held in parallel. They could include on their agenda briefings by experts. The proposal put forward by France would enable free groups to lower the burden on delegations to fewer meetings than the current format, while ensuring action-oriented discussions and recommendations. Indeed, the thematic groups should also enable needs-based cybersecurity capacity-building activities and build on agreed initiatives developed within this open-ended working group, through sharing expertise, identifying needs, matching needs with resources, and informing the further development of common understandings. As for your question relating to the issue of modalities on the participation of other interested parties and stakeholders, it will come as no surprise that the EU member states see the contribution by academia, civil society, businesses, and the technical community as valuable to our discussions. It is essential that the Program of Action is established in a way that ensures meaningful contribution from stakeholders with modalities that do not allow a single state to have the final say in whether a stakeholder can participate. These modalities work on the same principle as modalities of this open-ended working group, that is, a voice, not a vote, while providing a meaningful avenue to express that voice more fairly and with more integration. Through this modality, state objections to a stakeholder’s participation are subject to transparency and a subsequent vote of all member states to determine whether the prospective stakeholders should be excluded. This will ensure that relevant stakeholder expertise will be available to the Program of Action as it helps states to implement the framework. Chair, the EU commits to continue working hard to get this right. Together, we can constructively contribute to shaping a future regular institutional dialogue where all of us can access the best opportunities there are for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Thank you.

Thank you very much, European Union. Japan, to be followed by Singapore.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Japan strongly believes that a regular institutional dialogue should be a permanent framework that is action-oriented and enables effective implementation of the framework for responsible state behaviour. In order to clarify the objectives of multistakeholder participation, it may be a good starting point to discuss possible concrete programmes where each state can derive tangible benefits from the participation of stakeholders who have diverse knowledge and expertise. Detailed debates on modalities need to be held in parallel with debates on merits. Chair, to make the future regular institutional dialogue action-oriented, we need to have regular discussions on specific common issues in a practical way. In a thematic group, for example, we could discuss scenarios on the specific common and significant threats and risks we discussed earlier this week, such as cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, ransomware, and so on. Regarding the number of dedicated thematic groups and the frequency of the meetings, first and foremost, we need to keep in mind the resource limitation we have. The current OEWG meets three times a year for five days each. This number may be the upper limit of the number of meeting days. If several thematic groups are established, we should also consider the need for a sequential format that allows the same person to participate in all the thematic groups, the need to reserve a separate day or days for the plenary, and the need to have enough time for each group to discuss in depth. Given the importance of securing the participation of as many states as possible, we should proceed with concrete discussions on how to reduce the participation costs based on the current OEWG. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Japan. Before I give the floor to Singapore, I think the question of how we sequence the meetings or the future permanent mechanism is coming up. The Islamic Republic of Iran made the comment, Japan has also made the comment, and this relates to the idea of making it inclusive and the cost of participation because the more meetings we have, the more we have to bring in people from capital, the more partners who are engaged in different programs to bring participants and fund participants to support their participation, to also expand resources. So I think it’s a fair point. We can concentrate all meetings at a certain point and meet for a few weeks. That’s one model. The other model is to sequence it over two to three sort of meetings. Both have advantages and disadvantages. If you have a few meetings, then you give time for conversations to take place, for ideas to take root, and for different countries to talk to each other. So even if you had a model where you have all the meetings taking place over, say, a three-week period where everything is meeting once a year, it may be challenging to hear a proposal and then reach agreement to it within a matter of weeks because one has to go back to capital and consult inter-agency teams and experts would need to be consulted, but it will reduce participation costs. So there are strengths and weaknesses in the different models. Of course, as Japan, you said, there’s an upper limit to how often we can meet because we are a permanent – the future mechanism is a permanent mechanism, but it is not a mechanism that will be in session permanently because it is not possible for us to be constantly meeting. So there is definitely an upper limit in terms of number of days of meetings per year, which also means we have to think in terms of interstitial meetings in a virtual format, virtual town halls. There’s nothing to stop the future chair from convening meetings, informal virtual meetings. Maybe we want to sort of put this as part of the design so that we give everyone an opportunity. So some reflections and please feel free to give your own reactions as well. Singapore to be followed by Brazil.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Speaking of the number of meetings, as a small State with limited resources, Singapore maintains the view that we should not have an extensive number of thematic groups, given that meetings of each thematic group would place a significant demand on the time and resources of each State, and too many of these would be unsustainable in the long run. Mr. Chair, while there should be cross-cutting discussions across the various pillars, the robust discussion of current and emerging threats should be preserved to build a picture of the evolving cyber threat landscape. This is an area where we should involve non-State stakeholders to contribute to a multi-dimensional, current, and global understanding of the threats facing us. Norms implementation should also be a key element to be preserved. We should capitalize on the existing norms to spur forward discussions on the gaps in norms, aligned with the recognition that additional norms could be developed over time. The continued capacity building efforts for the relevant areas of interest could be left to various existing providers. However, there should be consistent guidance on the type of capacity building needed, and to enhance targeted capacity building efforts in the development of cyber security professionals and leaders of the future. The Future Permanent Mechanism should also continue developing concrete initiatives to better coordinate and target capacity building activities. In order not to lose the momentum which we have achieved at the OEWG thus far, we would suggest that there should be at least one thematic group which builds on the reaffirmation that international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability, and promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment. The thematic group or groups under a permanent mechanism should also consider how existing international law applies to the use of ICTs, including whether any gaps exist, and if there are, to be open and take steps to address these gaps. As per Annex C of the 3rd Annual Progress Report on the Elements for the Open-Ended Action-Oriented Permanent Mechanism on ICT Security, we also urge the continued consideration of some meetings being convened in a hybrid format for part or all of thematic group meetings where feasible, to reduce the strain of physical participation for delegations from capital. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Singapore. Brazil, to be followed by Mexico.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. My delegation reiterates its appreciation to you and your team for your efforts on this issue. We made relevant progress from the second to the third APR in outlining elements of our mechanism, which shows us our capacity for reaching important agreements within the OEWG. We also welcome the adoption of a single consensus First Committee resolution, which you proposed, endorsing the third APR, which sets the stage for the continuation of our discussions, with a view to adopting a single permanent mechanism by consensus in July. We thank France, Canada, and Chile for their presentations, which give us relevant food for thought as we continue our consideration of this topic. My delegation made some considerations on elements for the future mechanism in other statements throughout this week, which I will not repeat for the sake of brevity. We agree that our regular institutional dialogue mechanism must be action-oriented and integrate all key aspects to secure ICT environments, such as confidence building and capacity building, and also allow for in-depth discussions on areas where common agreement still eludes us. This is why we supported having a yearly one-week plenary and allocating more time to thematic groups with no simultaneous meetings. The thematic groups should be structured in a way that allows smaller delegations to have meaningful participation. To reconcile this with the large number of relevant topics that merit further discussion, we could, as is the practice of most UN bodies, have rotating agendas to coincide with the biennial cycles mentioned in NXC. The effectiveness of our future mechanism will be directly related to the diversity of representation in its meetings. Making use of remote meeting options in rotating time frames as a complement to in-person meetings is one tool to make that happen. Nevertheless, given the importance of in-person contact to foster trusting relationships in this area, it will also be essential to promote the in-person participation of delegates from developing countries. We welcome the UNODA fund established for this purpose with donations by France and Ireland, and believe such funding must become a permanent fixture of our future mechanism, in line with what already happens in many other UN processes. The contributions of a wide range of views from other stakeholders will be positive to our debates, given their expertise and their role in implementing elements of our UN framework. We stand ready to work with delegations to find a consensus solution to enable their participation, which could include, among other aspects, different modalities for plenary and thematic group participation. It would also be necessary to ensure a balance in that participation in terms of both geographic and sectoral aspects, so that we can fully reap the benefits of a diverse breadth of contributions. To make that a reality, in addition to modalities, we should look into funding options to facilitate the participation of stakeholders from developing countries. Much has been said about the fundamental role capacity building must play in our future mechanism. One point we would like to make is that while we agree that it must be cross-cutting to all issues debated in the future mechanism, it must also be the subject of targeted discussions, so as to address its effectiveness and ensure that resources are adequately allocated in an equitable manner, and that initiatives are demand-driven, politically neutral, and duly incorporate the capacity building principles. Despite some differences in views, we are happy to see the discussions advance within this OEWG, focused on the adoption of a single track mechanism. It continues to be our view that if we focus our discussions on the actual elements of what we would like this framework to be, there is a considerable amount of common ground, as demonstrated by the progress we have already made. However, we still have much to do in July if we want to deliver a mechanism that is well fleshed out, so as to allow for a seamless transition for this process to the next. This is why we reiterate our call that the next session be exclusively dedicated to RID, or at the very least, supporting Canada’s proposal that we start our discussions with RID, to allow more time to deliberate on these issues. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Brazil. Thank you also for your suggestions, and I’d like to hear reactions to the specific proposal in terms of how we can give more time for a discussion on RID. By giving more time for a discussion on RID, we are not deprioritizing the other aspects of the mandate of this working group, but it is just a pragmatic recognition that given this last cycle of this process and our fundamental responsibility and priority to ensure a smooth and seamless transition, we have to fix a clear roadmap for a smooth and seamless transition. One option is to do the next session entirely for RID, or another option that has been suggested is to start with RID. Of course, there’s also the option of having virtual informal town hall meetings even prior to the next formal session in February. Clearly, we all need more time to discuss this. I give the floor now to Mexico, followed by Egypt. Mexico, please. Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My country would like to thank France and Canada for their presentations. Mexico has analyzed in detail the various views on the establishment of the future mechanism for permanent dialogue, and we would therefore incline to consider that a new intergovernmental body should be established under the auspices of the GA First Committee, so that issues of cyber security and the use of ICTs and communication in the context of international security can be regularly discussed. This body should be inclusive, representative, and more authoritative. We once again express our support for the substantive and significant participation of all relevant stakeholders, and we’d underscore the need to go beyond current agreements on their participation. And here, Mexico proposes that the creation of a multistakeholder panel should be considered, so that relevant stakeholders can provide specific inputs regarding gender items, ensuring therefore that their views be included. As an example of good practice, we could analyze the model of multistakeholder participation tiers in the UN Convention on Climate Change, which would allow these stakeholders to be present as observers without compromising their intergovernmental nature. We would also like to thank Chile for the proposal here, and we shall analyze it in detail. We view very positively the organization of roundtables or workshops, where interested stakeholders can bring forward both written and oral contributions on key issues. These could subsequently be compiled as informal reports to go before states. It is vital to include a gender-sensitive approach in all the mechanism’s activities, ensuring also that key populations be considered as well as sex-generic diversity. So, we would like to say once again that we are concerned at avoiding the excessive multiplication of working groups or subgroups to organize the future dialogue mechanism. We suggest therefore that we consider the example of the UN Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Committee. And we also believe that El Salvador’s proposal is viable, suggesting that interrelated issues be taken in a sole working group to avoid duplications, integrating all cross-cutting priorities. Lastly, we like the proposal of considering an alternating model, where working groups would be active in alternating cycles. This would involve the combination of virtual and in-person discussions to facilitate the participation of delegations and stakeholders, particularly in developing countries. We reiterate our belief that the efficacy of the mechanism will largely depend on its decision-making ability. Here, we wish to say that it’s relevant to adopt a more dynamic, flexible, and realistic approach when it comes to decision-making, to make possible progress on key issues. This would make it possible to maintain the task necessary in our discussions and ensure that decisions reflect the collective interest and are not obstructed by individual positions. Thank you.

Thank you. Mexico, Egypt, to the floor, please.

So, I don’t have a statement to read on this particular issue, so I’d rather share some ideas with you, Chair, and with the plenary on this issue. So, I came to this OEWG with a preconceived perception that the best way forward is to have thematic groups on each of the five aspects we have been discussing today. However, after listening to so many statements and as well having bilateral meetings with several delegations over the past few days, I believe personally that the idea of having a scenario-based discussion and as well focusing on incidents and looking at them from the different aspects we have deserves a lot of merit, actually, because it brings us to the practicality we need to discuss such issues. That said, and on the other side, I believe that there is still one aspect where I see that the normative basis and structure of it is not ready, which is the applicability of international law to cyberspace. I guess we need more discussion separately on this issue, and yes, theoretical discussions, not practical discussions. It’s okay to develop the normative framework of such issue first. So, by way of moving forward on a practical proposal, I propose that we make a cloning process of the structure of the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. So, this committee has a very interesting structure where we have two subcommittees, one technical and the other one legal. In the technical committee, they discuss everything related to outer space from a practical aspect, and in the legal one, they have theoretical discussions or the normative framework of how international law applies to outer space. I guess this could combine both approaches that we’re discussing here. So, on the one side, we have this scenario-based discussion or incident-based discussions from all aspects, confidence building, norms, everything related to certain incidents as critical infrastructure in the technical subcommittee or the technical working group or the technical thematic group, whatever we will call it, and then a separate thematic group for the applicability of international law on cyber security. So, only two thematic groups, Chair. That said, I would like to move on to the next topic, which is the stakeholdership, how the stakeholders will participate in the upcoming meetings. I believe that this issue deserves more discussions, so I support a proposal by Brazil that in the next meeting, we start by the RID in terms of how the stakeholders will participate in thematic groupings, but I as well think that we should not go to the OEWG without having something before that. So, maybe you should have some kind of intersessional virtual meetings to lay the groundwork for the OEWG. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. Thank you very much for saying right at the outset that you had come to this meeting with certain preconceived notions. And I think that is the challenge for all of us in this process. It is a fact that a lot of us have preconceived notions and positions. In that sense, we carry a lot of excess baggage onto the plane. We need to start putting this excess baggage at the terminal and go with an open mind and see what works best, whether it’s the number of dedicated thematic groups, how we slice and dice horizontally, vertically. What we want is a mechanism that we can all sit together and say very proudly belongs to all of us. And as I’ve said before, it is not often at the United Nations that you get an opportunity to design a new institution. And we have this very rare opportunity and privilege and responsibility to design this future permanent mechanism. It’s not ad hoc. It’s going to be permanent in the sense that once you establish it, it will be there for some time to come, for a long time to come. And therefore, I want to fully echo what Egypt said in terms of leaving aside preconceived positions. Because we all have our briefs and positions, and especially in this process, which has a 25-year antecedent of positions and interagency processes and capitals with their red lines, full of red lines everywhere, that we need to navigate. But let’s come with an open mind. Let’s take a pragmatic approach. Let’s see what will make a real difference to our countries and countries which need help and how we can attain our objective of creating an open, secure, stable, and interoperable, not to mention peaceful and stable ICT environment. So I think that’s good food for thought. Thank you, Egypt, for your remarks. We’ll adjourn for lunch now. We still have about 30 speakers left. So this afternoon, do please come prepared to react to some of the other proposals that you have heard, but also to keep your presentations succinct. Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.